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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Overview 
1.1.1 The concept of insolvency and bankruptcy 
The terms ‘insolvency’ is generally used to denote a situation where a person or 
a company does not have enough money to pay debts.1 However, this term is sometimes 
used interchangeably with ‘bankruptcy’ for the same purpose of describing an 
individual’s or a company’s inability to meet its financial obligation. Therefore, there 
has been the existence of legislation named ‘Insolvency Act’ or ‘Bankruptcy Code’ 
elsewhere in the world.  
However, ‘insolvency’ and ‘bankruptcy’ should be understood clearly in the 
legal context of each country, particularly their usage in the legislation. For example, in 
the United Kingdom (UK),2  ‘bankruptcy’ is exclusively used to refer to an individual’s 
financial difficulty, the term ‘insolvency’ is used for describing a corporate financial 
problem,3 and the proceedings for personal and corporate insolvency are governed 
under separate parts of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA1986).4 Meanwhile, in the United 
States (US) ‘bankruptcy’ is used for denoting the financial problems of both individuals 
and companies and the US Bankruptcy Code offers a single insolvency proceeding to 
deal with both personal and corporate insolvency.5 Following the US approach, Canada 
employs a single proceeding to deal with both personal and corporate insolvency. Yet, 
under the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), ‘insolvency’ is a wide 
concept which comprises several procedures for settling financial problems of 
 1 Cambridge Dictionary, <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/insolvency> accessed 25 April 2016 2 Within this research, the subject of examination is the insolvency law of England and Wales, however, hereinafter referred to as the UK.  3 R.M. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, (Sweet and Maxwell, 4th edn, 2011) at 1 4 Insolvency Act 1986, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/45/contents> 5 American Bankruptcy Code, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/11 > 
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individuals and companies. ‘Bankruptcy’ does not have the same meaning as 
‘insolvency’, rather, it is a procedure dealing with liquidation of companies or debt 
arrangement for an individual.6 In the legal context of Vietnam, ‘bankruptcy’ is 
understood as a financially difficult state of a company or an individual. However, there 
is an absence of regulations to deal with personal insolvency in the country, only 
companies are eligible under the bankruptcy legislation.7  
What the above-mentioned examples suggest is that there should be a 
consideration of the difference in using the terms ‘insolvency’ and ‘bankruptcy’ to 
address corporate and personal insolvency. Depending on the legislative policy of a 
country, a law can provide for a single proceeding or separate proceedings in dealing 
with corporate and personal insolvency. Regarding corporate insolvency, the law in this 
domain offers various proceedings, which are not exclusively constrained to the 
liquidation to terminate an insolvent company but includes other arrangements such as 
rescuing a company or receivership.8  
1.1.2 The concept of rescue and the rise of the rescue culture 
Compared to personal insolvency, the law on corporate insolvency was 
introduced later.9 The history of corporate insolvency law began since the time when a 
company was first recognised as a distinct legal entity insolvency law then was created 
for the purpose of liquidating or winding up insolvent companies.10 The modern 
 6 See Canadian Insolvency and Bankruptcy Act 1985, <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/b-3/> accessed 27 April 2016 7 Law on Bankruptcy 2014, Vietnamese version at   <http://www.moj.gov.vn/vbpq/lists/vn%20bn%20php%20lut/view_detail.aspx?itemid=29059> accessed 20 April 2016 English version at  <http://www.itpc.gov.vn/investors/how_to_invest/law/Law_on_Bankruptcy_2014_0/mldocument_view/?set_language=en> accessed 20 April 2016 8 Receivership is a regime under which a secured creditor appoints a receiver to control the debtor business to liquidate the debtor’s asset for the purpose of enforcing its security interest according to the virtue of financing agreement signed between the debtor and the creditor; and R.J. Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law ( Irwin Law, 2009) at 1 and 12 9 Goode (n3) at 9-12 10 Ibid. 11 
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corporate insolvency law has experienced a philosophical change which no longer 
places emphasis solely on liquidation, rather, extending its focus to restructuring 
insolvent companies. Two famous examples of this change are the US bankruptcy law 
reform with the introduction of Bankruptcy Code 1978, featuring Chapter 11 which 
permits the reorganisation of ailing companies11 and the rise of ‘rescue culture’ in the 
insolvency law reform in the UK in the 1980s, resulting in the enactment of the IA 
1986.12  
While liquidation means to terminate, dissolve or wind up an insolvent company 
and sell its properties for the purpose of distributing the return to creditors, rescue offers 
a contrasting idea of preserving a financially troubled, but viable company by making 
‘major intervention necessary to avert eventual failure of the company’13. Underlying 
the liquidation is not only the idea of maximising the return to creditors through a sale 
of the company assets,14 but also that companies which are unable to compete in the 
market should be eliminated to give way for more effective ones to thrive.15 By 
contrast, corporate rescue is justified with the idea that creditors would get more 
benefits when the going-concern value of the company is preserved in a successful 
rescue bid than in the event of liquidation.16 The rescue benefits lie in not only a better 
rate of creditor’s return but the significance of preserving employment and stabilising 
the economy of a community.17 Given the nature of the modern economy, the role of 
 11 Arthur L. Moller and David B. Foltz Jr., ‘Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code’ (1980) 58 North Carolina Law Review, 881-924 12 Cork Report, Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) Cmnd 8558 13 Belcher, Corporate Rescue, (Sweet and Maxwell, 1997), at 12 14 TH Jackson, Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University Press, 1986), chapter 1 15 D.G. Baird, ‘Bankruptcy 's Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 The Yale Law Journal 580  16 G Mccormack, Corporate Rescue Law – An Anglo-American Perspective (Edward Elgar, 2008) at 5 17 Cork Report, Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) Cmnd 8558, para 204. The report is seen as having the role to give rise to a “rescue culture”. 
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corporate rescue has become essentially important. As stated by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF),18  
[The] role of rescue gains more importance where the value of a 
company is increasingly based on technical know-how and goodwill 
rather than on its physical assets, preservation of the enterprise’s human 
resources and business relations may be critical for creditors wishing to 
maximize the value of their claims. 
 The 2007-2008 financial crisis had a tremendous negative impact on the world 
economy, urging countries to devise effective mechanisms to solve the consequences it 
brought about as well as preventing the systematic risk from happening again. In this 
context, the issue of reforming insolvency legal systems, especially improving the 
effectiveness of legislation on corporate rescue has emerged as an urgent need among 
countries.19 Generally, there have been two approaches for countries to follow in 
reforming their insolvency laws. The first one is to borrow the laws from the advanced 
states with a long history of insolvency legal development, such as the US and the UK. 
The second approach is to rely on the assistance of international donors, such as the 
UNCITRAL, the IMF and the World Bank,20 who provide legislative guidelines for 
countries in drafting their legislation. Though the insolvency law reforms have already 
taken place in less-developed countries, they have not always produced fruitful results 
as expected because different countries have different political, economic, social, 
 18 International Monetary Fund, ‘Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures’ [1999] 14. 19 Godwin, ‘Corporate rescue in Asia: Trends and Challenges’ (2012), 34 Sydney Law Review 163, 164; Philip Wood, ‘The philosophy of insolvency rescue’ (2009) 6 Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 309 20 UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (United Nation, 2005) 
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history and traditional conditions, which presents several challenges to the reform’s 
endeavour.21 
 
1.1.3 The case of Vietnam in the trend of rescue law reform 
Since 1986 Vietnam initiated the policy of ‘Doi Moi’ (renovation) to transform 
its economy from central planning to market towards socialist orientation.22 This 
economic transition requires Vietnam to build a legal framework to govern economic 
and commercial relations, instead of relying on ‘administrative economic contracts’.23 
Insolvency law is among the legislation Vietnam enacted to support the economic 
transition. The making of insolvency law in Vietnam was extensively influenced by the 
laws of Western countries;24 yet, Vietnamese insolvency law is an example of a failure 
in adopting foreign law.25 The first insolvency legislation of Vietnam is the Bankruptcy 
Law 1993 (BL1993).26 After a decade of taking effect, it was replaced with the 
Bankruptcy Law 2004 (BL2004) for failing to attain the promised objective of being an 
effective route for companies to resolve their financial difficulties. However, the 2004 
legislation followed the same path of failure as its predecessor, which resulted in the 
second placement with the current legislation, the Bankruptcy Law 2014 (BL2014).  
The failure of the two pieces of insolvency legislation in 1993 and in 2004 is 
evidenced by an extremely small number of companies filing for bankruptcy. For 
example, between 1993 and 2003, there were only 152 applications received by courts 
 21 Godwin, Ibid; and Nathalie Martin, ‘The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency System: The Perils of Legal Transplantation’ (2005) 28 B.C.Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1. 22 Vo Nhan Tri and Anne Booth, ‘Recent Economic Developments in Vietnam’ (1992) 6 Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 24 23 John Gillespie, ‘Insolvency Law in Vietnam’ in Roman Tomasic, Insolvency Law in East Asia,  (Ashgate, 2006) at 243, 250, 257 and 262  24 Ibid. 245 25 Ibid. 245-250, the detailed examination will be presented in Chapter Six – Rescue Law in Vietnam 26 C Booth, ‘Drafting Bankruptcy Laws in Socialist Market Economies: Recent Developments in China and Vietnam’ (2004) 18(1) Columbia Journal of Asian Law 93 
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in the country and only 46 companies were declared bankrupt under the BL1993.27  In 
the period 2004-2013, during which the BL2004 had taken effect, the courts received 
336 applications with only 83 enterprises declared bankrupt.28 Meanwhile, the number 
of companies falling into financial distress every year is very high; for example, in 2011 
the number of dissolved companies was approximately 54,000.29 The failure of the 
legislation is attributed to the principal reason that the legal ideas borrowed from 
insolvency laws of Western countries could not take root in the unique legal culture of 
Vietnam.30 The absence of an effective insolvency legal framework has negatively 
affected the competitiveness of the economy as a large number of distressed companies 
still exist in the market while market resources should be utilised by more efficient 
companies.  
In 2014 Vietnam introduced new insolvency legislation, the BL 2014, with the 
mandate of providing a more effective route for financially distressed companies to exit 
the market as well as facilitating corporate rehabilitation for viable companies.31 
However, the failure of the two previous insolvency laws cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of the new law. As the new legislation took effect for five years, there 
emerges a need to examine whether it can become an effective mechanism on which 
financially distressed companies can rely to solve their insolvent affairs.  
 27 Gillespie (n23) 245 28 According to Report No. 44/2013 of the People’s Supreme Court of Vietnam on implementation of the Bankruptcy Law 2004, Vietnamese version is consulted at <http://duthaoonline.quochoi.vn/DuThao/Lists/DT_DUTHAO_LUAT/View_Detail.aspx?ItemID=643&TabIndex=2&TaiLieuID=1156> accessed 1 May 2016 29 Ho Huong, ‘In 2012: About 54,261 companies dissolved’ (2013) <https://enternews.vn/nam-2012-khoang-54-261-doanh-nghiep-giai-the-27780.html> accessed 1 May 2016 30 Historically the insolvency law-making in Vietnam has been influenced by those of Western countries since the time of introduction of the first bankruptcy legislation. John Gillespie (n23) and, Transplanting Commercial Law Reform in Vietnam: Developing a “rule of law” in Vietnam (Ashgate, 2006) 31 The legislation was passed by the National Assembly on June 19th 2014 and took effect on January 1st 2015, Vietnamese version at  <http://www.moj.gov.vn/vbpq/Lists/Vn%20bn%20php%20lut/View_Detail.aspx?ItemID=29059>  English version at < https://www.economica.vn/Portals/0/Documents/51-2014%20Law%20on%20Bankruptcy.pdf > accessed 20 April 2016 
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In principle, the BL2014 centres around two main proceedings: liquidation and 
rescue. What makes the 2014 legislation different from the two predecessors is that it 
places more emphasis on corporate rescue. Previously, the BL 1993 and 2004 were 
mainly seen as a tool for liquidating insolvent companies and most of the literature on 
Vietnamese insolvency law focused on the issues of why the law did not create 
incentives for financial distressed companies to file for liquidation.32 As a result, the 
issue of corporate rescue has not sufficiently been researched. Inspired by the lack of 
academic research on corporate rescue law in Vietnam, this thesis is conducted to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the current legislation. Specifically, this thesis critically 
compares the models of rescue administration under the laws of the UK, Canada and the 
outcomes of the comparison will be utilised to make recommendations for Vietnam to 
enhance the effectiveness of its rescue law. 
1.2 Thesis’ objective and inquiries 
1.2.1 Thesis’ objective 
When a company enters into a rescue procedure, models of administrative 
control will decide roles, rights and obligations of actors who participate in the 
procedure. There are various models of control featuring a different degree of the 
actor’s participation. For example, the Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) model allows 
directors of a company to remain in their managerial position and continue to carry out 
business activities for the company;33 the Professional-in-Possession (PIP) model 
features the involvement of insolvency practitioners (IP) who will replace the company 
 32 According to Duong Dang Hue, the chair of the Drafting Committee of the Bankruptcy Law 2004 and an influential scholar in this area, recognised that it is an objective of the legislation to provide a mechanism for ineffective companies to orderly exit the market and create good conditions for more effective companies to thrive. See Duong Dang Hue, ‘The Law on Bankruptcy with the Improvement of the Business Environment in Vietnam’ (2005) 3 Democracy and Law 26–31 33 D. Hahn, ‘Concentrated Ownership and Control of Corporate Reorganisations’ (2004) 4 J. Corp. L. Stud., 117, 122 
Chapter One - Introduction  
8  
directors in the management and take actions to rescue the company;34 and the hybrid 
model of the DIP and the PIP permits company directors to hold the office, however, 
their activities will be subject to the supervision of IPs.35 These models are employed 
very differently in legislation of different countries depending on the legislative policies 
and insolvency practices in the countries. This thesis launches a comparative 
examination into the models of administration under the insolvency laws of the UK, 
Canada and Vietnam to highlight similarities and differences among the laws of the 
countries in selecting and applying these models.  
The main objective of this thesis is to make a proposal for Vietnam to improve 
the effectiveness of its rescue law. The proposal is formulated from the outcome of the 
comparison on models of rescue administration provided for under insolvency 
legislation of the UK, Canada and Vietnam. The comparison enables the thesis to 
ascertain the best practices emerging in each jurisdiction that Vietnam can apply to 
enhance the effectiveness of its law, in consideration of the differences of the legal 
culture among Vietnam and the selected countries. 
1.2.2 Thesis inquiries 
Deriving from the objective set out above, this thesis will launch an examination 
to the following inquiries: 
 What is the justification for introducing corporate rescue law? How has legal 
history and culture contributed to shaping the uniqueness of the rescue law in the UK, 
Canada and Vietnam? 
 What models of rescue administration are regulated under rescue laws of the 
UK, Vietnam and Canada? How are the participation of insolvency actors, such as 
 34 Ibid. 124 35 Y Rotem, ‘Contemplating a Corporate Governance Model for Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Lessons from Canada’ (2008) 3 Virginia Law & Business Review 125, 137 
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directors, creditors, IPs, and the courts regulated under these models? What are 
similarities and differences among them and what factors decide these differences? 
 In evaluating the effectiveness of a rescue law, what benchmarks can be used 
and justification for introducing these benchmarks, and the extent to which rescue laws 
of the selected jurisdictions meet these standards? 
 What lessons can Vietnam learn from experiences of the UK and Canada in 
regulating corporate rescue; in case Vietnam follows the laws of the UK and Canada, 
are the principles of rescue law in these countries compatible with the political, 
economic and social conditions of Vietnam?  
1.3 Methodology 
The term ‘methodology’ should be distinguished from ‘method’ within the 
research. While methods are tools or ‘research techniques’ for carrying out a research, 
methodology is understood as research strategies as a whole which provide justification 
for the selection of suitable methods to conduct research.36 In answering the questions 
raised by this thesis, the author employs the socio-legal methodology, with the support 
of the doctrinal (black-letter law) and the comparative method. 
1.3.1 The socio-legal methodology 
Form a socio-legal scholars’ point of view, law is considered as a part of the 
social and political structure, therefore, the proper way to understand law is to place it 
into the context to which it is related.37 In light of this understanding, the socio-legal 
research does not see law as an ‘autonomous force’ that governs society,38 rather, it 
approaches a law by examining the extent to which societal factors contribute to 
 36 Matt Henn, Mark Weinstein and Nick Foard, A Critical Introduction to Social Research (Sage, 2nd edn, 2006), at 9 37 P Thomas, ‘Curriculum Development in Legal Studies’ (1986) 20 Law Teacher 112 38 D O’Donovan, ‘Socio-Legal Methodology: Conceptual Underpinnings, Justifications and Practical Pitfalls’ in L Cahillane, J Schweppe, (eds) Legal Research Methods: Principles and Practicalities (Clarus Press, 2016) p110 
Chapter One - Introduction  
10  
shaping the law and the effects the law brings about to society.39 As the socio-legal 
research examines the relationship between law and society, it approaches a legal issue 
from the perspectives of other social sciences.40 Under this approach, knowledge of 
other disciplines such as history, sociology, economics and political science are used to 
provide answers to a legal problem.41  
As the main objective of this thesis is to offer Vietnam recommendations to 
improve the effectiveness of its corporate rescue law, the methodology must be the 
socio-legal studies approach. As a law’s purpose is to ‘regulate and shape behaviour of 
people in a society’,42 the effectiveness of law is defined by its ability to fulfil its 
purposes or meet its objectives.43 The examination on the effectiveness of a law falls 
within the objective of the socio-legal research studies because this approach aims to 
ascertain the actual operation of a law in society.44 The application of the socio-legal 
approach enables this thesis to assess the effectiveness of Vietnamese corporate rescue 
law by examining the extent to which the law has actually operated in Vietnam and the 
extent to which societal factors such as history, politics, economy and culture influence 
on the creation of corporate rescue law in the country.  
It cannot be denied that corporate insolvency affects not only the debtor 
company and creditors but also employees, suppliers and the economy of a community. 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of insolvency law and rescue law, the author 
cannot employ the doctrinal methodology as this approach considers law to be 
autonomous and thus examining meanings, coherence and clarity of legal rules in 
 39 Socio Legal Studies Association, SLSA Statement of Principles of Ethical Research Practice (January 2009) section  1.2.1 <https://www.slsa.ac.uk/images/slsadownloads/ethicalstatement/slsa%20ethics%20statement%20_final_%5B1%5D.pdf> accessed on February 12, 2020 40 M Salter and J Mason, Writing Law Dissertation: An Introduction and Guide to Conduct Legal Research (Pearson Education, 2008), 132 41 Ibid. 137 42 A Allot, ‘The effectiveness of Law’ (1981) 15 (2) Valparaiso University Law Review, 234 43 Ibid. 44 Salter and Mason (n40) 152 
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isolation with external influence.45 Therefore, the author must ‘go beyond the law and 
legal doctrine itself’46 to understand the effect of the rescue law in Vietnam, which is 
the function of the socio-legal methodology. Because the sociolegal research studies 
law and legal institutions from the perspective of the social sciences,47 it has the nature 
of multi and interdisciplinary research, which relies on the knowledge of other social 
sciences, including sociology, psychology, economics and history.48 In applying the 
socio-legal methodology, this thesis utilises the knowledge of a number of social 
sciences to ascertain two core issues: first, the influence of societal factors on the 
shaping of corporate rescue law of the UK, Canada and Vietnam and second, the actual 
operation of these laws in the selected countries. For the first issue, the thesis combines 
the knowledge relating to theories and history of insolvency law to highlight how the 
contextual factors and legal theories contribute to the uniqueness of insolvency and 
rescue legislative policies in the selected country.49 Second, for assessing whether the 
operation of corporate rescue laws of the countries is effective or not, the thesis draws 
on psychological, sociological, economic and political insights to develop four 
benchmarks of time and cost, expertise, creditor participation and abuse management.  
A limit of applying the socio-legal methodology within this research is that the 
author cannot generate his own data and some data is not available. For example, to 
evaluate the benchmark of time and cost, the author has to rely on secondary data from 
other research, such as the World Bank’s statistics on insolvency.50 However, due to the 
 45 Ibid, 54, 106 46 GL Priest, ‘The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards’ (1993) 91 Mich L Rev 1929, 1933 47 Don Harris, ‘The Development of Socio-Legal Studies in the United Kingdom’, (1983) 2 Legal Studies, 315 48 J Shaw, ‘Socio-Legal Studies and the European Union’, in Philip Thomas (ed.), Socio-Legal Studies, (Aldershot: Ashgate-Dartmouth, 1997), 311–12, cited by Mason and Salter (n39) 129. 49 See the detailed examination in chapter four (UK law), chapter 5 (Canada law) and chapter six (Vietnam law) 50 The World Bank, ‘Resolving Insolvency’ < https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency> accessed February 18, 2020 
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secrecy of information on the outcome of rescue cases and the private arrangement 
between companies and their creditors, the data cannot truly inform the time and cost of 
corporate rescue cases; instead, it is a general figure for all insolvency cases, including 
rescue and liquidation, which can partly support this research. However, as the thesis is 
not an empirical study and ‘time and cost’ is considered equally among other criteria in 
evaluating the effectiveness of rescue law, the limit relating to collecting data will not 
materially affect the validity of this thesis. 
1.3.2 The support of doctrinal method and comparison method  
1.3.2.1 The doctrinal method 
As addressed above, because the objective of this research is to improve the 
effectiveness of the corporate rescue law of Vietnam, the methodology employed must 
be the socio-legal studies. However, in pursuing this objective, apart from the sociolegal 
research, the doctrinal method or black-letter law method plays a supplementary role.  
The doctrinal method features ‘a critical conceptual analysis of all relevant 
legislation and case law to reveal a statement of the law relevant to the matter under 
investigation’.51 This method approaches to a legal issue through an examination of the 
meaning of legal rules, principles, doctrines, and judicial statements relating to the 
issue.52 The sources of doctrinal examination are very wide, ranging from statutory 
materials, case reports, standard textbooks, reference books, legal periodicals, 
Parliamentary Debates, and Government Reports.53 It should be borne in mind that the 
analysis of employing the doctrinal method is not merely an interpretation of the 
meaning of statutes and legal decisions but it is a logical and systematic examination of 
 51 T. Hutchinson, ‘Valé Bunny Watson? Law Librarians, Law Libraries and Legal Research in the Post-Internet Era’, (2014) 106(4) Law Library Journal 579, at 58 52 Khushal Vibhute & Filipos Aynalem, Legal Research Methods, at 71, <https://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/legal-research-methods.pdf> accessed 30 April 2016 53 Ibid. 74 
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these materials to deduce the legal reasoning and rationales that decides the consistency 
and certainty of the law.54 
The reason for applying the doctrinal method is that in order to improve the 
effectiveness of a law, it is important to ascertain the content of the law. It should be 
noted that law has internal and external effectiveness.55 While the internal effectiveness 
refers to the coherence and consistency of legal rules, the external effectiveness refers to 
the effective operation of the law in real life.56 Prior to examining the external 
effectiveness, the actual operation of law, a legal researcher must ‘verify the authority 
and status of the legal doctrine being examined’,57 which means that he must understand 
and ascertain the content and meaning of the legal rules relating to the topic of his 
research. This thesis cannot assess the effectiveness of Vietnamese corporate rescue law 
if it does not examine and analyse legislation and cases. Within the ambit of this 
research, the doctrinal analysis is employed to provide an understanding of the 
corporate rescue procedures in the selected jurisdictions. Specifically, by examining the 
provisions regarding corporate rescue in insolvency legislation of the selected countries, 
the thesis can answer the questions of what models of control are prescribed in the 
legislation. This allows the thesis to provide detailed information on how rescue 
procedures are carried out; which actors are involved in the rescue proceeding; and what 
rights and obligations the laws confer to them. Under this approach, sources for the 
examination are the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA1986) and the Company Act 2006 
(CA2006) in the UK, the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 1985 (BIA) and the Company 
Creditor Arrangement Act 2002 (CCAA) in Canada, and the Bankruptcy 2014 
 54 Ibid. 73 55 W Schrama, ‘How to Carry Out Interdisciplinary Legal Research: Some Experiences with an Interdisciplinary Research Method’ (2011) 7 Utrecht L Rev 147, 148 56 Ibid, 57 T Hutchinson, 'Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury' in D Watkins, M Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (1st edn, Routledge, 2013) p 7 
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(BL2014) in Vietnam. In addition to a legislative analysis, examining bodies of cases 
and judicial opinions has the supporting role to clarify and interpret the content of 
provision under the legislation. 
Although the doctrinal research is able to respond to the question of how 
corporate rescue models are regulated under different jurisdictions and allows the 
research to test the degree of coherence and certainty, it cannot fully assist the author to 
achieve the research objective, which is to improve the effectiveness of Vietnamese 
corporate rescue law as well as answering the research questions raised by the thesis. 
For example, the analysis assisted by the doctrinal method cannot provide answers to 
the questions of what is the justification for introducing rescue law, what are criteria 
used for assessing the effectiveness of a rescue law and how to establish these 
standards, or how political, economic and social condition contribute to shaping the 
rescue law in each country? This is due to the constraint of this approach to the 
examination of legal rules, principles and doctrines in written law sources without 
considering what contributes to the shaping of the rescue laws and how the laws 
actually operate in the selected countries.58 Since the doctrinal method cannot answer 
these questions, it only plays a supplementary role in conducting the research.  
1.3.2.2 Comparative method 
As this thesis involves a comparison on corporate rescue laws of the three 
jurisdictions, the comparative method has been adopted. However, this method cannot 
become the methodology as the purpose of the comparative method is to identify 
similarities and differences between the compared jurisdictions, while the objective of 
the investigation is to improve the effectiveness of Vietnamese rescue law. However, 
this method can assist the pursuit of the thesis objective by helping the author identify 
 58 M Salter and J Mason, (n40) at 89-90 
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the best practices that Vietnam can take into consideration to enhance the efficacy of its 
law as well as contemplating the differences of the societal context among the countries. 
 Within comparative law research, the most prominent method is the functional 
approach with the purpose of looking at similarities among laws in responding to a 
social problem.59 However, the functional method is insufficient for conducting this 
thesis as it aims to offer Vietnam recommendations to improve the effectiveness of its 
rescue based on the experience of the UK and Canada, which is feasibly conducted only 
where there is a clear understanding of how laws of the selected countries are similar 
and different from each other. Therefore, the research endorses a wide range of methods 
of comparative law, including functional method, analytical method (analysing legal 
concepts and rules), structural method (examining the framework of the law), historical 
method (examining legal development) and law-in-context method (focusing on societal 
context, including politics, economy, culture, ideology, etc).60 With an extended 
comparative approach, subjects of the comparisons are not confined to legal provisions 
governing rescue procedures prescribed in insolvency legislation of three countries but 
extended to policies, economy, social and culture conditions shaping the laws of the 
three states. 
There are three reasons for justifying a comparison of rescue laws of the UK, 
Canada and Vietnam within this thesis. First, although the differences in legal culture of 
Vietnam and Western countries dictated the failure of Vietnam in importing Western 
insolvency law in the legislation 1993 and 2004,61 Vietnam has had two-decades 
experience to be familiar with Western insolvency law since the enactment of the first 
 59 See K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 1998) 60 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Methodology of Comparative Legal Research’ (2015) Law and Method, at 10, available at <https://www.bjutijdschriften.nl/tijdschrift/lawandmethod/2015/12/RENM-D-14-00001> accessed 30 April 2016 61 This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six – Corporate Rescue Law in Vietnam 
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insolvency legislation in 1993.62 Importantly, under the pressure of economic 
integration, the legal reform in Vietnam has brought its laws in alignment with Western 
laws63 and the country has been facilitating a suitable platform for the Western-oriented 
law to operate, for example, by shifting economy towards market liberalism and 
privatising state-own-enterprises (SOE).64  
Second, the UK and Canada appear to provide preferential practices for Vietnam 
to improve the efficacy of its new insolvency law. When Vietnam introduced the new 
insolvency legislation, the Bankruptcy Law 2014, the model of administration in rescue 
is the hybrid model, featuring the creation of a new profession of insolvency 
practitioner (IP) and the hybrid model of insolvency administration. As examined in 
chapters six and seven, in order to improve the effectiveness of the new legislation, 
Vietnam should enhance not only the judicial expertise but also the quality of IPs. In 
this regard, the UK and Canada can offer Vietnam with good recommendations. For the 
UK, the country has long a long history of development of the IP profession and the 
effectiveness of the UK insolvency law largely relies on the expertise of these IPs.65 
Therefore, the UK can provide Vietnam with valuable experience to develop qualified 
insolvency practitioners. Especially, Vietnam recently started to have initial interaction 
with the UK rescue law. For example, in Bluecrest Mercantile BV and another v. 
Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group and others and Re Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry 
Group, a Vietnam company was sanctioned by an English court to restructure its debts 
 62 In drafting the first insolvency in 1993, Vietnam considered insolvency law of a number of Western countries, such as Australian, New Zealand, the United State and France, see J Gillespie (n23) at 255, footnote 80. 63 The World Bank, ‘Vietnam Legal Reform for WTO Accession’ (March 2006), <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTVIETNAM/147271-1169742068115/21087827/vn_wto_legal_reform_march_2006.pdf> accessed on 21 February 2020 64 In 1986, Vietnam embarked a new policy of ‘Doi Moi’ to open door with the world and shift the market towards market liberalism under which the private sector was conferred advantageous conditions to flourish while reducing the area of the public sector. See 65 See the in-depth examination in Chapter Four 
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under the scheme of arrangement procedure provided for by the UK Company Act.66 
This case can suggest a degree of suitability in applying the UK law to resolve corporate 
restructuring in Vietnam. Considering Canada, the country is the mature insolvency 
jurisdiction in which court and IPs have an important role in deciding the effective 
operation of the law.67 Canadian corporate rescue law features the hybrid model of 
administration under which directors of an insolvent company carry out rescue under 
the supervision of IPs and court. This model is similarly found under the Creditor 
Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) in the UK Insolvency Act and the Bankruptcy Law 
2015 of Vietnam. Since the courts and the IPs play an important role deciding the 
effectiveness of the rescue procedure in Canada, Vietnam can utilise the experience of 
Canada in combining the expertise of these actors under the current model. In addition, 
the UK and Canada are jurisdictions with diverse approach to rescue model, therefore, 
they can broaden perspective for Vietnam in revising its law. Noticeably, the UK law 
provides for three rescue procedures that follow three different models of administration 
(the administration follows the PIP model; the scheme of arrangement follows the PIP 
model; and the CVA follows the hybrid model). Meanwhile, Canadian law provides for 
two rescue procedures similarly following the hybrid model. These different models 
provide with Vietnam multiple dimensions of examination to draw on the best practices 
that can be applicable to the case of Vietnam law. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 This thesis consists of eight chapters with an overview of content as follows. 
Chapter one deals with introducing the necessity for conducting the thesis, its 
 66 Bluecrest Mercantile BV and another v Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group and others [2013] EWHC 1146 (Comm) and Re Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group [2013] EQHC 2476 (Ch), and see D Shah and J Walker, ‘First Scheme of Arrangement for a Vietnamese Company is Sanctioned’ <https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2013/09/first-scheme-of-arrangement-for-a-vietnamese-compa> (accessed on February 20, 2020) 67 See the detail examination in Chapter Five 
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objectives, questions, methodology and structure. Chapter two provides a literature 
review which highlights contemporary works underpinning the thesis and determines 
the originality of the thesis. Chapter three is a discussion on the framework for 
evaluating insolvency law and corporate rescue law. Specifically, it will examine the 
concept of corporate rescue and the justification of introducing rescue law, the models 
of administration in rescue and their characteristics, informal and formal rescue 
procedures, and the establishment of the benchmarks for evaluating a rescue law.  
Chapters four, five, and six are the examinations on corporate rescue law in the 
UK, Canada, and Vietnam respectively. Each chapter will similarly investigate three 
main aspects, namely the influence of legal history and legal culture on the shape of the 
current legislative framework, the operation of current rescue procedures under the 
legislation, and the evaluation of the effectiveness of rescue law of each country 
following the benchmarks established in chapter three.  
Chapter seven is a critical comparison where the rescue laws of the three 
countries are juxtaposed. The chapter begins with discussing the theoretical framework 
guiding how laws should be compared and then it compares the legal culture in which 
the rescue laws have operated in the three countries. Next, following the evaluation 
benchmarks established in chapter three, rescue laws of the selected countries will be 
compared together to highlight the best practices and the comparison’s findings will 
become the basis to make recommendations for Vietnam. Finally, chapter eight 
summarises the thesis’s objective, findings and recommendations for furthering 
research in corporate rescue law.  
The next chapter will provide the literature review regarding the justification for 
introducing rescue law, the models of rescue administration, and the criteria to evaluate 
the effectiveness of a rescue law.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter is to achieve two purposes: first, it provides a literature review 
regarding the issues raised by the thesis, and second, it demonstrates the thesis’ 
contribution to knowledge and originality emerging against the background of 
contemporary scholarly work. The literature review is divided into separate themes to 
examine the aspects of corporate rescue law into which the thesis makes inquiries. In 
particular, the literature review centres around the following issues: how rescue law is 
justified by contemporary theories? What are the main models of corporate rescue 
administration? What elements should be considered as benchmarks to evaluate the 
effectiveness of a rescue law? What problems have emerged from Vietnamese rescue law 
that merit the thesis examination? Within each theme, the thesis will identify who are 
main scholars and evaluate their contributions. After that, the originality of the thesis will 
be identified by addressing how it fills the gaps appearing in the literature and what 
additional contribution it makes to the literature.  
2.1 Theories on insolvency laws and models of rescue administration  
2.1.1 Two different schools of thought justifying the introduction of 
insolvency and rescue law 
In tandem with introducing corporate rescue law, there is a need for justifying its 
existence by either devising sound theories or examining legislation and cases to define 
the core principles.1 As for the former, contemporary theories on insolvency law devised 
 
1 A Keay and P Walton, Insolvency Law Corporate and Personal (Jordans, 3rd 2012) at 26 
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by legal scholars have been a subject of intense debate. There are two main schools of 
scholars who are categorised as traditionalists and proceduralists.2 The traditionalists are 
those who believe financially troubled companies should be given a second chance to turn 
around their financial affairs while the proceduralists tend to defer the market mechanism 
under which ineffective companies should be liquidated to give way for more efficient 
companies to operate in the market.3 
The proceduralists tend to focus their arguments on protecting the rights of 
creditors. A prominent scholar of this is Jackson, who proposes the creditor bargain 
theory.4 Jackson sees insolvency law as having the objective of maximising return to 
creditors, therefore, insolvency law is considered as a device for creditors to collect debts. 
Accordingly, in order to preserve debtor’s assets for the purpose of enhancing creditors’ 
distribution, single procedures pursued by individual creditors to enforce their claims 
must be barred in replacement of a compulsory collective procedure. If creditors race to 
collect debts individually, this will duplicate cost and lead to harmful dismemberment of 
the debtor’s assets. Therefore, the collective procedure should be what creditors would 
agree if they were able to negotiate before the occurrence of an insolvency event. 
Furthermore, the creditor bargain theory is developed in the direction of protecting pre-
insolvency entitlement, which means that the law should deal with the relationship 
between the company and its creditors. Therefore, Jackson and Scott suggest that the 
interest taken into account must be those of creditors, and the interest of those other than 
the creditors such as suppliers, employees or community is considered only where they 
are qualified as creditors under a state’s law.5 Regarding corporate rescue, Jackson and 
 
2 D. G. Bair ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale Law Journal 573 3 Bair, Ibid 4 T. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University Press, 1986), Chapter 1 5 T. Jackson and R.E Scott, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1989) 75 Va L Rev 155-204 
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Baird suggest that it is inappropriate for the cost of rescue to be borne by secured creditors 
as they are already protected by security agreements.6 Rather, it is unsecured creditors, 
shareholders, and employees who should bear this cost because they would have 
incentives to get benefits from the rescue proceedings.7  
In contrast to the proceduralists’ position which largely considers and protects the 
interests of creditors, the traditionalists argue that insolvency law should channel its 
protection towards not only creditors but also a wider range of parties involved in 
insolvency. For example, Korobkin, Warren and Gross see the objective of insolvency 
laws in terms of protecting the interest of those directly or indirectly affected by 
insolvency affairs, including creditors, owners, managers, tort claimants and other 
members of communities.8 Therefore, these scholars find corporate reorganisation as one 
of mandates insolvency law must pursue.9 Another theory of traditionalism that advocates 
introducing rescue law is the team production devised by LoPucki.10 This theory states 
that rescue law is perceived as an implicit bargain under which members of the team 
(stockholders, creditors, executives, other employees, suppliers, customers, local 
governments, regulatory agencies, and others) agree to compromise their rights for 
turning an insolvent company around and that the team delegates authority for directors 
to distribute the return to the members in proportion with their contribution.11 The 
justification for corporate rescue, as expressed by this theory, lies not only in the 
 
6 D.G Baird and T. Jackson ‘Corporate Reorganisations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interest: A comment on adequate protection of secured creditors in bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U Chi Law Review 97 7 Ibid. 101 8 D.R. Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’, (1993) 71 Tex. L. Rev. 541; E. Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy Making in an Imperfect World’ (1993-4) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336; K. Gross, ‘Taking Community Interest into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay’ (1994) Washington University Law Quaterly 1031  9 K.Gross, Failure And Forgiveness: Rebalancing The Bankruptcy System (Yale University Press, 1997), 248-49, D. R. Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (1991) 91 Colombia Law Review. 717, 766-68. 10 L. LoPucki ‘A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization’ (2004) 557 Vand. L. Rev, 741 11 Ibid. at 749-50 
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distribution of surplus to creditors and shareholders and but also the increase of social 
wealth through preserving jobs for employees, paying taxes and maintaining the 
management position of directors – these results cannot be achieved in cases of 
liquidation.12 
As such, the theories proposed the two schools of scholars contrasting ideas: while 
the traditionalists endorse corporate rescue, the proceduralists reject it.  However, there 
are inherent shortcomings in both of these theories. As for the proceduralists, the creditor 
bargain theory takes into consideration only the interest of creditors without being able 
to explain why other parties’ interest should be ignored in insolvency.13 In addition, 
proceduralists see the creation of insolvency law can be justified by the creditor bargain 
to avoid the duplication of costs resulted from creditor’s individual enforcement of 
debts.14 However, in reality, the creditor bargain theory proposed by Jackson is unlikely 
to be achieved due to different perspectives, incentives and interest creditors would 
possess in the course of insolvency.15 As for the traditionalists, they attempt to bring many 
parties into the scope of insolvency protection, but this cannot avoid criticism due to the 
indeterminacy of the involved parties.  For example, as proposed by Korobkin, parties 
who are in the most vulnerable positions should have the protection over those in a better-
off position,16 yet, he himself acknowledges the difficulty in identifying the vulnerability 
position of these parties.17  Similarly, though the team production theory defers the rescue 
option, it cannot fully explain why authority should be delegated to the board of directors 
 
12 Ibid. at 763 13 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency: Perspective and Principle (Cambridge University Press, 2edn, 2009) at 37 14 Baird and Jackson (n6) at 105 15 G. McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law: An Anglo-American Perspective (Edward Elgar, 2008) at 24 16 Korobkin, (n7) at 575–89. 17 Ibid. at 584 
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in control of rescue procedures and draws a clear boundary as to which parties should be 
protected by rescue law.18  
It should be noted that these theories are proposed by legal scholars, who have 
attempted to justify the United States (US) bankruptcy law on a theoretical basis.19 Given 
the difference among rescue laws in different jurisdictions, it is interesting to examine the 
extent to which these views are reflected under rescue laws of the United Kingdom (UK), 
Canada and Vietnam. Through examining the rescue laws in these countries, this thesis 
argues that there is an interplay between the ideas proposed by the traditionalists and the 
proceduralists. On the one hand, despite the shift of focus towards rescue in insolvency 
legislation of these countries, it appears from the examination that corporate rescue is 
only carried out where it provides creditors with more benefits than other options, which 
is an expression of the creditor maximisation under Jackson’s creditor bargain theory.20  
On the other hand, rescue law of these countries also follows the traditionalists’ view by 
emphasising the importance of protecting employment and stabilising economy.21 It is 
also worth noting that rescue laws of the selected countries are aimed at ‘business rescue’, 
which is to preserve the going-concern values of a company, instead of ‘company rescue’, 
which is to keep the company intact as a whole.22 The philosophy behind ‘business 
rescue’ is that if viable parts of the company’s business is preserved, even by transferring 
to a new owner, and it will preserve the employment and contribute to the stability of the 
economy.23 
 18 G. McCormack (n15) at 33 19 All the scholars mentioned above base their discussion on the US Bankruptcy Code. 20 See Chapter Four (4.3.1 The emphasis of UK law on corporate rescue) and Chapter Five (5.4.5 Whether the BIA and the CCAA proceeding place emphasis on corporate rescue?) 21 See Chapter Four (4.1.2 The rise of rescue culture in the UK), Chapter Five (5.1 Legal development of corporate insolvency and rescue law in Canada) and Chapter Six (6.4.1 The rescue concept and the extent to which Vietnam places emphasis on rescue) 22 See n20 23 See Chapter Three (3.3.2.2 Company Rescue and Business Rescue) 
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2.1.2 Models of rescue administration 
2.1.2.1 Pro-creditor vs. Pro-debtor jurisdictions 
Legal scholars attempt to classify insolvency jurisdictions around the world based on 
the extent to which debtors and creditors enjoy rights conferred by insolvency legislation 
to protect their interests. For example, Wood divides jurisdictions into pro-creditor or pro-
debtor jurisdictions.24 A pro-creditor jurisdiction allows creditors to protect themselves 
from insolvency risk, for example, by enforcing security interest against the debtor’s 
assets outside the insolvency procedure.25 A pro-debtor jurisdiction tends to encourage 
corporate rescue to increase the assets for creditor distribution.26 However, this 
classification can produce a certain degree of ambiguity. For example, as admitted by 
Wood, though a pro-debtor jurisdiction aims to increase the debtor company’s assets 
through favouring a rescue option, a formal rescue procedure might precipitate a company 
into ‘trauma and destructiveness’ instead of initiating an informal private restructuring.27 
McCormack shares a similar viewpoint in this regard. As corporate rescue becomes one 
of focus of insolvency law, he argues that the classification of the pro-debtor and pro-
creditor jurisdiction no longer has a significance.28 For example, through a comparison 
of Chapter 11 of the US law and with the Administration and the Creditor Voluntary 
Arrangement under the UK law, he finds that rescue laws of the two jurisdictions share 
similar elements such as the recognition of the preservation of the company going-
concerns value and the stay of proceedings against creditors in order for the company to 
devise rescue plans.29 Furthermore, he argues that it is not inclusive with the classification 
 
24 P. Wood, ‘Principle of International Insolvency’ (1995) 4 International Insolvency Review 94, 96.  Actually, Wood also includes the not-interested jurisdiction in the classification, such as countries without commercial traditions. However, it is not significant to be examined within this research 25 Ibid. 96 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid.96-7 28 G. McCormack, (n15) 292-296 29 Ibid. 289-290 
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of pro-debtor and pro-creditor jurisdiction since apart from the debtor and creditors, the 
classification can be extended to another parties, such as pro-manager jurisdiction or pro-
employee jurisdiction.30 
2.1.2.2 Three models of rescue administration 
Another way to classify rescue law is to rely on the models of rescue administration. 
Hahn classifies insolvency systems based on the models of administrative control in 
rescue.31 According to this characterisation, there are two main models of rescue 
administration emerging from insolvency legislation around the world: the Debtor-in-
Possession (DIP) model in the US law and the Professional-in-Possession (PIP) model 
(or the trustee model) in the UK law.32 While the DIP model allows the current board of 
directors to enjoy their management power in rescue, the PIP model brings outsider 
Insolvency Professionals (IPs) to replace the company directors in the management of the 
company.33  
Hahn points out the shortcomings inherent in each model. As for the DIP model, 
retaining incumbent management bears a risk that the fate of the company will be 
gambled again by those who already led it to the financial trouble at the beginning.34 
Regarding the PIP model, the problem with it is that replacement of the current directors 
with IPs may produce more cost because the IP are unfamiliar with the management of a 
new company, which requires them to spend time and resources to obtain informational 
input regarding the operation of the company.35 Furthermore, in fear of being replaced by 
 
30 Ibid.293 31 D. Hahn, ‘Concentrated Ownership and Control of Corporate Reorganisations’ (2004) 4 J. Corp. L. Stud., 117 32 Hahn (n31) 121-127.  33 Ibid. 34 Lynn M. LoPucki, ‘Trouble With Chapter 11’ (1993) Wis. L. Rev. 729, at 732-734 35 David A. Skeel, Jr., ‘Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory’ (1993) Wis. L. Rev. 465, 517 and note 18 
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IPs in rescue, the company directors are unlikely to file an early rescue application, rather 
they tend to hide the company’s affairs to prolong their employment and not to cooperate 
with IPs in rescue procedures.36  
In attempting to overcome the shortcomings of the two models discussed above, 
Hahn proposes a hybrid model called ‘the integrated co-determination’ which shares 
characteristics of both the DIP and the PIP model. Under this hybrid model, a trustee 
appointed by court will take a seat in the board of directors of an insolvent company and 
has the veto power over any matters voted on by the board; yet, the trustee cannot interfere 
with decisions made in the ordinary course of business beyond the scope of the board.37 
With this proposed model, Hahn attempts to solve the problems inherent with the two 
models mentioned above.38 First, letting the current directors operate the company in 
rescue can provide incentives for them to initiate the procedure in a timely manner.39 
Second, granting the trustee the veto power over managerial decisions can prevent the 
board of directors from taking risky action that would harm the interest of creditors.40  
Rotem believes that a hybrid model of rescue control can contribute to eliminating 
the shortcomings with the DIP and the PIP model.41 However, Rotem disagrees with 
Hahn’s proposition that the trustee should occupy a seat in management because this 
participation is likely to discourage the trustee to make decisions with the fear of 
producing failure and misjudgement on his part.42 In examining the rescue procedures 
under Canadian law, Rotem argues that a hybrid model should be the one under which 
 
36 Hahn (n31), 137-138 37 Ibid. 148 38 Ibid. 149-151 39 Ibid. 149 40 Ibid. 151 41 Yaad Rotem, ‘Contemplating a Corporate Governance Model for Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Lessons from Canada’ (2008) 3 Virginia Law & Business Review, 125 42 Ibid. 138 
Chapter Two - Literature Review  
28  
the trustee holds a neutral position in channelling information for co-operation among 
parties in a rescue.43 
As such, there are three models of administrative control in rescue, namely the DIP, 
the PIP, and the hybrid model. The thesis makes an additional contribution to this issue 
by examining the extent to which these models are reflected under the legislation of the 
UK, Canada and Vietnam.44 The examination, in the next chapters of this thesis, finds 
that the UK has the most diverse approach which incorporates all three models in its 
legislation: the administration follows the PIP model, the Scheme of Arrangement (SA) 
follows the DIP model, and the Creditor Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) follows the 
hybrid model; meanwhile, Vietnam and Canada similarly adopt the hybrid in their rescue 
law.45 It is worth noting that the hybrid model is reflected in the legislation of these 
countries is not the one proposed by Hahn with an IP holding a management position in 
the board of directors; rather, it is the model addressed by Rotem, under which the IP has 
a monitoring role over the company directors’ activities in running the company.46 
Another contribution of this thesis is the finding that the incorporation of these models 
into rescue procedures is decided by the combination of unique societal factors in 
different countries.47 Therefore, although a model of administrative control is similarly 
incorporated in rescue laws of different countries, such as the hybrid model, it operates 
differently and generates a different degree of effectiveness. The thesis will prove this 
 43 Ibid. 157-160 44 See Chapter Three (3.5 The reflection of rescue administrative model in rescue law of the UK, Canada, and Vietnam) 45 Ibid. 46 This will be examined deeply in the CVA procedure of UK law (Chapter Four), the BIA and CCAA procedures in Canadian law (Chapter Five) and the rescue procedure in Vietnamese law (Chapter Six) 47 See Chapter Four (4.1.3 The unique environment where rescue law operates in the UK), Chapter 5 (5.2 The distinguishing characteristics of Canadian rescue law) and Chapter Six (6.1 Legal development of insolvency in Vietnam) 
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point by examining the influence of historical, economic, social and cultural factors on 
the operation of rescue laws in the selected countries.48 
2.2 Assessing the effectiveness of rescue law 
2.2.1 Legal scholarships on evaluating the effectiveness of rescue law 
(i) Multiple values approach 
Warren proposes to evaluate insolvency law under a multiple values approach.49 
In her perspective, insolvency law is viewed as a process of reckoning debtor’s default 
and distributing insolvency consequences to a number of different actors, which involves 
competing and conflicting values and none of which dominates others.50 Furthermore, 
she proposes four principal goals an insolvency law should achieve, namely enhancing 
the value of the debtor company, distributing the values according to multiples normative 
principles, internalising the costs of the business failure to the parties dealing with the 
company, and creating reliance on private monitoring.51 This approach, however, is 
criticised by Finch for not being unable to establish in a precise manner how to resolve 
the contradictions among competing interests and which values should be emphasised.52 
Even Warren admits that her theory is unlikely to inform a policy decision.53 Although 
there is a considerable limit in Warren’s approach, there are recognisable aspects in her 
approach, which is the need for introducing a set of objectives or goals for evaluating 
rescue law and the need for rescue law to enhance the value of a company. 
 (ii) Finch’s and Mokal’s approach 
In recognising that insolvency theories aim to protect the interests of different 
parties cannot completely resolve the tensions, Finch designs a set of benchmarks for 
 
48 Ibid. 49 E. Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775 50 Ibid. 777 51 E. Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy Making in an Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Michigan Law Review 334 52 V. Finch, ‘The Meausres of Insolvency Law’ (1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 227, at 241 53 E. Warren (n38) at 811 
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evaluating the effectiveness of insolvency law.54 The benchmarks include four elements 
of efficiency, expertise, accountability, and fairness.55 ‘Efficiency’ looks to the securing 
of mandated ends at lowest cost; ‘expertise’ refers to the proper exercise of judgment by 
specialists; ‘accountability’ looks to the control of insolvency participants by democratic 
bodies or courts or through the openness of processes and their amenability to 
representations; and ‘fairness’ considers issues of substantive justice and distribution.56 
It is especially suggested by Finch that these four values can be traded off against each 
other in the attainment of the legitimacy of insolvency law.57  Mokal is a famous critic 
who heavily rejects the evaluation approach proposed by Finch.58 In an investigation of 
Finch’s values, Mokal reasons that ‘fairness’ represents the substantive goal of the 
insolvency law, while ‘efficiency’ represents its procedural goal.59 He argues that the 
procedural goal should be the means to pursue the substantive goal, therefore, the trade-
off among these values, such as between fairness and efficiency as suggested by Finch, 
is unacceptable.60 Furthermore, Mokal argues that it is Finch’s mistake for viewing 
‘expertise’ and ‘accountability’ as independent criteria, rather they are sub-components 
of ‘efficiency’.61 
In attempting to provide criteria for creating a sound insolvency law, Mokal offers 
an approach called the ‘authentic consent model’.62 This model places the emphasis of 
examination on the elements of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’, which can be only produced by 
the principle of ‘reciprocity’.63 Accordingly, Mokal addresses that conflict among 
 
54 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency: Perspective and Principle (n13) 55 Ibid. at 56 56 Ibid.  57 Ibid. at 54-56 58 RJ Mokal, ‘On Fairness and Efficiency’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 452 59 Ibid. 548-9 60 Ibid.  61 Ibid. p.459-462 62 RJ Mokal, ‘The Authentic Consent Model: Contractarianism, Creditors’ Bargain and Corporate Liquidation’ (2001) 21(3) Legal Studies 400-43 63 Ibid. 415, 421-2 
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creditors who possess different perspectives and incentives make it impossible to lead to 
good cooperation among creditors in insolvency, and to solve this problem, any principles 
governing insolvency law should be devised with the consent of the conflicting parties.64 
In Mokal’s words, ‘it is fair to require people to submit to procedures and institutions 
only if, given the opportunity, they could in some sense have agreed in advance on 
principles to which they must submit’.65 The parties under Mokal’s approach must give 
their consent in the satisfaction of four ‘constructive attributes’ which are ‘liberty’, 
‘equality’, ‘reasonableness’ and ‘self-interest’. Mokal’s model attempts to avoid the 
limits of the creditor bargain theory by Jackson66 by widening the scope of parties’ 
participation in insolvency procedures to embrace not only those who have the rights 
before insolvency but those whose rights arise after.67 However, Mokal’s model is 
criticised for a wider scope of participating parties as well as the impossibility to 
implement it in reality.68 McCormack argues that in reality different parties may possess 
different perspectives about the four attributes – liberty, reasonableness, equality, and 
self-interest as suggested by Mokal, which makes it impossible for them to find a common 
voice.69 Furthermore, these parties are unlikely to have the same understanding of the 
concepts of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’ because of the differences in political, philosophical 
and religious beliefs.70  
In summary, all the above-mentioned scholars are unable to provide a set of 
benchmarks to evaluate an insolvency law in a convincing manner. Warren provides very 
abstract and vague values on what the law should pursue without certainty,71 the set of 
 
64 Ibid. 422-3 65 Ibid. 423 66 See Jackson (n4) 67 Mokal (n58) 424 68 Gerard McCormack (n15) at 29 69 Ibid.  70 Ibid. 71 Finch (n52) at 241 
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benchmarks of fairness, efficiency, expertise, and accountability proposed by Finch 
cannot escape the criticism for suggesting the trade-off between these benchmarks.72 
Meanwhile, Mokal emphasises merely on the issue of ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ as core 
elements of an insolvency law without considering the fact that the parties involved in 
insolvency may have different perceptions about fairness because they possess different 
perspectives and interests.73  
(iii) Rotem’s approach 
Rotem proposes a parameter for evaluating the effectiveness of a rescue law that 
consists of four criteria, namely timely commencement of rescue, skills and expertise of 
those who control a company during rescue and those who devise and negotiate rescue 
plan, avoidance of governance conflict, and quality and scope of information flowing to 
insolvency forum.74 The last criteria, quality and scope of information flowing to the 
insolvency forum, is a new criterion devised by Rotem.75According Rotem, corporate 
rescue can be performed under legal proceedings prescribed by legislation or it can be 
performed via a sale of the company to a third party under an auction.76 A rescue law, 
therefore, must facilitate the availability of information about the company for not only 
parties participating in rescue but also outside parties.77 This thesis disagrees with Rotem 
in this regard and argues that the decision of whether to sell the company in the market is 
significantly based on the expertise of the parties involved in control of rescue, who can 
themselves evaluate the quality of information and that the disclosure of information may 
 
72 Mokal (n58) 458-9 73 Mccormack (n15) at 29 74 Rotem, (n41) 75 Ibid. 152 76 Ibid. 152-153 77 Ibid. 156-157 
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negatively affect the company, for example, this can lead to the decrease of its value in 
the market. 
2.2.2 Benchmarks for evaluation of rescue law formulated by this thesis  
In recognising the limits pertaining to the measures for assessing rescue law in the 
above discussion, this thesis suggests a set of evaluation benchmarks including four 
elements of time and cost, expertise, the abuse management and creditor participation. 
Though the benchmarks are proposed based on the previous work as discussed above, yet 
they are expressed differently. Importantly, this thesis contributes a new benchmark for 
the evaluation of rescue law, which is creditor participation.78   
Regarding Finch’s approach, this thesis agrees with Finch for considering efficiency, 
expertise, and fairness as benchmarks to evaluate the effectiveness of rescue law.79 
Undeniably ‘fairness’ and ‘efficiency’ should be the first benchmarks of evaluation 
because the law has to deal with competing interests of different parties involved in 
insolvency in a fair way and this should be achieved with low cost to guarantee to return 
to creditors. However, these concepts should be given substances. As for ‘efficiency’, a 
law is efficient as insofar as it can produce low cost and timely procedure, therefore, the 
thesis finds time and cost should be taken into consideration. The thesis also agrees with 
Finch and Rotem in recognising ‘expertise’ to be an evaluation benchmark as corporate 
rescue involves the making of business decisions and monitoring decisions, which 
requires actors that participate in this procedure to possess a sufficient degree of 
expertise.80 As for ‘fairness’, it appears to be a right approach for Finch to include this 
benchmark for evaluating a rescue law. However, the difficulty with Finch’s approach 
 
78 This will be examined in detail in Chapter Three (See 3.5.2 Forming a set of benchmarks for evaluation of a rescue law) 79 Ibid. 80 Finch (n13) at 54 and Rotem (n41) at 152 
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lies in how to construe the meaning of ‘fairness’ in order to determine whether a rescue 
law has distributed fairness equally among the parties involved in rescue.81 In response 
to this problem, the thesis employs a benchmark that is similar to, but carries clearer 
meaning than fairness, which is abuse management. As an alternative explanation of 
‘fairness’, ‘abuse management’ simply addresses whether a rescue law is able to tackle a 
potential abuse arising in rescue procedure which harms the interest of a party, which 
appears to be a practical and feasible way to construe the meaning of fairness. 
‘Creditor participation’ is a new benchmark this thesis contributes to the measure of 
the effectiveness of rescue law. It is perceived that creditors do not actively participate in 
insolvency administration due to lack of information and expertise regarding the business 
operation of a company or lack of incentive in contemplation that the amount they would 
receive in the distribution of the company assets will not compensate the effort they 
invested in administering the rescue.82 Despite this, the success of a rescue procedure 
largely depends on the creditor participation insofar as they are those who decide whether 
to approve a rescue plan and contribute finances to fund the implementation of the plan. 
If a rescue law does not provide incentives for creditors to cast their vote and fund the 
rescue plan, it is unlikely that a company will be saved in its financial crisis. For these 
reasons, ‘creditor participation’ deserves to be a benchmark to evaluate the effectiveness 
of a rescue law.  
2.3 The case of insolvency law and rescue law in Vietnam 
2.3.1 Challenges of legal transplantation in insolvency law reform  
 
81 McCormack (n15) at 29 82 R. Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency (Iwrin Law, 2009) at 220 
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Legal transplantation is termed by Watson to denote the movement of a rule, a 
law or a system of law from one country to another.83 According to Watson, there is no 
connection between law and the social context in which it operates, thus a law can transfer 
easily to places and societies that are very different from the place of its origin.84 In 
contrast to Watson’s position, Legrand believes that it is impossible to have successful 
legal transplant because a legal rule has a unique meaning given by a legal culture which 
cannot be transferred along with it from a legal culture to another.85 Holding a neutral 
point of view with two scholars above, Kahn-Freund recognises that there are still degrees 
of transferability, yet this depends on a level of compatibility between the transplanted 
laws and the political, economic and cultural environment in the host country.86 
In an investigation of legal transplant in insolvency law, Martin suggests that the 
ignorance of societal factors such as history, tradition and culture contributes to the failure 
of incorporating foreign insolvency law into the law of the host country.87 Starting with 
the investigation of US history and culture of consumer credit practice that shapes its 
bankruptcy law, Martin provides an abundance of evidence of countries, such as Japan, 
Hong Kong and China that failed to borrow and implement principles of US bankruptcy 
law into their own laws due to the incompatibility of US law with the legal culture of 
these countries.88 The UNCITRAL also suggests that in applying principles of the 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency, lawmakers should consider the difference between 
these principles and the legal and social values of the society in their countries.89 
 
83 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (University Press of Virginia, 1974) 84 Ibid. 21-30 85 Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European Comparative Law, 117-119 86 Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 Mod. L. Rev.1, at 7-8 87 Nathalie Martin, ‘The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency System: The Perils of Legal Transplantation’ (2005) 28 B.C.Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1  88 Ibid. 89 UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (United Nation, 2005) at 9  <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf> 
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Regarding the case of Vietnam, the law-makers extensively borrowed Western 
insolvency law in drafting two insolvency legislation in 1993 and 2004.90 However, as 
addressed by Gillespie, an extremely low number of companies filing for insolvency 
under the two legislation is the evidence that signifies the failure of embracing Western 
insolvency law.91 Gillespie explains that cultural factors, such as the fear of losing 
prestige and reputation which is a reflection of the ingrained influence of Confucianism, 
are responsible for companies in Vietnam holding a hostile view towards relying on the 
formal insolvency procedures in the legislation.92 In addition to traditional values, the 
influence of socialism is another factor that prevents the law from operating in the 
countries insofar as the government has the inclination to use administration orders 
instead of the legislation to deal with insolvency of state-own enterprises.93 From a 
creditor’s perspective, Kaneko finds that legislation featuring a pro-debtor model under 
which the company’s directors are allowed to hold the office while secured creditors are 
conferred limited rights to enforce security has not encouraged the creditors from actively 
taking part in the insolvency procedures.94 Furthermore, sharing the same opinion with 
Gillespie, Fitzpatrick and Wywil95 and Booth96 consider the lack of insolvency 
administrators and professionals to handle insolvency as another factor that discourages 
the use of insolvency law in Vietnam. 
 
90 Gillespie, ‘Insolvency Law in Vietnam’ in Roman Tomasic, Insolvency Law in East Asia, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), at 239 91 Ibid. for example, there were only 152 applications received by courts in the country and only 46 companies were declared bankrupt under the 1993 legislation. 92 Ibid. 249 93 Ibid.  94 Kaneko Yuka, ‘Re-evaluating model laws: Transplant and Change of Financial Law in Vietnam’ (2012) 19 Journal of International Cooperation Studies 95 Fitzpatrick and Wywil, ‘Business Bankruptcy Law Reform in Vietnam’ (1997-8) 5 Asia Pac. L. Rev. 37 96 Booth, ‘Drafting Bankruptcy Laws in Socialist Market Economies: Recent Developments in China and Vietnam’, (2004) 18 Columbia Journal of Asia Law 93-147 
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2.3.2 The scarcity of the use of rescue law in practice and the lack of research 
on rescue law in Vietnam 
Corporate rescue had been recognised as one of the insolvency procedures under 
the previous insolvency legislation in Vietnam. For example, the BL1993 had provisions 
that allow a company to be restructured by the creditor meeting approval97 and the 
BL2004 had a section to provide for the company’s reorganisation.98 Inheriting the legacy 
of the two predecessors, the current legislation (BL2014) provides for a rescue procedure 
under chapter VII,99 with an enumeration of a number of measures for rescuing the 
insolvent company100 as well as governing the duration to implement a rescue plan.101 
However, in reality, the number of insolvency cases that involved corporate rescue is 
extremely rare. For example, there is only one case of successful rescue recorded in a 
research,102 while the report 44 of the People Supreme Court of Vietnam on summarising 
the implementation of the Bankruptcy Law 2004 did not mention any decisions in respect 
of corporate rescue at all.103  
 
97 For example, art 2 of the Bankruptcy Law 1993 governs that the creditor committee has the right to approve the plan to re-organise the business activity of the debtor company; and the Article 36 governs that the judge issues the bankruptcy order only if the creditor committee did not approve the plan to negotiate and reorganise the business activity of the debtor company. The Bankruptcy Law 1993,  <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/iir.3940060104> accessed 10 June 2016 98 Under the BL 2004, art. 5 regulates that rescue is one of bankruptcy procedures; and section 1 of chapter VI provide detailed procedure for corporate rescue, available at  <http://www.moj.gov.vn/vbpq/en/lists/vn%20bn%20php%20lut/view_detail.aspx?itemid=7849> 99 The Bankruptcy Law 2014, available at <http://www.economica.vn/Portals/0/Documents/51-2014%20Law%20on%20Bankruptcy.pdf> accessed 10 June 2016 100 According to art.88(2) of the Bankruptcy Law 2014, Measures for recovery of business operations shall comprise: (a) Raising capital; (b) Reducing, writing off or rescheduling debts; (c) Changing lines of production and business; (d) Renovating production technology; (dd) Restructuring the management apparatus, merging, dividing or separating production sections; (e) Selling shares to creditors and other people; (g) Selling or leasing assets; (h) Other measures which are not contrary to law. 101 BL 2014, art.89 102 Duong Dang Hue, ‘Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law in Practice and the Improvement of Business Environment in Vietnam’ (2008), a research sponsored by Ministry of Justice and the GTZ Project of Federal Republic of Germany.  The author mentions one case of rescuing a textile company (Xí nghiệp Ươm tơ Tháng 8) in Lam Dong province 103 The People Supreme Court Report, the report 44/BC-TANDTC of the People Supreme Court on summarising the implementation of the Bankruptcy Law 2004 
Chapter Two - Literature Review  
38  
Along with the limited use of the rescue procedure in the legislation, the issue of 
corporate rescue has been unsophisticatedly researched in Vietnam. In fact, the issue of 
corporate rescue has been largely ignored by academic scholars. In the context of the 
transition of Vietnamese economy towards market liberalism, much of research on 
insolvency law tends to focus on the issues of how the borrowed ideas of Western law 
have been incorporated in Vietnamese law and how Vietnam facilitates a compatible legal 
environment in which the new law can function properly.104 Similarly, the issue of how 
well the insolvency law functions in solving corporate insolvency affairs of insolvent 
companies attracts a great deal of attention of domestic scholars.105 However, it appears 
that much of the discussion largely focuses on one aspect of insolvency which is 
liquidation, while the issue of corporate rescue has left untouched for a long time. As 
acknowledged by Duong Dang Hue, the chair of the Drafting Committee of the 
Bankruptcy Law 2004 and an influential scholar in this area, it is an objective of the 
legislation to provide a mechanism for ineffective companies to orderly exit the market 
and create good conditions for more effective companies to thrive.106 Most of Hue’s 
works are dedicated to improving the reliance of financially troubled companies on 
liquidation procedures to exit the market and rarely mention the rescue function of the 
legislation.107  
 
104 Gillespie (n90) and  Gillespie, Transplanting Commercial Law Reform: Developing a ‘Rule of Law’ in Vietnam (Ashgate, 2006), Fitzpatrick and Wywil (n95), and Booth (n96)  105 See Duong Dang Hue, ‘Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law in Practice and the Improvement of Business Environment in Vietnam’ (2008), a research sponsored by Ministry of Justice and the GTZ Project of Federal Republic of Germany, and Duong Dang Hue, Bankruptcy Law in Vietnam (Judicial Publishing House, 2005)  ;  Pham Duy Nghia, ‘Seeking the philosophy of Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law’, (2003) 11 Law-Making Research Journal, 35-47 106 Duong Dang Hue, ‘The Law on Bankruptcy with the Improvement of the Business Environment in Vietnam’ (2005) 3 Democracy and Law 26–31 107  In ‘Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law in Practice and the Improvement of Business Environment in Vietnam’ (2008), a research sponsored by Ministry of Justice and the GTZ Project of Federal Republic of Germany, Hue mentioned that the Bankruptcy Law 2004 had the function of rescue is very limited with only one successful case of a textile company in Lam Dong province. 
Chapter Two - Literature Review  
39  
Recently, the issue of corporate rescue in Vietnam has been raised through a 
research article by Duong Huong Son on the website of the Ministry of Justice.108 In 
recognition of the shift of insolvency law focus from liquidation towards rescue in the 
law-making practice around the world, Son emphasises the importance of rescue law in 
turning financially difficult companies around in Vietnam and the need to prevent the 
companies from entering into insolvency at early stages of the crisis.109 Son recommends 
that in order for the rescue law to operate properly, Vietnam should provide clarity into 
the definition of ‘insolvent company’, simplify the filing for the rescue procedure and 
confer debtor companies more advantageous conditions to initiate the procedure.110 What 
emerges from this article is that the importance of corporate rescue has been just 
recognised recently by academics and Vietnamese corporate rescue law has been still an 
area that is open for academic research. There are many important issues of Vietnamese 
corporate rescue that need to be thoroughly examined to contribute to the improvement 
of its effectiveness, which has been the impetus for the conduct of this thesis. 
This thesis makes a new contribution to the research on Vietnamese rescue law in 
the following respects. First, it examines one of the issues that has been ignored in the 
literature, which is the model of rescue administration employed under the BL2014.111 
Specifically, it will examine how the practice of corporate rescue has emerged and 
supported in Vietnam, what model of administration is employed in the current legislation 
and if this model can generate a degree of effectiveness in consideration of its strengths 
  See other Hue’s papers “Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law in Practice” (2003) 1 State and Law Journal and ‘The Bankruptcy Law 2005 and the Improvement of Business Environment in Vietnam’, (2005) 3 Democracy and Law. 108 Duong Huong Son, ‘Corporate Rescue – An Important Objective in the Making of Modern Bankruptcy Law’ (2013), available at  <http://moj.gov.vn/qt/tintuc/Pages/nghien-cuu-trao-doi.aspx?ItemID=1642> accessed 15 June 2016 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 See Chapter Six on rescue law in Vietnam 
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and limits. Second, based on the best practices drawn on the comparative study on rescue 
laws of Vietnam, the UK and Canada, the thesis makes a number of recommendations for 
Vietnam to re-consider the effectiveness of its rescue law. Endorsing the findings of the 
previous literature that attributes the failure of legal transplant to the differences between 
an imported law and legal culture of a host country, the thesis takes into consideration the 
societal context of Vietnam in making these recommendations.  
2.4 Conclusion  
The literature review highlighted the three main issues on which the thesis 
focuses, namely the theoretical framework justifying the introduction of insolvency law 
and rescue law, the benchmarks for assessing the effectiveness of rescue law, and the 
background of research on Vietnamese corporate rescue law which provides incentives 
for conducting this thesis. Compared to the contemporary work, the originality of this 
thesis is expressed in the following respects. First, the thesis examines the validation of 
the theories proposed the traditionalists and the proceduralists by examining the extent to 
which they are reflected by the rescue laws in the UK, Canada and Vietnam. In addition, 
based on the previous literature, the thesis endorses the classification of three models of 
administrative control, the DIP, the PIP and the hybrid models, yet, argues that these 
models will be reflected differently in rescue laws of the selected countries due to the 
influence of unique societal factors in each jurisdiction. Second, based on the previous 
literature, the thesis has developed a set of evaluation benchmarks for assessing the 
effectiveness of rescue law, which consists of four elements: time and cost, expertise, 
abuse management and creditor participation. Third, set against the backdrop of the 
scarcity of research on rescue law in Vietnam, this thesis proves itself a contribution to 
knowledge in that it offers a number of recommendations for Vietnam to enhance the 
effectiveness of rescue law based on the best practices drawn from a critical comparison 
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on the models of administrative control under rescue laws of the UK, Canada, and 
Vietnam. 
 In the next chapter, this thesis will provide a discussion of the framework for 
evaluating a rescue law that encompasses a number of cores issues, such as the concept 
of corporate rescue, the role of rescue law, the model of rescue administration and the 
formulation of the benchmarks for assessing the effectiveness of rescue law.  
Chapter Three - The Framework for Assessing Effectiveness of a Rescue Law  
42  
CHAPTER THREE  FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS  
OF RESCUE LAW 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 This chapter purports to gain insight into important issues that underpin 
corporate rescue law. First, it begins with an examination into the concept of corporate 
rescue along with issues related to it, such as modes of corporate rescue, the basis for 
initiating corporate rescue, and the importance of corporate rescue law. Second, the 
chapter furthers the examination into three models of rescue administration emerging 
from insolvency legislation, namely the Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) model, the 
Professional-in-Possession (PIP) models and the hybrid model. The chapter particularly 
identifies main actors, operation, strengths and limits pertaining to each model and 
examines how these models are reflected under the legislation of the United Kingdom 
(UK), Canada and Vietnam. Finally, based on contemporary works on the evaluation of 
a rescue law, the chapter develops a set of benchmarks for assessing the effectiveness of 
a rescue law, which consists of four elements: time and cost, expertise, abuse 
management and creditor participation. In this section, the examination focuses on the 
rationale for introducing the benchmarks and how to perceive their content. This chapter 
plays an important role in the examination of this thesis insofar as it establishes a 
framework for the investigation into rescue laws of the selected jurisdictions in the next 
chapters.1 
3.1 The concept of corporate rescue 
3.1.1 Understanding corporate rescue from a broad perspective 
 
1 The four benchmarks will be used to assess the effectiveness of rescue laws of the UK, Canada and Vietnam in Chapter Four, Five and Six respectively 
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A company in financial or economic difficulty has to consider two options, 
whether its operations will be terminated through liquidation or a course of rescue 
activities will be initiated. The second option is often identified as corporate rescue. 
Belcher defines corporate rescue as ‘a major intervention that is necessary to avert the 
eventual failure of a company’2 A major intervention must be understood as a drastic 
action at the time of crisis.3 Unlike an action carried out at the time of normal business 
operation, a drastic action must be one that has the effect of a structural shift to turn a 
company from financial distress back to a healthy normal business.  
According to this definition, rescue is initiated only when a company has been 
subject to a state of crisis, a situation where a company enters into financial or 
economic difficulty.4 There is a wide range of causes, including internal and external 
factors that contribute to the crisis.5 The internal factors causing crisis come from within 
the company, such as poor financial controls and mismanagement by the board of 
directors who take ill-advised strategic formulation.6 The external factors of crisis are 
those that come from outside the company, such as downturn of the economy and 
changes in market conditions.7 There are several signals that reveal a company’s crisis, 
including default, failure and insolvency.8  Default describes the inability of a company 
to make payment of debts when they become due.9 Failure, in an economic sense, 
depicts a situation in which the rate of return of an invested capital is continually lower 
 
2 Alice Belcher, Corporate Rescue (Sweet and Maxwell, 1997), at 12 3 Ibid  4 H.D. Platt, Why Companies Fail: Strategies for Detecting, Avoiding, and Profiting from Bankruptcy (BearBooks, 1999) 6 5 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles and Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2edn, 2009) 152-171 6 Ibid. 152-160 7 Ibid. 161-171 8 Plat (n4) at 39-55; E.I. Altman and E. Hotchkiss, Corporate Financial Distress and Company: Predict and Avoid Bankruptcy, Analyse and Invest in Distressed Debt (John Wiley and Sons Inc,3rd edn, 2006), at 4-6 9 Ibid. at 5; and Belcher (n2) at 39-40 
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than the similar ones or lower than the cost of capital investment of a company.10 Most 
commonly, insolvency is used to describe a company’s lack of liquidity, a situation 
where it is unable to meet current obligations or a situation where the total liabilities 
exceed the total assets in a company’s capital structure under a fair valuation.11 As 
corporate rescue is defined as ‘a drastic remedial action’ to deal with crisis, this 
definition is very broad in that it encompasses any activities to respond to the 
company’s crisis, including both formal and informal rescue.12 The formal rescue refers 
to legal proceedings regulated under insolvency legislation, while informal rescue 
includes remedial actions arising from a contractual agreement among parties. For the 
purpose of this thesis, corporate rescue is used in a narrow sense of the legal context, 
which includes legal proceedings prescribed in the legislation of the selected countries.  
 3.1.2 Understanding the concept of corporate rescue in the legal context 
Insolvency and insolvency law are different concepts. Insolvency is a situation 
where a company cannot meet its obligations when they become due or a situation 
where the net asset of a company is less than the total liability.13 Insolvency law is a 
branch of law mandated to solve problems arising from insolvency affairs of a company 
by providing different legal procedures, such as liquidation, rescue, or receivership.14 In 
the legal context, rescue is a procedure provided by insolvency legislation to respond to 
the insolvency affair of a company by saving its operation and business. Insolvency is 
the prerequisite condition for rescue law to come into operation.15 However, insolvency 
 
10 Altman and Hotchkiss, Ibid. at 4 11 Ibid. at 5 12 Belcher (n2) at 13 13 Altman and Hotchkiss (n8), at 4-6 14 RM Goode, The principle of Corporate Insolvency Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 4th edn, 2011) at 29, and RJ. Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law (Irwin Law Inc, 2009), at 16 15 There is also an exception for this, for example, chapter 11 of US bankruptcy Law does not require the proof of insolvency for initiation of a reorganisation for a company. See Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/11/chapter-11> accessed on 5 July 2016> accessed 14 August 2016 
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does not itself automatically give rise to the operation of the rescue procedure, rather 
where there is the occurrence of an insolvency event, a company, its directors or its 
creditors must carry out actions to initiate rescue procedure, for example, by filing a 
rescue application. The rescue procedure is allowed to proceed so long as the company 
satisfies with requirements by legislation, such as the satisfaction with the insolvency 
test. As such, corporate rescue a narrow concept in the legal context and can be 
identified as formal rescue. 
3.2 Formal rescue and informal rescue 
 3.2.1 Formal rescue 
Formal rescue is a legal procedure stipulated by insolvency legislation. A 
distinct feature of this form of rescue is the binding effect on parties involved in this 
procedure.16 Formal rescue often has the advantage of a moratorium or a stay, which 
prevents creditors from enforcing their claims against the company during rescue so that 
the company can enjoy a comfort zone to devise a rescue plan without being distorted 
by the creditors.17 However, a disadvantage of the formal rescue is that it lacks secrecy 
or confidentiality insofar as information on the company’s insolvency affair will be 
disclosed to the public as an obligation prescribed by legislation,18 which might 
negatively affect the company’s reputation and lead to creditor’s unwillingness to 
support the company in rescue.19 
 3.2.2 Informal rescue 
 
16 For example, under UK administration procedure, the approved proposal will carry binding effects on all creditors.  17 This will be discussed in detail when examining rescue procedures in rescue laws of the UK, Canada, and Vietnam. 18 For example, the UK Insolvency Rules require the administrator in the administration to publish a notice of his appointment in the London Gazette and advertises it in a manner he thinks it fits. See Insolvency Rule 2009, Rule 8(1) 19 Finch (n5) at 251 
Chapter Three - The Framework for Assessing Effectiveness of a Rescue Law  
46  
Informal rescue is referred to measures conducted out of the legislative scope, 
such as a private arrangement agreed by a debtor company and its creditor. There are 
several benefits associated with this type of rescue. For example, the informal rescue 
has a degree of flexibility as it is not subject to strict regulations and the terms of rescue 
can be negotiated and tailored to meet the company’s needs.20 As for the company’s 
directors, the informal rescue allows them to stay in management and not to be replaced 
by an insolvency practitioner, who normally has the power granted by legislation to 
investigate their conduct or take over their role them in operating the company in 
rescue.21 Furthermore, the informal rescue is often carried out under secrecy, thus 
prevent disclosing a company’s insolvency affairs to the public, and this is a reason 
rendering the informal rescue an attractive option for distressed companies.22 However, 
a major disadvantage of the informal rescue is that it is an agreement between parties 
whose interests are affected, therefore, dissenting parties can initiate a formal rescue 
procedure, such as liquidation to terminate the informal rescue attempts.23 
The informal rescue is commonly associated with two similar strategies, 
turnaround and workout.24 Turnaround denotes a radical improvement for a company 
facing entirely a crisis that sufficiently threatens its survival, with the goal of 
maintaining the significant participation status of the company in major industry.25 
Turnaround is carried out based on signals of corporate declines, including liquidity and 
profit problems26  that threaten the existence of a company.27 Workout is a process that 
 
20 Ibid.  21 For example, the UK administration is the procedure that offers the administrator the right to replace the current directors of a company in management of its business (Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1, para 61) 22 Finch (n5) at 251 23 Ibid. at 253 24 Belcher (n2) at 19-22 25 Zimmerman, The Turnaround Experience: Real-world Lessons in Revitalising Corporation, at 26 <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/22a3/c313587e034bcb50395f927fb94f732f2702.pdf?_ga=2.5364211.1355532620.1565472027-2065229105.1565472027> accessed 15 August 2016 26 Ibid 
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involves a private negotiation between a company and its creditors for the purpose of 
debt restructuring without resorting to formal insolvency rules.28  Workout has emerged 
as a popular practice around the world and become one of important elements for an 
efficient insolvency system under the guidance of the UNCITRAL and the World 
Bank.29 An example of workout is the London Approach, which is a set of principles 
developed by the Bank of England for guiding debt restructuring among bank 
creditors.30 Turnaround and workout generally include activities such as reforming 
management, reducing the company assets by selling unprofitable ones, cutting cost and 
restructuring debts.31 
3.2.3 Relationship between formal and informal rescue 
Formal and informal rescue are essential elements of an effective rescue system 
and a distressed company can rely on both to solve its financial difficulty more 
effectively.32 The informal rescue, with certain advantages such as flexibility and 
protection of the company reputation, is often the company’s first resort. If the informal 
rescue attempts fail, the formal rescue will be initiated to continue the rescue process. It 
is suggested by the World Bank that a legal system should consider issues relating to the 
continuum of the informal rescue and the formal rescue.33 For example, if a company 
participates in informal rescue with good faith, this can be considered as the basis for 
dismissing a creditor’s petition to open formal insolvency procedure to avoid the 
 
27 Ibid. 23 28 Belcher (n2), at 23 29 UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004), at 238 and the World Bank, ‘Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes’, at 14 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/5807554-1357753926066/ICRPrinciples-Jan2011%5bFINAL%5d.pdf>, accessed 16 August 2016 30 The Bank of England, ‘London Approach’, <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/qb/1993/qb93q1110115.pdf > accessed 20 August 2016 31 Finch (n5) at 317-321 32 The World Bank, Out of Court Restructuring, part III.5 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/OutOfCourtDebtRestructuringBeforeTypesetting.pdf> accessed 1 September 2016 33 Ibid. para 103 
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holdout problem.34 Furthermore, the formal rescue should be well designed to deal with 
problems arising upon failure of the informal rescue. For example, transactions such as 
payment to some creditors under the informal rescue can constitute a preference and can 
be avoided under the formal rescue.35  
3.3 The basis for initiating rescue procedures 
3.3.1 The application of the cash flow test and the balance sheet test 
Insolvency of a company is determined by the application of the two primary 
tests, the cash flow test and the balance sheet test.36 Under the cash flow test, a company 
becomes insolvent when it is unable to pay debts when they become due.37 Under the 
balance sheet test, a company is considered to be insolvent when its total assets are 
insufficient to satisfy its total liabilities.38 The two tests have an important role of 
gatekeeping insofar as it determines whether a company is insolvent, which is the 
prerequisite requirement to initiate insolvency procedures.39 As one of procedures 
dealing with the insolvency of a company, rescue is initiated upon the satisfaction of the 
tests.40 Generally, the two tests are employed by insolvency legislation as a basis for 
determining if a company is insolvent.41 However, it is not all cases that the two tests 
are provided for in legislation. For example, while the UK and Canadian insolvency 
 
34 Ibid. para 103 35 Ibid. 16(c) 36 RM Goode (n14) at 112-115 37 Ibid. at 114 38 Ibid. 39 R.J Wood (n14), at 16-7 40 For example, the insolvency test is a condition to initiate rescue procedures in three jurisdictions, see s.123 Insolvency Act 1986 (the UK) and s.2 ‘insolvency person’ Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada) and art. 4.1 Bankruptcy Law 2014 (Vietnam). The exception for this is the Scheme of Arrangement under the Company Act 2006 of the UK, which does not require a company to satisfy the tests to be eligible for rescue the procedure. 41 For example, among the selected jurisdictions, the UK and Canada apply two tests to determine insolvency ground, see section 123 Insolvency Act 1986 and section.2 “insolvent person” Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 1985  
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legislation employ both tests,42 Vietnamese insolvency law employs only the cash flow 
test.43  
3.3.1.1 The cash flow test 
The cash flow test is satisfied as long as there is evidence that a company is 
unable to pay debts when they become due.44 A proper understanding of the test 
requires giving clarification to the elements of ‘debt’, ‘due’ and ‘unable to pay’. 
Experience from case law has provided some guidance for examining the cash flow test 
in order to deal with these matters. For ‘debts’, a debt here must be a liquidated claim, 
which is an ascertainable claim.45 Therefore, an unliquidated claim, such as damages for 
breach of contract must be excluded from the calculation.46 It must be noted that only 
due debts are the subject of the calculation under the cash flow test.47 ‘Due’ is viewed as 
an element of presence and futurity. ‘Due’ is the element of presence in the sense that it 
refers to the debts that are both existing and immediately payable.48 ‘Due’ has the 
element of futurity as it refers to the existing but immature debt.49 The court may 
examine the debt due in the future to determine the insolvent status of a company.50 
However, there is a degree of uncertainty pertaining to taking debts due in the future 
into the calculation because not all contingent and prospective debts will be considered 
 
42 Ibid. 43 However, it is a special feature of Vietnamese insolvency that a company is considered to be insolvent until it is unable to pay a debt, however, within three months from the maturity date (art. 4.1, the Bankruptcy Law 2014) 44 Statutory wordings of the test may be different but carry the same meaning. For example, under English insolvency legislation, s. 123(e) provide that a company is deemed unable to pay its debts if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due; under Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law (BIA), s. 2(1) provides that insolvent person is one that for any reason is unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due or who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due 45 Stooke v. Taylor (1880) 5 Q.B.D 596 at 575 46 Goode (n14) at 124 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 125 50 Re Cheyne Finance Ltd [2007] EWHC 2402 (Ch), cited by Goode, Ibid. 
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and this depends on the circumstances pertaining to companies on a case-by-case 
basis.51 
For ‘unable to pay’, determining this element requires the consideration into a 
number of issues that are based on the commercial reality.52 The consideration cannot 
be merely confined to the cash resources of a company,53 rather, assets of a company 
are a subject of a careful calculation to determine which assets can be realisable and 
liquidated to pay the debts in a short time.54 Furthermore, the consideration is extended 
to the whole financial position of a company; for example, the current revenue and net 
cash of a company are also examined.55 The evidence of a temporary lack of liquidity is 
not sufficiently qualified as proof of insolvency because in examining commercial 
reality, the important issues are whether a company is able to continue to operate its 
business and whether it is able to continue to pay its debts.56 Although there can be 
more technical issues pertaining to the cash flow test when its components are broken 
down, in reality, the test is easy to apply because the court looks at the company’s 
actual ability to pay debts when a demand has been made.57 If a creditor cannot make 
payment for due debts when a creditor has served a demand, this is sufficient to 
constitute the proof of insolvency for petitioning a winding-up order or administration 
order.58 
3.3.1.2 The balance sheet test 
 
51 Ibid. and A. Keay and P. Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal (Jordans, 3rdedn, 2012) at 19 52 Sandell v. Porter 115 CLR 666 (Australian case) 53 Ibid.  para 15 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 (Federal Court of Australia) 57 This is observed by Keay and Walton (n51) in Re Camburn Petroleum Products Ltd [1979] 3 All ER 297 at 307 and Re Taylor’s Industrial Flooring Ltd [1990] BCC 44, CA 58 Ibid. 
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The balance sheet test provides that a company is insolvent when its total assets 
are insufficient to discharge all liabilities.59 The test is used to establish evidence for a 
number of insolvency orders, including the administration order, the contribution order 
for wrongful trading, the order for avoidance of undervalue or preference transactions, 
and the order for disqualification of directors under the UK law.60 The test is undertaken 
by calculating the company’s assets and liabilities and then comparing whether the 
value of the liabilities outweighs the value of the assets. However, similar to the cash-
flow test, the application of the balance sheet test is not problem-free because of the 
difficulty associated with the valuation of assets and liabilities. Regarding the asset 
valuation, assets can be valued by either a fair valuation or disposal of assets under a 
fairly conducted sale.61 Principally, the assets taken into account must be subject to the 
current ownership of the company and the prospective or contingent assets in the future 
are excluded. However, whether the value at the starting point in the balance sheet or 
the current value should be considered is a key question. The court can rely on the latter 
in the case some assets have depreciated in value.62 For the liability, the test takes into 
account all liabilities, including contingent and prospective liabilities.63 The term 
‘liability’ under the balance sheet test is construed broadly, embracing debts and 
contingent and prospective claims for the purposes of protecting long-term creditors.64 
However, calculating contingent and prospective liabilities is not an easy task because 
this depends on the possibility of occurring these liabilities in the future.65  
 
59 Goode (n14) at 129 60 s.123 and s.124 (UK IA 1896)  61 Wood, (n14) 20 62 633746 Ontario Inc. (Trustee of) v. Salvati (1990), 79 C.B.R (N.5) 72 (Ont. H.C.J) 63 Goode (n14) at 145 64 Wood (n14) at 21 65 Notwithstanding this fact, professor Goode has offered two ways to calculate a contingent liability. See Goode (n14) 146-147 
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There is a degree of uncertainty in applying the balance sheet test. In practice, 
the mere fact that liabilities outweigh assets is not a conclusive evidence for insolvency. 
In BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail, the determinative evidence the Court 
of Appeal wants to see from the balance sheet test is that the insolvent company has 
reached the point of no return.66 However, the UK Supreme Court has rejected the 
formulation of point of no return, ruling instead that a company is insolvent under the 
balance sheet test when it has insufficient assets to be able to meet all of its liabilities, 
including prospective and contingent liabilities when they eventually fall due.67 The 
ruling invites the inference that since the cash-flow test deals with the currently due 
debts and the debts due in reasonably near future, the eventually due debts under the 
ruling must be seen as medium or long-term debts; therefore, the balance sheet test has 
a nature of medium and long-term liquidity test.68 Nevertheless, the UK Supreme Court 
states that the determination on whether a company is insolvent under the test must 
depend on the evidence of specific circumstances of a company on a case-by-case 
basis.69 
3.3.2 The role of insolvency tests in rescue 
The two insolvency tests have a gatekeeping goal in deciding which procedures 
should apply to an insolvent company.70 However, in selecting an appropriate 
insolvency test, the cash-flow test appears as a more favourable one. Guidance of the 
UNCITRAL on insolvency legislation states that where insolvent law adopts a single 
test, it should be based on the debtor’s inability to pay debts as they mature and not on 
 66 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v. Eurosail-UK [2011] EWCA Civ 227 67 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and others (Respondents) v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL PLC (Appellant) [2013] UKSC 28 68 Paul Sidle, ‘The Supreme Court confirms that the ‘balance sheet insolvency’ test is fact-specific, focussing on whether there will eventually be a deficiency’,  <http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/mkt/london/Supreme_Court_in_Eurosail_copy.pdf> accessed 26 October 2016  69 The Eurosail Case, (n67) para 38 70 See Wood (n14) at 16-7 
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the balance sheet test.71 Because the balance sheet test suffers from a number of 
disadvantages, it should not be used as the single test.72 Similarly, the World Bank 
recommends that ‘the preferred test for insolvency should be the debtors’ inability to 
pay debts as they come due’, which means the cash-flow test.73 
An important question regarding the application of the insolvency tests in rescue 
is that should the tests be a mandatory requirement for initiation of rescue procedures, 
or should rescue procedures be initiated even before a company satisfies the insolvency 
tests? It is recognised by the R3 that the success of corporate rescue large depends on 
whether it takes place at an early stage of a company’s distress; therefore, rescue should 
be conducted before a company falls into insolvency.74 However, making an early 
decision of rescue prior to insolvency is not purely a task for legislators, rather it 
depends greatly on the expertise of the company’s directors who could practically 
understand the company’s circumstances through day-by-day management. Therefore, 
the issue of initiating early rescue appears to be relevant to the informal rescue rather 
than the formal rescue. However, it is cautious that initiating early rescue could be an 
unsound business decision that brings about distortion to the normal operation of a 
company.75 Regarding the formal rescue, approving rescue procedures prior to the 
satisfaction of the insolvency tests should be a matter subject to court discretion. Where 
rescue law confers a debtor company certain advantages, early initiation of rescue 
 
71 UNCITRAL (n29) at 61  72 Ibid. at.60  73 The World Bank Principle and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights System, 2001, at.8 74 R3 – Association of Business Recovery Professional, ‘Understanding Insolvency’, October 2008, p.3 <https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/publications/public/Understanding_insolvency_-_October_2008.pdf > accessed 2 November 2016 75 Henry Peter, ‘Bankruptcy and Reorganisation trigger criteria: from retrospective (balance sheet) to a prospective (cash flow) test’. In Henry Peter, Nicolas Jeandin, and Jason Kiborn, The Challenges of Insolvency Reform in the 21 Century (Schulthess Juristischen Medien, 2006) at .37 
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procedures can be open to abuse and unfairness because the company can use the 
advantages provided for by the law to distort the competition with its competitors.76  
3.4 Importance of corporate rescue law 
3.4.1 Different views on the role of rescue law from contemporary legal 
scholarship 
As mentioned in the literature chapter,77 legal scholars who have attempted to 
justify insolvency law from a theoretical basis are classified as traditionalists and 
proceduralists.78 These scholars hold contrasting views towards the issue of whether the 
insolvency law should focus on the corporate rescue option. The traditionalist scholars 
are those who identify themselves with the following features.79 First, they advocate 
corporate rescue because of its important role in preserving the company, protecting the 
employment and stabilising the economy.80 Second, for traditionalists, though the 
interest of creditors and other parties should be taken into account, rescue law should be 
designed in a manner that has limited effects on creditors and other parties who decide 
to do business with the debtor company prior to insolvency.81 Third, in order to 
implement the rescue procedure effectively, traditionalists recognise the essential role of 
judges. Given the diversity of rescue cases with different facts and circumstances, 
 
76 R3 Association of Business Recovery Professionals, ‘US ‘Chapter 11’: Should it be adopted in the UK?’ <https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/policy_papers/corporate_insolvency/R3_Chapter_11_briefing_(October_2015).pdf> accessed 5 November 2017 77 See Chapter Two (2.1.1 Two different schools of thought justifying the introduction of insolvency and rescue law) 78 D. G. Bair ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale Law Journal, 573 79 For the prominent scholars of this group see, Karen Gross, ‘Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System’ (1997) 248-49; Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’, (1991) 91Colom. L. Rev. 717; Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy policy, (1987); 54 U. Chicago Law Review. 775; Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘Searching for Reorganization Realities’, (1994) 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257 80 Ibid 81 D.G. Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale Law Journal 573   
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judges should be granted with a wide range of discretional authority to deal with rescue 
on a case by case basis.82  
In contrast with the traditionalists, the proceduralists83 are of the opinion that the 
survival of a company is a matter subject to market forces, instead of being decided by 
rescue law.84 A company fails because it is unable to compete in the market, thus it 
should be liquidated to give way for more effective companies to prosper. The 
proceduralists believe that companies deserving protection of rescue law should be the 
ones in financial distress rather than economic distress.85 Specifically, a company in 
financial distress is a well-operated company but has been facing financial difficulty, for 
example, not having enough money to pay its creditors despite good business 
operation.86 However, a company in economic distress is one that has been losing its 
competitiveness or one that is not strong enough to survive in hard times of the 
market.87 A company that is viable but has presently faced financial difficulty deserves 
rescue; yet, a company that is unable to compete in the market deserves to be eliminated 
and give way to more effective companies to operate in the market.88 Rescue law does 
more harm than good if its goal is to preserve any companies failing in the market.89 
Additionally, the proceduralists pay more attention to the effects of the law on the 
parties before insolvency, especially the effects of the law on the behaviour of those 
who made investment in the company.90 For them, insolvency law should protect the 
 
82 Ibid. 579 83 For the prominent scholars of this group, see T. H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University Press,1986), Douglas G. Baird, ‘A World without Bankruptcy’ (1987) 50 Law and Contemporary Problems, 183-85 84 Baird (n78) at 578 85 Ibid. 581 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 578, and Douglas G. Baird and Thomas Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 The University of Chicago Law Review, 102 90 Baird (n78) 578 
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rights of the parties before the occurrence of insolvency instead of the rights arising 
after insolvency, otherwise, companies are likely to pursue ineffective courses of action 
before reaching the insolvency forum.91 Furthermore, the proceduralists take the view 
that judges in rescue should be a ‘disinterested arbiter’ who has the role of controlling 
weaknesses associated with rescue procedures under which different parties have 
different interests needed to be protected, thus judges should not be granted a wide 
range of discretion to deal with the insolvency affairs.92 
As such, there is a sharp distinction between the traditionalists and the 
proceduralists regarding the mandate of rescue law. The traditionalists recognise the 
need for the law to rescue a failing company but the proceduralists do not. Much of the 
debate between these scholars has been carried out and neither parties win or lose.93 
Values of the debate between the traditionalists and the proceduralists lie in the attempts 
looking for answers to the questions of what are the goals of rescue law, which interest 
the rescue law should represent for and how the law should be designed to achieve the 
goals. Theoretically, a rescue law drafted under the influence of traditionalists’ idea will 
focus on the interests of a wide range of parties in insolvency and therefore tend to defer 
the rescue decision with a reliance on judicial expertise in implementing the procedure. 
By contrast, a rescue law based on proceduralists’ viewpoint inclines to take into 
consideration the interest of creditors and favouring a sale of the debtor company to 
make distributions to creditors.  
3.4.2 Important role of rescue law 
3.4.2.1 The change of insolvency legislative focus from liquidation to corporate 
rescue  
 
91 Robert K. Rasmussen, ‘The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives’, (1994) 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 1159, 1163 92 Baird (n78) 579 93 Ibid. 
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Insolvency law was originally created to primarily deal with liquidation or 
winding-up of insolvent companies.94 The law objective was mainly perceived in terms 
of maximising creditors return through selling the company’s assets and distributing the 
proceeds to creditors.95 However, changes in the economy have invited the adoption of 
a new philosophy that underpins the existence of insolvency law.96 The objective of 
maximising the creditor’s return of insolvency law has been pursued no longer by the 
way of liquidation, but by the way of preservation of the going-concern value of an 
insolvent company.97 This is consistent with the fact that the determination of a 
company’s value currently is not based merely on its physical assets but also intangible 
assets, such as know-how and goodwill.98 The mandate of insolvency law is no longer 
viewed as serving creditor’s interest but it is extended to serve wider social-economic 
interests, including employment, customers, tax collection and the economy.99  
The philosophical change regarding the role of insolvency law gives rise to the 
so-called ‘rescue culture’ which supports the recognition of corporate rescue as a goal in 
the making of insolvency law.100 What an insolvency law or rescue law should do is to 
preserve and enhance the value of a company. Harmer identifies two common principal 
tasks a rescue law should achieve, which are ‘preservation of the income-producing 
business of the enterprise and the reduction, rescheduling of debt (for example, by 
write-off or by conversion of debt into equity) according to the realistic capacity of the 
enterprise to bear it’.101 Yet, the rescue outcomes should not always mean saving a 
company and fully restoring it to the normal stage prior to its distress although this may 
 94 R.M. Goode (n14) at 9-11 95 Jackson (n83) Chapter 1 96 R.W. Hamer, ‘Comparison of Trends in National Law: The Pacific Rim’ (1997) 23 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 139-165 97 R.W. Hamer, Ibid. 144 98 International Monetary Fund, ‘Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures’ (1999) at 14  99 Finch (n5) 246 100 M. Hunter, ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture’ (1999) 104 Commercial Law Journal, 426 101 R.W. Harmer (n96), at 146 
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be the case of rescue outcome.102 Instead, what rescue should function is to create a 
proper environment where the two goals could be achieved in harmony with 
contemporary and economic thoughts.103  
3.4.2.2 Company Rescue and Business Rescue 
Insolvency law has shifted its focus from liquidation to rescuing companies, and 
the justification for rescue law is to preserve the going-concern value of the company.104 
However, there is a distinction between ‘company rescue’ and ‘business rescue’. It is 
generally understood that a company is a separate legal entity from its owners, 
incorporated under company legislation and carries out a business for profit.105 Business 
is commercial activities performed by a company, or more exactly by the people of the 
company – management and employment staff, and the business can be transferable 
from the original owner to new owners.106 Company rescue or ‘pure rescue’ means 
preserving the whole company intact with the same operation, management, workforce 
and especially the same ownership.107 Meanwhile, rescuing a business is perceived as 
preserving viable part or productive part of a company, making it survive under new 
ownership.108 Therefore, while company rescue attempts to preserve a company as a 
whole, business rescue emphasises the preservation of the going-concern of a company 
through a complete sale or partial sale. 109 
The philosophy of ‘company rescue’ and ‘business rescue’ has an influence on 
the shaping of the objectives of a rescue law. If encouraging investment in 
 
102 Ibid. 144 103 Ibid. 146 104 McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law: An Anglo-American Perspective (Edward Elgar, 2008), at 3 105 Salomon v Salomon & Company Ltd [1897] AC 2 106 Sandra Frisby, ‘In search of a Rescue Regime: The enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 67(2) Modern Law Review, at 248, and Bo Xie, Comparative Insolvency Law: The Pre-pack Approach in Corporate Rescue (Edward Elgar, 2016) at 4-5 S. Frisby, Ibid. 249 108 Ibid. 249 109 Ibid. 
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entrepreneurship is a favourable strategy, rescue law can be designed following the 
spirit of the ‘company rescue’, which offers protection to the owners of a company. An 
example of this is Chapter 11 of United States (US) Bankruptcy law under which 
shareholders are granted rights in insolvency proceedings. As examined by Moss, 
‘where in reality there is nothing properly left for shareholders, this seems to enable 
them to use blocking tactics so as to extract value from the situation in which equitably 
they should receive none.’110 In contrast to the ‘company rescue’ approach, a rescue law 
based on the ‘business rescue’ tends to favour saving business and protecting 
employment. For example, UK insolvency law does not confer shareholders significant 
rights as Chapter 11 and the rationale is that shareholders bear lower-cost risk than 
employees and business partners.111 Instead, the UK law places more on saving the 
business, preserving employment and protecting the wider business community.112 
3.5 Models of rescue administration 
3.5.1 Three models of rescue administration 
Corporate rescue involves the participation of different actors who play very 
different roles in rescue procedures, such as company directors, creditors, courts and 
insolvency practitioners (IPs).  For example, the company directors hold the best 
knowledge and skills regarding the company’s operation, thus they are well prepared to 
design rescue plans and negotiate with creditors. IPs who are experts will assist the 
directors in drafting rescue plans and at the same time act as court officers to monitor 
the rescue procedure; the courts stand at the apex of an insolvency system with the 
power to approve or reject the insolvency application, adjudicate disputes among parties 
and monitor the parties’ compliance with the law. As for creditors, though not 
 110 G. Moss, ‘Chapter 11 - an English lawyer’s critique’, (1998) 17 Insolvency Intelligence, 18  111 Ibid. and Finch (n5) 288 112 Ibid. 
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participating in the administration of insolvency, they have a significant role in deciding 
the fate of rescue in that they will decide the approval of a rescue plan and provide the 
rescue finance to implement the plan. Models of rescue administration differ from each 
other in the extent to which these actors have different participation in controlling 
rescue procedures. The following discussion on models of rescue administration largely 
relies on the works of Hahn and Rotem.113 Based on the examination on rescue law of 
the US and the UK, Hahn determined that the two main models of rescue 
administration, namely the DIP model and the PIP model or the trustee model.114 Rotem 
makes an additional contribution to Hahn’s work that there is also the hybrid model of 
the DIP and PIP, which is reflected under Canadian rescue law.115 
 3.5.1.1 The Debtor-in-Possession model (DIP model) 
The DIP is a model under which the current board of directors remains in 
control of the company and they have a significant role in preparing a rescue plan and 
implementing it, which is the reflection of core principles of Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code.116 As remaining in office during rescue, the directors will control the 
company’s operation and make important decisions regarding daily business activities. 
In implementing a rescue, the directors will carry out a course of negotiations between 
the company and its creditors. The company directors also play a major role in deciding 
whether to keep carrying rescue or apply for liquidation procedure.117 However, the 
 
113 David Hahn, ‘Concentrated Ownership and Control of Corporate Reoganizations’, (2004) 4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 117, and Yaad Rotem, ‘Contemplating a Corporate Governance Model for Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Lessons from Canada’ (2008) 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 125 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924598> accessed 10 November  2016 114 Hahn, Ibid. at 121-127 115 Rotem, Ibid. at 13-15 116 11 U.S. Code § 1107. See Hahn (n106) at 123 and Gerard McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue: An Anglo-American Evaluation’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 517-18 117 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) 
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company directors do not absolutely enjoy a wide latitude of power, they are subject to 
the supervision of the creditors and the courts.118  
The DIP model is distinct for not only the central role of the management board 
but also the way to monitor the rescue to avoid power abuse by the board. The 
monitoring role is performed by judges,119 who hold key responsibilities and largely 
contribute to the efficiency of the procedure. For example, judges can expedite rescue 
by screening the rescue application to refuse the rescue application without or with a 
low prospect of success.120 Judges are entitled to hear matters relating to the review of 
director’s decisions that may prejudice the interest of other parties or decision outside 
the ordinary course of business.121 Especially, judges are granted the power to replace 
the management board with a court-appointed official in case there is a necessary need 
to do so.122 
 The employment of the DIP models is justified on the ground that retaining the 
company directors will benefit rescue in key aspects. In the first place, as the directors 
have already run the company for a certain duration of time, they are familiar with the 
operation of the company.123 Giving the directors a chance to continue their 
management during rescue allows the company to avoid indirect costs because if the 
directors are replaced with IPs, these outsider professionals have to invest time and 
resources to get used to with every aspect of the company’s operation.124 In addition, 
the conflict of interest between the management board and the outsiders could prevent 
 
118 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000) and 11 U.S.C. § 1103 119 The law also entrusts monitoring role to creditor committee, but the role of court in this model is a dominantly significant feature of the law. See , Lynn M. LoPucki and Gorge G. Triantis, ‘A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies’ (1994) 35 Harv. Int'l. L. J. 267, 305 120 Lynn M. LoPucki and Gorge G. Triantis, Ibid. 284 121 U.S.C Bankruptcy Code § 363(b)(1) 122 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (a) (2000) 123 Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, ‘Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy of Large, Publicly Held Companies’ (1993) 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 694  124 David A. Skeel, Jr., ‘Market, Court, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory’, 1993 Wis. L. REV.465, at 517 & n.188. 
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effective cooperation necessary for accomplishing a successful rescue.125 For example, 
in fear of losing their employment, directors may not disclose the financial situation of 
the company in a timely manner, or they tend to decline to provide the information 
required by IPs.126 
However, these advantages do not mean that the DIP model can freely escape 
criticism. Opponents of the DIP model argue that failure of a company is attributed to 
unsound business decisions of the management board in the first place, thus it is highly 
risky to allow them to keep their position because the board can gamble the future of the 
company again.127 This is likely to open the door for litigation if creditors find a 
business decision made by the directors prejudices their interest. Furthermore, it seems 
not to be convincing to claim that the company directors are the only party who 
possesses sufficient skill and expertise to run the firm in rescue because for some 
companies there is no requirement for management board to hold special skills.128 Thus, 
the replacement of the board with outside IPs does not cause much of disruption or 
cost.129 Another threat associated with the deployment of the DIP model is that it may 
create incentives for many non-viable companies to be rescued but they are unable to 
survive because of the poor management of the directors.130 
3.5.1.2 The Professional-in-Possession (PIP) model  
The PIP model represents a distinguishable feature of the administration 
procedure of the UK IA 1986.131 The trustee model offers a contrasting approach to the 
DIP model in that outside IPs will be appointed and replace the company directors in 
 
125 LoPucki & Triantis (n119) at 304-305 126 Ibid.  127 Lynn M. LoPucki, ‘The Trouble with Chapter11’ (1993) Wis. L. Rev. 729, at 732-34 128 LoPucki and Triantis (n119) 304 129 Ibid. 130 Empirical Study by C.G. Fisher & Jocelyn Martel, ‘Empirical Estimates of Filtering Failure in Court Supervised Reorganization’, (2004)1 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. 143  131 IA 1986, Schedule B1 
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operating the company and its business.132 The IPs are in charge with proposing and 
implementing a rescue plan. In doing so, IPs must possess a certain degree of expertise 
necessary and that is the reason why IPs are required to hold a license to practice their 
profession.133  
An advantage of the PIP model is that allowing IPs to take control of the 
company may avoid the management problem associated with abusive conduct of the 
directors because IPs are required to act in the best interests of all creditors.134 However, 
there are certain concerns regarding the operation of this model.  The company directors 
are likely to hide the company crisis and delay the filing for rescue due to the fear that 
they will lose their job upon the appointment of the IPs.135 At the same time, they are 
likely to take highly risky business decisions with the hope that they can rescue the 
company without relying on formal rescue proceedings.136 These risky attempts have a 
danger of exacerbating the company crisis and makes it more difficult for IPs when they 
participate to rescue the company. In order to tackle this problem, penalties can be 
imposed on the offenders such as monetary penalty or director disqualification.137 This 
has a counter-effect because in couple with removing directors from office, imposing 
severe punishment cannot create incentives for the company directors to actively 
contribute to the rescue.138 
3.5.1.3 The hybrid model  
 
132 For example, these powers are granted to an administrator under Schedule B1, English Insolvency Act 1986 133 For example, in the UK, IPs must hold a license issued by a professional recognised body (PRB) to practice in insolvency. Currently, there are five PRBs in the UK. See <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/insolvency-practitioners-recognised-professional-bodies/recognised-professional-bodies> accessed 13 August 2018 134 See IA 1986, Schedule B1, para 3(2) 135 D. Hahn (n113) at 139 136 Ibid.  137 See s.214 UK Insolvency Act 1986 (IA1986) and s.6 and 10, the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 in the UK. 138 Hahn (n113) at 140-41 
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Due to the shortcomings of the DIP and PIP models, scholars have attempted to 
propose a hybrid model with a combination of characteristics of the two models. Under 
the hybrid model, both the company directors and IPs have roles to play in rescue 
administration.139 Adams proposes a hybrid model under which a trustee will be 
appointed and the company directors remain in their position.140 However, the trustee 
has limited participation by holding decisions on whether a company should be rescued 
or liquidated, leaving the management power still in hands of the directors.141 With this 
model, the company directors continue their role of running the business, thereby 
reducing the cost and disruption caused by the trustee’s unfamiliarity with the company 
in case they take control of the company.142 Yet, this does not mean that all problems 
are solved. There is a warning that dishonest trustees may elect to rescue a company in 
an attempt to get a higher rate of fee than in the case they decide to liquidate a 
company.143  
Hahn proposes another hybrid model, which is ‘the integrated co-determination 
model’, featuring the participation of both the company directors and the trustee.144 The 
unique feature of this model is that the trustee will be appointed by a judge145 and 
occupies one seat in the management team, which allows him to have a veto in respect 
of all matters voted by the board.146 However, the trustee will not interfere with 
decisions made by the directors in the ordinary course of business. As a member of the 
management team, the trustee can work along with the directors on matters ranging 
from negotiating to drafting rescue plans. A rescue plan drafted by both the trustee and 
 139 Ibid. and Edward S. Adams, ‘Governance in Chapter 11 Reoganizations: Reducing Costs, Improving Results’, 73 B.U. L. REv. 581, 621-23 (1993) 140 Adams, Ibid. 621 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 622 143 Ibid.  144 David Hahn, (n106) 147-49 145 Ibid. 148 146 Ibid.  
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the management board can ensure the fairness in so far as the directors acting for the 
interests of shareholders will be balanced with the trustee acting disinterestedly as an 
independent objective party for the interest of all parties in rescue.147 In addition, 
allowing the management to retain their power can avoid the problem of the trustee’s 
unfamiliarity with the company operation, thus reduce cost and disruption.148 However, 
this model has to accompany the facilitation of cooperation between the trustee and the 
directors in case of conflicts. The trustee can exercise the veto power to reject a decision 
by directors if there is no agreement reached but exercising the veto power cannot 
always solve the problem efficiently, rather, there must be a mechanism to resolve their 
disputes.  
In recognition of the advantageous features pertaining to the hybrid model, 
Rotem finds the optimal hybrid model should be the one employed under the 
Companies’ Creditor Arrangement Act (CCAA) of Canada.149 According to Rotem’s 
examination, the hybrid model under the CCAA provides for the participation of both 
company directors and the IP (the monitor). This model is different from the ones 
proposed by Adams and Hahn in that the monitor does not participate in the decision-
making process, instead, he plays an intermediary role in assisting the directors in 
carrying out rescue and at the same time monitoring and reporting to the court on the 
rescue progress.150 By not taking part in the day-to-day management of the company, 
the monitor will not distort the business decision-making and this also reduces direct 
costs for the company.151 
 
147 Ibid. 148 Ibid.  149 Rotem (n113) and Canadian Companies’ Creditor Arrangement Act 1985, <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-36/> accessed 20 November 2016 150 For general duties of the monitor, see CCAA, s.23(1) 151 Rotem, Ibid. at 142 
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To summarise the discussion, there are three models of administrative control in 
rescue, namely the DIP model, the PIP model and the hybrid model. The different levels 
of participation of parties in rescue administration render these models distinct from 
each other. The issues dealt with by these models are how to operate the company in 
rescue and how to monitor the rescue. While the DIP model and the PIP model have 
certain shortcomings in response to the issues, the hybrid model seems to be a more 
efficient approach. However, the hybrid model has different versions and the most 
efficient one should carry the features of inducing sound business decisions in operating 
the company and enhancing the monitoring over the company rescue. 
3.5.2 Reflection of models of rescue administration in the laws of the UK, 
Canada and Vietnam 
This section aims to provide an overview of rescue law in the UK,152 Canada, 
and Vietnam by addressing main rescue procedures under insolvency legislation of 
these countries and how these procedures reflect the models of rescue administration as 
discussed above. 
3.5.2.1 Rescue law in the UK 
The main legislation providing for corporate rescue in the UK is the Insolvency Act 
1986 (IA 1986).153 Another legislation that governs corporate rescue in the UK is the 
Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006).154 It is a distinguishable trait of the UK rescue law that 
there is a diverse approach to corporate rescue, which introduces three different rescue 
 
152 For the purpose of this thesis, as mentioned in the introduction chapter, the UK is referred to England and Wales and the UK insolvency law is the insolvency law of England and Wales. 153The Insolvency Act 1986, hereinafter referred as to the IA 1986 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/45/contents> accessed 20 November 2016 154 The company Act 2006 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents> accessed 20 November 2016 
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procedures, namely the administration155, the company voluntary arrangements (CVAs) 
under IA 1986156 and the schemes of arrangement under section 895 of the CA 2006. 
 The administration is the most popular rescue procedure in the UK. Under this 
procedure, an administrator will be appointed and replace the company directors in 
management.157 However, the administrator will not undertake the rescue in a 
straightforward manner, rather he has to perform his functions to pursue hierarchical 
objectives, (1) to rescue the company as a going concern, or (2) to achieve a better 
result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the company were 
wound up, or (3) to realise the company’s property in order to make a distribution to 
one or more secured or preferential creditors.158 Though rescue is stated as the first 
objective, the administrator will not pursue it if he considers it is unlikely to do it or 
other options can yield more benefits to creditors. Once deciding which option is the 
best for the company, the administrator is in charge with drafting a proposal to deal with 
the company’s insolvent affair and presenting it to creditors who will decide the 
approval of the proposal with their voting.159 The administration procedure has the 
nature of the PIP model in that the administrator will replace the current directors in the 
management of the company.160 The administrator plays a very important role in the 
administration insofar as he acts as an officer of the court161 and an agent of the 
company.162 He has important rights and obligations in performing his functions, such 
 
155 IA 1986: Sch.B1 156 IA 1986: Part 1 and SchA1 157 IA 1986: SchB1, para 59(1) 158 Ibid. para 3 159 Ibid. para 49(5) and para 51 160 Ibid. Para 59(1) 161 Ibid. para 4  162 Ibid. para 69  
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as drafting the proposal,163 controlling the administration process and managing the 
company’s affair and assets and removing the company directors in management.164 
Another rescue procedure regulated by the IA 1986 is the CVA.165 Under this 
procedure, a debtor company negotiates with its creditors to come up with an agreement 
on how to pay its debts.166 The CVA can be initiated by nominating an IP to act as a 
nominee, who then works with the company directors to prepare a rescue proposal. The 
proposal will be decided by creditors at a creditor meeting167 and it will be implemented 
provided it obtains enough creditor approval.168 The CVA is the reflection of the hybrid 
model of the DIP and the PIP model insofar as the company directors are allowed to 
stay in management, however, the IP will monitor the progress of the arrangement and 
distribute the dividend to creditors.169  
The SA is another rescue procedure prescribed under Part 26 of the CA 2006.170 
The SA is an arrangement between a company and its members or between a company 
and its creditors to deal with the financial difficulties of the company.171 Once legally 
approved by its member or its creditors, a SA needs to be sanctioned by the court to 
have a binding effect on the members or the creditors of the company.172 The SA 
follows the DIP model in that the directors are permitted to keep in their management 
position and there is a high level of judicial involvement to monitor the procedure. A 
special feature of the SA is that it is regulated outside the IA 1986 and it does not 
require the proof of insolvency for companies that wants to initiate this procedure. 
 
163 Ibid. para 49(5) 164 Ibid. para 59-66  165  IA 1986: Part 1 and Sch. A1 (IA 1986) 166 Ibid. s.1(1) 167 IA 1986: SchA1 168 Insolvency Rule 1986, rr.1.19 169 IA 1986: s.7 (2) 170 CA2006: Part 26, s.895-901 171 CA 2006: s. 895 172 CA 2006, s. 899 
Chapter Three - The Framework for Assessing Effectiveness of a Rescue Law  
69  
2.5.2.2 Rescue law in Canada 
There is the existence of dual rescue procedures in Canada under the Bankruptcy 
and Insolvency Act (BIA)173 and the Company Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA).174 
While the BIA rescue is a law-based procedure that adheres strictly to statutory 
provisions, the CCAA rescue is a judicial-based model that relies significantly on the 
court’s involvement. The both of the procedures follow the hybrid model that allows the 
current directors to run the company’s business in rescue, however, they are subject to 
the supervision of IPs, such as the trustee and the monitor 
The BIA procedure has a broad application to the extent that it does not impose any 
financial threshold of the amount of debt on insolvent companies, which means most 
companies can apply for it.175 There are two ways to initiate a rescue procedure under 
BIA. The first way is that the debtor company can file a proposal that has already 
developed with a licensed trustee.176 The second way, where the debtor company is 
unable to file the proposal in the first instance, is that it can initiate the procedure 
through filing a notice of attention to make a proposal with the official receiver.177 Upon 
filing the notice of intention to make a proposal, the company must select a licensed 
trustee to act as the trustee under the proposal. Both of the ways will effect an automatic 
moratorium preventing creditors from enforcing debts against the company and 
providing a breathing space for it to negotiate with the creditors.178 Following the 
hybrid model of administration control, the BIA procedure does not deprive the 
company directors of management power, however, there will be a trustee who is 
 
173 < https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/b-3/> accessed 20 November 2016 174 <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-36/> accessed 20 November 2016 175 BIA s.50(1) 176 Ibid. s.50(2) 177 Ibid. s.50.4(1). The procedure can be initiated by a trustee in bankruptcy, a receiver or a liquidator of the debtor company. 178 Ibid. s. 69.1 and s.69.1(1) 
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appointed by the debtor company but acts as a court officer to monitor the rescue 
procedure.179 
Unlike the BIA, the CCAA narrows the scope of application by imposing a 
financial threshold of the amount of debts, which is C$5million or more, on companies 
that want to initiate this procedure.180 Under the CCAA, an insolvent company enters 
into rescue by applying to the court for an initial order.181 After reviewing the 
application, the court will decide whether to refuse the application or make an initial 
order providing a stay of creditors’ claim and authorise the company to prepare a plan 
of rescue.182 When a plan of rescue is drafted, creditors will be divided into classes for 
the purpose of voting the plan. After received the creditors’ approval in a prescribed 
manner, the plan needs to be approved by the court to have a binding effect on all 
creditors of classes affected by the plan.183 Similar to the BIA, the CCAA adopts the 
hybrid model of administration which allows directors of a company to remain control 
of the company. However, the company is monitored by the monitor, who is appointed 
by the court and assists the directors in dealing with rescue related matters. The CCAA 
rescue is considered more flexible than the BIA as there is a discretionary power of 
judges who are entitled to issue orders to deal with issues emerging on a case-by-case 
basis.184 
2.5.2.3 Rescue law in Vietnam 
 
179 BIA s.50.5 180 CCAA s.3.1 181 Ibid. s.11.02(1) 182 Wood (n14) at 330-31 183 CCAA. s. 6(1) 184 Ibid. s. 11.2(1), s. 11.3 s. 11.5(1), s. 11.52, s.32, s. 36, 
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The current legislation governing corporate insolvency and rescue in Vietnam is the 
Bankruptcy Law 2014 (BL2014)185 which exclusively provides for insolvency of 
companies. Under the BL2014, when a company becomes insolvent, the company, its 
creditors or employees can file an application to the court requesting the initiation of a 
bankruptcy procedure.186 The acceptance to initiate this procedure will trigger a 
moratorium that prevents creditors from enforcing their claims against the company187. 
If the judge decides to initiate the insolvency procedure, he will appoint an IP to act as 
the asset management officer (AMO) to monitor the company’s assets and supervise the 
procedure.188 There is a meeting of creditors summoned by the judge to vote for 
whether liquidating or rescuing the company.189 If the decision of the meeting is to 
rescue the company, then the company will design a rescue plan with the assistance of 
the AMO,190 which will be approved by creditors at the second creditor meeting.191 
Where the plan is approved by creditors, it will be implemented in the period of time 
decided by the creditor meeting or the legislation.192 The rescue procedure in Vietnam 
follows the hybrid model of rescue administration insofar as it allows the directors to 
retain their management role in carrying out business activities and it provides for the 
participation of an IPs (the AMO) who will assist and monitor the company in rescue.  
 As such, at first glance, the UK appears to have the most diverse approach to 
rescue with three rescue procedures that follow different models of rescue 
administration (the administration follows the PIP model, the SA follows the DIP model 
 
185 <http://www.moj.gov.vn/vbpq/lists/vn%20bn%20php%20lut/view_detail.aspx?itemid=29059> (Vietnamese version) accessed 5 December 2016 <http://www.itpc.gov.vn/investors/how_to_invest/law/Law_on_Bankruptcy_2014_0/mldocument_view/?set_language=en> (English version) accessed 5 December 2016 186 Ibid. Art. 5 187 Ibid. Art. 41 188 Asset management asset can be an individual or a company under BL 2014, see Article 11-13 189 Ibid. Art. 83 190 Ibid. Art. 87 191 Ibid. Art. 90, 91 192 Ibid. Art. 89 
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and the CVA follows hybrid model). Canada and Vietnam similarly adopt the hybrid 
model of administration under their rescue law. However, while Canada introduces dual 
rescue procedures under two pieces of legislation, Vietnam approaches corporate rescue 
with a single procedure. Noticeably, rescues laws of all selected jurisdictions share a 
common feature in incorporating the hybrid model into rescue procedures. Despite this 
similarity, differences in legal history and social and cultural conditions in these 
countries have rendered their rescue laws to be unique products which generate a 
various degree of efficiency.193 
3.6 Measuring effectiveness of corporate rescue law 
3.6.1 Definition of the effectiveness of law and measuring the effectiveness 
of corporate rescue law  
Socio-legal scholars adopt the view of legal instrumentalism under which laws 
are considered as a pragmatic tool that regulates behaviour of people or results in social 
changes.194 Because of this social function, the success or failure of a law is evaluated 
by examining its ability to achieve the reforms initiated by the policymakers.195 Within 
this framework, legal scholars define ‘legal effectiveness’ as the ability or capacity of a 
law to fulfil its social objectives or purposes.196 According to this understanding, the 
evaluation of legal effectiveness places the emphasis on the relationship between 
legislation’s purposes and the actual results it is intended to bring about.197 In other 
 
193 This will be examined in detail in Chapter Four (UK law), Chapter Five (Canada law) and Chapter Six (Rescue laws in Vietnam) and be highlighted again in Chapter Seven (Comparison) 194 GL Priest, ‘The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards’ (1993) 91 Mich L Rev 1929, 1932  Friedman and Macaulay (1977), cited by A Sarat, ‘Legal Effectiveness and Social Studies of Law: On the Unfortunate Persistance of a Research Tradition’, (1985) 9 Legal Stud Forum, 23 195 H Xanthaki, ‘Quality of Legislation: an Achievable Universal Concept or a Utopian Pursuit?’ in M T Almeida (ed.), Quality of Legislation ( Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2011), p.7  available at <https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/4854/1/Nomos_book_Quality_of_legislation_a_utopian_pursuit.pdf>  (accessed 24 March 2020) 196 A Allots, “The Effectiveness of Laws” (1981) 15 Val. U. L. Rev. 229, at 233 197 H Xanthaki, ‘On Transferability of Legislative Solutions: The Functionality Test’ in C Stefanou and H Xanthaki (eds) Drafting Legislation. A Modern Approach (Ashgate: 2008) at 17 
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words, the examination will focus on identifying and explaining the gap between 
legislative texts (law in books) and reality (law in action).198  
However, where there is insufficient data to inform whether the post-application 
of new legislation has achieved the intended purposes, it is important for the 
examination to be directed at the quality of legislation or quality of legislative texts.199 
Legal effectiveness, which is the ability of legislation to meet the social objectives set 
by the policymakers, is considered to be the highest pursuit for legislators in the drafting 
process.200 Notwithstanding the universal understanding of the concept of 
‘effectiveness’, there remains the question of how to evaluate the ‘effectiveness’ in 
legislation.201 The most practical way to test the legal effectiveness is to determine 
whether the legislation has provided a clear set of objectives, purposes or benchmarks, 
which is often stated in preambles, general purpose provision of legislation or in policy 
papers of a party.202 If answered in the affirmative, the examination then goes further 
with assessing whether the substantive text of the legislation is aligned to its purposes 
and conducive to results.203 However, it is often the case that the purpose is not clearly 
stated in the legislation and thus efforts must be taken to identify it.204 Furthermore, 
because the legal effectiveness is a qualitative concept, the assessment of this concept 
requires researchers to attribute to it specific elements, virtues or parameters.205 
However, attributing specific values to the effectiveness are subject to a degree of 
indeterminacy as there are different values perceived to constitute ‘effectiveness’, which 
 198 A Sarat (n193) at 23 199 H Xanthaki (195) p1-9 200 Ibid. 201 Ibid. 202 M Mousmouti, ‘The “effectiveness test” as a tool for law reform’ available at <https://journals.sas.ac.uk/lawreview/article/view/2116> accessed on 24 March 2014 203Ibid. p.6 204 Ibid. p.6 205 Xanthaki (n195) p9 
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is explained by the differences in  ‘the legal, political, social, and financial parameters 
which form the legislative environment’206  
In applying the above analysis into corporate rescue law, there is understanding 
that its purpose is to rescue viable companies from the financial crisis. Therefore, 
assessing the effectiveness of rescue law is associated with examining the extent to 
which a rescue law can achieve this purpose. As effectiveness is a functional qualitative 
concept, the examination into the effectiveness of rescue law must identify specific 
values or benchmarks the law must possess in achieving its purpose – saving viable 
insolvency companies. However, different values and benchmarks can be selected to be 
criteria for the examination due to the indeterminate nature of the concept of the 
effectiveness. Therefore, the selection of appropriate benchmarks must go along with 
providing clarity into the content of the benchmarks as well as justification for the 
selection. Following this approach to effectiveness, this section begins with examining 
how contemporary scholars have established their benchmarks for evaluation of the 
effectiveness of rescue law and what are the shortcomings pertaining to their works. 
Based on the knowledge of contemporary work, the author develops his own 
benchmarks along with providing clarification and justification for his selection. 
3.6.2 Forming a set of benchmarks for evaluation of a rescue law 
3.6.2.1 Finch’s benchmarks 
Finch makes a claim that there is no need for an insolvency law to be evaluated 
if a clear mandate is already provided by the legislators and the law sufficiently 
achieves these mandates.207 However, this happens only on rare occasions for the case 
of insolvency law.208 Once the legislators do not expressly state the statutory mandates, 
 
206 Xanthaki (n195) at 9 207 V Finch ‘The Measures of Insolvency Law’ (1997) 17 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 227 at 249 208 For example, the Cork Committee, in a review of English insolvency law, proposed a set of aims which the modern insolvency law should achieve, however, these proposed objectives are not stated in 
Chapter Three - The Framework for Assessing Effectiveness of a Rescue Law  
75  
evaluating the effectiveness of an insolvency law demands the establishment of 
evaluation benchmarks.209 Following this approach, Finch proposes a way of evaluation 
with reference to four elements of efficiency, fairness, accountability and expertise.210 
Finch explains these benchmarks as follows, 
‘Efficiency’ looks to the securing of mandated ends at lowest cost; ‘expertise’ 
refers to the proper exercise of judgment by specialists; ‘accountability’ looks 
to the control of insolvency participants by democratic bodies or courts or 
through the openness of processes and their amenability to representations, 
and ‘fairness’ considers issues of substantive justice and distribution.211  
 The proposed benchmarks invite criticism on a number of fronts. First, it is the 
issue of determining precisely the meaning of ‘fairness’ in the context of insolvency 
law. Making a reference to the term ‘justice’ to clarify the term ‘fairness’ does not 
effectively work here because in the context of insolvency different parties possess 
different incentives and perspectives regarding their rights and entitlements.212 For 
example, the scheme of asset distribution can be considered to be fair by a creditor but 
can be viewed to be unfair by other creditors. Furthermore, there is no clear boundary of 
these benchmarks because the benchmark of ‘efficiency’ is seen to overlap ‘expertise’ 
and ‘accountability’ in the sense that ‘expertise’ and ‘accountability’ are components of 
‘efficiency’ instead of independent criteria.213  
Another point that opens to attack in Finch’s approach is the contention that to 
some extent it is possible for a trade-off between efficiency and fairness, which means 
 the legislation, Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558, 1982), para 129 209 Finch (n207), 235 210  Finch (n5) at 56 211 Ibid. 212 RJ Mokal, ‘On Fairness and Efficiency’ (2003), 66 MLR 452 213 Ibid. 459-462 
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that ‘fairness’ can give way to ‘efficiency’ in designing an insolvency law.214 This claim 
is heavily criticised because of its unsoundness.215 Mokal argues that while ‘efficiency’ 
represents the procedural goal of insolvency law, ‘fairness’ represents the substantive 
goal of the law,216 allowing a trade-off between ‘fairness’ and ‘efficiency’ means 
accepting that the substantive goal is less important than the procedural role.217  
Notwithstanding the above limitation, this thesis recognises good values 
proposed by Finch, such as ‘fairness’, ‘efficiency’ and ‘expertise’. Undeniably 
‘fairness’ and ‘efficiency’ should be the first benchmarks of evaluation because the law 
has to deal with competing interests of the parties involved in a fair way and this should 
be achieved with low cost to guarantee to return to creditors. In addition, ‘expertise’ is 
essential in achieving the effectiveness of a rescue law as the rescue procedure cannot 
operate effectively by those who lack skills and knowledge. However, the key issue 
emerging in Finch’s approach is that her benchmarks should be clarified and given 
contents, especially two criteria of fairness and efficiency. A benchmark should not 
only have a clear meaning but also address how rescue law should do to achieve it.218 
3.6.2.2 Rotem’s parameter for evaluating rescue law 
Based on the conventional wisdom,219 Rotem has synthesised a set of parameters 
for evaluating the effectiveness of rescue law that consists of four criteria, timely 
commencement of rescue, skills and expertise of those who control a company during 
rescue and those who devise and negotiate rescue plan, avoidance of governance 
conflict, and quality and scope of information extracted within a rescue model.220 There 
are significant similarities in the benchmarks proposed by Finch and Rotem in the 
 
214 Finch (n5) at 55-56 215 RJ Mokal, (n212) 458 216 Ibid. 217 Ibid 218 See 3.5.2.3 Benchmarks for evaluation of rescue proposed by the thesis  219 Rotem (n113) 150-152 220 Ibid. 151-152 
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following aspects. First, in Rotem’s examination, ‘avoidance of governance conflict’ 
can be viewed as another explanation to ‘fairness’ because no conflict of interest among 
parties in rescue means their rights will be kept in balance without any prejudices or 
bias arising. Second, the benchmark of ‘expertise’ is similarly recognised by both Finch 
and Rotem.221 Third, it is possible to consider ‘timely commencement’ as an 
equivalence to ‘efficiency’ criteria as ‘timely commencement’ purports to save time and 
cost arising in rescue.222 However, in comparison with Finch’s approach, the parameters 
set by Rotem has more clarity in terms of providing the content for each element instead 
of introducing ambiguous terms such as ‘fairness’ and ‘efficiency’.223 For example, 
Rotem justifies the criterion of ‘timely management’ on the ground that commencing 
corporate rescue in a timely manner will prevent the company directors from hiding the 
insolvency affairs and thus enhance the rescue success.224  
A distinct contribution of Rotem for evaluating rescue law is the introduction of 
the criterion ‘quality and scope of information extracted’.225 According to Rotem’s 
examination, there are two approaches to rescue a company.226 The first one is to rely 
on the formal rescue administrative paradigm prescribed by the legislation with the 
participation of parties such as creditors, directors, courts, and IPs.227 The second 
approach is a market-oriented one, which is to sell the company to a third party under an 
auction instead of entering into a formal rescue procedure.228 Under the latter rescue 
approach, the company will be sold as a going concern through an auction, and a third 
party who wins the auction will be the new owner of the company and the company as a 
new one without being subject to any liabilities and obligations before the company’s 
 
221 Ibid. and Finch (n5) at 56  222 Rotem, Ibid. 151 223 Ibid. 150-153 224 Ibid. at 151 225 Ibid. 152 226 Ibid. 152-153 227 Ibid. 152 228 Ibid. 153 
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insolvency.229 In making the decision whether to purchase the insolvent company, a 
potential buyer must be in a position of understanding the company situation very well 
through the possession of significant information that can inform its decision, but this 
information is not often available for him in the market.230 Therefore, it is the 
insolvency judge to make a decision whether to rescue a company under a formal legal 
procedure or sell it via an auction and in doing so, there must be an administrative 
mechanism that is capable of extracting accurate information about the company.231 
However, Rotem noted that not only the bankruptcy judge but all parties in the 
insolvency forum should be able to obtain the information, even the outsiders of the 
company.232 
This thesis disagrees with the criterion of ‘quality and scope of information 
extracted’ under Rotem’s approach for two reasons. First, the idea of selling a debtor 
company to a third party through an auction can happen before or after the company has 
entered into the rescue procedure. However, it seems to be very uncertain about the 
nature of the sale, whether it is rescue or liquidation. The sale has the nature of rescue in 
the sense that the company is sold as a going concern and transferred to a new owner, 
and the sale has the nature of liquidation in the sense that the company assets are sold 
piecemeal and this leads to termination of the company. If the sale happens before the 
company enters into the formal rescue, it is not the role of rescue law to provide 
information for potential buyers, rather the market conditions will decide if the 
company can be bought or not.233 If the sale occurs after the company enters into the 
formal rescue, the decision to sell the company does not depend only on the disclosure 
 
229 Ibid. 153 230  Lucian Arye Bebchuk,’ A New Approach to Corporate Reorganisations’ (1998)101 Harvard Law Review 775, at 776, cited by Rotem (n106) 231 Rotem (n113) at 156 232 Ibid. 157 233 A decision to buy an insolvent company is made so long as the potential buyer can possess sufficient information about the company and when the market functions well to allow the purchase. See Ibid. 154 
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of information to potential buyers but depends on the expertise of the persons 
administering the rescue procedures, who must evaluate the information and come up 
with right decisions. Second, disclosure of information about the company in insolvency 
for the purpose of achieving a better sale may not be always a sound policy for it can 
negatively affect the valuation of the company in that this information will decrease the 
business value of the company in the market. For the reasons discussed, this thesis is of 
the opinion that ‘quality and scope of information extracted’ cannot have a decisive role 
in evaluating the efficiency of a rescue law. 
3.6.3.3 Benchmarks for evaluation of rescue law proposed by this thesis 
This thesis agrees with Finch in that ‘fairness’ and ‘efficiency’ should be two 
main benchmarks for examining the effectiveness of rescue law. However, because ò 
the difficulty in construing the meaning of these benchmarks, their contents should be 
reasonably given to determine what they expect a rescue law to have. As discussed 
above, this thesis recognises some good values in the criteria proposed by Rotem.234 
Based on the works of the two scholars, this thesis develops a set of benchmarks for 
evaluating rescue law, including time and cost, expertise, abuse management and 
creditor participation. 
(i) Time and cost 
  ‘Time and cost of rescue’ should be the first benchmark for evaluation. In 
perceiving that the ultimate goal of rescue is to restore insolvent companies and make 
payments to creditors, rescue law is considered to be efficient only when it operates in a 
cost and time-saving manner.235 Apparently, relying on rescue law will not be a feasible 
option if it provides for a lengthy and costly procedure. Finch addresses that rescue law 
 
234 See 3.5.2.2 Rotem’s parameter for evaluating rescue law in this chapter 235 According to Oxford Dictionary, ‘efficiency’ is defined as ‘the quality of doing something well with no waste of time or money’, <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/efficiency?q=efficiency> accessed 12 December 2016 
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should achieve its goal at the lowest cost236 and Rotem also finds rescue law should 
provide for a timely commencement of rescue procedure.237 Time and cost relate to 
each other in that the longer rescue procedure is carried out, the more cost it will 
produce at expense of creditors. 
Regarding time of rescue, the examination will focus on whether a law contains 
provisions that allows rescue to be carried out in a time-saving manner. Specifically, 
this thesis will examine provisions regulating the time for commencing rescue 
procedures, the length of the moratorium/stay of creditor’s action and the time for 
completion of rescue.238 As for the cost, rescue law is viewed to be effective if it is able 
to maximise creditor’s return and reduce rescue costs, especially IP’s fees as this 
expense often constitutes a dominant part of the costs of rescue.239 However, it seems to 
be unlikely to obtain specific figures on creditor’s return and the payment for IP’s fees 
since these figures would be very different from case to case, which is subject to a 
thorough empirical study. Due to the unavailability of the empirical study,240 the 
examination directs at whether rescue provides a mechanism to determine IP’s fee 
appropriately, for example, the law confers creditors a right to decide this expense or to 
petition the court to adjust this fee where they find is unreasonably high.241 
(ii) Expertise 
 
236 Finch, (n5) at 56  237 Rotem (n113) 238 This examination will be applied to evaluate the effectiveness of rescue law in the selected countries in the next chapters. 239 For example, the UK Insolvency Service, in their report, found a higher a level of insolvency fee in the administration, resulted from the increase of IP fee. See the UK Insolvency Service, Enterprise Act 2002 - Corporate Insolvency Provisions: Evaluation Report (2008),  at 111, available at <https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080610162953/http:/www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/legislation/EA02CorporateInsolvencyReport.pdf> accessed 3 January 2017 240 The empirical studies on the rescue are not always available in the three selected countries. For example, this thesis makes reference to some studies regarding the UK law, however, there is the absence of similar studies in Canada and Vietnam 241 This examination will be applied to examine the laws of UK in Chapter Four (4.3.2.1 Time and cost) Canada in Chapter Five (5.4.1 Time and cost) and Vietnam in Chapter Six (6.4.2.1) 
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 The thesis agrees with the two scholars to include ‘expertise’ as the second 
benchmark because a rescue procedure cannot be operated effectively by the parties 
who lack knowledge, skill and experience in area of insolvency. The parties 
participating in rescue administration include company directors, court and IPs. In 
rescue, expertise is not only exercised in operating the company business but also in 
formulating the rescue plan and monitoring the rescue proceeding. Therefore, the 
examination will focus on if the parties involved in rescue administration possess a 
sufficient degree of expertise and co-ordinate their expertise. For example, in 
recognition that IPs should earn professional qualification to participate in a rescue 
proceeding,242 the thesis will examine whether rescue law has sufficiently provided for 
the licencing IPs to guarantee the service required, and whether the law allows the IP to 
assist the company in rescue or to assist the court in monitoring the rescue.243 
(iii) Abuse management 
Abuse management can be considered as the alternative explanation to the ‘fairness’ 
proposed by Finch and the ‘avoidance of governance conflict’ proposed by Rotem 
because it can convey the meaning of fairness more clearly than the latter. While there 
is the difficulty in perceiving the true meaning of the ‘fairness’ under Finch’s 
proposition,244 the ‘avoidance of governance conflict’ does not completely convey the 
meaning of fairness as the law is likely to achieve fairness from tackling potential 
abuses arising which prejudice interests of parties involved rather than avoiding the 
governance conflict. Furthermore, under the examination of expertise, if parties 
sufficiently develop expertise in rescue, they can easily deal with the problem of 
conflict of interest. For example, insolvency judges who possess a sufficient degree of 
 
242 UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004) at 174 243 This examination will be applied to examine the effectiveness of rescue laws of the UK in Chapter Four (4.3.2.2 Expertise), Canada in Chapter Five (5.4.2 Expertise) and Vietnam in Chapter Six (6.4.2.2 Expertise) 244 Finch (n5) at 56 
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expertise can adjudicate the dispute among the parties in rescue. Therefore, the thesis 
finds there is no need to include the ‘avoidance of governance conflict’ in the set of 
evaluation benchmarks. Instead, the thesis directs the investigation at whether there is 
potential abuse arising from a rescue procedure and whether rescue law is capable of 
tackling potential abuses.245 
(iv) Creditor participation 
Creditor participation is a new evaluation benchmark proposed by this thesis to 
assess the effectiveness of rescue law. This benchmark requires that rescue law should 
provide incentives for creditors to actively participate in the rescue procedure. The idea 
of creditors participating in rescue administration is not appreciated for creditors tend to 
be indifferent to rescue management.246 Due to the uncertainty over the rescue’s 
success, creditors are unlikely to invest time and effort in managing the company.247 
Although creditors do not directly take part in the decision-making process in corporate 
rescue, their interest is guaranteed by insolvency judges and IPs who monitor the rescue 
procedure. However, it does not mean creditors do not have a role to play in a rescue 
proceeding. Instead, they have significant participation that decides the success of 
corporate rescue in three aspects. Firstly, by exercising the right to approve rescue 
plans, creditors decide the likelihood for rescue to occur.248 Secondly, there is often a 
creditor committee established by legislation to contribute to the rescue supervision.249 
Thirdly, by extending finance to fund rescue plans, creditors are the party who 
 
245 This examination will be applied to examine the effectiveness of rescue laws of the UK in Chapter Four (4.3.2.3 Abuse management), Canada in Chapter Five (5.4.4 Abuse management) and Vietnam in Chapter Six (6.4.2.4 Abuse management) 246 Wood (n14) 220 247 Ibid. 248 It will be seen in the following chapters that rescue laws in the selected countries require the creditor approval for a rescue plan to be carried out. 249 For example, s. 1102 US Bankruptcy Code, para 57 Schedule B1, the UK Insolvency Act 1986,  
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significantly decides the prospect of rescue success.250 The most significant contribution 
of creditors to rescue lies in the last aspect, which is providing the rescue finance or 
‘DIP finance’ for implementing a rescue plan. This kind of finance has been largely 
recognised for its importance in providing an insolvent company with a prospect of 
success as well as expediting rescue procedure by shorting the time of its 
implementation.251 It is undeniable that borrowing money at the time of being insolvent 
is not an easy task for a company because substantial assets of the company are likely to 
be subject to security. Lending the company at this time seems to be a risky decision 
because the likelihood for the lender to recover his finance will be undermined in case 
of rescue failure if the company does not offer the lender of the rescue finance a mean 
of security. Therefore, giving the DIP finance a super-priority over the existing security 
will incentives the lender to provide finance to implement the rescue plan.  
As such, there are three important factors a rescue law must have in satisfaction with 
this benchmark: first, providing a stay of proceedings against creditors to stop their 
individual enforcement,252 second, providing a fair scheme of voting,253 and third, 
providing a guarantee for the rescue finance extended by creditors to implement the 
rescue plan.254 
An argument against creditor participation may be that calling for creditors to 
fund the rescue plan may invite potential abuses insofar as upon extending the funding, 
creditors may demand more benefits under a financing agreement and thereby exert 
 
250 The finance provided to by creditors implement a rescue is termed ‘DIP financing’. This will be examined deeply in the section for evaluating the effectiveness of rescue law in each country.  251 Sris Chatterjee, Upinder Dhillon, and Gabriel G. Ramirez, ‘Debtor-in-Possession Financing’ (2004) Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 28, No. 12, pp. 3097-3112; Sandeep Dahiyaa and others,  ‘Debtor-in-possession financing and bankruptcy resolution: Empirical evidence’, (2003) 69 Journal of Financial Economics, 259–280 252 INSOL International, ‘Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts II’ (2017), principle 1 & 2 253 Ibid. principle 3,4,6, and 7 254 Ibid. principle 8 
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influence on the decision-making process for their own benefits.255 Admittedly, this 
possibility may occur but only to the extent that creditors occupy a dominant position in 
the administrative management of rescue. However, there is the participation of judges 
who take the role of supervising and monitoring the abuse as well as IPs who act for the 
best interest of creditors as the whole, and this will reduce potential abuse arising from 
creditors’ inclination to influence the decision-making process. For example, the 
possibility that a creditor demands for favourable treatment under a financing agreement 
can be curtailed by a judge who reviews the agreement and makes a ruling in a manner 
that ensures a balance of interest among parties.256 
 3.7 Conclusion  
This chapter provided an in-depth examination into the core issues that underpin 
corporate rescue law as follows. First, the examination addressed that rescue is a broad 
definition that involves any remedial actions to avert a company’s failure in crisis.  
However, in the legal context, it is a narrow concept in that it refers to legal procedures 
provided for settling the insolvency affairs of a company. Rescue can be categorised 
into formal and informal rescue. While the formal rescue takes the form of legal 
proceedings prescribed by insolvency legislation, the informal rescue concerns remedial 
measures carried outside the legislative scope. There is the relationship between the 
formal and informal rescue in that both can be used and support each other in rescuing a 
company.  
Second, the chapter has examined the application of the cash flow test and the 
balance sheet test in determining the insolvency status of a company. The chapter 
addressed the possibility of initiating corporate rescue in an early manner without 
 
255 Wood (n14) 400-1 256 David A. Skeel, Jr, ‘Creditors' Ball: The ‘New’ New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11’ (2003). Faculty Scholarship. Paper 29, at 42 < http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/29> accessed 15 January 2017   
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recourse to the two tests yet makes caution of the limits of this practice in causing 
business distortion for the company and unfair competition in the market. 
Third, the chapter addressed the importance of rescue law in preserving a 
company and clarified two different policies of company rescue and business rescue. 
While company rescue aims to preserve a company as a whole with the same 
ownership, business rescue purports to preserve the going-concern value of a company 
which can result in the sale of the company business to a new owner.  
Fourth, this chapter identified three main models of rescue administration, DIP, 
the PIP and the hybrid model. In a brief examination of the application of these models 
in rescue laws of the select countries, the chapter found the UK has applied all three 
models under its rescue law, meanwhile, rescue law of Canada and Vietnam share the 
similarity in the employment of the PIP model. 
Last, in addressing the limits inherent in the literature regarding establishing 
benchmarks for evaluating a rescue law, the chapter developed a set of evaluation 
benchmarks which includes four elements time and cost, expertise, abuse management 
and creditor participation. These benchmarks will be employed to assess effectiveness 
of rescue law of the selected countries in the following chapters. 
 In the next chapter, the thesis will launch a detailed examination of the rescue 
law of the UK.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 CORPORATE RESCUE LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM   
4.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, this thesis provided the discussion addressing the main 
models of rescue administration as well as formulating the benchmarks for evaluating the 
effectiveness of a rescue law. Furthering the discussion, this chapter examines the extent 
to which the rescue law of the United Kingdom (UK)1 reflects these models and evaluates 
the effectiveness of the UK rescue law. It first maps out the legal environment comprising 
unique historical and economic conditions in which the rescue law operates. Then it 
makes a detailed investigation into the informal rescue under the London Approach and 
three rescue procedures, namely the administration and the Creditor Voluntary 
Arrangement (CVA) under the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA1986) and the Scheme of 
Arrangement (SA) under the Company Act 2006 (CA2006). Finally, the chapter is 
devoted to critically examining the effectiveness of the UK rescue law under the four 
benchmarks established in the previous chapter.2  
4.1 The societal context where UK rescue law is operating 
The socio-legal and comparative approach to legal study suggests that an 
examination of a legal system confined merely to ‘rules and statutes’ in isolation with the 
societal context where it has operated is insufficient because it cannot address factors that 
influence the shaping of that legal system.3 Therefore, the examination of a legal system 
should be conducted in tandem with taking into consideration the history, ideology, 
 
1 For the purpose of this dissertation, the UK rescue refers to the law of England and Wales. 2 See Chapter Three (3.5.2 Formulating benchmarks for evaluation of a rescue law) 3 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 3edn, 1998) and M. Hoecke and M. Warrington, ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law’ (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 495, 496. 
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social-economic conditions to acquire a rounded understanding. Following this approach, 
this section examines the legal environment in which the UK rescue law has operated. 
4.1.1 A brief history of corporate insolvency law in the UK. 
The insolvency law in the UK was not introduced until the enactment of the Joint 
Stock Companies Act 1844, which provided a company with the status of a legal distinct 
entity although shareholders still bore unlimited liability.4 The growth of companies at 
this time urged the need for liquidating financially troubled companies, resulting in the 
enactment of the Winding-Up Act 1844.5 However, apart from this liquidation legislation, 
private practices for corporate restructuring were developed to deal with situations where 
companies entered into insolvency.6 For example, the ‘majority rule’ was created under 
a trust deed to allow a majority of creditors to restructure the property rights of the 
minority.7  Provisions for private arrangement between a debtor company and its creditor 
were first included in the Joint-Stock Companies Arrangements Act 1870 to provide for 
‘compromises and arrangements between creditors and shareholders of joint-stock and 
other companies in liquidation.’8   
 
4 Joint Stock Companies Act, 7&8 Vict, c110. 5 Winding Up Act 1844, 7&8 Vict, c111 6 John Tribe, ‘Companies Act Schemes of Arrangement and Rescue: the lost cousin of restructuring practice?’, at 5, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1328487> accessed 2 February 2017 Jérôme Sgard, ‘Bankruptcy Law, Majority Rule, and Private Ordering in England and France (Seventeenth–Nineteenth Century)’ (2009‐2010) OXPO Working Paper, at 2, 9-11. In this article, Sgard cited the finding of Bowen as follows. [T]he great commercial world, alienated and scared by the divergence of the English bankruptcy law from their own habits and notions of right and wrong, avoided the court of bankruptcy as they would the plague. The important insolvencies which had been brought about by pure mercantile misfortune were administered to a large extent under private deeds and voluntary compositions, which, since they might be disturbed by the caprice or malice of a single outstanding creditor, were always liable to be made the instruments of extortion] (Bowen 1907) See, <http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/centres/oxpo/working-papers/wp_09-10/OXPO_WP09-10b_Sgard.pdf> accessed 2 February 2017 8 Joint Stock Companies Arrangements Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict c 104 
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The modern corporate insolvency in the UK began with the establishment of Cork 
Committee in 1977, with the mandates of reviewing and making recommendations to 
reform the insolvency legal system.9 The recommendations by the Cork Committee led 
to the enactment of the IA198510 and then the IA198611 to overcome the shortcomings of 
the former statute. Presently, the IA1986 is the main legislation to deal with corporate 
insolvency and corporate rescue. There are two main procedures for corporate rescue in 
the UK, which are the administration12 and the CVA13 under the IA1986. Apart from 
these procedures, the CA2006 provides for another rescue procedure which is the SA.14 
4.1.2 The rise of rescue culture in the UK 
The foundation of UK rescue law was the establishment of the Cork Committee 
in 1977 to overhaul the insolvency legal system.15 Through their report, the Committee 
proposed recommendations that supported the introduction of corporate rescue law.16 
Accordingly, the Committee suggested a ‘possible less formal procedure as alternatives 
to bankruptcy and company winding-up proceeding in appropriate circumstances’17 As 
recognised in the report, since insolvency affairs affect not only a company and its 
creditors but also the public interest, it is important to preserve viable companies that 
make a useful contribution to the economy.18 The recommendations by the Cork 
Committee is seen to give rise to the so-called ‘rescue culture’ which contains multiple 
 
9 The committee was chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork, therefore, it is commonly referred as to ‘Cork Committee’ and the report of the committee is also referred as to ‘Cork Report’. For detail of the report, see Cork Review Committee Report on Insolvency Law and Practice 1982 (Cmnd 8558). 10 Insolvency Act 1985, c65 11 Insolvency Act 1986, c45. 12 IA1986, SchB1 13 Ibid. Part I and SchA1 14 CA 2006, part 26 15 The Cork Committee (n9) and Muir Hunter, ‘The Nature and Function of a Rescue Function’ (1999) 104 Commercial Law Journal, 433. 16  The Report on Insolvency and Law Practice, commonly known as the ‘Cork Report’ 17 Muir Hunter (n15) 433 18 Cork Report (n9) 19 
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attributes of ‘positive’, ‘protective’, ‘corrective’ and ‘punitive’, which means that a 
chance of rescue for deserving companies must go along with severe treatment for true 
economic delinquents.19 In order to nurture this rescue culture, Hunter addresses key 
principles, including the judicial pressure to induce the parties into a compromise 
arrangement, the need for enforceable mechanisms of binding creditors collectively in 
their arrangement, the availability to have a moratorium under the CVA, the control of 
Insolvency Practitioner’s (IP) qualification and professionalism, the participation of 
banks into rescue and the availability of funding to carry out rescue.20  
The philosophy of rescue has been gradually accepted and endorsed in the UK. In 
terms of legislation making, the IA1986 provides two rescue-oriented procedures, the 
CVA and the administration order, as alternative routes to the winding-up.21 Regarding 
judicial recognition, the House of Lords officially gave their acceptance of corporate 
rescue in Powdrill v. Watson, stating that ‘the rescue culture, which seeks to preserve 
viable businesses, was and is fundamental to much of the Insolvency Act of 1986’.22 
Following the legislative and judicial recognition, government officials23 and bankers24 
voiced their support and endorsement for the rescue culture. A significant example of the 
bankers’ endorsement is the introduction of the London Approach, a set of principles 
developed by the Bank of England to deal with the financial difficulties of insolvent 
companies without resorting to formal legislation.25 In terms of professional practice 
 
19 Hunter (n15) 435 20 Ibid. at 437-438  21 IA 1986, part I and II. 22 Powdrill v. Watson [1995] 2 AC 394, [1995] 2WLR 312, [1995] 2 All ER 65, quoted by Hunter (n15) at 433. 23 The Department of Trade and Industry and the Treasury, in the White Paper 1998, ‘Our Competitive Future: Building Knowledge Driven Economy’, examined how to further rescue culture more efficiently’. And see Peter Mandelson, the Secretary of Trade and Industry in 1998, had made a speech for reassessment of attitude toward business failure and encourage entrepreneurs to take risks in the future (quoted by Hunter (n15) at 462). 24 For example, the British Bankers’ Association, Banks and Business Working Together (London, 1997).  25 John Flood and the others, ‘The Professional Restructuring of Corporate Rescue: Company Voluntary Arrangements and the London Approach’  
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development, the rise of the rescue culture is partly a factor demanding regulations on 
licensing and enhancing the professionalism of IPs. For example, the IA986 subjected 
membership of IPs to a Recognised Professional Body (RPB) or to the licensing power 
of the Secretary of State directly.26 There are now more than 1,700 IPs who passed the 
insolvency test along with earning a sufficient level of experience in order to be granted 
a license to practice in the UK.27 The rescue culture also brings about a new character, 
namely turnaround professionals, who will assist companies to avert their financial 
difficulty before resorting to formal insolvency.28 
A considerable change in UK rescue law is the introduction of the Insolvency Act 
2000 (IA200) and the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA2002).29 While the IA2000 facilitates a 
moratorium under the CVA procedure to support rescue for small companies,30 and the 
EA2002 introduces a new administration procedure to replace the administrative 
receivership.31 Since the enactment of the EA2002, there has been a change of rescue 
philosophy, with the focus shifting from dealing with ex-post consequences towards 
preventing ex-ante risks.32 Through the replacement of the administrative receivership 
with the administration under this Act, rescue is no longer confined to making a proper 
 <http://www.johnflood.com/pdfs/Prof_Restructuring_of_Corp_Rescue_1995.pdf > accessed 20 July 2017. 26 Insolvency Act 1986, part XIII. According to the Insolvency Service, there are 5 RPBs in the UK, including the Association of Certified Chartered Accountants (ACCA), the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland – CARB (ICAI), the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland (ICAS) and the Insolvency Practitioners Association (IPA). See The Insolvency Service, ‘Recognised Professional Bodies’ (2014) < https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/insolvency-practitioners-recognised-professional-bodies/recognised-professional-bodies> accessed 20 July 2017 27 R3, ‘The Future of Insolvency Practitioner Regulation’, at 1 <https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/policy_papers/insolvency_industry/The_future_of_insolvency_practitioner_regulation.pdf> Accessed 20 July 2017. 28 V. Finch, Corporate and Insolvency: Perspectives and Principles (Cambridge University Press, 2edn, 2009) 222 29 Enterprise Act 2002 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/contents> accessed 29 May 2017 and Insolvency Act 2000 <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/39/contents> accessed 29 May 2017 30 IA1986, SchA1.  31 Ibid. 32 Finch (n28) at 253 
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intervention at an early stage but now it has evolved to a new level, which is risk 
management.33 The abolishment of the administrative receivership dictates that creditors 
can no longer take advantage of this regime to collect debts; rather, they have to rely on 
the new administration under which the administrator acts in the interest of all creditors 
as a whole.34 The administration is conducted only if the administrator makes the 
statement of consent to act after evaluating the company’s viability, and within eight 
weeks of their appointment, he must present proposals to creditors.35 Under this strict 
timeframe, it is unlikely that the administrator will accept the appointment if he has not 
been provided with a sufficient amount of information. Therefore, major creditors, such 
as banks who wish to appoint the administrator, must be already in the position of 
obtaining information about the company as soon as possible. By entering into a financial 
agreement with the company, banks may exercise their lending power to demand that 
borrowing companies have to provide and update their financial situation as well as 
identifying potential risks and how to manage these risks.36 The tendency of shifting the 
rescue focus is reinforced by the increasing requirement for corporate disclosure.37 For 
example, under the Company Act 2004, the pre-insolvency scrutiny for a company is 
enhanced with the requirement for the directors to ensure that there is no relevant 
information that they know but the auditors are unaware of.38 In addition, the CA2006 
demands a company’ directors to conduct a business review on how they perform their 
duties under which directors have to identify principal risks and uncertainty facing a 
company.39 
 
33 Ibid. 253. 34 IA 1986, s.72A 35 IA 1986: SchB1, para 52  36 Finch (n28) at 256. 37 Ibid. 38 the Company Act 2004: s.9 < https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/27> accessed 5 May 2017 39 Company Act 2006: s. 417(3) 
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4.1.3 The unique legal environment where rescue law operates in the UK 
The UK rescue law has been shaped under the influence of the following factors. 
First, the UK is identified as a pro-creditor insolvency jurisdiction.40 This is reflected by 
the way the law confers creditors the right to protect themselves from insolvency. 
Traditionally, the main measure for a secured creditor to collect their debt was to appoint 
a receiver, who will take control of a company and realise its assets to pay the creditors.41 
However, when the receiver finished his job and handed the control back to the 
company’s directors, the company was unlikely to survive because of the shortage of 
finance and assets.42 This practice of debt collection had been employed for a long time 
in the UK until the enactment of the EA2002, which abolished the right of a floating 
charge holder to appoint a receiver. Alternatively, a floating charge holder now has the 
only option to initiate the administration procedure under which the administrator acts for 
the interest of creditors as a whole. The pro-creditor nature of the UK law also features a 
hostile attitude towards the management of an insolvent company. For example, despite 
the acceptance of the philosophy behind corporate rescue, the UK appeared to have 
hostility over the model of debtor-in-possession inspired by Chapter 11 of the United 
States (US) Bankruptcy law.43 As corporate insolvency is perceived as wrongdoing rather 
misfortune,44 the UK approach to rescue law is to replace directors of an insolvent 
 
40 P. Wood, ‘Principle of International Insolvency’ (1995) 4 International Insolvency Review 94, 97-98. 41 RM Goode, The principle of Corporate Insolvency Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 4th edn, 2011) 315 and A. Keay and P. Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal (Jordans, 3edn, 2012) 54-57 42 Paul J. Omar and Jennifer Gant, ‘Corporate Rescue in England: Past, Present and Future Reforms’ (2016) 24 Insolvency Law Journal, available at <http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/27854/1/Pubsub5402_Omar.pdf> at 3  43 Ibid. at 7 44 Westbrook ‘A Comparison of Bankruptcy Reorganisation in the US with Administration Procedure in the UK’ (1990) 6 Insolvency Law and Practice 86, 88 and G Moss ‘Chapter 11: An English Lawyer’s Critique’ (1998) 11 Insolvency Intelligence 17 
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company with outside professionals and punishing directors with culpable 
mismanagement.45  
Secondly, the UK insolvency law relies heavily on the expertise of IPs. Stemming 
from the attitude towards treating insolvency as management wrongdoing, borrowing IP’s 
expertise to control the rescue procedure appears to be a feature of the UK law. In 
recognition of the importance of IPs, the Cork Committee recommended that IPs should 
be provided by the private sector but subject to professional regulations to ensure their 
competence and integrity.46 In the UK, IPs are often accountants and lawyers whose 
profession is regulated directly by the Secretary of State or by RPBs to maintain 
professionalism.47 There are currently five RPBs in the UK48 tasked with conferring 
membership for qualified IPs who have earned a level of working experience and 
successfully passed the JIEB examination.49 The development of the IP professional in 
the UK is also recognised through the establishment of R3 (the Association of Business 
Recovery Professionals) whose objective is to support IPs profession through training, 
education and networking.50  
Thirdly, UK banks have an important role in providing finance and rescuing 
debtor companies. Though companies can rely on various ways for financing, among 
other creditors, banks have been seen as a dominant financer to provide finance for both 
 
45 Goode (n41) 62 46 Finch (n28) at 185 47 Cork Report, ch.15 48 See Insolvency Service (n26), The RPBs are self-regulatory organisations in that IPs must satisfy requirements of education, training, and experience provided by these RPBs to become their members and must follow their regulations to maintain their membership. However, the RPBs are subject to the oversight of the Insolvency Service, who exercises the Secretary of State’s function regarding insolvency to ensure that the RPBs regulate their members properly with suitable rules. In doing so, there is a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between the RPBs and the Secretary of State to guarantee the consistency in RPBs’ approaches to regulate IPs practice.   49 It is the Joint Insolvency Examination Board (JIEB) exam organised by the RPBs. See ICAEW, ‘Qualifying as an Insolvency Practitioner’ at <https://www.icaew.com/technical/insolvency/qualifying-as-an-insolvency-practitioner> accessed 6 September 2017 50 See R3 Website at <https://www.r3.org.uk/what-we-do> accessed 7 September 2017. 
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small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and large companies.51 Not only do the banks 
involve in lending, but they have a significant role in corporate rescue. A very good 
example of this is the London Approach, a set of guidance that features the banks’ co-
operation in settlement of debt for distressed companies.52 It was the Bank of England 
who first envisaged the necessity of rescuing large companies during the economic 
recession, resulting in the introduction of the London approach to guide the co-operation 
among bank creditors in rescue. Also, it is the Bank of England who still backs up the 
efficiency of the approach by exercising its influence on other banks to ensure they follow 
the principles by the approach and be willing to co-operate in the rescue. Despite findings 
addressing the UK banks’ lack of concession and reluctance in restructuring debts that 
leads debtor companies to liquidation,53 the replacement of the receivership with the 
administration by the EA 2002 has placed the banks in a different position other than 
merely collecting debts.54 The banks now have to be actively involved in rescue as they 
no longer have the right to appoint a receiver to take over the company business to satisfy 
the debts owed to them. Instead, they are motivated to monitor the risk of insolvency at 
the early stage and co-operate with the administrator to solve the financial distress of 
debtor companies.55 
4.2 Rescue law in the UK 
4.2.1 The London Approach – an informal rescue measure 
 51 The Bank of England, ‘Understanding and Measuring Finance for Productive Investment’, Discussion Paper April 2016, available at <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fsdiscussionpaper/080416.pdf>  accessed 18 Sep. 17 and A Cosh and others, ‘Financing UK Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 2007 Survey’ (2018) <https://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/research-projects-output/sme-finance-report-final.pdf> accessed 18 September 2017. 52 Flood (n25). 53 J.R. Franks and O. Sussman, ‘Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small-to-Medium Size UK Companies’ (2003) CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3915  54 Finch (n28) 255-8 55 Ibid.  
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Informal rescue involves private negotiation between a company and its creditors 
without resorting to formal procedures prescribed by legislation. The London Approach 
is a very good example of this kind of rescue. The London Approach has its origin dating 
back to the economic crisis in the mid-1970s when companies faced very serious financial 
difficulty at a large scale. The Bank of England, at that time, took an active role to promote 
corporate restructuring by acting as a broker to co-ordinate banks to solve the financial 
difficulties of large companies.56 The Bank then gradually changed its policy, shifting its 
focus from direct participation towards transferring its expertise and guidance to market 
participants and left corporate financial difficulty to be solved by themselves.57 After a 
number of discussions with London-based banks and their professional advisers, in 1990, 
a set of guiding principles was created in the name of ‘London Approach’.58 Although 
the Bank now has the policy of limiting its intervention into corporate restructurings, it 
can exercise its influence to make sure the market participants follow the principles set 
by the approach.59 In some cases, the Bank’s participation appears to be necessarily 
important to ensure rescue success. For example, in the case of Yell Group – a famous 
publisher facing a debt restructuring problem, the Bank secretly mediated the creditors’ 
participation to ensure the likelihood of sufficiently getting creditor approval.60 
Noticeably, its efforts included using its influence to contact foreign banks in Spain to 
call for their participation in the process.61 
 
56 J. Flood (n25)  57 J Amour and S Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency Procedures: the London Approach to the Resolution of Financial Distress’(2000) ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper 173, 16.   58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 30-32. 60 Mark Leftly, ‘Yell's Restructuring Heralds the Return of the ‘London Approach’ (2009) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/yells-restructuring-heralds-the-return-of-the-london-approach-1830370.html> accessed 03 September 2017. 61Ibid. 
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The London Approach involves two phases.62 At the first phase, a debtor company 
informs its banks about its financial difficulty and asks for the banks’ support in rescue. 
The banks will offer the company a stay during which no enforcement action is to be 
carried out against the company while credit and additional working capital may continue 
to be provided. During that time, an intensive investigation into the company’s affairs is 
conducted to inform the banks about the rescue prospect. If the rescue is viable, some 
restructuring actions will be called for.63 The second phase involves the implementation 
of the restructuring plan. There will be a lead bank who co-ordinates a series of 
negotiations among the creditor banks, accountants and the company. The negotiation 
could result in some of debt restructurings such as debt-equity swap or other debt 
compromise forms.64  
The London Approach has its merit in the confidentiality for not disclosing the 
debtor company affair to the public and encouraging banks to co-operate together to solve 
the insolvency of a debtor company.65 A weakness of the London approach is that it is 
very expensive to implement, thus is used to restructure high-profile companies.66 
Nevertheless, its success has invited the British Bankers Association to use the principles 
to resolve the financial difficulty of SMEs.67 This resulted in the introduction of the 
statement of principles on how banks work together to assist SMEs in financial 
difficulties,68 and the core value of the principles still lies in voluntary co-operation of the 
 62 Amour and Deakin (n57) 18-19. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 John Flood (n25) at 29. 66 Ibid. 67 Katarzyna Gromek Broc and Rebecca Parry, Corporate Rescue: An Overview of Recent Developments from Selected Countries (Kluwer Law International, 2004) at 155 68 Ibid. 
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banks. The success of the London Approach is also recognised at international level as it 
has been modified to apply to corporate restructuring in several countries.69 
Given the changes in the global credit market, however, the London Approach 
has been facing certain challenges.70 With the existence of the financial market, 
companies no longer rely on bank loans as the only form of credit; and identities of 
creditors change continuously upon debt transfers. This situation has challenged the 
effectiveness of the London approach in the extent to which the banks cannot exert their 
influence on creditors who are not connected to them. Furthermore, the change of 
creditor’s identity upon debt transactions makes it very difficult for the banks to call for 
the creditors to participate in rescue negotiation.   
4.2.2 Formal rescue procedures under the legislation 
4.2.2.1 The Administration 
4.2.2.1.1 The origin of the administration 
The administration has its origin related to the two procedures, namely the 
administrative receivership and the administration order (or the old administration) under 
the IA1986. The receivership was mainly a device for creditors to collect debts. Under 
common law, a receiver is a person appointed by the court to receive the rent and income 
to pay secured debts.71 The appointment of a receiver is made when a debtor defaults in 
payment of debts and this is often stated in an agreement, such as a mortgage deed. The 
power to appoint a receiver then was legislatively regulated in 1860.72 Initially, a receiver 
 
69 Thomas Laryea, ‘Approaches to Corporate Debt Restructuring in the Wake of Financial Crises’, IMF Staff Position Note (2010) SPN/10/02, at 16-17, available at  <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1002.pdf> accessed 04 September 2017  70 Amour and Deakin (n57) 34-36 71 Re Morritt (1886) 18 QBD 222. 72 Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1881, s.19. Presently, the power to appoint a receiver in a mortgage is subject to a Law of Property Act 1925. 
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was appointed by courts, however, when floating charge became a common security 
device for lending, a debenture allowed a receiver to be appointed on an out-of-court basis 
with the power of not only selling but also managing the charged property.73 The IA1986 
stipulated the appointment of a receiver under the administrative receiver procedure, 
under which the receiver was granted the power to dispose of the debtor’s charged 
property to pay the charge holder.74 However, the introduction of the EA2002 brought 
about a significant change to administrative receivership. Since 15 September 2003 
(which is the date the Act took effect) a holder of a floating charge is no longer able to 
appoint a receiver, rather, the only way for him to collect debts is to rely on the 
administration procedure, under which the administrator is appointed to act for the 
interest of creditors as a whole.75 This follows that a creditor no longer has the privilege 
to collect his own debt by appointing a receiver because the administrator does not act 
solely for a person who appoints him but for the creditors as a whole. This change is 
considered important for corporate rescue in the UK as one of the primary objectives of 
the new administration is to rescue insolvent companies.76  
 The enactment of the EA2002 also brought an end to the old administration or the 
administration order. Although the old regime offered some protections for debtor 
companies, such as a moratorium to prevent creditors from taking action to collect debts,77 
the use of the old administration as a rescue device was very rare for several reasons.78 
Firstly, the administration was created to replace receivership in cases where none of the 
 
73 A floating charge is a security that covers all the company’s asset, including present or future assets. A floating charge will be crystallised and become a fixed charge – a charge executed on a specific piece of assets if there is an event for crystallisation such as debtor default on payments or liquidation.  74 IA 1986: s.29 (2) and s.43. 75 However, the holder of a debenture entered before 15 September 2003 enable to opt for either appointment of a receiver or administrator.  76 IA 1986: SchB1, para 3.1(a). 77 Ibid s.10(1). 78 According to the Department of Trade and Industry (DIP) Among 88000 corporate insolvencies in the UK, there is only 447 Administration Orders were made, cited by Finch (n28) at 367 
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creditors is a floating charge holder. However, if there was a creditor holding a floating 
charge, the administration occurs only when the creditor’s consent is obtained.79 
However, in most cases, creditors with a floating charge tend to initiate the receivership 
instead of the administration. Secondly, the lack of popularity of the old administration is 
attributed to its high cost stemming from the involvement of court and IPs.80 Thirdly, its 
limited use is blamed for the administrator owing no obligation to consult creditors before 
making decisions.81 The replacement of the old administration with the new one by the 
EA2002 has strengthened corporate rescue as the procedure purports to pursue a hierarchy 
of objectives with rescue being the first priority.82 Furthermore, by preventing floating 
charge holders from relying on the receivership to collect their own debt, the new 
administration has become a dominant insolvency procedure in the UK.83  
4.2.2.1.2 Objectives of the administration 
The para 3(1) of Schedule B1 provides for objectives of the administration as 
follows 
The administrator of a company must perform his functions with the 
objective of 
(a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or 
(b) achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than 
would be likely if the company were wound up (without first being in 
administration), or  
 
79 Ibid s.10(3). 80 According to the report of the Department of Trade and Industry 1993, cited by Finch (n28) at 368-370. 81 Ibid. 82 IA 1986: SchB1, para 3(1) 83 However, for a debenture entered into prior 15 September 2003, the right of appointing a receiver remains unchanged. Also, there are a number of exceptions for appointing receivership in special cases, section 72A-72GA IA 1986. 
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(c) realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more 
secured or preferential creditors.84 
   As rescue is the first objective, it seems to be the highest objective the 
administrator must consider before the objectives 3(1)(b) and 3(1)(c). However, rescue is 
not the highest objective because the proper factor for the administrator to consider which 
objective is to be performed is whether it can produce better results for creditors than the 
others. According to the wording of para 3(3), the administrator will not pursue the 
objective 3(1)(a), rescuing the company, if he thinks it is not reasonably practicable to do 
so or the objective 3(1)(b) appears to produce the better result than rescue.85 As such, the 
objective of rescue will be performed by the administrator so long as it can produce better 
results than other options stated in para 3. It is noticeable that ‘the better result’ test is 
based on what the administrator thinks, which means that his decision is based on 
subjective judgment.86 To prevent potential abuse arising from this subjectivity, the 
administrator is required to perform his function in the interest of creditors as a whole87 
and performs his function as quickly and efficiently as is reasonably practicable.88 Reality 
shows that rescue is not always the most popular option among administration cases; the 
rate of success for rescuing companies is very modest, at below 10%, while the majority 
of administration cases involves realising and selling a company’s assets to distribute 
proceeds to creditors.89  
 
84 IA 1986: SchB1 para.3(1) 85 Ibid, para 3(3) 86 IF Fletcher ‘UK Corporate Rescue: Recent Developments—Changes to Administrative Receiverships, Administration, and Company Voluntary Arrangements—The Insolvency Act 2000, The White Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 5 EBOR 119, at 136 87 IA 1986, SchB1, para 3(2) 88 Ibid. para 4 89 A Katz & M Mumford, A Study of Administration Cases (Insolvency Service, 2008)  <www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/research/corpdocs/studyofadmincases.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017 
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4.2.2.1.3 Procedure for appointment of the administrator 
The administration is initiated through the appointment of the administrator.90 
There are three ways for the administrator to be appointed, by court,91 by a holder of 
floating charge92 or by the company or its directors.93 First, the court can make an 
administration order on an application by the company, its directors or its creditors if it 
satisfies that the company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts along with the 
likelihood that the objectives of administration are achievable.94 Second, a floating charge 
holder is granted the power to appoint the administrator. The condition for this 
appointment is that the floating charge must be a qualifying one that purports to empower 
the holder of the charge the right to appoint the administrator.95 In addition, the floating 
charge must be enforceable to appoint the administrator.96 For example, under the 
debenture between the charge holder and the company, the charge is agreed to be 
enforceable when the company defaults in payment or becomes insolvent. Third, similar 
to a holder of a floating charge, a company or its directors has the power to appoint the 
administrator with the requirement for providing insolvency proof that the company is 
unable to pay debts.97 
Of the three methods of appointment above, the administration is usually initiated 
on an out-of-court basis, by a floating charge holder or a company’s director. However, 
the right of directors to appoint the administrator is subject to that of a floating charge 
 90 IA 1986 SchB1, para 1 91 Ibid. para 10 92 Ibid. para 14 93 Ibid. par 22 94 Ibid. para 11 and 12. The insolvency evidence is that the company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debt 95 Ibid. para 14. A floating charge is considered qualifying if it alone or in combination with other securities is created on a whole or substantial asset of a company and it states that it purports to give the holder of the charge the power to initiate the administration or the administrative receivership.  96 Ibid. para 16 97 Ibid. para 27(2) 
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holder in that the directors must give a floating charge holder a five-day written notice of 
intention of appointment and within this period no appointment can be made without the 
consent of the floating charge holder.98 Additionally, even if an administration order has 
been made to the court, a floating charge holder still has a right to appoint his own 
administrator unless the court thinks it is appropriate to refuse it.99 As such, among the 
parties granted the right to file an application, the floating charge holder enjoys the 
priority over directors of a company.  
4.2.2.1.4 Effect of the administration 
The most noticeable element of the administration procedure is the availability of 
a moratorium or a stay of actions against the company. The objective of the moratorium 
is to give the company a breathing period in which it is free from creditors’ harassment 
and has more time to solve its financial difficulties.100 There are two types of 
moratoriums: the interim moratorium101 and the substantive moratorium.102 In a case of 
the court appointment, the interim moratorium triggers from the date the application for 
administration is made to the court and continues until an administration order is made or 
until the application is dismissed.103 In case a floating charge holder or company’s 
directors appoint an administrator, the interim moratorium takes effect from the date 
when a copy of the notice of intention to appoint the administrator is filed at the court and 
continues until the appointment is made.104 An interim moratorium is very important in 
that it prevents creditors from immediately enforcing their debts against the company 
when they learn that the administration is going to be initiated. There is the continuity 
 
98 Ibid. para 26, 28 (1) 99 Ibid. para 36. 100 A. Keay and P. Walton (n41) at 108 101 IA 1986 SchB1, para 44 102 Ibid. para 42 103 Ibid. para 44 (1) 104 Ibid. para 44 (2). 
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between the interim and the substantive moratorium in that once the administration order 
is made, the interim moratorium comes to an end and is immediately replaced with the 
substantive moratorium.105  
The scope of protection of the moratorium is very large.106 Once a company enters 
into administration, no resolution to wind up the company can be passed, no winding-up 
order can be made, and no administrative receiver can be appointed.107 Apart from these 
restrictions, a number of actions against the company are barred, including enforcing 
securities over the company’s asset, repossessing goods in the company’s possession 
under a hire-purchase agreement, landlord’s right of forfeiture by peaceable re-entry in 
relation to premises let to the company and other legal processes such as legal 
proceedings, execution, distress, and diligence.108 Preserving the company’s assets has a 
vital role in implementing the administration, thus offering the company the protection of 
the moratorium is understandable. However, the effect of a moratorium is not absolute 
because parties with actions against the company can be able to overcome the 
moratorium’s restrictions by obtaining a leave of the court or the administrator’s 
consent.109 The administrator only gives his consent if the actions about to be taken do 
not jeopardise the administration’s viability. For example, it is appropriate for the 
administrator to give consent for a party to a hire-purchase agreement with the company 
to repossess a piece of equipment, which is no longer in use by the company.110 The court 
will be the final resort to lift a moratorium if the administrator refuses to do so. In granting 
its permission, the court will consider whether lifting a moratorium will impede the 
 
105 Ibid. para 42 and 43 106 Ibid. para 42 and 43 107 Ibid. para 4. 108 Ibid. para 43. 109 Ibid. para 43. 110 A. Keay (n41) at 113 
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purpose of the administration, and in case of refusal, fairness can be ensured for the 
petitioner by the court ordering the administrator to act in a certain way.111 
4.2.2.1.5. Procedure following the appointment 
After the administrator is appointed, he will perform a number of tasks as soon as 
reasonably practicable. Accordingly, the administrator must send a notice of the 
appointment to the company and publish it in a prescribed manner.112 He must obtain the 
list of creditors, and send the notice of the appointment to creditors of whom he is aware 
of.113 Furthermore, he must send the notice to the Registrar of Companies within seven 
days of his appointment.114 These requirements ensure that the administration is publicly 
shared with related parties and the failure to follow them will constitute an offence.115 As 
the main task of the administrator is to pursue the objectives under para 3(1) by presenting 
proposals to creditors to obtain their approval, within eight weeks of his appointment, the 
administrator must send a statement of proposals to creditors in which he must present 
the rationale for the decisions in the proposals.116 A creditor meeting must be called within 
ten weeks of the appointment to decide whether to approve or reject the proposals.117  
The proposals are approved by a simple majority in value of the indebtedness of 
unsecured creditors who are present and cast their votes.118 Secured creditors and 
preferential creditors are protected from the proposals by virtue of para 73 under which 
their priority of debts is preserved and the right of secured creditors to enforce their 
 
111 See Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc [1992] Ch505. In this case, a computer-letting company entered into administration, the funders of the company petition the court to order the administrator to make the due rental payment to the funders. The Appeal Court granted permission and provided a guideline on what factors the court will consider granting a permission to lift a moratorium, one of which is that the permission is granted only if the purpose of the administration is not impeded to be achieved.  112 IA 1986, SchB1 para 46 (2). 113 Ibid. para 46(3). 114 Ibid. para 46(3). 115 Ibid. para 46(9). 116 Ibid para 49. 117 Ibid. para 51 118 Insolvency Rule 1986, Rule 2.28 
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security is not affected.119 The administrator must report to the court and the Registrar of 
Companies about the result of the voting, whether creditors approve without modification 
or with modification.120 After the approval is obtained, the administrator will carry out it 
to pursue the stated objectives. The administration automatically ends after one year of 
the appointment unless it can be extended by the court for a specific period or it can be 
extended with the consent of creditors for a period of up to six months.121 Also, the 
administration comes to an end where its objective has been achieved122 or it is converted 
into other procedures such as the CVA.123  
4.2.2.1.6 The pre-packaged administration 
The pre-packaged or pre-pack administration is a special procedure under which 
an agreement has been concluded before a company enters into administration and the 
company’s business or assets then will be sold immediately upon the appointment of the 
administrator. The pre-pack administration can be instigated in the existence of events 
that places the company in a disadvantageous position if it enters into administration. For 
example, creditors are unlikely to come up with an agreement, no lenders are willing to 
finance the administration, or putting a company into administration will potentially ruin 
its goodwill and reduce its value in the market.124  
Generally, the pre-pack is a sale of the company’s assets or business without 
obtaining the creditor’s approval. There is no specific provision in insolvency legislation 
 
119 IA 1986, SchB1, para 73 120 Ibid. para 53 and 55 121 Ibid. para 76  122 Ibid. para 80 123 Ibid. para 83. Other ways for termination of the administration are that an administrator may be replaced because of resignation, removal, ceasing to be qualified, or death (para 87-89) and that the court ends administration at a petition of the administrator if he thinks it is impossible to achieve its objectives (para 80) or at a petition of a creditor who could establish that the administration is appointed with an improper motive (para 81).  124 Keay (n41) at 128. 
Chapter Four - Corporate Rescue Law in the United Kingdom  
106  
that explicitly permits the pre-pack, however, judicial responses to this matter can be 
addressed. The first case is T&D Industries Ltd with the ruling that the administrator has 
a right to deal with the company’s asset under time pressure before a creditor meeting is 
called to decide it.125 Later, the issue was repeated in Re Transbus International Ltd.126 
In this case, on the issue of whether or not the administrators can effect the sale of the 
company without the creditor’s approval, the court made their decision in the affirmative. 
The judge recognised that there are certain circumstances in which the administrator is 
not required to present proposals in front of a creditor meeting and there is no need for 
the court to intervene with the administrator’s business judgment.127 Later, DKLL 
Solicitor v Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs reinforced the judicial approval for the 
pre-pack administration.128 The case involves the application made to the court for an 
administration order in respect of an insolvent law firm. There had been a proposed 
arrangement to sell the firm, which would be effective immediately following the making 
of the order. The HMRC, a major creditor of the firm, opposed the making of the 
administrator on the ground that the proposed sale would prejudice the right of creditors 
who could not exercise their voting right over the sale because there would be no proposal 
presented before the creditor meeting.129 The court granted the order for administration 
by virtue of para 55 of IA 1986 that grants the court the power to authorise a proposal 
despite creditors’ opposition if the court thinks it is appropriate.130 The court rationale is 
 
125 Re T&D Industries plc [2000] BCC 956. 126 Re Transbus International Ltd, [2004] EWHC 932. 127 Ibid. the judge in, this case, explained that:  [T]here will be many cases where the administrators are justified in not laying any proposals before a meeting of creditors. This is so where they conclude that the unsecured creditors are either likely to be paid in full, or to receive no payment, or where neither of the first two objectives for the administration can be achieved: see paragraph 52 of the SchB1. If, in such administrations, administrators were prevented from acting without the direction of the court it would mean that they would have to seek the directions of the court before carrying out any function throughout the whole of the administration. 128 DKLL Solicitor v. Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs  [2007] B.C.C. 908 129 Ibid. para 17 130 IA 1986, SchB1, para 55 
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that implementing the sale would enhance the prospect for the statutory objective of the 
administration to be achieved as well as protecting current employment at the firm.131 
Along with T&D Industries Ltd and Re Transbus, this ruling again shows the court’s 
willingness towards deferring business judgment of the administrator as well as endorsing 
the pre-pack. 
The pre-pack has become popular as it provides for an expeditious route for selling 
a company’s asset or business while keeping legal and professional costs at low levels.132 
A research addresses that the rate of employment preservation in the pre-pack is 
significantly higher than that in the sale conducted without the pre-pack,133 which means 
key employees can be retained and continue to contribute to the company. Furthermore, 
as the pre-pack allows the company to be sold in a speedy and discreet manner, its 
business could be continued with the lowest distortion.134 Another benefit is that by not 
putting the sale in front of creditors for approval, the pre-pack becomes a good way to 
overcome the holdout problem arising where a large number of creditors make it 
impossible for reaching an agreement or there is a major creditor who attempts to take 
advantage of his vote to gain benefits for himself.135 
Nevertheless, there are concerns associated with the practice of using the pre-
pack. Putting a company in a very quick sale means there is less likelihood for the sale to 
be presented widely to interested parties in an open market; therefore, it is unlikely for 
 
131 DKLL Solicitor v. Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2007] B.C.C. 908, para 20 132 Finch (n28) at 456 133 Sandra Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis off Pre-Packaged Administrations’ (2007) Report to the Association of Business Recovery Professional (2007). According to the report, in 92% of pre-pack cases, all of the employees were transferred to the new company compared to 65% in a business sale <https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/technical_library/Consultation%20Responses/Pre-Pack.pdf> accessed 20September 2017 134 Ibid. 135 Finch (n28) 457. 
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the sale to obtain the best price.136 Transparency appears to be a problem of the pre-pack 
as creditors are not informed about the pre-pack until it has been completed.137 In order 
to improve the transparency of the pre-pack, the Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 
(SIP16) is introduced to require IPs to disclose information relating to sales to creditors.138 
The SIP16 requires IPs to provide the information on how and why the pre-pack is 
conducted along with detailed information of the purchasers.139 However, the statement 
does not require IPs to disclose information about the pre-pack before the administration 
takes place. Nor does SIP16 grant creditors the power to vote for approving a pre-pack 
sale.  Another major concern with the pre-pack is that a debtor company may be sold to 
connected parties.140 Due to the business urgency of the pre-pack sale, the company might 
be sold to connected parties such as its directors or shareholders instead of potentially 
interested parties in the market. This situation is described as ‘phoenix trading’ where 
directors of a financially troubled company purchase the company at undervalue and then 
start a new company free of any indebtedness owed by the old company.141 In 
encountering this abuse, s. 216 of the IA1986 prohibits persons to be directors of a new 
company whose name is similar or the same as an insolvent liquidated company of which 
they were directors before.142 Although the law prohibits both direct and indirect 
participation of the directors into a new company, it appears to be difficult to prove 
 136 R3, ‘Pre-packaged sales (pre-packs)’ <https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/publications/press/Pre-packs_briefing.pdf > accessed 27 September 2017. 137 Ibid. 138 The statement is introduced by IP profession to ensure that IPs will maintain the benchmarks required for the purpose of harmonising IP practice. See R3, ‘Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (E&W)’ <https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/technical_library/SIPS/SIP%2016%20E&W.pdf> accessed 28 September 2017 139 Ibid, 140 Frisby (n133) finds that in prepack administration, the proportion of sales to connected party is slightly higher than those to connected party (59 % compared to 41 %) 141 See V. Bavoso and JP.Tribe, ‘Phoenix Companies: Do Directors Learn Form Failure?’ (2001), available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2117241> accessed 25 September 2017, and Helen Anderson, ‘Directors' Liability for Fraudulent Phoenix Activity—A Comparison of the Australian and UK Approaches’ (2014) 14 Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 139. 142 IA 1986, s.216 even forbids directors of a liquidated company to directly or indirectly take part in the promotion, formation or management of a company that is known by the prohibited name within 5 years.  
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whether they actually participate in the management in an indirect way. This concern 
echoes with a finding that where companies are sold to connected parties the survival rate 
is much lower than those sold to an unconnected party.143  
4.2.2.2 The Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) 
The CVA provides for a compromise between a debtor company and its creditors 
to restructure the company’s debts.144 The CVA originates from the Cork Report’s 
recommendation that there should be a simple procedure for debt settlement to tackle the 
deficiency of an informal arrangement that does not have a binding effect on dissenting 
creditors.145 The justification for reaching the CVA is that though this arrangement allows 
creditors to receive the return less than the debts owed by the company, it would be higher 
the amount in case of liquidation. The CVA is considered as a rescue procedure insofar 
as if successfully approved, it prevents creditors from putting the company into 
liquidation and offers the company a chance to restructure its debts. Despite the perceived 
benefits, the number of CVA has been very small, which is accounted for the lack of a 
moratorium.146 If combined with the administration, the CVA can have a moratorium 
which is available under the former. However, this practice becomes an expensive and 
complicated option.147 In response to the demand for a moratorium, the IA2000 amended 
the IA1986 to facilitate a moratorium for eligible, small companies.148 Consequently, 
there are two types of CVA, one under Part I and the other under the Schedule A1 of the 
IA1986.  
 
143 Frisby (n133) the survival ratio of companies sold to unconnected and connected party is 71.5% to 51.4%.  144 IA 1986, Part I and SchA1. 145 Cork Report (n9) para 400-3. 146 Keay and Walton (n41) at 156 147 Finch (n28) at 490 148 IA 2000, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/39/pdfs/ukpga_20000039_en.pdf > accessed 30 November 2017 
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4.2.2.2.1 The CVA under Part I of the IA1986 
The IA1986 provides that it is directors of the company who can commence the 
CVA procedure.149 In the case of liquidation or administration, the liquidator or the 
administrator can initiate the CVA.150 If the company directors initiate the CVA, they 
must make a proposal and seek a nominee who can act in relation to the CVA to supervise 
its implementation.151 The nominee must be an IP or a person authorised to act as a 
nominee.152 If the nominee agrees to act, within 28 days, he must submit a report to the 
court stating his opinion on whether there is a prospect for the proposal to be approved 
and implemented and whether the creditor meeting and the member meeting should be 
summoned to approve the proposal.153 The report also includes information on the date, 
time and venue of the meeting to the court.154 In order to make the report, directors must 
provide the nominee with the proposed voluntary arrangement and the statement of 
company affairs with the details of its creditors, assets and liabilities.155 The nominee then 
sends the notice of meetings along with the proposal and the company’s statement of 
affairs to its members and its creditors.156 Where a company is in administration or 
liquidation, the administrator or the liquidator will act as the nominee to call for the 
meeting of the company’s members and creditors with the time, date and place he thinks 
fit to consider the proposal and there is no requirement for submitting a report to court.157 
 
149 IA 1986 S. 1(1)  150 Ibid. s.1(3) 151 Ibid. s.2. However, in reality, directors of a company tend to approach an IP and have the IP’s advice on whether or not to carry out the CVA as well as have the proposal drafted by the IP. See Keay and Walton (n41) at 153 152 Ibid. s.1(2) 153 Ibid. s. 2(2) 154 Ibid.  155 Ibid. s. 2(3) and Insolvency Rules 1986: r.15 and 1.6 156 IR 1986, r.1.9. Notice of meetings must be sent by the nominee at least 14 days before the day the meeting takes place 157 IA 1986, s.3 
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The meetings will decide the issue of whether the proposal will be approved. At 
the creditor meeting, a proposal is approved by a majority of creditors who hold 75% in 
value of unsecured debts.158 There is no division of creditors into different classes for 
voting purpose and the votes are calculated according to the amount of unsecured debt as 
on the date of the meeting.159 A secured creditor is allowed to vote only when he gives 
up his security interest or if his debt is partly secured, he can carry the vote in respect of 
the unsecured amount of his debt.160  
 It is a special feature of the CVA procedure that proposals can be approved either 
by both meetings of the company’s creditor and its member or it can be approved just by 
the creditor meeting.161 This means that although the company’s members are conferred 
a right to vote, their approval is subject to those of creditors. The only way for them to 
oppose is to apply to the court within 28 days to have the CVA rejected.162 Besides, the 
CVA’s fate is decided by creditors because the CVA does not offer a moratorium to 
prevent creditor’s actions against the company.163 In the absence of a moratorium, nothing 
can prevent a creditor from enforcing debts and this can undermine the attempts to rescue 
a company under the CVA.   
4.2.1.2.2 The CVA under the Schedule A1of the IA1986 
The CVA under Schedule A1 is a rescue procedure for small companies. Under s. 
382(3) of the CA2006, a small company is defined as (1) having the turnover of not more 
than £10.2 million, (2) its balance sheet total not exceeding £5.1 million and (3) having 
no more than 50 employees. A company is eligible for a moratorium if it can satisfy two 
 
158 Ibid. r.1.19 159 Ibid. r.1.17 160 Ibid. r.1.19 (3) 161 IA1986 s.4A 162 Ibid. 163 The exception is made for the CVA of small companies which provides for a moratorium 
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of three requirements.164 If an insolvent company satisfies these requirements, its 
directors can approach a nominee with a proposal and a statement of the company affairs. 
The nominee has to give his opinion to the directors as to the likelihood for the CVA to 
be approved, the funds available for the company to carry the business during the 
moratorium as well as meetings of creditors and members to be called to decide the 
CVA.165 Then the directors will submit the proposal, the statement of the company affairs 
and the statement of the nominee’s opinion along with the nominee’s consent to court for 
obtaining a moratorium.166 When these documents are filed, the moratorium comes into 
force and ends after 28 days or earlier when the creditor meeting and the member meeting 
are held.167 Similar to the administration procedure, the scope of the moratorium is very 
wide and prevents parties from petitioning winding up or administration orders, 
appointing an administrative receiver, enforcing security or judgment over the company’s 
assets, or taking other actions that may be harmful to the company pool of assets without 
a leave of court or consent of the nominee.168 During the moratorium, the nominee has 
the duty of monitoring the company affairs to form his opinion on whether the CVA has 
a reasonable prospect of being approved and implemented.169 If the prospect for CVA to 
be implemented no longer exists, the nominee must withdraw his consent to act, resulting 
in the termination of the CVA.170 While the nominee monitors the company’s affair, the 
company is under the management of the directors. However, the directors are allowed 
 164 IA 1986, SchA1, para 3(2).  However, the company cannot be eligible to a moratorium if either it is in administration, liquidation, administrative receivership or already in a CVA; or in the previous 12 months a moratorium was conferred to the company which did not result in the approval of the CVA or result in the approval of a CVA but the CVA ends prematurely. See IA 1986, SchA1, para 4 165Ibid. para 6 166Ibid. para 7 167Ibid. para 8, this time is extendable to further two-month period by agreement of both the meetings (SchA1, para 32) 168 Ibid. para 12 169 Ibid. para 24 170 IA 1986, SchA1, para 25 
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to dispose of the company’s asset so long as there is an approval from the creditors’ 
committee or the nominee.171 
4.2.2.2.3 Effects of the CVA 
When a proposal is approved, the CVA is implemented according to its terms and 
the nominee will become the supervisor of the CVA.172 The approved CVA carries a 
binding effect on every person who was entitled to vote at either meeting (whether they 
were present or represented at the meeting or not), or who would have been so entitled if 
he or she had notice of the meeting.173 This means that creditors who voted against the 
CVA, who did not vote, or who did not receive the notice of CVA proposal are bound by 
the CVA.  
Those who are entitled to vote may apply to the court to revoke the CVA on the 
grounds of unfair prejudices or material irregularity in respect of the meeting.174 First, to 
establish there is unfair prejudice, the court uses two tests, the vertical test and the 
horizontal test.175 The vertical test compares the creditor’s position under the CVA with 
one under other procedures such as liquidation and the horizontal test compares the 
creditor’s position with those of other creditors under the CVA. Second, material 
irregularity is addressed where an irregularity may affect the result of the creditor 
approval. As addressed by courts, material irregularity takes the form of the breach of the 
obligation to notice creditors or preventing them from voting at the meeting176 or 
providing misleading information in the statement of the company’s affairs.177 However, 
 
171 Ibid. para 18 172 Ibid. Para 39 173 IA 1986, s.5 174 IA 1986, s.6 175 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v. PRG Powerhouse Ltd [2007] BPIR 839 176 Re Cardona [1997] BCC 679 177 Re a Debtor (No 87 of 1993) (No 2) [1996] BPIR 64 
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an act of the nominee for not sending the notice of the meeting to a creditor with a small 
amount of debt that cannot influence the voting will not be considered as material.178 
The CVA comes to an end where the company is able to pay all creditors and 
return to normal business. It may be also the case that the company can pay its creditor 
but after that it is no longer able to carry on the business or that the company fails to pay 
its creditors and has to enter into liquidation. If the terms of CVA provides for what is to 
happen on failure to CVA or in liquidation, then the terms are given effect.179 In case 
there are no such provisions and the company goes to liquidation, the money or assets to 
be paid to creditors will be held in trust for creditors who benefit from its terms.180 
4.2.2.3 The Scheme of Arrangement (SA) under the CA2006 
The SA provides for a compromise or an arrangement between a company and its 
creditors or its members for the purpose of restructuring the company or carrying out an 
amalgamation.181 The SA is a special procedure in that it does not require the proof of 
insolvency and the approval of the SA is decided not only by the companies’ members or 
creditors but also by the court’s sanction. 
4.2.2.3.1 The operation of the SA procedure 
To initiate the SA, a company, its creditors or its members must apply to the court 
for an order to convene a creditor or member meeting to vote on the proposed 
arrangement.182 A liquidator or an administrator may apply for a court order if the 
company is in liquidation or administration.183 The company must send the notice of the 
meeting along with the statement explaining the effects of the arrangement to related 
 
178 Re A Debtor (No 259 of 1990) [1992] 1 All ER 641 and Re Cardona [1997] BCC 697 179 Re NT Gallagher & Son Ltd [2002] BBC 133 180 Ibid. 181 CA2006, part 26<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/part/26> accessed 1 November 2017 182 Ibid. s.896  183 Ibid. 
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parties before the meeting takes place.184 Regarding the approval, the company’s creditors 
or members will be divided into separate classes. The arrangement is approved when a 
majority in number representing 75% of the value of each class of creditors vote in favour 
of the arrangement.185 Furthermore, the SA has a binding effect provided it is sanctioned 
by court at a formal hearing.186 When the arrangement is given effect, it will bind all 
creditors within the class that approves the proposal, including secured creditors.187  
4.2.2.3.2 Special features of the SA 
There are some noticeable features associated with the SA. First, it is a flexible 
procedure for corporate rescue in that it does not require a company to be insolvent, its 
terms can be flexibly tailored and there is no requirement for external IPs to replace the 
current directors. Second, although the threshold for approval is higher than other 
procedures in couple with the requirement for creditors to be divided into classes, once 
the SA is approved, it will bind all creditors, even secured creditors.188 However, it should 
be noted that the SA only binds creditors within a class and there is no binding effect 
across classes.189 Third, the SA relies on a high level of court involvement insofar as the 
court convenes the meeting of creditors as well as sanctioning the arrangement.190 Finally, 
unlike other procedures such as administration and CVA, there is no moratorium 
triggered by the initiation of the SA to stop creditors from enforcing their debts, which is 
considered as a disadvantage of this procedure for rescue.191 
 184 Ibid. s. 897  185 Ibid. s.899 186 Ibid. 187 Ibid. s.899(3) 188 Ibid. 189 J. Payne, ‘A New UK Debt Restructuring Regime? A Critique of the Insolvency Service’s Consultation Paper’ - Part 2 (2016) available at < https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/commercial-law-centre/blog/2016/06/new-uk-debt-restructuring-regime-0> accessed16 October 2017 190 CA2006: s.896 and 899 191 Keay and Walton (n41) at 204 
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The SA is beneficial to rescue in certain aspects. First, the SA’s content is not 
prescribed by the legislation and parties to the SA can modify its terms to meet the 
company’s broad range of needs.192 Second, no requirement for the insolvency proof 
means the company’s financial problems can be tackled at the early stage of its crisis to 
ensure the rescue viability.193 Third, when directors remain in their management role 
instead of being replaced by IPs, this can prevent them from taking harmful actions to 
avoid transferring the control power to the outsider, such as hiding the company’s difficult 
affairs.194 Nevertheless, the SA faces the difficulty of how to properly divide creditors 
into different classes,195 which often leads to judicial intervention.196 Yet, the court’s 
involvement with formality is likely to render the procedure more time and cost-
consuming.197 Furthermore, a feature that renders the SA less attractive is the absence of 
a moratorium to protect the company from enforcement actions by the creditors.198 
4.2.2.4 The interplay between the administration, the CVA and the SA 
Regarding the usage of rescue procedures in the UK, although corporate rescue 
accounts for a small figure, around 10% of insolvency cases and 90% of insolvency cases 
go to liquidation, the use of rescue procedures has slightly reduced since 2012.199 
 
192 However, the design of the SA must be in the ambit of the company power under company law. See Finch (n28), at 481 and Mayer Brown, ‘Scheme of Arrangement: An English Law Cramdown Procedure’  <https://www.mayerbrown.com/public_docs/scheme_of_arrangement.pdf> accessed 20 October 2017 193 Finch, Ibid. at 482 and Tribe (n6) at 11 194 Finch, Ibid.  195 Alastair Goldrein, ‘Ready, Willing and Able, but Perhaps Not Always Acceptable: UK Schemes of Arrangement in Europe’ (2011) 7 Pratt's Journal of Bankruptcy Law 114 196 One of the approach the court utilises to classify creditors in a class is that ‘those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest’ (Sovereign Life Assurance Company (In Liquidation) v Dodd [1892] 2 QB 573); or the court will look at whether the rights of creditors are distinct to divide them into different classes (Re Hawk Insurance Company Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 241, and Re Telewest Communications plc [2004] BCC, 342) 197 Finch (n28) at 485 198 Ibid. Yet, a counterview appears is that the importance of rescue is to get creditor’s consensus; therefore, if creditors can be enlightened that the arrangement could lead to higher returns, the SA will be carried out faster without bearing the cost and time resulted from compliance of the moratorium. See John Tribe (n6) at 9-10 199 The Insolvency Service, ‘Insolvency Service Official Statistics’ <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/insolvency-service-official-statistics> accessed 07 October 2011 
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According to the Insolvency Service, the administration is the most popular procedure for 
rescue in 2018, with 1464 cases, followed by the CVA with 356 cases.200 The popularity 
of the administration can be explained with the legislative strategy of abolishing the 
receivership by the enactment of the EA2002. As a result, creditors can only rely on the 
administration to collect debts in insolvency. Furthermore, the availability of a 
moratorium to stay creditors’ action against the company renders the administration a 
more attractive option compared to the CVA and the SA as the latter procedures do not 
offer the same kind of protection.201 There is no official figure for the SA, this may be 
because it is not a procedure prescribed under the Insolvency Act. Yet, a survey shows 
that it ranks behind the CVA in terms of popularity because it is a relatively new, 
complicated and costly procedure, with a high threshold of creditor approval and a high 
level of court involvement.202 
 
 
200 Ibid. Insolvency Statistics (October to December 2018), at 5  <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/780233/Commentary_domain_update.pdf> accessed 9 October 2017 201 A moratorium is introduced under a CVA but it is exclusive for small companies. Ibid. SchA1, section 1 202 A survey by PwC with 70 lawyers finds that 85% of respondents think CVA become more popular for the last two years, while the figure for the Scheme of Arrangement is only 45%. Especially, 66% prefers using the CVA over the Scheme of Arrangement. See PwC, ‘Schemes and CVAs – the perfect arrangement? Law Survey’ <https://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/schemes-and-cvas.pdf > accessed 7 October 2017 
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Table1. New company insolvency in England and Wales in 2014-2018.203 
A special feature of the UK rescue law is the possible interplay between the rescue 
procedures. For example, the administration can be initiated in combination with the 
CVA. An advantage of this combination is that an insolvent company can use the 
moratorium available under the administration (which is not provided for under the CVA) 
to stop creditors from enforcing debts while negotiating the CVA.204 Once the CVA 
proposal is approved, the administration procedure comes to an end and the term of the 
CVA is implemented.205 Similarly, in combination with the SA, the administration can 
offer the SA with a moratorium that is not available under the CA2006. The issue here is 
whether the CVA or the SA will be a better choice with the administration. Each 
procedure has its advantages and disadvantages rendering it appealing or unattractive to 
lawyers and practitioners. While the CVA is considered to be simpler and more cost-
effective to implement, the SA has its merit with the ability to deal with complex 
restructuring with a high involvement of creditors who possess different rights and 
interests.206 CVA cannot bind secured creditors without their consent; while the SA has a 
high level of court involvement and has to deal with the issue of dividing creditors into 
proper classes despite the binding effect on secured creditors. The combination, therefore, 
is not optimal to rescue small companies, instead, it can be used for more complicated 
and expensive companies.207 
 4.3 Evaluation of the UK rescue law 
 
203 The Insolvency Statistics, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/780233/Commentary_domain_update.pdf> at 5 204 The exception is made for the case of small companies CA 2006, see IA 1986, SchA1 205  IA 1986, Section 5. IA and SchB1 para 83 206 PwC Law Survey, ‘Schemes and CVAs – the perfect arrangement?’ (2010) available at  <https://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/schemes-and-cvas.pdf> accessed 25 October 2017 207 Finch (n28) at 490 
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4.3.1 The emphasis of UK law on corporate rescue  
It is important to distinguish between ‘company rescue’ and ‘business rescue’.208 
While ‘company rescue’ involves restoring an insolvent company back to a normal state 
with the same ownership, ‘business rescue’ preserves only viable parts of the company’s 
business, which may result in the transfer of the business to a new owner.209 The UK 
rescue law appears to operate under the latter philosophy.210 This is expressly reflected in 
the objectives of the administration. According to para 3(1), the administration’s 
objectives are to rescue a company as a going concern, to achieve a better result for 
creditors than in liquidation, or to realise the company’s assets to distribute to secured 
creditors or preferential creditors.211 As rescue is the first objective to be mentioned in 
para 3(1), this may lead to a misunderstanding that it will enjoy the highest priority over 
the others. Indeed, the ultimate purpose of the administration is to maximise creditor 
return because the administrator will select one objective that, he thinks, can produce 
better results to creditors in comparison with the others.212 This means although rescue is 
feasible to achieve, the administrator will opt for a sale of the company if this option can 
produce higher returns for creditors. The study of the administration by Katz and 
Mumford has offered strong evidence for this, with only less than 10% of administration 
cases involving successful rescue.213 Echoed with this study is the survey on the pre-pack 
administration by Frisby, which addresses an increasing trend in using the pre-pack to 
 208 See Chapter Three  (3.3.2.2 Company Rescue and Business Rescue) 209 S. Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 67 Mod. L. Rev. 247, at 272, 248, and 249 210 As stated by the Insolvency Service in a report, ‘corporate rescue mechanisms are not intended to maintain inefficient firms that are not economically viable, or to protect debtors from creditors except for time-limited and short periods to facilitate the orderly restructuring of the corporate entity and/or its business’. The Insolvency Service, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms: Report by the Review Group’ (The Insolvency Service, 2000) 211 IA 1986: SchB1, para 3 212 Ibid. para3(3) and 3(4) 213 Katz and Mumford (n89) 
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sell insolvent companies before the administration occurs, with the pre-pack sale 
accounting for 52% of the administration cases.214  
Nevertheless, this cannot obscure the rescue-oriented nature of UK law. With the 
enactment of the EA2002, creditors are barred from initiating the receivership,215 and the 
administration becomes the only resort for creditors to collect debts. This helps a 
company avoid the risk of being liquidated for lacking assets necessary to operate 
business upon the completion of the receivership. The likelihood of liquidation is also 
prevented as any pending winding-up will be dismissed by the virtue of the administration 
appointment.216 Furthermore, the administration is more conducive to rescue insofar as it 
can be initiated on an out-of-court basis, which allows the company to be rescued in an 
expeditious, convenient fashion.217 The UK law also encourages rescue by offering 
diverse rescue procedures, including the administration, the CVA and the SA. Especially, 
being insolvent is not a requirement for a company to apply for the SA procedure, which 
implies the UK legislative policy of encouraging financially distressed companies to 
initiate rescue actions before their financial affairs get worse. 
4.3.2 The assessment of the administration, the CVA and the SA under the 
four established benchmarks 
Noticeably, the UK approach to corporate rescue is diverse with three different 
procedures: the administration, the CVA and the SA. According to the models of rescue 
administration discussed in chapter three,218 the administration represents the Profession-
in-Possession (PIP) model under which the IP replaces company directors in management 
and administering rescue, the SA features the Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) model with the 
 214 S Frisby (n133) 215 IA 1986 s.72 216 Ibid. SchB1, para 40 217 Ibid. para 17 and 21  218 See Chapter Three, section 3.4.2.2 
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company directors remaining in management, and the CVA reflects a hybrid model under 
which the directors still hold the offices under the oversight of the IPs. This section will 
examine the effectiveness of these models of the UK rescue law under four benchmarks 
established in chapter three, namely time and cost of rescue, expertise, abuse management 
and creditor participation.  
4.3.2.1 Time and cost   
4.3.2.1.1 The Administration 
The duration for carrying out the administration is restricted to twelve months, 
and this period may be extended by the court or extended with creditors’ consent for up-
to-six months.219 However, the likelihood for an extension is relatively low as a report 
found the average time for completing the administration has been around 348 days.220 
The speediness of the administration could be attributed to a number of statutory efforts. 
Firstly, there is the requirement that the administrator must perform his functions as 
quickly and efficiently as is reasonably practicable.221 Secondly, the route for entering 
into administration is no longer constrained to the court appointment, rather, the 
administration can be initiated in an out-of-court route, which allows the company to enter 
into the administration in a timely fashion.222 Thirdly, the pre-pack sale speeds up the 
completion of the administration by selling the company before the occurrence of the 
administration. Finally, the availability of the moratorium bars creditors from taking 
actions against the company and offers it a peaceful time to devise rescue plans.223  
 
219 IA 1986, SchB1, para 76 220 The length of administration is significantly reduced compared to that of the administration before the Enterprise Act, which is 438 days. See Frisby Report 2006 codified by the Insolvency Service its Evaluation Report 2008 <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080610162953/http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/legislation/EA02CorporateInsolvencyReport.pdf> accessed 01 November 2017 221 IA 1986: SchB1, para 4 222 Ibid. para 22-34 223 Ibid. para 42, 44 
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However, the time limit appears to be the main problem of the administration. 
Though the restriction of the twelve-month period seems to satisfy creditors who are 
always eager to get the administration results, this places a great deal of pressure on the 
administrator in making appropriate decisions. In addition, the IA1986 requires the 
administrator to present proposals to creditors within eight weeks and convene the 
creditor’s meeting within ten weeks of his appointment.224 It is apparent that the strict 
timeframe of eight weeks cannot support the administrator to come up with a well-
prepared rescue proposal as it takes time for him to be familiar with the company’s 
operations and devise rescue solutions based on what he has learned about the company’s 
financial affairs. Under this pressure, the administrator is likely to select a more feasible 
option, such as selling the company, instead of investing time and efforts in an uncertain 
rescue. As a result, a company might be unreasonably sold although it could deserve a 
better chance to be rescued under the administration. Therefore, this thesis takes the view 
that instead of limiting the time for the administration, the law should allow this matter 
to be decided by negotiation between the administrator and the creditors. 
In terms of cost, two factors for the consideration are the realisation and the return 
to creditors. Empirical studies often compare the cost of the administration with that of 
the receivership and the old administration (which is abolished under the EA2002). As 
for the creditor return, Frisby finds the administration benefits secured and preferential 
creditors only, with the figure of secured creditor’s return increasing from 29.3% in the 
receivership to 34.6% in administration; and the figure for preferential creditors’ return 
rose more significantly, from 13.2% to 52.7%.225 Meanwhile, unsecured creditors 
enjoyed a slight increase from 1.9% to 2.8%, which is considerably lower than the figure 
 
224 Ibid. para 49(5)(b) and para 51(2) 225 Frisby (n220), at 119 
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in the old administration with 6.7%.226 However, it should not be forgotten that unsecured 
creditors could be compensated for the benefit under section 176A,227 which provides for 
a prescribed part to be paid to unsecured creditors out of the company’s net asset.228  
Regarding realisation, a report by the Insolvency Service found the realisation in 
the administration significantly higher than in the receivership, and this is more obvious 
in the case where creditors are over-secured.229 However, the cost of rescue in the 
administration was also found to be higher than in the receivership because of the increase 
in the professional fees such as IP and legal fees.230 As a result, despite the increase in the 
realisation rate, the administration offers no actual increase in creditors’ return because 
the realisation is reduced by the high administration fee.231 Therefore, IPs appear to be 
the party who enjoys the benefit of the administration. In countering the abuse of fees by 
the administrator, rule 18.16 sets out the basis to fix the professional fee. According to 
the rule, the fee can be fixed by reference to the value of the property the administrator 
has to deal with or the time properly given by the administrator or as a set amount.232 It 
is the creditor’s committee who fixes and reviews the fee in case there is a substantial or 
material change that affects the original one.233 By allowing creditors to decide the 
administration cost, the UK law can deal with the problem of IP fees as well as 
encouraging creditors to participate in rescue. 
 
226 Ibid. 227 IA 1986 228According to the Insolvency Act 1986 (Prescribed Part) Order 2003, the prescribed part is 50% if the net asset does not exceed £10,000. If the net asset exceeds £100,000, the prescribed part will be 50% of £10,000 plus 20% of net asset that exceeds £10,000. However, the total value of the prescribed part must not exceed £600,000. 229 John Armour, Audrey Hsu and Adrian Walter,  Enterprise Act 2002 – Corporate Insolvency Provision: Evaluation Report, codified in the Insolvency Service in the Evaluation Report 2008 (n217) at.111  230 Ibid.  231Ibid. 232 IR 2016: r.18.16 (2  233 Ibid. r.18.16(9)  
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4.3.2.1.2 The CVA 
Similar to the administration, the out-of-court initiation and the introduction of a 
moratorium offer CVA a degree of flexibility that allows it to be conducted in a timely 
fashion.234 In addition to a flexible entry, a moratorium preventing actions against the 
company provides it with peacetime to draft CVA proposals. However, unlike the 
moratorium under administration, the CVA’s moratorium is eligible to the small 
companies only.235 This leads to the implication that there will be more use of the CVA 
with moratorium than the CVA without a moratorium. Yet, it is interesting to find that 
CVAs with moratorium has very little use and most of CVA cases are conducted without 
resorting to moratorium’s advantage.236 
In comparison, the CVA cannot be carried out as quickly as the administration for 
several reasons. First, the threshold for approval under the CVAs is higher than in the 
administration, with 75% compared to 50%.237 This difficulty is coupled with the fact that 
the CVA cannot bind secured creditors and preferential creditors unless they agree to, 
which demands more efforts to be made to convince these creditors to approve the CVA 
proposals.238 Second, while the legislation limits the duration of the administration to 
twelve months with a possible extension of six months, the CVA’s duration depends on 
what the parties have agreed. Generally, the duration of the CVA completion is three to 
five years,239 however, this period may be shorter or longer depending on the nature of 
 234 IA 1986, s.1(1)  235 IA 1986, SchA1, para 3(2) 236 According to a survey by Walters and Frisby, there was 86% of CVA conducted without using a moratorium. See, A. Walters and S. Frisby, Preliminary Report to the Insolvency Service into Outcomes in Company Voluntary Arrangements, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1792402> at 10, accessed 11 November 2017 237 IR 1986, r.1.19 and 2.28 238 Ibid. r. 1.19(3) 239 See This knowledge is provided by the Company Rescue, a professional company in this field  <https://www.companyrescue.co.uk/guides-knowledge/guides/a-company-voluntary-arrangement-cva-or-a-formal-time-to-pay-agreement-3817/> accessed 11 November 2017 
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each case. A report on CVA’s outcomes finds over half of surveyed CVAs which lasted 
for less than eighteen months were more likely to end up with failure, resulting in the 
company termination, while CVAs lasted for three years or more tend to be associated 
with the likelihood of company survival, yet this figure accounted for only 10% of the 
surveyed cases.240  
The duration for carrying out CVAs can be longer than administration. It is 
understandable that as the administration is constrained to the statutory limit of twelve 
months, a sale of the company is a likely outcome under this time pressure.241 For rescue 
purpose, the administration is viewed as the last resort because of ‘damaging effects it 
can have on a company’s value’.242 Meanwhile, the CVA’ purpose is to keep a company 
running and operating profitably in the future, therefore, it requires considerable time and 
efforts to be invested in the negotiation with creditors to get their approval. A longer 
duration of CVA is compensated for its benefits insofar as a successful CVA allows the 
company to preserve its valuable elements and continue its activities without suffering 
from the distortion of director’s replacement and the change of ownership.  
 Regarding the creditor’s realisation in CVA, unsecured creditors are the party 
who receiver more benefits according to the result of some surveys. An empirical study 
on the CVA reveals that unsecured creditors do better than secured creditors in terms of 
return.243 However, it does not necessarily mean secured creditors perform badly in the 
CVA, their performance was recorded to be positive.244 In 2004, R3 published a survey 
that unsecured creditors had an average return of 17 pence in the pound, which is higher 
 
240 Walters and Frisby (n236) at 15 241 See the discussion on time and cost of the administration (4.3.2.1.1 The Administration) 242 Richard Fleming, KPMG’s UK Head of Restructuring, cited by G. M. Weisgard and M. Griffiths in Company Voluntary Arrangement and Administration (Jordan, 3edn, 2013) p.8 243 G.A.S Cook, N.R Pandit and D. Milman, ‘Formal Rehabilitation Procedures and Insolvent Firms: Empirical Evidence on the British Company Voluntary Arrangement Procedure’ (2001) 17 Small Business Economics, at 266 244 Ibid.  
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than the figures in the administration (6.3 pence) and receivership (5.4 pence).245  The 
most recent survey of Walters and Frisby also confirms the high rate of return to 
unsecured creditors in CVA, at 13%.246 The results from these surveys indicate that the 
high rate of return for unsecured creditors is an obvious advantage that encourages the 
use of the CVA.  
Regarding the CVA fees, before the introduction of the IA2000, the CVA 
experienced a low use for several reasons, one of which is the cost.247 It was considered 
to be too expensive for small companies to pursue it.248 The changes provided by the 
IA2000 has rendered the CVA an efficient procedure.249 Compared to the administration, 
CVA’s fee is significantly lower. It is well-confirmed by law firms that CVA is a cost-
effective procedure, with the cost being 5-10 times lower than in administration.250 This 
fee can be agreed to be paid on an annual basis and can be deducted from the monthly 
payment the company makes into the CVA.251 This scheme of payment, therefore, does 
not place a much heavy financial burden on an insolvent company, instead, it allows the 
company to continue its operation and business.  
4.3.2.1.3 The SA 
A special feature of the SA is that it can be initiated without the occurrence of an 
insolvency event, which means that a company can rely on it to solve its financial problem 
at the early stage of its crisis. Due to the lack of official statistic on the SA, data on time 
 
245 R3 Twelfth Survey, Company Insolvency in the United Kingdom (R3, 2004) 246 Walters and Frisby (n236) at 24 247 Finch (n28) at 497 248 D. Milman and F. Chittenden, Corporate Rescue: CVAs and the Challenge of Small Companies, ACCA Research Report 44 (ACCA, 1995) 249 Finch (n28) at 498 250 Company Rescue, ‘Administration or Company Voluntary Arrangement CVA’ (2019) <https://www.companyrescue.co.uk/guides-knowledge/guides/administration-or-company-voluntary-arrangement-cva-3803/> accessed 11 November 2017 251 Wilmott Turner Financial Services, ‘What does a CVA cost?’ <https://wilmottturner.com/company-voluntary-arrangements-cva/what-does-a-company-voluntary-arrangement-cva-cost> accessed 11 November 2017 
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and cost is not available for a comparison with the administration or the CVA. However, 
one conclusion can be made is that the SA is a less effective procedure compared to the 
CVA in terms of time and cost because of its complexity.252 For instance, while the CVA 
treats all creditors as the same, the SA separates creditors into classes for voting.253 
Therefore, the threshold for approving the SA is duplicated as the approval for the SA 
must be satisfied within each class of creditors. Furthermore, the SA involves high 
participation of the court from reviewing the application, opening the hearings, settling 
disputes among parties to sanctioning the SA and these add more cost and time to its 
implementation.254 
To summarise, the above analysis has assessed the effectiveness of the UK rescue 
law under the benchmark of time and cost. It appears that all procedures have advantages 
and drawbacks. The administration proves itself to be the fastest route to rescue, however, 
it cannot support corporate rescue with a very limited timeframe and high IP cost. The 
SA allows a company to be rescued with a timely initiation for not requiring insolvency 
proof, but it has the drawback of being costly and complicated procedure featuring a high 
level of court involvement. Of all the procedures, the CVA appears to be the best option 
in terms of time and cost and its lengthy implementation can be accepted for the purpose 
of corporate rescue. Though the UK law offers a degree of flexibility in introducing 
multiple procedures for rescue, this cannot work well in the absence of a moratorium 
under some procedures. As discussed previously,255 the moratorium is not available under 
the CVA and the SA, therefore, the two procedures have to combine with the 
 252 PwC, ‘Schemes and CVAs – the perfect arrangement? Law Survey’ (2010) <https://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/schemes-and-cvas.pdf> accessed 11 November 2011 253 CA2006, s.896 (1) 254 Finch (n28) at 485 255 See section 4.2.2.2 of this chapter 
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administration to take advantage of the moratorium. However, as the administration is a 
costly procedure, this combination will add more time cost to rescue.  
4.3.2.2 Expertise  
4.3.2.2.1 The Administration 
The administration follows the PIP model, featuring the participation of the 
administrator who replaces directors in managing and controlling the company. The 
explanation for the UK resorting to borrowing the expertise of an outsider can be the 
hostility that blames the director’s mismanagement for insolvency.256 The development 
of rescue practice led to the creation of IP profession, which comprises the membership 
of accountants and lawyers.257 Presently, IPs are monitored by the membership to RPBs 
or by direct authorisation of the Secretary of State.258 In order to become a member of a 
RPBs, an IP must earn a level of working experience and successfully pass the JIEB 
examination.259 The way of regulating IPs in the UK is very special in that RPBs are self-
regulatory organisations, but the government can exercise control over them in the form 
of the Insolvency Service’s supervision.260 Noticeably, the Insolvency Service and RPBs, 
in a joined effort, issued the Statement of Insolvency Practice to regulate IPs profession. 
If an IP is punished for his misconduct, the sanction will be published on the government 
website.261 With these rigorous provisions for granting and controlling membership 
provided by the RPBs along with the governmental supervision, IPs in the UK appear to 
 
256 Westbrook (n44) 257J. Flood and E. Skordaki, Insolvency Practitioners and Big Corporate Insolvencies, ACCA Research Report 43 (1995) at 9 258 See section 4.1.3 of this Chapter 259 ICAEW (n49) 260 Insolvency Service, <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/principles-for-monitoring-insolvency-practitioners> accessed 16 November 2017 261 <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/current-insolvency-practitioner-sanctions> accessed 16 November 2017 
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be qualified to exercise their expertise in rescue procedure.262 It is the fact that recent 
concern about IPs is not principal with IPs’ lack of skill, rather it is the IP’s cost.263  
Nevertheless, the more important issue in examining IP expertise is whether the 
law allows them to exercise their expertise within the administration. Noticeably, the law 
confers the administrator a wide range of power to do ‘anything necessary and expedient’ 
for management of the business and property of the company.264 Yet, it does not 
necessarily mean that he can be able to work alone in pursuing the administration purpose; 
rather, he has to work with the directors and the creditors of the company. In this regard, 
the IA1986 presents a great deal of challenges to the administrator. Accordingly, the law 
stipulates that the administrator has eight weeks to present proposals to creditors and ten 
weeks to convene the creditor’s meeting following his appointment.265 In performing his 
functions under this time pressure, the administrator must rely on the director’s 
information because he has not been familiar with the company’s operation before the 
appointment. Although the law grants the administrator a right to require the information 
from the directors,266 the likelihood of the co-operation depends on whether the directors 
have incentives to provide the required information. If the directors learn that the 
administrator’s decision is to rescue the company, they are likely to co-operate with the 
administrator since working with the administrator to rescue the company is an 
opportunity for them to retain their employment. By contrast, if the directors are not 
certain about the administrator’s intention, or if they learned that the administrator’s 
 
262 Each RPB have their own benchmark, however, in general persons who want to have memberships must possesses a degree of experience, evidenced with a number of hours working on insolvency area. See R3, ‘Making a Career as an Insolvency Practitioner’ <https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/publications/professional/Making_a_Career_Brochure_V2.pdf> accessed 16November 2017 263 Finch, (n28) at 192 264 IA 1986: SchB1, Para 59  265 Ibid. para 49(5)(b) and para 51(2) 266 Ibid. para 47. Directors’ misconduct is subject themselves to the severe punishment under Company Director Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA) 
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intention is to sell the company, they tend to preserve information in an attempt to delay 
the decision-making as well as prolonging their employment. The directors are more 
likely to preserve information due to the threat that the administrator will launch an 
investigation into their conducts in the administration.267  
As such, by imposing a time pressure on the administrator to perform his functions 
and discouraging the voluntary co-operation between the administrator and the directors, 
the administration does not allow expertise to be sufficiently contributed in rescue. In 
responding to this issue, imposing obligations on the directors to provide the information 
required by the administrator appears to be insufficient.268 Along with the strong 
punishment for errant directors, the proper approach for effective communication 
between the administrator and the directors should lie in the changing of fault-based 
attitude towards insolvency which blames the director mainly for the company’s failure. 
For example, it is proposed that there should be a lenient treatment for directors who seek 
early help and cooperate with the administrator.269 
4.3.2.2.2 The CVA 
The CVA follows the hybrid model of rescue administration that features the role 
of the IP in appraising and supervising rescue while allowing the company directors to 
stay in management and implement the rescue. Therefore, the efficiency of the CVA does 
not rely on the expertise of the directors and the IPs separately; rather, it demands the co-
ordination of expertise between the IP and the directors.270  
 267 IA 1986: schB1, Para 64, 268 David Hahn, ‘Concentrated Ownership and Control of Corporate Reoganizations’, (2004) 4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 117, at 146-8, Finch (n28) 438 269 Finch, Ibid. at 438 270 Finch, Ibid. at 505 
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The IP’s expertise is exercised at two stages, drafting the CVA proposal and 
implementing the proposal. At the first stage, IP acts as the nominee, using their expertise 
to screen and appraise the proposals drafted by the directors to report to court whether 
there is a reasonable prospect for the proposal to be approved.271 In reality, the IP may 
involve earlier in the CVA when the directors approach them for professional advice on 
the suitability of the proposal.272 However, in this case, the nominee must be objective 
and bases his opinion on his expertise and facts; otherwise, he must be liable for the cost 
incurred by his lack of professionalism.273 At the second stage, when the proposal gets 
approved from creditors, the nominee will act as the supervisor to supervise its 
implementation. At both stages, it is important for IPs to maintain to be independent to 
gain the consensus for the CVA.274 As the nominee is an IP, his membership and practice 
are regulated the same way as those under administration to ensure professionalism.  
Apart from the IP’s expertise, implementing the CVA importantly requires the 
expertise of the directors. Since the CVA is an arrangement between a company and its 
creditors, it involves a course of negotiation which demands the directors to have a degree 
of experience and skills. It is important for the directors to have the competence in running 
the company during troubled times, and even it is more important for them to show their 
competence to gain trust among creditors.275 By not depriving the directors of the 
management power, the CVA has encouraged them to cooperate with the IPs and try their 
best at the second chance to save the company.276 As the likelihood for the CVA to be 
 
271 Section 2 IA 1986 272 Keay and Walton (n41) 152-153. Where the liquidator or the administrator may act as the nominee in the CVA, there is no requirement to make reports to court. s.3(2) IA 1986) 273 Ibid. 274 J. Tribe, ‘Company Voluntary Arrangements and Rescue: A New Hope and a Tudor Orthodoxy’, (2009) Journal of Business Law, 5, available at,  <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1328471> p27-28, accessed 22 November 2017  275 Flood (n25) 19 276 J. Tribe, (n274) 17 
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approved depends on how well the directors perform to gain creditor approval, they are 
demanded to have a degree of competent management,277 and encouraged to get training 
of insolvency to ensure that they could improve their performance.278 As such, in 
comparison with the administration, the CVA appears to be more efficient in terms of 
expertise contributed in rescue insofar as it encourages directors’ expertise in devising 
rescue proposals in couple with borrowing the expertise of the IPs to evaluate the 
proposals and supervise its implementation.  
4.3.2.2.3 The SA 
The SA is a very well-reflected example of the DIP model, which devolves the 
power of implementing rescue on hand of the company directors. In countering with 
potential abuse arising from director control, there is a high judicial involvement to 
supervise the procedure, which makes it distinct from the administration and the CVA. 
Under the CVA and the SA, directors remain in the management of the company. 
However, the extent to which they exercise their expertise under the latter is somewhat 
different from the former. Unlike the CVA, the SA can be initiated without the proof of 
insolvency,279 which provides the directors with flexibility as well as encouraging them 
to be aware of the company’s financial situation before commencing this procedure. If 
the insolvency, as correctly estimated by the directors, is likely to happen, the chance for 
the company to be rescued is very high; by contrast, an immature initiation can bring a 
degree of distortion to the normal operation of the company. Furthermore, the directors 
have to face the difficulty regarding dividing creditors into proper classes for the voting 
scheme and drafting the SA proposals in the absence of the moratorium protection.280 
 277 Insolvency Practitioner Association, <www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/download/documents/145> accessed 3 December 2017 278 Finch (28) at 506 279 See Chapter three (3.3.1 The application of the cash flow test and the balance sheet test) 280 Finch (n28) at 485 
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However, in compensation for these disadvantages, the SA provides the directors with 
incentives to optimise their expertise in certain important respects. For example, 
commencing the SA does not impose on the directors the obligation to disclose 
information on the company’s affair publicly. In addition, by not removing the directors, 
the SA incentivises them to exercise their expertise since this is a second chance for them 
to correct their mistakes before as well as securing their employment.  
Regarding the judicial role in insolvency, the courts have the highest status in an 
insolvency system, with the power to direct how insolvency procedure to be carried out 
and settle disputes among parties.281 As a matter of cost, it is opined that the participation 
of the courts in insolvency procedure should be limited, except for special cases such as 
compulsory winding-up.282 In case of rescue, a critical question as to judiciary 
participation is whether the court’s role is restricted to the statutory rule or the judge 
should have judicial discretion. It appears to be normal if the court directs parties to follow 
procedural rules; however, judicial discretion requires judges to obtain a sufficient degree 
of expertise in insolvency to effectively deal with rescue on a case-by-case basis. The 
extent of court involvement in rescue significantly is not the same for all legal systems 
because it depends on the development of practice and legal culture of specific 
jurisdictions.283  
Regarding the court involvement in the SA, there are two court hearings: the class 
hearing – to decide if a direction is issued to summon creditor’s meeting, and the 
sanctioning hearing - to sanction the SA when it gets approval from creditors.284  The 
 
281 Keay and Walton (n41) at 35 282 Ibid. 283 For example, in the USA, a jurisdiction famously featuring court involvement into rescue, the judges have an active role in restructuring, and the judges in famous jurisdiction for restructuring such as Delware and New York, has more expertise and sophistication than those at other courts. See, David A. Skeel Jr., ‘Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware’ (1998) Delaware Law Review (1), 31-33 284 S.896(1) and 899(1), Company Act 2006 
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court’s focus is to provide parties with guidance on how to divide creditors into proper 
classes.285 Furthermore, the court ensures that procedural requirements have been 
complied; for example, whether notice of creditor meeting has been sent and appropriate 
resolution has been made.286 Especially, the main focus of the court is fairness insofar as 
the court sanctions the SA only when it is approved fairly and reasonably.287 Therefore, 
the court’s functions under the SA are not to make business judgments, rather the court’s 
function is to exercise its power to control and supervise the compliance of statutory rules. 
The explanation for this is that the UK courts do not have the sort of experience to deal 
with this issue like those in the US.288 However, the UK courts have to exercise their 
discretion to solve the important issues silenced under the legislation scope, for example, 
how to properly divide creditors and what constitutes fairness to sanction the SA. Judicial 
experience on the SA has proved that the court has enough capacity to deal with the issues 
of classification of creditors for voting purposes or the issue of whether to sanction the 
based on the ground of fairness.289 
4.2.3.3 Abuse management 
4.3.2.3.1 Administration 
Under this benchmark, a rescue law is effective so long as it can address and tackle 
potential abuse by a party that harms the interest of the others. Featuring the PIP model, 
the administration replaces the directors with the administrator, and thereby tackles the 
 285 Latham and Watkins, ‘UK Scheme of Arrangement Overview’, <https://www.lw.com/admin/Upload/Documents/uk-schemes-of-arrangement-2014.pdf> accessed 28 November 2017, 4 286 Ibid. 6 287 Ibid. 288 R3, US ‘Chapter 11’: Should it be adopted in the UK?, p4, available at <https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/policy_papers/corporate_insolvency/R3_Chapter_11_briefing_(October_2015).pdf>  accessed 06 December 2017 289 See, Re Hawk Insurance Company Ltd [2001], Re British Aviation Insurance Co Ltd, [2005] APP.L.R. 07/21, Scottish Lion Insurance Company Ltd v. Goodrich Corporation & Ors [2010] ScotCS CSIH 6, SCLR 167,  
Chapter Four - Corporate Rescue Law in the United Kingdom  
135  
abuse stemming from the directors taking risky actions in an attempt to save the company 
by themselves but at the cost incurred by creditors.290 If the directors continue to operate 
the company without resorting to insolvency law, he can be subject to severe penalties, 
such as monetary fines or disqualification.291  
Given the removal of company directors from management, abuse does not seem 
to arise from their conduct, rather it may potentially arise from the administrator’s 
decision in the pre-pack. Accordingly, the administrator’s decision to initiate the pre-pack 
allows a company to be sold immediately before entering into the administration without 
a need to call for a creditor meeting. Though the IA1986 does not expressly provide for 
the pre-pack, it can allow this practice to occur. According to para 3(1), objectives of the 
administration are (a) rescuing the company, (b) achieving better results for creditors than 
in the case of winding up and (c) realising assets to distribute to secured or preferential 
creditors.292 Where the administrator thinks the objectives 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b) cannot be 
achieved, para 52(1) allows him to come up with a decision that he does not need the 
approval of creditors293 and the pre-pack is such the decision. The pre-pack practice has 
the judicial endorsement in a series of cases, such as T&D Industries Ltd,294 Re Transbus 
International Ltd,295 and DKLL Solicitor v Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs,296 under 
which the courts showed their reluctance to make the second-guessing intervention into 
commercial judgments by the administrator.297 
Once the administrator is allowed to have such the discretion in deciding the pre-
pack, he may make a decision that prejudices creditors’ interest. This possibility happens 
 
290 IA 1986: para 64, and D. Hahn (n268) at 127 291 IA 1986: s.214 and Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986: s.6 and 10 292 IA 1986: SchB1, para 3(1) 293 Ibid. para 294 Re T&D Industries plc [2000] BCC 956 295 Transbus International Ltd, [2004] EWHC 932 296 DKLL Solicitor v. Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, [2007] B.C.C. 908 297 Transbus International Ltd, [2004] EWHC 932, para 14 
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where a major creditor, who attempts to buy the company at an advantageous price, 
approaches the administrator for a pre-pack sale. Notwithstanding the requirement for the 
administrator’s impartiality to act in the interest of creditor as a whole, he has to perform 
this function in a very limited time frame298 and this pressure is likely to force him to 
select the pre-pack in order to sell the company in a prompt manner. Though the law 
allows aggrieved parties a right to challenge the administrator’s conduct at court,299 it is 
unlikely for creditors to establish sufficient evidence as they do not run the company and 
participate in its operations. Furthermore, the judicial endorsement for the administrator’s 
business decision, shown as a number of cases, has the effect of discouraging creditors to 
exercise this right.300  
In an effort to placate the creditors who are deprived the rights to approve the pre-
pack, the Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (SIP16) requires material information on 
the pre-pack such as the identity of purchasers and valuation to be provided to creditors,301 
and the compliance will be monitored by the Insolvency Service.302 However, the SIP16 
cannot sufficiently respond to this problem because it does not require the administrator 
to convene a meeting to explain to the creditors what is going to happen; and more 
importantly, it remains under the SIP 16 that creditors do not have the right to cast their 
vote over the approval of the pre-pack.303 Especially, failing to comply with this 
requirement does not constitute serious misconduct for revocation of the administrator’s 
 
298 The administrator has to present a proposal to creditors within 8 weeks of his appointment, convene the creditor meeting to approve the proposal within 10 weeks of his appointment and have one year to complete the administration. IA 1986: SchB1, para 52 and 76 299 Ibid. para 74 300 Although the courts endorse the administrator’s decision, they might make an intervention in case of conflict of interest. For example, in VE Vegas Investors IV LLC v. Shinners [2018] EWHC 186 (Ch), the court removed the administrators for facilitating a pre-pack sale to sell the company back to its management 301 See the content of SIP 16 at <https://www.r3.org.uk/what-we-do/publications/professional/statements-of-insolvency-practice/e-and-w/sip-16-list> accessed 28 November 2017 302 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statements-of-insolvency-practice-16-sip-16> accessed 28 November 2017 303 SIP 16 (n302) 
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license by RBPs.304 With these reasons, the administration appears to be an insufficient 
device in tackling abuse arising from the administrator’s decision of selecting the pre-
pack. 
4.3.2.3.2 The CVA 
The CVA follows the hybrid model of rescue administration under which the 
directors’ control and implement rescue under the IP’s supervision. As a hybrid model, 
the CVA is considered to overcome the drawback of the PIP model by allowing the 
company directors to remain in the management and the drawback of the DIP model by 
injecting the IP’s supervision in the implementation of the CVA.305 The CVA works more 
effectively than the administration in dealing with abuse in the extent to which it is an 
arrangement between the company and its creditors under which the terms will be 
negotiated by the parties themselves, while in administration, it is the administrator who 
proposes a rescue proposal without consulting creditors. Therefore, if the company 
directors abuse the CVA by including disadvantageous terms in the arrangement, 
creditors will prevent this by rejecting the arrangement. Similarly, by providing the CVA 
to be approved with a high threshold of 75% of creditors voting,306 the law can prevent 
the abuse when a major creditor attempts to use his advantage to influence the CVA. 
Furthermore, the CVA facilitates a mechanism to deal with conflicts by allowing the 
suffered parties to challenge the CVA on the ground of unfair prejudice and material 
irregularity.307 In response to the silence of the legislation as to what constitutes unfair 
prejudice, the courts have developed a set of well-established principles, which can 
 
304 Insolvency Service, Report on the Operation of Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (2009) at 3, available at  <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/301181/sip16_report_dec_2009.pdf> accessed 5 December 2017 305 See Chapter Three, section 3.4.2.3 306 IR1986: r.1.19 307 IA 1986: s.6 
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effectively identify whether a creditor being placed in a disadvantageous position.308 
Similarly, regarding the material irregularity, the case law has been developed to deal 
with this problem.309 Furthermore, it should be mentioned the role of the IP, which is the 
supervisor, in the CVA in managing potential abuse. Since the supervisor has to keep a 
balance between protecting creditor and avoiding demotivating the directors in 
performing their function in the CVA, the law grants the supervisor limited powers that 
allow him to intervene the directors’ decision.310 Nevertheless, the supervisor can 
exercise the power granted by s.423 to apply for a court order to impeach transactions 
defrauding creditors, such as transactions entered at undervalue.311 
4.3.2.3.3 The SA 
The SA is the reflection of the DIP model, under which the directors implement 
the rescue under the court’s oversight. The SA is different from the administration and 
the CVA procedure in that it does not involve IP’s participation, although the directors 
may consult an IP for drafting a proposal. The SA is perceived to be fairer than the CVA 
in the extent to which there is a separation of creditors into specific classes for voting 
purposes and it can only bind creditors including secured creditors within a class and there 
is no binding effect across classes.312 In ensuring there is no prejudice of interest, the 
obligation to provide information is strictly imposed on the directors with the serve 
punishment for non-compliance.313 The court exercises the supervision role to prevent 
potential abuses by only sanctioning the agreement among parties when it is satisfied that 
it is fair and reasonable and creditors who are affected by the SA may challenge it at the 
 
308 See section 4.2.2.2.3. Effects of the CVA  309 Ibid. 310 Weisgard and Griffiths (n242) at 179. 311 IA1986, s.423 312 CA2006, s.899 313 Ibid. 897 
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sanction hearing.314 With the judicial monitoring and supervisor, the SA appears to be a 
very a strong regime to prevent abuse. 
4.3.2.4 Creditors’ participation 
Creditors contribute to rescue efficiency in two important respects: first, the fate 
of a rescue proposal is decided by their approval and second, given the company’s 
shortage of finance in the financial hardship, creditors are potential suppliers of the 
finance to implement rescue proposals.315 In addition to the financial support, 
sophisticated creditors like banks can contribute their expertise to the implementation of 
rescue,316 for example, by suggesting necessary modifications in a rescue proposal at the 
creditor meeting.317 The fact that the UK creditors do not control rescue does not 
necessarily mean they do not have the capacity in doing so. An empirical research by 
Amour, Hsu and Walters in examining the receivership finds that allocating control rights 
to a single concentrated creditor can bring out positive outcomes such as high creditors’ 
return and employment preservation rate.318 Factors that encourage creditor participation, 
as discussed in chapter three, include the availability of a moratorium, equal treatment for 
all creditors in the proposal and a super-priority for the rescue finance.319 
4.3.2.4.1 The administration 
 
314 Re Anglo-Continental Supply Co. Ltd [1922] 2 Ch 723, 315 See Chapter 3: section 3.5.2.3(iv) 316 In the UK, banks are major lenders among corporations and the introduction of the Enterprise Act 2002 with a new administration procedure has required the banks to make a shift to monitoring debtors’ insolvency risk. See Finch, (n28) 265-268 317 For example, IA 1986: s.4 and para 53 and 54 of SchB1 allow creditors to vote with modification of a proposal.  318 J. Amour, A. Hsu and A. Walters, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Secured Creditor Control in Bankruptcy: Evidence from the UK’, University of Cambridge Centre for Business Research Working Paper No. 332, available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=912302> accessed 01 December 2017  319 See Chapter Three (3.5.2.3 Benchmarks for evaluation of rescue proposed by the thesis, (iv) creditor participation 
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The administration satisfies with the requirement for introducing a moratorium 
that prevents creditors from enforcing their security interest320 and equal treatment for 
creditors as the administrator under the obligation to act in the interest of all creditors as 
a whole.321 However, there is uncertainty regarding the availability of a super-priority for 
the rescue finance or the ‘DIP finance’. Due to the importance of the DIP finance in 
implementing rescue,322 giving this finance a super-priority has been adopted elsewhere 
in the US and Canada.323 However, UK law seems to be silent on this matter. Similar 
provisions for a super-priority for the rescue finance can be found in the IA1986.324 For 
example, para 99, which provides for the settlement of the debts incurred by the 
administrator under a contract he entered into in performing his functions, states that the 
debts will have priority over administrator’s expense and remuneration. By virtue of this 
provision, the rescue finance could be sufficiently characterised as an expense of the 
administrator in performing his functions, and thus enjoy priority over any other 
security.325 Judicial response to this matter is famously found in the case Bibby Trade 
Finance Ltd v. McKay, which involves the finance advanced to a company in 
administration.326 When accounting for the proceeds, the administrator decided to pay the 
lender of the finance in priority, and this payment would not reduce the company’s 
liability to the lenders incurred before the administration. The directors of the company 
did not agree and challenged the payment. The court decision is to accept the finance as 
the administration expense and therefore enjoy a priority status.327 The judgment indicates 
 320 IA1986: SchB1, para 42 and 44 321 Ibid. para 3(2)  322 L J Abbot, S Parker & G F Peters, ‘The Effect of Post-bankruptcy Financing on Going Concern Reporting’ (2000) 21 AICPA and UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2005),  <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05- 80722_Ebook.pdf>  accessed 2 December 2017 323 11 U.S. Code § 364 - Obtaining credit and Company Creditor Arrangement Act (Canada), 11.2(1)(2) Interim financing 324 IA1986, s.19(4) (5) and para.99 SchB1 325 McCormack, ‘Super-Priority New Financing’ (2007) JBLR 701, at 713 326 Bibby Trade Finance Ltd v. McKay [2006] EWHC 2836 (Ch), 2006 WL 3831159 327 Ibid. para 27 
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that although the legislation is still not clear on the issue of the rescue finance, the UK 
court has sufficient judicial capacity to deal with this issue. However, it should be noticed 
that the issue of deciding priority does not rest on the administrator’s power, instead, it 
must be the matter decided by the court. In Freakley v Centre Reinsurance International 
Co.,328 the House of Lords recognised the administrator’s power in deciding which 
expense is necessary for the administration, yet this must be subject to the court’s 
supervisory role to determine the matter of priority. 329 
The Insolvency Service has already recognised the importance of the rescue 
finance in the proposals for adopting super-security for the rescue finance under the 
Consultation Paper 2009 and 2016.330 However, these proposals have not been taken 
forward by the UK Parliament as there has been controversy over how to protect the rights 
of existing creditors and the effect of the proposal on the UK lending practice.331 In 
absence of legislative confirmation on the priority of the rescue finance, the fact that this 
matter has to be decided by the court on a case-by-case basis can demotivate creditors to 
advance the rescue finance in the fear of potential disputes and litigation. 
4.3.2.4.2 The CVA 
Unlike the administration procedure which may lead to different outcomes, the 
CVA is carried to pursue the only purpose of rescuing a company. Therefore, it demands 
a higher level of creditors’ participation than under the administration. The CVA is able 
to provide equal treatment for creditors since it is an arrangement between the companies 
 
328 Freakley v Centre Reinsurance International Co. [2006] UKHL 45  329 Ibid. para 16 330 Insolvency Service, A Review of The Corporate Insolvency Framework, A Consultation on Options for Reform, available at  <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/525523/A_Review_of_the_Corporate_Insolvency_Framework.pdf > accessed 5 December 2017  331 Jennifer Payne, ‘The future of UK debt restructuring’, at 11. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2848160 >or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2848160> accessed 5 December 2017 
Chapter Four - Corporate Rescue Law in the United Kingdom  
142  
and creditors, and this requires the directors to present an equal treatment to get creditor 
approval.  
However, there are two factors that impede creditors from participating under the 
CVA. First, the absence of a moratorium appears to be the main weakness of the CVA.332 
Given the fact that a CVA proposal must be distributed to creditors before the creditor 
meeting is convened,333 the creditors may recognise that the company is in financial 
trouble at the time of receiving the proposal and they may take individual actions against 
the company before the meeting takes place.334 Although a study on the CVA reported 
that most of the companies carried out a stand-alone CVA rather than a CVA with a 
moratorium,335 the Insolvency Service has proposed for including a moratorium under the 
CVA because of its potential necessity, especially for viable companies.336 Second, 
similar to the administration, the legislation has been silent on the matter of super-priority 
for the rescue finance. A survey on corporate restructuring addresses this issue as one of 
the main hindrances preventing the CVA from achieving positive outcomes.337 
4.3.2.4.1 The SA 
The SA is similar to the CVA with the absence of a moratorium and a super-
priority of the rescue finance. The SA is a flexible procedure insofar as it can be initiated 
without insolvency proof, therefore, it is not important to have the moratorium for all 
 
332 It should be noticed that a moratorium is only available under the CVA for small companies. IA1986, SchA1, para 3(2) 333 Ibid. r.1.9 334 The exception is made for the case of small, eligible companies who can rely on the moratorium under SchA1 IA 1986. 335 Walters and Frisby (n236) 336 The Insolvency Service, ‘Proposals for A Restructuring Moratorium’ - A Consultation, available at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc_register/RestructuringMoratoriumConsultationDocument.pdf> accessed 6 December 2017 337 R3, Ninth Survey of Business Recovery in the UK, p.14 available at <https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/technical_library/Consultation%20Responses/Annual%20survey/09th_Company_survey.pdf>  accessed 5 December 2017 
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cases. It is opined that the absence of the moratorium appears not to be a problem because 
in getting creditor’s consensus, it is more important for the directors to enlighten and 
convince creditors that the SA is the best route for them to pursue rather than resorting a 
costly and burdensome moratorium.338 Yet, this thesis takes a counterview that if the 
creditors cannot be convinced without a moratorium, the failure of negotiation at the 
beginning can result in creditors taking individual enforcement actions against the 
company, which destroys the chance of rescue success. Therefore, there must be an 
introduction of a moratorium to prevent creditors from initiating individual enforcement. 
Nor does the SA provide for the super-priority of the rescue finance. The 
uncertainty as to whether the rescue finance should be given priority over the existing not 
only disincentives creditors to advance the finance but also subject directors to liability 
for dissipation of the company’s asset if they agree that the funder can get this super-
priority advantage.339 It seems to be that the absence of insolvency proof to initiate the 
SA is an advantage for the company to approach new financiers or even existing creditors 
to get new finance. However, the initiation of the SA somehow informs creditors, 
especially sophisticated creditors that the company has faced financial difficulty. The new 
finance is advanced only if the lenders are satisfied that they can have better treatment 
than the existing creditors in recovering their finance, which again gives rise to the need 
for the super-priority to be addressed by the legislation.  
The SA has a fairer treatment of creditors than the CVA in that despite the same 
requirement for the threshold of creditor approval of 75%, the SA divides creditors into 
separate classes for the purpose of voting. According to the voting mechanism, dissenting 
creditors are bound within a class and there is no cram-down across creditor’s classes.340 
 
338 J. Tribe, (n6) at 10 339 Finch (n28) at 503 340 J. Payne (n184) 
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This can prevent the potential abuse of plotting more powerful creditors into a class and 
use the approval of such class to oppress the weaker, dissenting classes. However, similar 
to the CVA, the absence of moratorium and lacking provisions for dealing with super-
priority for the rescue finance discourage creditors to participate in the SA. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The formation of the Cork Committee to overhaul the insolvency law system 
significantly gave rise to the rescue culture that has nurtured and shaped the rescue law 
in the UK. As a result of the wide endorsement of this culture, the UK law has a very 
diverse approach to corporate rescue, with the informal rescue under the London 
Approach and the formal rescue under three different rescue procedures in the IA1986 
and the CA2006. Despite the flexibility associated with introducing three different 
procedures of the administration, the CVA and the SA, the UK legislative policy appears 
to make the administration a main legal device for corporate rescue by abolishing the 
receivership and not facilitating a moratorium to prevent creditors from taking actions 
against the company under the CVA and the SA. The administration reflects the UK 
traditional attitude that views insolvency as the failure of management. This has created 
conditions for the IP profession to develop and contribute to the effectiveness of its rescue 
law.  
The UK legislation has a diverse approach in adopting different models of rescue 
administration, with the administration following the PIP model, the SA following the 
DIP model and the CVA following the hybrid model. The assessment of these procedures 
under the four benchmarks of time and cost, expertise, abuse management, and creditor 
participation produced different outcomes. As for the administration, its merit lies in 
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several aspects, such as the statement of rescue objectives, the facilitation of a 
moratorium, and the administrator acting for the interest of creditors as a whole. However, 
with the strict timeframe and the removal of the company directors from the office, this 
procedure does not allow the administrator to sufficiently contribute expertise in rescue. 
As a result, the administrator tends to put a company into the pre-pack sale instead of 
pursuing the rescue option. The practice of using the pre-pack can lead to potential abuse 
insofar as the administrator will sell the company at a lower price in the market. 
Furthermore, the absence of the super-priority for the rescue finance has the effect of 
demotivating creditors to participate in the administration. 
The CVA is the second most popular procedure in the UK. Though the CVA is 
more cost-effective than the administration, it is a lengthy procedure which demands 
strong commitment and support from the creditors. The CVA appears to be a more 
advanced approach than the administration for being able to combine the expertise of the 
IP and the company’s directors in devising and implementing rescue proposals. As an 
agreement between the company and creditors, the CVA allows creditors to tackle abuse 
by providing a high threshold of creditor approval. Furthermore, the abuse can be tackled 
by the supervisor exercising the role of monitoring over the CVA’s implementation. 
However, this procedure cannot encourage creditor participation due to the unavailability 
of the moratorium and the uncertainty of the priority in respect of the rescue finance. 
Regarding the SA, it is a flexible procedure that does not require a company to 
have proof of insolvency. Though the SA is managed by the current directors, the judicial 
involvement is a guarantee that potential abuse could be prevented. However, the SA may 
incur significant cost due to the intensive involvement of courts in supervising this 
procedure. In the absence of the moratorium coupled with the uncertainty of the 
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legislation on the priority status of the rescue finance, efforts to encourage creditor 
participation could be inhibited.  
The advanced attribute of the UK rescue law is the diverse approach that allows a 
financially troubled company to consider different procedures or combine them together 
to settle its insolvency affair. However, due to the lack of a moratorium and the 
uncertainty over the super-priority for the rescue finance, the combination of these 
procedures, for example, the administration combined with the CVA, could result in 
unnecessary costs in rescue. Therefore, there has emerged a need for the UK law to 
facilitate a moratorium in all rescue procedures as well as addressing the issue of super-
priority for the rescue finance. 
The next chapter will launch an investigation into Canadian rescue law which 
similarly follows the evaluation framework employed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CORPORATE RESCUE LAW IN CANADA 
 
5.0 Introduction 
Following the framework employed to examine the rescue law of the United 
Kingdom (the UK), this chapter launches the examination into the rescue law of Canada. 
This chapter begins with an examination of the legal development of Canadian insolvency 
law to identify the factors that shape the legislative framework of corporate rescue in the 
country. It then furthers the investigation into two rescue procedures under the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA)1 and the Company Creditor Arrangement Act 
(CCAA).2 Finally, the chapter assesses the effectiveness of Canadian rescue law under 
the benchmarks established in chapter three, namely time and cost, expertise, creditor 
participation and abuse management. 
5.1 Legal development of corporate insolvency and rescue law in Canada 
Prior to the confederation in 1867, Canada was a British colony and governed by 
British law.3 After the confederation, Canada enacted its first federal insolvency 
legislation, the Insolvency Act 1869 (IA1869), which exclusively provided for the 
voluntary and involuntary insolvency of traders.4 The Act was replaced with the 
Insolvency Act 1875 (IA1875),5 under which debtors were restricted to apply for debt 
discharge and debtor’s ability to apply for voluntary bankruptcy was no longer permitted. 
However, some of these provisions were criticised due to the unfairness relating to the 
 
1 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3), <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/b-3/> accessed 7 July 2018 2 Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36) <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-36/> accessed 7 July 2018 3 Canada Guide, ‘The Canadian Legal System’ <http://www.thecanadaguide.com/basics/legal-system/> accessed 7 July 2018 4 IA 1875, S.C.1869, c.16, see R. Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law (Irwin Law, 2009) at 31 5 Ibid 
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distinction between traders and non-traders as well as the fraudulence caused by the 
availability of debt discharge, which resulted in a need for repealing the Act.6 In 1880, 
the Canadian Parliament repealed the IA1875, and in the following four decades, there 
were no federal bankruptcy laws enacted.7 Instead, during this period, debtors and 
creditors had to rely on provincial laws to settle their insolvency affairs. However, the 
differences in the provincial laws in response to the problem of insolvency in conjunction 
with the economic depression in 1913 prompted the need for official insolvency 
legislation to be enacted by the federal parliament.8 The insolvency law reform in this 
period resulted in the introduction of the Bankruptcy Act 1919 (BA1919).9 The Act 
marked a milestone in the development of Canadian insolvency law, signifying the 
approach to regulating the insolvency affairs of individuals and companies under a single 
legislative framework.10 After the enactment of the 1919 Act, Canadian insolvency law 
continued to experience a number of reforms. In 1932, the Office of the Superintendent 
in Bankruptcy was established for supervising and regulating the qualification of 
bankruptcy trustees.11 Modern Canadian insolvency law began in the 1970s, with the 
Tessé report calling for an overhaul of the bankruptcy system,12 followed by significant 
reforms in 1992, 1997, 2005/2007 and 2009.13 Presently, Canada offers a single 
bankruptcy proceeding for discharging individuals and liquidating companies under the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).14 
 
6 T. G.W. Telfer, Ruin and Redemption: The Struggle for a Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 1867-1919 (Toronto University Press, 2014) and ‘Ideas, Interests, Institutions and the History of Canadian Bankruptcy Law 1867-1880’ (2010) 60(2) The University of Toronto Law Journal, 603-621 7 Ibid 8 S.W. Jacobs, ‘A Canadian Bankruptcy Act: Is It a Necessity?’ (1917) 37 Canadian Law Times, 604, at 605 9 T.G.W. Telfer, ‘The Canadian Bankruptcy Act of 1919: Public Legislation or Private Interest’, (1994-1995) 24 Canadian Business Law Journal 24 Can. Bus. L.J. 357 10 Ibid 357-359 11 Wood (n4) at 33 12 Roger Tassé, Bankruptcy and Insolvency: Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation (Information Canada, 1970) 13 Wood, (n4) at 34-35 14 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3) 
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In terms of corporate insolvency law, the first statute dealing with corporate 
insolvency is the Winding-up Act 1882,15 which provided for liquidation of insolvent 
companies. The Act was replaced by the BA1919 that regulated the insolvency of both 
companies and individuals.16 Though the BA1919 govern the matter of corporate 
insolvency, it did not express the objective of corporate rescue in strong terms, rather 
there was a rudimentary provision that allowed an insolvent company to make a proposal 
for a scheme of arrangement with its creditors.17 During the Great Depression, rescuing 
financially troubled companies had been debated in the legislative discussion and the 
Canadian Parliament determined that it was important to preserve the company value, 
goodwill and employment.18 As a result, the Companies Creditors’ Arrangement Act 
(CCAA) was enacted to provide for corporate restructuring.19 As such, at this time there 
were two pieces of legislation that dealt with corporate insolvency, the BA1919 providing 
for liquidation matter and the CCAA providing for corporate rescue matters.  
Due to the debtor’s abuse of the CCAA to escape liability to creditors, the 
amendment in 1953 restricted the application of the Act to companies that issued bonds 
or debentures under trust deeds.20 This amendment rendered the CCAA a product of 
extremely low use for forty years.21 However, the economic recession in the 1980s 
provided incentives for Canadian courts to re-consider the Act to deal with restructuring 
insolvent companies, and thus revived its application.22 The requirement for a company 
 
15 Winding-up Act 1882, S.C 1882 c.23 16 Bankruptcy Act 1919, S.C 1919 c.36 17 Ibid s.13. See Jacob S. Ziegel, ‘The Modernization of Canada's Bankruptcy Law in a Comparative Context’ (1998) 33 (1) Tex. Int'l L. J., 1-26  18 Janis Sarra, ‘The Evolution of the Companies’ Creditor Arrangement Act in Light of the Recent Development’ (2011) 50 Canadian Business Law Journal 211. 19 Companies Creditors’ Arrangement Act (CCAA), S.C 1933 c.36 20 CCAA 1953, S.C 1952-53, c.3 21 J. Sarra (n18) at 211 22 Ziegel (n17) at 7 
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to issue bonds under a trust deed to be eligible under the CCAA was abolished, and as a 
result of this, most of companies are entitled to file for restructuring under the CCAA.23 
In 1992, the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) was amended, and a rescue 
procedure was added under part III division I of the statute in an attempt to make it 
become the primary proceeding for corporate restructuring in Canada.24 For example, the 
BIA facilitates easy access to initiate the rescue procedure with a simple notice of 
intention to make a proposal.25 Nevertheless, the CCAA was not repealed by the BIA; 
instead, it proved to be the favourable choice for restructuring large companies with 
complex structures of debts. Consequently, there has existed a dual rescue regime under 
the BIA and the CCAA, which appears to be a distinguishable feature of Canadian rescue 
law. While the BIA features a rule-based procedure that is suitable for small and medium 
companies, the CCAA is a judicial-based procedure to deal with the insolvency of large 
companies with the value of debts exceeding C$5 million.26 Both statutes had undergone 
several reforms in between 1997 and 2009, and Canada has pursued the policy of 
convergence which attempts to bring the two regimes into alignment as well as 
minimising the differences arising from them.27 However, differences remain between 
them and this will be discussed further in this chapter. 
5.2 The distinguishing characteristics of Canadian rescue law 
5.2.1 Rescue law in Canada developed under the influence of UK and US laws 
Canadian rescue law historically developed under a mixture of influence of UK 
and US laws. As a former British colony, Canadian insolvency law was traditionally 
 
23 Sara (n18) 212. It should be born in mind that the CCAA is eligible for companies with the total value of debts exceeding C$ 5 million, see CCAA, s.3(1) 24 Ziegel (n17) at 7-8 25 BIA, s.50.4 26 Ziegel (n17) at 9 27 Wood (n4) 310 
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rooted in the UK legal system.28 Regarding corporate rescue, Canadian law has its origin 
in the practice of using trust deed - a financing instrument employed by bondholders to 
secure bonds against the debtor’s asset through a fixed charge or a floating charge.29 The 
trust deed operated based on the principle of the receivership that when the debtor fails 
to pay debts, bondholders can enforce security by appointing a receiver who manages the 
debtor’s business and sell its assets to pay the bondholders.30 When the economic crisis 
occurred in the 1920s and 1930s and dictated corporate failure on a large scale, trust deed 
vehemently became an important tool for restructuring companies since creditors found 
rescuing companies could bring more benefits to them than in liquidation.31 The trust 
deed in Canada shared a very important characteristic with that in the UK in that it 
contained a majority provision, which allowed a major creditor to have the power to 
compel other creditors in deciding important matters relating to the debtor, including 
restructuring a debtor company.32  
However, the practice of using the majority provision under trust deeds was 
gradually curtailed in order to attract finance from the US. Accordingly, as the US 
investment gained prevalence in Canada in the 1920s and 1930s, in order for Canadian 
companies to list their securities in the US security market, they were required to omit the 
majority provision under trust deed in compliance with US legislation in protecting 
minority investors.33 Because the majority provision under Canadian trust deeds allowed 
 
28 Canada Guide (n3) 29 W. Kaspar Fraser, ‘Reorganization of Companies in Canada’ (1927) 27 Columbia Law Review, 932-957 30 Ibid 934 31 Ibid 945-949 32 Ibid and F. R. MacKelcan, ‘Canadian Bond Issues’ (1952) 30:4 Can Bar Rev 325, 330, and Jérôme Sgard, ‘Bankruptcy Law, Majority Rule, and Private Ordering in England and France (Seventeenth–Nineteenth Century)’ (2009-2010), at 2 < http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/centres/oxpo/working-papers/wp_09-10/OXPO_WP09-10b_Sgard.pdf> accessed 9 July 2018 33 Ibid W.K. Fraser, ‘House of Commons Standing Committee on Banking and Commerce’   Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence respecting the Companies Creditors’ Arrangement Act, No. 1, 7  June 1938 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1938), at 18‐22, cited by V. E.Torrie in Protagonists of company reorganisation: A history of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada) and the role of large secured creditors (PhD thesis, Kent University, 2015) at 82. 
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a creditor to have the power to compel other creditors, it was perceived as lacking 
integrity and thereby deterring US investors to advance their finance.34 In addition to 
responding to the need for attracting US finance, a large scale of corporate failures in the 
Great Depression urged Canada to enact corporate rescue legislation since the practice of 
using trust deeds to settle debts was insufficient. As a result of these impetuses, in 1933 
Canada enacted the CCAA which is the first Canadian legislation dealing with corporate 
restructuring. The Act provided legitimacy to the objective of corporate rescue insofar as 
it permitted an arrangement between a company and its creditors and this arrangement 
had a binding effect on creditors, including secured creditors. The CCAA, as 
acknowledged by a Canadian parliamentarian at that time, is an adoption of the s.153 of 
English Company Act 1929 that provided for restructuring companies based on the 
restructuring measure under English trust deeds.35  
Apart from the influence of the UK legal tradition, the shaping of Canadian law 
was decided by factors coming from the US. As examined, in compliance with the 
requirement of the US security market to abolish the majority provision from trust 
deeds.36 However, in this regard, the US influence on Canadian rescue law was not 
significant because the majority provisions still remained an important feature of the trust 
deeds in Canada after the 1930s.37 The influence of the US on the Canadian rescue law 
became more obvious in the 1970s when the US reformed its bankruptcy law with the 
introduction of Chapter 11,38 a legal mechanism to restructure financially troubled 
companies characterised by the Debtor-in-Possession model (DIP). Chapter 11 brought 
 
34 Ibid 35 Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo 5, c 23, s 153 ; see Hon. C.H. Cahan (Conservative), Debates of the House of Commons of Canada, (9 May 1933) 4th session 17th Parl (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1933), 4724, cited by Torrie (n29) 36 See note 33 and 34 37 W Benson, Business Methods of Canadian Trust Companies (Ryerson Press, 1949) 169 38 A. L. Moller, and D. B. Foltz Jr, ‘Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code’ (1980) 58 (5) North Carolina Law Review 881 
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about a philosophical change that conferred corporate rescue a legitimate objective apart 
from liquidation and Chapter 11 has become a popular model for other countries to 
follow.39 Canada also contemplated Chapter 11 to the extent that corporate rescue was 
considered as a remedy for debtor companies to restructure their debts and the hostile 
attitude toward the company insolvency changed as well. In the 1970s, there was more 
often debtor’s application to CCAA rather than creditor’s and the debtor’s abuse of the 
proceeding was no longer a primary concern.40 As Canada entered into a recession in the 
1980s, the DIP model, as the distinct feature of Chapter 11, gained greater acceptance in 
Canada along with corporate rescue being widely recognised as a normative goal of 
insolvency law.41  
In summary, corporate rescue law in Canada had been shaped by the influence of 
both the UK and the US. The primitive rescue practice had been rooted in the deployment 
of the trust deeds, which was an inheritance of the UK law. In the time of economic crisis 
in the 1930s and 1970s, Canada looked for the approach from the UK and US to reform 
its law, as exemplified with the adoption of the English Company Act 1929 to enact the 
CCAA and the acceptance of the philosophical change towards accepting corporate 
restructuring under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. The mixture of influence 
from both the UK and the US has become a special feature of Canadian rescue law. 
5.2.2 Canadian rescue law was a creditor remedy to cure the shortage of 
rescue measures 
Canadian rescue law developed under the influence of the UK counterpart with 
the practice of using trust deed - a private arrangement between a debtor company and a 
bondholder to secure the payment against the company’ assets under a floating charge 
 
39 N. Martin, ‘The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation’ (2005) 28 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 40 Tassé Report (n12) 57-60 41 Ibid at 175-176 
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and a fixed charge.42 By including a major provision that allows a major creditor to 
compel other creditors in deciding important matters relating to a debtor company, trust 
deeds became a remedy used by creditors to restructure debts for a company.43 
Nevertheless, it should be born in mind that trust deeds operated under receivership which 
was a tool for creditors to enforce security.44 Accordingly, upon the debtor’s default, a 
bondholder could enforce security by seizing the company’s assets or appointing a 
receiver to control the company and sell its assets to pay the bondholder. This practice 
often precipitated an insolvent company to liquidation because it lacked essential property 
to maintain its operation. The idea of employing a trust deed for the purpose of rescue 
only emerged later when the bondholders contemplated that maintaining the company’s 
going concern status would allow them to more benefits than they would receive in 
liquidation.45  
The first statute legitimising corporate rescue in Canada (CCAA) was enacted in 
the context of the economic downturn in the 1930s.46 Not only did the Act provide for a 
legislative framework to deal with corporate insolvency in the time of crisis, it also 
responded to the creditor’s demand. When the provision of majority was omitted from 
trust deeds for Canadian bonds to be eligibly listed in the US market, the creditors lacked 
a remedy to effect corporate restructuring.47 Therefore, the introduction of the CCAA 
officially provided creditors with a solution to deal with this problem.48 Second, the 
enactment of the CCAA offers creditors a solution to overcome the shortcoming 
pertaining to corporate restructuring under provincial laws. Particularly, in Canada, 
 
42 Fraser (n29) 936 43 Ibid 44 Ibid 934 45 Ibid 946 46 See n19 47 See n34 48 Alfonso Nocilla, ‘The History of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Future of Restructuring Law in Canada’, (2014) 56 Can. Bus. L.J. 73, 78 
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creditor-debtor relations were subject to the stipulation of provincial laws instead of 
federal law,49 and this created a degree of difficulty where a debtor company had 
properties situated in different provinces, which could lead to multiple actions to be taken 
to effect restructuring.50 Rescuing companies through the receivership under provincial 
laws was not a sufficient approach because there was a lack of binding effect on and 
coordination among creditors to safeguard the viability of a rescue plan.51 The 
receivership of Abitibi, a paper and pulp company, in the 1930s is a very good example 
of the insufficient capacity of the provincial laws to deal with rescuing insolvent 
companies.52 The receivership of Abitibi had been conducted for a long period (1932-
1946) and eventually had to be completed under the CCAA due to the lack of consensus 
for rescue plans that resulted in several rescue proposals to be rejected.53 Therefore, the 
enactment of the CCAA signalled a legislative response to creditors’ need for a more co-
ordinated remedy to solve the restructuring of debtor companies. 
Later amendments of the CCAA also reflected the Canadian Parliament’s 
response to protecting creditor’s interests. For example, in 1938 the CCAA was proposed 
to be repealed due to the abuse of debtor companies.54 When debtor companies 
increasingly used the CCAA to tactically escape the debts owed to unsecured creditors 
and trade creditors, the Bill 1938 was drafted to repeal it.55 However, the Act was not 
repealed promptly because of sporadic debates relating to the debtor company control.56 
 
49 According to Section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the exclusive power to make laws regarding to property and civil is granted the provincial governments, ‘property and civil rights in the province’ 50 H. E. Manning, ‘Company Reorganization, Part III’ (1932‐1933) 2 Fortnightly Law Journal, 176, cited by V.E Torrie, (n33) at 79 51  Ibid 52 Barry E.C. Boothman, ‘Night of the Longest Day: The Receivership of Abitibi Power and Paper’  Paper in Proceedings of Administrative Sciences Association of Canada (1992), 22 <http://luxor.acadiau.ca/library/ASAC/v15/Vol 15 No 14 History.pdf > accessed 9 July 2018 53 Ibid 54 J. Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (University of Toronto Press, 2003) at 14 55 Ibid 56 Ibid 
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Instead, there was an amendment in 1953,57 under which the application to CCAA was 
restricted to companies issuing bonds under trust deeds. As a result of this, the abuse of 
the legislation was efficiently tackled as abusive debtor companies had no basis to 
restructure unsecured creditor debts. 
After the amendment in 1953, the CCAA had a very limited use due to the changes 
in the lending and borrowing practice triggered by the introduction of new legislation. As 
the Bank Act 1967 was introduced, Canadian banks were permitted to offer finance on a 
long term and secured basis,58 companies increasingly relied on the banks as main 
financers rather than obtaining finance from bondholders. In addition to this, at the 
provincial level, there were substantial reforms of the Personal Property Security Acts 
(PPSA),59 with the introduction of a generic concept of security interest in order to 
overcome the complexity pertaining to the existence of different forms of security device 
as well as enhancing the predictability.60  The simpler security device offered by the Bank 
Act and the PPSAs had gained popularity in use over the trust deeds, therefore, the CCAA 
entered into the stage of dormant and were considered ‘a dead letter’.61 
Notwithstanding the popularity of the Bank Act and PPSAs, the economic 
recession in the 1980s and 1990s revived the use of the CCAA as a substantial basis for 
corporate rescue. In the crisis periods, Canadian banks could not just rely on liquidation 
to recover their finance because corporate failures on a large scale had a negative impact 
on the financial industry.62 As the banks wanted to restructure debtor companies, the Bank 
Act could not provide an efficient tool insofar as there were no provisions that granted 
 
57 Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1952, c C-54, s 2A 58 E.P. Neufeld, The Financial System of Canada: its Growth and Development (Macmillan  of Canada, 1972), at 110-111 59 The first PPSA was enacted in Ontario in 1967, later followed Canadian common laws jurisdiction. 60 Jacob S. Ziegel and Ronald C. C. Cuming, ‘The Modernization of Canadian Personal Property Security Law’, (1981) 31(3) the University of Toronto Law Journal, at 249-289 61 Torrie, (n33) at 248 62 Torrie (n33) at 156-159 
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the banks a right to compel other creditors. Furthermore, since the banks did not always 
employ trust deeds to secure their loans, they could not initiate the restructuring 
proceeding under the CCAA.63 Because of the lack of statutory remedy available for 
creditors to restructure insolvent companies, the CCAA was revived to be a useful tool 
for corporate rescue. In fact, during the time of crisis, Canadian banks had utilised the 
CCAA to support the restructuring of major clients on an ad hoc basis.64 The courts then 
gradually expressed the support to revive the application of the CCAA by allowing 
companies that had not issued trust deeds to be eligible to apply for the CCAA.65 For 
instance, through the adoption of the concept ‘instant trust deeds’, the court permitted 
insolvent companies to issue trust deeds to their creditors in order to make them eligible 
to the application of the Act.66 The restriction of trust deed was then abolished with the 
amendment in 1997.67 
To summarise, though the rescue legislation in Canada was to respond to the 
economic downturn, it apparently reflects the parliamentary deference to protect the 
interest of creditors. From the examination of the creation and evolution of the CCAA, 
the Canadian Parliament took actions to respond to the creditor demands if there had been 
no available remedy. The Bill 1938 to repeal the CCAA and the 1953 Amendment of the 
CCAA were the parliamentary action to tackle the debtor’s abuse of the CCAA that 
harmed the creditor interests. Later, when the Bank Act was insufficient to respond to 
creditor’s need for restructuring debts of debtor companies, the CCAA was re-considered 
and amended to respond to this matter.  
 63 This is because the 1953 amendment confined the use of the CCAA to the companies that issue bonds under trust deeds, see (n57) 64 Torrie, (n33) at 257 65 Ziegel (n17) at 7 66 e United Maritime Fishermen Co-op. (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44 (N.B. Q.B.), Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (B.C.C.A.); Banque Royal v. Biltisses d'Acier Novac Inc. (1990), 5 C.B.R. (3d) 140 (Que. S.C.) and see C. Ham, ‘“Instant” Trust Deeds Under the C.C.A.A.’ (1988) 2 Commercial Insolvency Reports, 25 67 Jacob S. Ziegel, ‘Canada's Phased-in Bankruptcy Law Reform’ (1996), 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 383., at 396 
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5.2.3 The bifurcation of rescue law and the significant role of the courts in 
Canada 
Presently, there is the existence of two corporate rescue procedures under part III 
of the BIA68 and the CCAA.69 While the BIA provides a rule-based procedure with 
detailed provisions for the restructuring of small companies, the CCAA offers large 
companies a procedure that is based substantially on judicial supervision.70 The 
bifurcation of rescue procedures is the reflection of strategically legislative reforms in 
Canada for a long time.71 Substantially, the main legislation for rescue in Canada is the 
CCAA, first enacted in 1933. As previously examined, the Act has proved its long 
survival during multiple attempts of repeal.72 In 1938, the Act was proposed to be 
repealed because of the debtor’s abuse to escape liability to unsecured and trade creditors, 
but the investor creditors successfully lobbied to retain it in order to issue security in the 
US market.73 In 1946, attempts to repeal the Act were renewed and proposals were 
published to incorporate company rescue under the Bankruptcy Act 1949. The attempt 
failed due to investor creditor’s lobbying.74 In 1970, the Tassé Committee recommended 
that Act should be repealed and replaced with a single and integrated law for bankruptcy 
and insolvency.75 However, the recommendation was not adopted due to the 
government’s inability to respond to the lobbying of different groups in the law-making 
process along with the importance of the Act in restructuring numerous financially 
 
68 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3, available at <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-b-3/136170/rsc-1985-c-b-3.html>  69 Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36, available at  <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-36/136168/rsc-1985-c-c-36.html> 70 Ziegel (n17) at 7 71 Ibid 72 See section 5.2.1 of this chapter and Alfonso Nocilla (n48) 73-103 and the Tassé Report (n12) at 1.2.27 73 Ibid 1.2.27. 74 A. Nocilla (n48), at 78-79. Although the Act was not repealed, there was an important amendment that limited the Act’s application to companies that issued bonds under trust deeds. 75 Tassé Report (n12) 
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difficult companies during the 1980s crisis.76 The issue of having a single and integrated 
bankruptcy and insolvency system was considered again in 1992 and in 1997 with the 
recommendation to repeal the CCAA upon the enactment of the commercial rescue 
provisions under part III of the BIA.77 However, insolvency practitioners (IPs) had 
successfully lobbied to retain the CCAA because it has been suitable for the restructuring 
of large and complex companies.78 Consequently, the 1997 Amendment resulted in the 
bifurcation of rescue legislation in Canada with Part III of the BIA and the CCAA 
exclusively for the companies with the amount of debt exceeding C$5million.79 As such, 
the survival of the CCAA is the result of the lobbying of interested parties such as 
creditors and IPs and the government’s effort in responding to the lobbying as well as 
maintaining a flexible and efficient legislative framework for corporate rescue.  
In fact, the CCAA contains basic principles for corporate rescue and does not have 
many detailed provisions.80 However, the usefulness that renders it a resilient statute is 
attributed to judicial supports. The courts have been constructing and clarifying the statute 
in a rescue-oriented manner since the very beginning of its enactment. As the CCAA was 
first introduced in 1933, the binding effect it had on secured creditors was considered 
unconstitutional to Canadian legal community because the federal government could not 
interfere with the provinces in the law-making process in respect of the rights of secured 
creditors.81 However, the constitutional reference of the CCAA by the Supreme Court of 
Canada (SCC) upheld its validity, holding that Parliament had the wide discretion to 
 76 A. Nocilla (n48) 80 77 House of Commons examined the Bill C22 to repeal the Act upon the enactment of rescue provision under part III of the BIA. See, Standing Committee on Consumer and Corporate Affairs and Government Operations, ‘Pre-Study of Bill C-22’ in Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. 15 (October 7, 1991), 78 J. S. Ziegel (n67) 397 79 Ibid 80 The CCAA is a relatively short statute with 62 articles  81 According to Section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the exclusive power to make laws regarding property and civil is granted the provincial governments, "property and civil rights in the province" 
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regulate matters relating to insolvency and bankruptcy.82 Since then, the courts started to 
support the application of the statute through judicial interpretation although this practice 
was very strict and narrow in the first place.83  
Since the 1953 amendment, the CCAA remained unused for a long time. The 
revival of the CCAA began in the 1970s when Canadian courts adopted a liberal 
interpretation, which paid more attention to policies behind the statute.84 This period saw 
the transformation of the SCC to become a more policy-conscious institution with the 
functions evolving beyond adjudication to developing the law.85 Following the SCC’s 
departure in its functions, the lower courts played an active role in interpreting legislation 
based on policies and intention of the parliament.86 The courts routinely exercised 
discretion and based their decisions on the inherent jurisdiction to provide answers to the 
matters related to rescue.87 For example, before the requirement for trust deeds was 
abolished, only companies that issued bonds under trust deeds were eligible under the 
CCAA. However, in the case Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op,88 the court exercised 
its discretion to adopt the concept of the ‘instant trust deeds’ to make the CCAA procedure 
eligible to companies that had not issued bonds under trust deeds. The liberal power of 
 
82 Though the issue of whether the federal government regulates the right of secured creditors was not addressed with substantial analysis in the first place, the SCC had addressed it at the second reference. Factum on behalf of the Attorney-General for Canada, filed with the Supreme Court of Canada (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1934), submitted with respect to the CCAA Reference; and Reference re constitutional validity of the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act (Dom.)1934 CanLII 72, [1934] SCR 659 (6 June 1934), Supreme Court (Canada).  83 See Re Stelco Inc. (2004), 48 CBR (4th) 299 (Ont SCJ),  84 This new interpretation is constructed by Elmer A. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974. The SCC and courts in Canada adopted it through a number of cases, see Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 SCR 559, Re Indalex Ltd.,  2013 SCC 6, JE 2013-185, para 136, and Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 1988 CanLII 3560 (AB QB) 85 Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2005), Part V: The Supreme Court of Canada. Contrast with the pre-Laskin SCC 86 Elmer A. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974) 87 In Stelco Inc. (Bankruptcy), Re, 2005 CanLII 8671 (ON CA), the court cited a number of cases where the court exercises the literal interpretation and relied on inherent jurisdiction, para 32 88 Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op. (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44 (N.B. Q.B.) 
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courts in interpreting the CCAA is considered to ‘flesh out’ the ‘bare bone’ of the 
statute.89 Because of the judicial flexible interpretation, the CCAA has become a popular 
rescue regime for large companies in Canada.90 Although the reforms of 2005 to 2007 
restricted the court’s discretion by expressly stating their specific powers under the 
CCAA, Canadian courts still enjoy a wide range of powers to make orders regarding 
corporate rescue.91 In addition to judicial interpretation, Canadian courts play an 
important role in supervising the rescue proceedings. The courts perform the function of 
screening rescue application to decide whether to accept or reject it.92 The courts also 
maintain a fair framework for parties involved in the rescue proceedings through 
reviewing the classification of creditors and importantly decide whether to accept a rescue 
proposal.93 The 2005/2007 amendment conferred the courts with similar jurisdiction 
under the BIA and the CCAA and this signalled the effort of the Canadian parliament to 
bring rescue under the two pieces of legislation closer and more integrated.94  
5.3 Legislative framework for corporate rescue in Canada 
Canadian corporate rescue law adopts the hybrid model of rescue administration 
which permits the incumbent directors of an insolvent company to retain in management. 
Both rescue procedures under the BIA and the CCAA reflect this model of rescue 
administration. While the BIA procedure is applicable for all companies, the application 
to CCAA is constrained to companies with the total value of debts being more than C$ 5 
million.95 This section examines how these rescue procedures work under the BIA and 
 
89 Re Stelco (2005), 75 OR (3d) 5, 253 DLR (4th) 109 (CA), para 32 90 Ziegel (n59) 397 91 Wood, (n4) at 322-324 92 Ibid 319 93 Ibid  94 Ibid 394 95 CCAA, s.3(1) 
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CCAA. The examination places the two procedures in parallel in order to highlight the 
similarities and differences between them.  
5.3.1 Initiation of rescue procedures 
Under the BIA 
The BIA has a wide scope of application, which allows an ‘insolvent person’96 to 
make a commercial proposal to its creditors regardless of whether the debtor is an 
individual or a company.97 In respect of companies, the BIA does not impose any 
restriction on the types of companies or the amount of debts, which means that insolvent 
companies with all sizes of operations and debt structure can file for rescue under this 
procedure. The procedure under the BIA can be initiated by two ways. The first one is to 
file a proposal with a licenced trustee if the proposal has been already formulated by the 
company, and the trustee then files the proposal and other related documents with the 
official receiver.98 After ten days, the debtor must file the cash-flow statement and the 
trustee’s report on the reasonableness of the statement.99 The second way is that the 
company will file a notice of intention to make a proposal with the official receiver.100 
This way appears to be a more preferable option than the first one in that it does not 
require the company to already prepare a proposal like the first option. However, within 
thirty days of the filing of the notice of intention, the company must file the proposal with 
the trustee and the company’s failure in doing so could result in voluntary liquidation.101 
Under the CCAA 
 
96 BIA: ss.2, the definition of an ‘insolvent person’ does not distinguish between individuals and companies 97 Ibid s.50(1) and 50 (1.1) 98 Ibid s. 50(2.1) and s. 62(1) 99 Ibid s.50.4(2) 100 Ibid s.50.4(1) 101 Ibid s.50.4(8)  
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Unlike the BIA, the CCAA limits its application by imposing a statutory threshold 
of debt value on an insolvent company. Accordingly, a company is eligible to initiate the 
rescue procedure under the CCAA if the total value of debts owed to creditors is more 
than C$5 million.102 As a court-driven procedure, the CCAA is commenced by an eligible 
company that files an application to the court for an initial order.103 It is more often that 
the debtor company is the party who initiates this procedure; however, the legislation does 
not restrict the right of initiation to other parties, therefore, there is still a case a secured 
creditor can commence the procedure.104 After receiving the application along with 
prescribed documents such as the cash-flow statement and the financial statement 
submitted by the debtor105 and in consideration of the circumstance of the company on 
hand, the court will make any order that it considers to be appropriate to the company.106  
5.3.2 Operation of the moratorium (the stay of proceedings) 
Under the BIA 
Upon the filing of a proposal or the notice of intention to make a proposal, there 
will be a moratorium that automatically arises to prevents creditors from commencing or 
continuing any actions, execution or enforcing their claims against the company.107 The 
moratorium under the BIA has a wide scope, carrying a binding effect on both unsecured 
creditors and secured creditors. However, the moratorium has its limitation in that it 
cannot operate against a secured creditor if he either already took possession of the 
secured assets before the notice of intention was filed for dealing with the asset.108 Neither 
does the moratorium apply when the creditor has given a notice to enforce the security 
 
102 CCAA, s.3(1) 103 The application often requests courts to issue important orders such as staying the enforcement of creditors, appointing the monitor and obtaining interim financing. 104 Re 1078385 Ontario Ltd. (2004) CanLII 66329 (ON SC) 105 CCAA, s.10(2) 106 Ibid s.11 107 BIA: s.69.1(1) and s.69(1) 108 Ibid s.69(2)  
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more than ten days before the company filed a proposal or the notice of intention to file 
a proposal, or if the debtor consented to the enforcement after receiving the notice from 
the secured creditor.109  
An important advantage of the BIA moratorium is its continuation. Accordingly, 
a moratorium automatically arises when the debtor initiates the rescue procedure by filing 
the notice of intention to make a rescue proposal and it terminates when a proposal is 
filed.110 Another moratorium then automatically arises until the proposal is approved by 
creditors or the courts. Once the proposal gets sufficient approval from the creditors, 
another moratorium comes into operation during the implementation of the proposal and 
it is only terminated when the trustee is discharged or the company goes to liquidation.111 
With this continuity of the moratorium, the BIA protects the company from creditors’ 
harassment and allows the company directors to have a comfort zone to draft a rescue 
proposal and carry out the rescue proceeding from the beginning to the end.112 
Under the CCAA 
If the moratorium under the BIA arises automatically upon the initiation of the 
proceeding, the moratorium under the CCAA arises from a court order. Therefore, the 
court could modify the moratorium to deal with specific problems in relation to the 
company’s insolvency.113 The scope of the moratorium issued by the court is very broad, 
comprising a moratorium that could be made under the BIA and it can be effective against 
secured and unsecured creditors.114 The first moratorium will operate within thirty days, 
and then the debtor must apply for another moratorium,115 thus allowing creditors to have 
 109 Ibid s.69(2) and 69.1(2) 110 Ibid s.69(1) 111 Ibid s.69.1(1)a 112 For the role of the stay, see UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, (the United Nation, 2005) at 83, available at <https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf> accessed 10 August 2018 113 Wood (n4) at 333 114 CCAA, s.11.02 (1) & (2) 115 CCAA, s.11.02(1) 
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time to be aware of the proceeding and participate in.116 In making any subsequent orders 
along with a moratorium, the court will consider the interest of not only the company but 
also its creditors to ensure that it is fair and equitable.117 In addition, the court must be 
satisfied that the application is made with the company acting in good faith and with due 
diligence.118 There are no limits in the number as well as the duration of the moratorium; 
therefore, the only way for creditors to stop the moratorium operation is to bring a motion 
to the court for lifting it.119 A creditor who wants to challenge the moratorium should 
provide evidence to convince the court that the moratorium has a prejudicial effect on his 
interest, and his action will not lead to similar actions from other creditors.120 In 
considering making an order to lift the moratorium, the court has to weigh the harm 
suffered by the creditor against the harm suffered by other creditors to determine whether 
he will suffer worse than the others.121 
5.3.3 Approval of a rescue proposal 
Both the BIA and the CCAA apply the same rules relating to the approval of a 
rescue proposal. Accordingly, a proposal must be approved by both the company’s 
creditors and sanctioned by the court.122 Regarding the creditor approval, creditors are 
divided into different classes for voting purposes; and the threshold for approving the 
proposal under the two statutes is the same, which is a majority of creditors holding two-
third values of debts.123 It is a special feature of the voting rule that the approved proposal 
 
116 D. W. Mann, ‘CCAA vs. BIA: A Comparison of Reorganization Processes’, at 13, <https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2000/january/1/ccaa-vs--bia--a-comparison-of-reorganization-processes> accessed 15 August 2018, 13 117 In Re Woodwards, (1993) 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236, the Supreme Court of British Colombia declined to grant a moratorium on the ground that the prejudice to affected party that is greater than the benefits that would be achieved in the insolvency of the company.  118 CCAA, s.11.02(3) 119 Wood (n4) at 343 120 Ibid 121 Golden Griddle Corp. v. Fort Erie Truck & Travel Plaza Inc. (2005), 29 C.B.R. (5th) 62 (Ont. S.C.J.) 122 BIA, s.59(2) and CCAA s.6(1) 123 BIA, s.54(2) and CCAA s.6(1) 
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only has the binding effect on the dissenting creditors within a class, and the classes that 
approve the proposal cannot bind a class that opposes the proposal.124 In addition to 
obtaining creditors’ approval, a proposal must be sanctioned by the court to have a 
binding effect on creditors. The CCAA does not provide any guidance for the court to 
approve a plan, but judicial precedent has established a set of principles to deal with this 
matter. A court may approve a plan if it is shown that there is compliance with the 
statutory requirement, no unauthorised conduct and that the proposal must be fair and 
reasonable.125  Meanwhile, under the BIA, a court’s decision to sanction the proposal 
must be based on the ground of fairness and reasonableness; a proposal with unreasonable 
terms or one without being calculated to benefit of the general body of creditors will be 
refused.126 Another significant requirement for getting court approval under the BIA is 
that the company must provide creditors with reasonable security of payment of not less 
than fifty cents on the dollar.127 
Once a proposal is approved by both creditors and the court, it will bind unsecured 
creditors and secured creditors.128 If the BIA proposal fails to gain either the creditor 
approval or the court sanction, it will automatically result in bankruptcy.129 Unlike the 
BIA, a CCAA proposal that fails to gain sufficient creditor approval does not result in the 
termination of the moratorium or the rescue. Instead, they are able to apply to the court 
for lifting the moratorium and then initiating other insolvency procedures such as 
liquidation.130 Upon the approval of the proposal, it will be implemented by the 
company’s directors according to the terms agreed by the parties. Although the law allows 
 
124 Wood (n4) 450 and UTI Energy Corp. v. Fracmaster Ltd. (1999), 11 C.B.R. (4th) 230 para 14 125 Northland v Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada (1989), 73 C.B.R. (2d) 195 (BCCA) 126 Ibid s.59(2) 127 Ibid s.59(3) 128 Ibid s.54(2)(d) and 6(1) 129 BIA, s.57. The bankruptcy in Canadian law has the nature of liquidation 130 Wood (n4) 451 
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the directors to retain their management power to carry the proposal, they are subject to 
the supervision of a trustee (under the BIA) or a monitor (under the CCAA) who are the 
officer of the court to ensure that accurate and timely information is provided to the 
creditors and the court.131 
The above examination has provided some highlights on the corporate rescue 
procedures in Canada. The two procedures share a number of similarities. Firstly, they 
allow the directors to stay in the office and carry out the rescue. Secondly, there is the 
availability of a moratorium to prevent creditors from taking action against the company. 
Thirdly, the mechanism for a rescue proposal has to be approved and implemented is 
similar, which requires the creditor’s approval and the court’s sanction for the proposal. 
The striking difference between them is that while the BIA procedure adheres strictly to 
the rule, the CCAA procedure is heavily reliant on court involvement from reviewing the 
application to sanctioning the rescue proposal. The effectiveness of the two procedures 
will be examined in the following section. 
5.4 Evaluation of Canadian rescue law under the four benchmarks 
Canadian law approaches the issue of corporate rescue with the hybrid model of 
rescue administration that permits the company’s directors to stay in office and continue 
to operate the business and implement the rescue plan. The hybrid model is incorporated 
into two distinct procedures under the BIA and the CCAA. In evaluating the effectiveness 
of these models, this thesis relies on the four benchmarks established in chapter three, 
namely time and cost, expertise, creditor participation and abuse management.132 
5.4.1 Time and cost  
As a rule-based procedure, the timeframe under the BIA is very strict. Though a 
debtor company can immediately initiate the BIA procedure by filing a notice of intention 
 
131 CCAA, s.11.7(1) and BIA s.2 132 See Chapter Three (3.6.2.3 Benchmarks for evaluation of rescue law proposed by this thesis) 
Chapter Five - Corporate Rescue Law in Canada  
168  
to make proposals,133 it must present a proposal within one month from the date of making 
the notice and failing to do so could result in the automatic liquidation for the company.134 
Submitting a rescue proposal to creditors under this time pressure is a very challenging 
task for the company directors as this can lead to a situation where the company is unable 
to devise a proposal in time, or the proposal is not viable to convince creditors for 
approval. The company can make an application to the court for extending this period, 
however, this is not easy because there are conditions that must be satisfied in order to be 
granted the extension, one of which is its ability to submit a viable proposal.135 If 
successful, the company can be granted an extension that does not exceed forty-five days 
for each individual extension and not exceeding five months in aggregate.136 If the rescue 
proposal is approved by creditors, it will be implemented within a period of five years.137 
In contrast to the BIA, the CCAA does not impose any time restriction. Therefore, 
a comparison based on the statutory wordings is unable to determine which procedure 
could be completed earlier. In addition, the length of the CCAA rescue depends on the 
nature of insolvency on a case-by-case basis as well as the terms of the proposal agreed 
by the creditors. As a result of this flexibility, the CCAA appears to be a more favourable 
option for companies with complex insolvency affairs. Meanwhile, small and medium 
companies tend to be attracted by the easy initiation of the BIA proceedings by just filing 
a notice of intention as well as the low court involvement.138 
 
133 BIA s.50.4(1) 134 Ibid s.50.4(8) 135 Ibid s.50.4(9). Accordingly, the court will consider the following factors (a) the insolvent person has acted and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence; (b) the insolvent person would likely be able to make a viable proposal if the extension being applied for were granted; and (c) no creditor would be materially prejudiced if the extension being applied for were granted. 136 Ibid 137 Ibid s.66.12(5) 138 See, Jacob S. Ziegel and Rajvinder S. Sahni, ‘An Empirical Investigation of Corporate Division 1 Proposals in the Toronto Bankruptcy Region’, (2003) 41:4 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 665-710 
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The cost of implementing the BIA procedure is a problem according to a study by 
Ziegel and Sahni.139 Though the rate of unsecured creditor return is significantly higher 
than it would be in liquidation, 44.65% compared to 6.89%,140 this return is reduced by 
the high trustee fee, 19.89% and the disbursement, 28.13% of the amount available to 
distribute to creditors.141 Therefore, the BIA does not appear to be a cost-effective 
procedure. In attempting to restrict the professional fees, there should be a mechanism to 
inspect and approve the professional fees. Unfortunately, Canadian law is insufficient in 
this regard. Section 39(3) allows the amount of trustee’s remuneration to be agreed 
between the company and the trustee, and the court will decide the amount only in the 
absence of an agreement among the parties.142 Because the legislation does not provide 
for how this remuneration is quantified, this provision is likely to bring more benefits to 
the trustees who charge their service with an inappropriate rate of professional fees. 
Therefore, this could encourage litigation by dissenting creditors if they find their return 
is largely deducted by the professional fee. If the issue of the professional fees is decided 
by the company and the trustees, to avoid potential disputes from creditors, the estimated 
fee should be clearly included in a rescue proposal. 
 Under the CCAA, there are no provisions that limit the number of court orders, 
the duration of the moratorium as well as the time to complete the rescue. Therefore, the 
courts can tailor their orders to meet the need of different companies in different 
circumstances. In fact, the CCAA is not a complex proceeding. Large companies choose 
it for restructuring because the complexity of their insolvency should be settled by the 
 
139 Ibid 140 Ibid 691 141 Ibid 693 This cost cover for the period from the initiation of the insolvency proceeding to accept 142 BIA, s.39(3) 
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flexible mechanism under the CCAA.143 However, the greater flexibility offered by the 
CCAA is a trade-off for the costs relating to professional fees and court involvement.144 
The professional cost has raised a concern of eroding creditor’s recoveries and somehow 
jeopardising the justification for the pursuit of the rescue objective which is to bring 
creditors more return than in the case of liquidation.145 Because the CCAA is a court-
supervised procedure and the restructuring under this Act is not subject to the 
administrative supervision,146 it is empirically difficult to obtain specific figures 
regarding the professional fees under the CCAA’s restructuring. Nevertheless, evidence 
emerging from case law partly reveals the extent that unreasonable professional fees may 
affect the viability of rescue. In Community Pork Ventures, the judge stated that:147  
The issue of expense is of concern to the court. While senior lenders with $35,700,000 on the table are quite prepared to absorb the not inconsiderable costs in the long run, the companies foresee the presently budgeted $650,000 of professional fees ballooning to $1,000,000 or more for only a three month period. The consolidated cash flow statements before the courts show only $215,000 of positive cash flows and a pro-forma accrual statement for the same period would, I am told, show a deficiency. Any further expense would render the cash flow negative and accruals would show an even worse result. These numbers will affect the survival potential of the business and the court must be on guard against any course of action which would render the process futile.   When the judge saw the professional fee would render the rescue plan unviable, she 
ordered the stay to be expired.148 In other cases, the courts did show the reluctance to 
allow IPs to receive unreasonable professional fees. For example, in Triton Tubular 
 
143 Canadian Bar Association, Bankruptcy, Insolvency and Restructuring Law Section and Canadian Corporate Counsel Association of the Canadian Bar Association, ‘Statutory Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act’ (July 2014), at 18 144 Jocelyne Gosselin and Benoit Mario Papillon, ‘Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Reorganization Proceedings under the BIA and the CCAA’, a study conducted for the Office of The Superintendent of Bankruptcy (2005), at 18 145 Canadian Bar Association (n143) at 19 146 Corporate and Insolvency Law Policy Directorate, ‘Report on the Operation and Administration of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act’, at 18 available at <https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/20_Report_on_the_Operation_and_Administration_of_BIA_CCAA.pdf> accessed 14 August 2018 147 Community Pork Ventures Inc. v.Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (2005), 11 C.B.R. (5th) 65, 2005 SKQB 245 (Sask. Q.B.), additional reasons 2005 SKQB 252 (Sask. Q.B.), para 10. 148 Ibid 
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Components Corp,149 the court refused a claim for collecting $750,000 professional fee 
resulted from the service that helped the debtor company recover only $1millon.   
As such, these cases address the judicial willingness to adjust the high cost of 
professional fees where it negatively affects the viability of rescue plans. Apart from 
recognising judicial intervention, these cases reveal a high rate of professional fees that 
could occur under the CCAA restructuring. Similar to the BIA, professional fees under 
CCAA should be subject to a mechanism for checking and reviewing, which returns to 
the role of legislatures and the Office of Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB) in Canada 
to regulate the trustees’ and monitors’ license and conduct.150  
5.4.2 Expertise  
Expertise refers to a high degree of knowledge, skills and competence of the 
parties that take part in rescue administration.151 The hybrid model employed under the 
BIA and the CCAA features the participation of the company directors, the IPs (the trustee 
in BIA procedure and the monitor in CCAA procedure) and the court. The directors’ 
expertise is exercised by operating the company and drafting the rescue proposal, while 
the IPs exercise their expertise by assisting and supervising the rescue. The court 
contributes greatly to rescue by screening the application and making orders relating to 
matters of rescue. Given the difference between the BIA as a rule-based procedure and 
the CCAA as a court-based procedure, the extent to which the IPs and the court contribute 
their expertise to the rescue administration can be different. However, after the 2005/2007 
amendment, the role of a trustee under the BIA and a monitor under the CCAA are 
 
149 Triton Tubular Components Corp., Re (2006), 20 C.B.R. (5th) 278 (Ont. S.C.J.[Commercial List]), additional reasons 2006 CarswellOnt 2968, at paras. 92 and 100. A similar case on judicial adjustment for professional can be found at Tepper Holdings Inc., Re (2011), 984 A.P.R. 1,2011 N3QB 311 (N.B. T.D.) 150 The high professional fee is one of the issue proposed to review in reports submitted to the Office of Superintendent of Bankruptcy in Canada. See Industry Canada, Statutory Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cilp-pdci.nsf/eng/cl00871.html> accessed 4 September 2019 151 See Chapter Three (3.6.2.3 Benchmarks for evaluation of rescue proposed by this thesis) 
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comparable.152 Furthermore, the role of courts under the two procedures are similar when 
the amendments to the BIA granted the courts with similar powers as those under the 
CCAA.153 As the above-mentioned actors have a very important role to play in rescue 
under the BIA and the CCAA, the law is considered to be effective so long as it can make 
sure that the participating actors possess a sufficient degree of expertise.  
Directors 
Both the BIA and the CCAA follow the hybrid model that allows existing 
directors to retain managerial power and this can bring about certain benefits. First, it is 
the existing directors who possess a great deal of knowledge on every aspect of the 
company operation, which means that they can start the rescue sooner without taking time 
to be familiar with the company’s business again.154 Secondly, this provides the directors 
a chance to correct their mistakes that led the company to the current stage of insolvency, 
and thus creates incentives for them to actively participate and co-operate with other 
parties in the rescue.155 Thirdly, this may prevent the scenario where the directors are 
replaced with outside professionals, and therefore, they are discouraged from seeking 
assistance and tend to hide material information about company affairs to prolong their 
tenure and avoid liability.156  
However, running a company during the rescue period is very different from that 
in the ordinary course of business given the changes in the business environment and 
multiple negotiations with creditors.157 In order to manage an insolvent company 
properly, the directors are required to possess a degree of expertise in business 
 152 D.W. Mann (n116) 11 153 See Wood (n4) at 394 154 Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford, ‘Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy of Large Public Held Companies’, (1993) 141 U. PA. L. Rev. 669, 694 and Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, ‘The Untenable Case for Chapter 11’ (1992) 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1044  155 LoPucki and Triantis, ‘A System Approach to Compavng U.S. and Canadian Reoganization of Financially Distressed Companies’, 35 Havard International Law Journal. 267, 304-05 156 Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (CUP, 2edn, 2009) at 400 157 Wood (n4) at 386 
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turnaround. Where existing directors are unlikely to possess such expertise, the practice 
of appointing a Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO) in Canada seems to be a solution for 
this. A CRO is a turnaround professional who is appointed to work along with the 
company directors to assist them in co-ordination of the rescue effort. The practice of 
appointing a CRO is recognised by courts to be an effective means for rescue success158 
insofar as the appointment can be an alleviation to creditors’ fear that the company is 
being managed by incompetent directors.159 The CRO can be appointed by the existing 
directors or the courts.  However, the CRO is not an officer of the court, rather, he acts as 
the company’s officer with the functions of formulating, implementing and monitoring 
the rescue plan.160 Although the CRO is not a court officer, a special advantage the court 
would confer on a CRO is to protect him from potential liabilities which are similar to 
those of monitors when performing his functions.161 The limited liability protection has 
the effect of incentivising the CRO to work the best their ability to produce the best 
restructuring result. Despite the additional cost incurred by the company, the CRO 
appointment appears to enhance the directors’ expertise under the hybrid model. The 
participation of the CRO not only allows the incumbent directors to exercise their 
expertise in operating the company but also reassures creditors about the rescue 
viability.162  
Insolvency Practitioners (IPs) 
IPs are the monitor under the CCAA procedure or the trustee under the BIA 
procedure, and they have the role of an intermediary party who assists the court and the 
 158 ICR Commercial Real Estate (Regina) Ltd. v. Bricore Land Group Ltd., (Re) (2007), 33 C.B.R. (5th) 39 (Sask.Q.B.), para 19 159 Wood (n4) at 386 160 Re Ivaco Inc. (2004) 3 C.B.R. (5th) 33 (Ont. S.C.J.)  161 Re Collins & Aikman Canada Inc. (2007), 37 C,B,R. (5th) 282 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 134 and  ICR Commercial Real Estate (Regina) Ltd. v. Bricore Land Group Ltd., (Re) (2007) (n114) 162 Grant B. Moffat, ‘Chief Restructuring Officer or Cost-Effective Restructuring Option’, (2002) available at <http://www.tgf.ca/resources/publications/publication/cro-chief-restructuring-officer-or-cost-effective-restructuring-option> accessed 14 August 2018 
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company in conducting the rescue. Under the BIA, the trustee has the duty of appraising 
and investigating the company’s affairs and assets to make reports relating the accuracy 
of financial information of the company to creditors.163 In addition, the trustee must file 
a report on the company’s cash-flow with the Official Receiver within ten days after the 
company files a notice of intention to make a proposal to initiate the rescue procedure.164 
Furthermore, the trustee must monitor the company and report to court and creditors 
regarding the rescue progress and material adverse change.165 Under the CCAA, the 
monitor must be a licensed trustee to be appointed166 and the role of the monitor is similar 
to that of the trustee under BIA.167 However, the monitor’s role is more significant in that 
they assist the court in deciding important matters relating to rescue. For example, they 
will advise the court if the procedure under the BIA provides the company more benefits 
than the current one.168 Given these important functions, the Office of Superintendent of 
Bankruptcy of Canada (OSB) regulates the licensing of monitors and trustees and monitor 
their practice to maintain professional standards.169 The OSB performs this function 
through the Directive No. 13R6 to impose certain requirements for obtaining a trustee 
license.170 Generally, candidates applying for a trustee license must be professionals in 
accounting or financial advisory firms and they have to pass a number of intensive courses 
and training programmes.171 Particularly, they have to complete the Chartered Insolvency 
and Restructuring Professional (CIRP) Qualification Program (CQP), the CIRP National 
 
163 BIA, s. 50(5) 164 Ibid s.50(6) 165 Ibid s.50(10) 166 CCAA, s.11.7(1) 167 CCAA, s.23 168 Ibid s.23(1)h 169 Wood (n4) at 33 170See s.5 Directive No. 13R6 (2015) on Trustee Licencing  <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br03247.html> accessed 14 August 2018 171 Ibid And see the OSB, ‘How to become a Licensed Insolvency Trustee’, <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br01128.html>  accessed 14 August 2018 
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Insolvency Exam and the Insolvency Counsellor’s Qualification Course.172 If candidates 
meet these prerequisites, they will make an application to the OSB to be invited to the 
Oral Board of Examination.173 When a candidate is successfully issued a trustee license, 
he is required to undergo a probation period of two years during which he must actively 
practice with an established trustee in the same physical location.174 In comparison with 
the UK, the requirements for licensing IPs in Canada appear to be stricter and more 
rigorous as the UK law just requires a candidate to obtain a level of working experience 
and successfully passed the JIEB examination.175   
In terms of monitoring trustee’s conduct, licensed trustees have to perform their 
function following the Code of Ethics prescribed by the Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
General Rules.176 Furthermore, the OSB facilitates easy, open access for the public to 
lodge complaints against the trustees’ alleged misconduct177 in tandem with providing for 
a procedure to govern trustee professional conduct under which misconduct will be 
reviewed by a hearing and the decision of which will be communicated with the 
complainer and be published.178 Similarly, for the investigation of monitors’ conduct, the 
legislation confers the OSB a right to apply to the court to review the appointment of 
monitors as well as their conduct179 and also the right to maintain a public record 
regarding CCAA proceeding.180 
The courts 
 
172 Ibid s.5 173 Ibid s.11 174 Ibid s.20 175 See Chapter Four (4.3.2.2 Expertise) 176 S. 34-39, Bankruptcy and Insolvency General Rules, <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br01858.html>  accessed 14 August 2018) 177 OSB, protecting public, <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/h_br03199.html> Accessed 14 August  2018 178 OSB, Directive No. 31 on Proceeding Governing Trustee Professional Conduct Proceedings, available at <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br03243.html> accessed 14 August 2018 179 CCAA, s.27-31 180 Ibid s.26 
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The courts hold the highest position in the rescue administration model under the 
BIA and the CCAA. Courts participate in rescue through making a number of important 
orders relating to whether to accept or reject a rescue application,181 to grant or extend a 
stay of proceedings182 or to sanction a rescue plan183 and so on. It should be borne in mind 
that courts exercise their expertise in corporate rescue differently from that of ordinary 
commercial litigation.184 While hearing commercial litigation involves an examination of 
issues in the past, dealing with corporate rescue requires courts to review proposals and 
ongoing activities.185 Therefore, insolvency judges should be well prepared with expertise 
regarding corporate restructuring.186 The involvement of the courts in dealing with 
corporate rescue is a distinct feature of Canadian law that was influenced by its unique 
legal developments. As examined earlier, in the 1980s the SCC transformed itself to 
become a more policy-conscious institution that assumed the functions of not only settling 
disputes but also developing laws.187 The transformations led to the adoption of a new 
liberal interpretation approach under which the courts construed laws based on the 
underlying policies behind the legislation as well as the intention of Parliament. 
Following this approach, the lower courts relied on their inherent jurisdiction and liberal 
interpretation to bring clarification into the very basic rules of the CCAA in a way that 
emphasises the objective of corporate rescue.188 The judicial interpretation is considered 
to ‘flesh out’ the skeleton structure of the CCAA.189 This practice of judicial interpretation 
is very important in the development of the CCAA insofar as it responded to a number of 
 
181 CCAA s.4 182 CCAA, s.11.02 (1) & (2)  183 BIA s.59(2) 184 Wood (n4) at 395 185 Ibid 186 Ibid 187 See section 5.2.3 The bifurcation of rescue law and the significant role of the courts in Canada in this chapter 188 Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 SCR 559 189  Re Stelco (2005), 75 OR (3d) 5, 253 DLR (4th) 109 (CA), para 32 
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issues that were silent by the Act and gave it a degree of flexibility in dealing with large, 
complicated insolvent companies.190 
The transformation of the Canadian courts’ functions in combination with the 
proactive approach of interpretation allowed the judiciary to be well prepared and 
developed to deal with complicated and sophisticated issues of rescue on a case-by-case 
basis. Inheriting the development of judicial involvement, Canadian courts have utilised 
advanced approaches to effectively deal with corporate restructuring. One of the 
approaches is judicial specialisation,191 which involves the institutionalisation of 
specialised judges working in bankruptcy and insolvency. For example, in Ontario and 
Quebec, there is the formal establishment of the Commercial List which comprises 
experienced judges who specialise in commercial litigation, including insolvency.192 
While in other provinces, restructuring cases will be assigned to judges who had 
experience in restructuring in the past.193 Another approach the courts follow to deal with 
rescue is the case management, under which the same judge will stick into a particular 
insolvency case and will hear various applications related to it.194 Given the complexity 
and time constraint, this approach has the benefit of familiarising the supervising judge 
with the case from the beginning and thus the judge can effectively deal various problems 
arising from the case in a timely fashion.195 
In summary, Canadian law appears to be able to allow the participating actors to 
contribute their expertise in the rescue procedures. While the debtor’s expertise is 
enhanced by the appointment of the CRO, the rigorous licensing and monitoring by the 
 
190 Ziegel (n59) 391 191 Wood (n4) 395 192 The Commercial Lists in Toronto, <http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/civil/commercial-list/> accessed 15 August 2018 193 Wood (n4) at 395 194 Ibid at 396 195 Ibid 
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OSB can ensure the monitor/trustee to be qualified for a supervisory role over the 
directors’ management. Especially, with the judicial development in insolvency, 
Canadian courts prove themselves sufficiently capable to deal with the matter of corporate 
rescue. 
5.4.3 Creditor participation 
Canadian rescue law adopts the hybrid model of rescue administration under 
which the company directors remain in office to implement the rescue proposal under the 
supervision of the trustee/monitor and the court. Although creditors do not directly 
participate in the administration, they significantly contribute to the success of the rescue 
in the extent to which they can be potential lenders of the rescue finance to implement 
rescue proposals and their voting decides whether a rescue plan is implemented.196 Under 
the BIA, without sufficient approval from creditors, a debtor company will automatically 
enter into liquidation.197 Under the CCAA, if the company cannot get the creditors’ 
approval for the rescue plan, the court will make an order to lift the stay of proceeding 
against the company, which means that the company is no longer protected from 
creditors’ enforcement and creditors can make an application for liquidating the 
company.198 To raise awareness of creditors about their role in rescue, Canadian law 
offers them some important protections to ensure that their interest will be treated fairly. 
For example, creditors are entitled to apply to the court for lifting the stay of 
proceedings199 or terminating the rescue procedure if they find the rescue implementation 
brings material prejudice to their interest.200 The law also provides for a fair voting 
 
196 See Chapter Three (3.5.2.3 Benchmarks for evaluation of rescue proposed by the thesis: (iv) creditor participation) 197 BIA s.57 198 See Wood (n4) at 451 199 BIA s.69.4 and the case Golden Griddle Corp. v. Fort Erie Truck & Travel Plaza Inc. (2005) 29 C.B.R (5th) 62 (Ont. S.C.J.) 200 BIA s.50.4(11)(d) and Re Bargain Harold’s Discount Ltd. (1992) 10 C.B.R (3d) 23 (Ont. Ct. Gen Div.) 
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mechanism under which creditors may be divided into different classes and the approval 
has no cram down effect to bind a dissenting class of creditors.201 
One of the most striking features of Canadian rescue law is the lack of formal 
creditor’s representation in rescue administration. Normally, in a jurisdiction that adopts 
the DIP model, such as the US, there is the formation of a creditor committee to represent 
creditors in the rescue procedures.202 However, neither the BIA nor the CCAA adopts the 
formation of creditor committee. While the BIA entitles creditors to appoint inspectors 
who act on behalf of the creditors to supervise and instruct the trustee to take appropriate 
steps to protect the company’s estate and creditors in liquidation, this power is restricted 
in rescue.203 Similarly, there is no statutory framework providing for formulating a 
creditor committee under the CCAA. The perceived reasons behind this are that this will 
produce additional costs and delays as a creditor committee is likely to face the problem 
of solving competing interests among different groups of creditors204 and that the current 
monitors/trustees, as court officers, are assumed to adequately represent the creditors in 
the rescue administration.205 However, in practice, the trustees/monitors sometimes have 
not fulfilled their role in representing and protecting the creditors; for example, they did 
not provide creditors with timely information or the progression of rescue.206 Therefore, 
Canadian creditors are likely to have a need for exerting their control in participating in 
rescue procedures. 
There are two ways for creditors to exercise their control and participation in 
rescue, through the establishment of an ad-hoc creditor committee and the advance of the 
rescue finance. The ad-hoc committee is most frequently established under the CCAA 
 
201 Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re), 1993 CanLII 8492 (ON SC) 202 11 U.S.C. § 1102 US bankruptcy Code,  203 The BIA s.56 204 K. McElcheran, Commercial Insolvency in Canada (Butterworths, 2005), at 238-41 205 Cassels Brocks, ‘Business Reorganisation Group e-COMMUNIQUÉ’ (2005) 9 (5) 206 Ibid 
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procedure with two or more creditors who hold similar claims against the debtor 
company.207 These creditors participate in rescue by counselling the directors to advance 
their common interest. It is common for a group of creditors to form a committee on the 
ad-hoc basis prior to the CCAA filing and this committee continues to work after the 
company initiates the rescue procedure.208 In complex rescue where a company has 
different structures of debts, security and priority, it is possible to have different 
committees representing different creditors that hold a similar type of claims.209 These 
committees will perform a number of important roles in negotiating the terms of rescue 
plans, reviewing financial information and other disclosures on the company’s operations 
and capital structure, acting as a sounding board for the monitor, assessing the governance 
of the debtor or even assisting in monitoring a going-concern sale.210  
With these important functions, the ad-hoc creditor committee can become an 
effective mechanism for creditors to participate in the proceedings as well as protecting 
their own interest. With the same or similar type of claims, the creditors in a committee 
can work together and exchange ideas to contribute to the development of the rescue plan. 
This role can be enhanced to support the success of a rescue plan where a committee 
represents the creditors who hold substantial claims or voting power in aggregate, which 
allows them to easily approve the plan by exercising their vote.211 Furthermore, the 
committee can perform the function of monitoring the director’s activities, which is 
similar to the role of the monitor. However, while the monitor has the neutral role of a 
court-appointed officer, the creditor committee has a direct economic interest in corporate 
 207 R.J. Chadwick and D. R. Bulas, ‘Ad Hoc Creditors' Committees in CCAA Proceedings: The Result of a Changing and Expanding Restructuring World’, in Janis Sarra, Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2011. Available at <https://www.blaney.com/webfiles/5%20%20Ad%20Hoc%20Creditors%20Committees%20in%20CCAA%20Proceedings%20The%20Result%20of%20a%20Changing%20an.pdf> accessed 28 August 2018 208 Ibid 2. 209 Ibid 210 Sarra (n54) at 82. 211 Ibid 
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rescue they represent.212 By exercising their control, the creditor committee can obtain 
information on the company’s business operation and the ongoing restructuring in a 
timely fashion, thus protecting themselves from the directors if they take actions that 
materially affect their interest.213 The collective work and co-ordination of the committee 
or different committees bring a further benefit in that it allows the debtor company to 
reduce time and cost that may arise from the multiple communications and negotiations 
between the directors with individual creditors.214 
Canadian courts have been accepted the formation of the ad-hoc committee of 
creditors in a number of large and complicated rescue cases, such as Air Canada in 2003, 
Stelco in 2004 and Calpine in 2005.215  The courts have increasingly recognised it as an 
effective channel for vulnerable creditors, especially unsecured creditors to advance their 
rights and interest in rescue.216 As a result of judicial endorsement, the 2009 amendment 
of the CCAA added an important advantage to the committee’s formation and operation 
under s.11.52(c)217 which permits the court to make an order to create a charge or security 
against the company’s property to secure the professional fees and expenses engaged by 
interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for 
effective participation of that person. Compared to the status of the self-funded 
committees in earlier years,218 s.11.52 has the obvious effect of encouraging the formation 
of the ad-hoc creditor committees. The encouraging effect is especially stronger for 
 
212 Chadwick and Bulas (n207) 7 213 Ibid 3 214 Ibid 3 215 Air Canada, Re, 2003 CanLII 49366 (ON SC), Stelco Inc., Re, 2004 CanLII 24849 (ON SC), and Re Calpine Canada Energy Limited (Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act), 2007 ABCA 266 (CanLII) 216 B.E. Romaine (Honourable Madam Justice, Court of Queen’s Bench Alberta), ‘Rights and Roles of Unsecured Creditors: Overview of the Current Status of Unsecured Creditors’ Committees in Canada’ (2012) The Twelfth Annual International Insolvency Conference, International Insolvency Institute. Available at <https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/overviewofthecurrentstatusofunsecuredcreditorscommitteeincanada.pdf> accessed 28 August 2018 217 CCAA, s.11.52(c) 218 Romaine (n216) para 6 
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unsecured creditors whose debts were not protected by any means of security and they 
have to fund their own activities if they want to participate in the rescue. Relying on the 
virtue of s.11.52, the court can make a decision to fund the creditor committee 
representing vulnerable creditors such as employees and retirees in Re Nortel Networks 
Corp and Re Fraser Papers Inc.219 The court decisions in the mentioned cases have 
signified the legal recognition of the importance of the creditor committee and their 
legitimate participation in the rescue administration. However, despite the benefits 
brought by the creditor committee, its participation in rescue along with IPs can produce 
more costs and potential delay if there is disagreement or disputes among them.220 
Furthermore, allowing the creditor committee to directly take part in rescue 
administration can lead to a degree of opportunistic abuse of creditors insofar as they owe 
no fiduciary duties to the company.221 
The second way for creditors to exert their control in rescue administration is to 
advance the rescue finance or the ‘DIP finance’ to implement a rescue plan. The terms 
DIP finance refers to the interim finance222 that is necessarily important for the 
implementation of a rescue plan.223 This finance can be advanced to the company either 
by the existing creditors or new creditors. Initially, due to the silence of the legislation 
regarding this matter, Canadian courts, in relying on their inherent jurisdiction, granted 
orders that allow the debtor company to obtain the DIP finance.224 The orders created a 
charge to secure the DIP finance against the company’ assets which confer the lender of 
 
219 Re Nortel Networks Corp (2009), 53 CBR (5th) 196, also (2009, 55 BCR (5th) 114 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); Re Fraser Papers Inc., 2009 CarswellOnt 6169 (Ont.Sup.Ct.) cited by Honourable Madam Justice B.E. Romaine, Ibid 220 K. McElcheran, (n204) 238-241. 221 B.E. Romaine (n216) 222 The term DIP financing is used under the Chapter 11 of US Bankruptcy Code, however, in Canada the term is used widely as interim financing. See BIA s.50.6(1) and CCAA s.11.2(1). 223 Re: United Used Auto & Truck Parts et al, 2000 BCSC 1708 (CanLII). 224 Re Westar Mining Ltd., [1992] B.C.J. No. 1360 (QL), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 88 (B.C.S.C.) and Skydome Corp., Re (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 118 (Ont. Gen. Div. – Commercial List). 
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this finance a priority over existing unsecured and secured creditors in the queue of 
payment.225 Especially, the court sometimes allowed the lender of the DIP finance to use 
this charge to cover a pre-existing debt owed by the company regardless of whether or 
not the existing debt was connected to the DIP finance.226 In order for the court to grant 
such orders, the court had to consider whether the priority given to the lender would 
adversely affect the pre-existing secured creditors.227  
In response to the popularity of the DIP finance, Canada has codified the common 
law principles regarding this matter in the BIA and the CCAA. Currently, both the statutes 
allow the court to make an order that grants the DIP finance a security interest that has 
priority over the existing security.228 However, the lender of the DIP finance cannot use 
this security to secure the debts that existed before the making of the order.229 The judicial 
and legislative recognition of the super-priority security of the DIP finance can provide 
creditors a strong incentive to advance the rescue finance to the company, as there is a 
legislative guarantee that this kind of finance will be paid in priority.  Apart from this 
protection, the DIP finance is a way for the creditors to exert their control in rescue. This 
can be achieved with a financial agreement between the company and the lenders, under 
which the lenders use their advantageous position to subject the company to the obligation 
of providing information about the progress of rescue on a regular basis.230 However, a 
drawback of this is that the DIP lenders may use their position to influence the rescue in 
the direction that favours their own interest.231 For example, they can force the company 
 225 Ibid 226 Re Hunter Trailer & Marine Ltd, 27 C.B.R (4th) 236 (Alta Q.B) and See R. Thornton, ‘Air Canada and Stelco: Legal Development and Practical Lessons’ in Janis Sarra, ed., Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2006 (Carswell, 2007) at 76-80. 227 Re Tuan Development Inc., 2007 BCSC 1827 (CanLII) 228 BIA, s.50.6(1) & (3) and CCAA, s.11.2(1) & (2) 229 Ibid 230 Wood (n4) at 400-01 231 Ibid 
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to a sale or pre-packaged sale and then become prospective purchasers with their 
informational advantages.232  
As such, Canadian rescue law appears to encourage creditor participation in 
rescue by endorsing the functions of the creditor committee and granting a super-priority 
for the DIP finance. Notwithstanding these benefits, the ad-hoc credit committee and the 
DIP finance present avenues for creditors to take advantage of  rescue to serve their own 
interest and more likely bringing detriment to the interest of others as well as increasing 
the rescue costs. To tackle these shortcomings, the courts and monitor/trustee have to 
perform their supervisory role to make sure that the legitimate interests are safeguarded 
and the potential abuse is preventable.  
5.4.4 Abuse management 
The hybrid model of administration in rescue adopted by Canadian law is justified 
by the argument that the incumbent directors of an insolvent company can take advantage 
of being familiar with its business and operation to manage the company and formulate a 
viable rescue plan.233 However, this model functions well only when there is an efficient 
mechanism that can prevent potential abuse, for example, how to preclude the incumbent 
directors from taking highly risky actions at the cost incurred by creditors.234 In 
preventing such abuse, Canadian law employs the court’s supervision through the 
function of an intermediary party, which is trustee/monitor, who is the court’s officer after 
accepting the appointment. It is worth examining if there are potential abuse emerging 
from the hybrid model and the extent to which this supervision mechanism works to 
prevent the abuse. 
 232 Ibid 233 LoPucki & Whitford (n154) 694  234 Lynn M. LoPucki, ‘The Trouble With Chapter 11’, (1993) Wis. L.Rev. 729, 732-34 
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First, where the law facilitates easy access for an insolvent company to enter into 
the rescue procedure, the incumbent directors are likely to initiate rescue to either, prolong 
their office tenure or to take advantage of the moratorium to compete with their rivals in 
the market.235 Canadian law effectively approaches this problem with the courts 
aggressively screening rescue application from the beginning to determine if it is viable 
or not.236 The courts partly exercise their supervisory role through the functions of the 
trustee or the monitor who assists the courts with reports on the company’s financial 
situation, the causes of business failure,237 the cash-flow statement and the reasonableness 
of the cash-flow statement.238 Especially, under the CCAA, monitors have the duty of 
advising courts immediately whether liquidation is a better option for the company and 
whether a rescue plan is fair and reasonable.239 The information provided by the 
monitors/trustees becomes an important basis for the courts to make decisions on whether 
to accept the rescue application. Therefore, if the courts and the monitors/trustees perform 
their function properly, the directors will be barred from attempting to initiate rescue to 
prolong their tenure.240 
In addition to the court’s assessment on the viability of a rescue plan, the directors 
are subject to a fiduciary duty that prevents them from taking any actions that are harmful 
to the company. Section 122(1) of Canadian Business Corporation Act (CBCA) requires 
directors to act honestly and good faith in the best interest of the company.241 In case the 
 
235 For example, in the case of US airlines re-organisation under chapter 11, the stay of proceeding allows the airlines company with great advantages, such as postponement of payment for creditors, employment and pension. As a result, these companies could offer low-cost tickets and distorted the healthy competition with other airlines. See, M. C. Mathiesen, ‘Bankruptcy of Airlines: Causes, Complaints, and Changes’, (1995-1996) 61 J. Air L. & Com. 1017,  236 Lopucki and Triantis, (n155) 284 237 BIA, s.50(5), CCAA, s.23(1) 238 Ibid s.50 (6) and 50.4(2)  239 CCAA, s.23(1) 240 CCAA. S.6(1) BIA, s.59(2) 241 CBCA, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-44/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-44.html>  accessed 14 August 2018. It is noticed that in Canada, a company can be incorporated under either CBCA or the provincial company legislations.  
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company enters into insolvency, the SCC adopted the interpretation that directors act in 
the best interest of the company by creating a better company and they must not favour 
the interest of any groups of stakeholders such as creditors or shareholders242 Rather, the 
directors must take into consideration, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, creditors, consumers, government and the environment.243 Although the court 
could not provide clear-cut guidance on how the directors are going to balance these 
competing interest,244 an inference can be made from this ruling is that any action by the 
directors that harms the maximisation of the company’s value is likely to be reviewed 
under ‘the best interest’ test.245 It is common that the directors who engage in misconduct 
can be removed by shareholders with the oppression remedy available under the CBCA 
if the shareholders find their conduct to be unfair and oppressive to their interests.246 
However, it is unlikely for the remedy to be exercised by the shareholders during 
insolvency because shareholders rank the last in the queue of priority of payment and this 
status does not provide them with an incentive to supervise the company. Nevertheless, 
the law empowers the court with this similar kind of power in insolvency.247 If the 
directors unreasonably impair the viability of the rescue plan, the courts can make an 
order to remove them from the office.248 The court power of rejecting a rescue 
application249 and withdrawing the directors from management appears to be a 
sufficiently preventative measure to prevent creditor abuse. The final preventative 
 
242 Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 SCR 461, Para.47 243 Ibid para 42. 244 Wood (n4) at 385 and Alan L. W. D'Silva and Genna Wood, ‘Directors’ Duties in Canada: Six Key Concepts, May 4, 2015’, available at <https://www.stikeman.com/en-ca/kh/canadian-ma-law/directors-duties-in-canada-six-key-concepts> accessed 23 August 2018  245  246 CBCA s.109 247 BIA s.64(1) and CCAA s.11.5(1) 248 Ibid 249 See (n217) 
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measure should be mentioned is that once the directors make offences in rescue, they can 
be found civilly or criminally liable with severe punishment under the BIA.250 
Second, the facilitation of rescue finance or ‘DIP finance’ can give rise to the 
creditor’s abuse where a creditor attempts to use the super-priority of the DIP finance to 
change the priority of a pre-insolvency debt. This happens the lender enters into an 
agreement with the company that allows a previously unsecured debt to become secured 
and enjoys the super-priority status like the DIP financing. Allowing this to happen will 
unfairly change the priority among the creditors and bring detriment to the interest of 
existing creditors. In Air Canada, the court permitted a security to cover a $700 million 
DIP finance and the outstanding debt under the aircraft leasing contract with the lender, 
and this gave the DIP lender a priority over other unsecured creditors.251 However, since 
the 2005/2007 amendment of BIA and CCAA, a creditor cannot use the DIP finance to 
secure the pre-existing obligation prior to the making of the order.252 Therefore, the abuse 
associated with creditor utilising the DIP finance to change the priority status can be 
tackled by the law. Furthermore, the abuse of creditors using the DIP finance to influence 
the rescue in a way that serves their interest is blocked by courts testing the nature of the 
DIP finance before approving it. Accordingly, courts need to consider a number of factors 
to grant a DIP finance order.253 For instance, the courts shall consider the period in which 
the company is expected to be subject to rescue proceedings, the management of the 
company’s business and financial affairs, the nature and value of the company’s assets.254 
The courts also rely on the report of the monitor/trustee on the reasonableness of the cash-
flow statement and the likelihood that the financing will enhance the viability of the 
 
250 BIA, s.202(2.1), 203, and 204.1. The offended directors can be subject to a monetary fine can be up to ten thousand dollars and imprisonment for up to three years. 251 R. Thornton (n207) at 76-78 252 BIA s.50.6(1) and CCAA s.11.2(1). 253 BIA s.50.6(5) and CCAA s.11.2(4). 254 Ibid 
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rescue. Importantly, the court will consider if the security granted to the DIP finance will 
materially prejudiced other creditors.255 An order will not be made unless there is ‘cogent 
evidence that the benefit of DIP finance clearly outweighs the potential prejudice to the 
creditors whose security is subordinated’.256 As such, in preventing abuse arising from 
the DIP finance, the effectiveness of Canadian law depends largely on the role and 
expertise of the courts in supervising rescue procedures. 
Third, the abuse can take the form of the sale of company assets during the rescue. It 
is obvious that a sale of the company’s assets at a lower price than the market leads to a 
decrease in creditor return. In tackling this problem, the BIA and the CCAA impose a 
restriction that does not allow directors to sell or otherwise dispose of the company’s 
assets outside the ordinary course of business unless there is a court approval for it.257 
Both the BIA and CCAA provide courts with a set of non-exclusive factors in considering 
whether to approve or reject the sale.258 This includes the reasonableness and the 
consideration of the sale, the opinions of the trustee or the monitor, the report of the 
trustee/monitor on whether the sale is more beneficial, the creditor consultation, and the 
possible effect of the sale.259 In granting orders based on the above guidance, the courts 
have to rely significantly on the monitor/trustee’s expertise via their report.260 Therefore, 
the monitor/trustee’s expertise and integrity play a decisive role that influences the 
soundness of the court’s decisions.  
The above analysis focuses on the sale of the company’s asset happening before the 
rescue procedure is initiated. The sale process is carried out by the monitor/trustee, who 
will promote the sale, identify potential purchasers and invite them into the sale process. 
 
255Ibid 256 Re United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd. (1999) 12 C.B.R 144, para. 28. 257 BIA s.65.13(1) and CCAA s.36(1). 258 BIA s.65.13(4) and CCAA s. 36 (3). 259 Ibid 260 BIA, s.50.4 and CCAA, s.23. 
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When the successful bidder is identified, an agreement will be entered into, and the court 
will make an order to approve the sale. However, the pre-packaged sale presents a 
different approach. The company will conduct the kind of sale that would need court 
approval, but all happened before filing for the rescue procedure. This quick sale practice 
offers the company several important benefits such as preserving the company market 
value and avoiding business disruption.261 However, a degree of abuse can penetrate in 
the sale to the extent that an influential creditor, such as a DIP finance lender, can use its 
informational advantage to become a potential purchaser, or the company directors or 
connected parties can purchase the company at a price lower than the market price.262  
Because the pre-packaged sale is conducted before filing for rescue, it falls outside 
the scope of legislation. However, in preventing the abuse of this kind of sale, the 
approach of the court is to treat it as similarly as the post-filing sale by imposing the same 
degree of scrutiny. In the case of Re Nelson Education Limited,263 the court dealt with the 
issue of whether to approve a sale that had been entered into prior a debtor company filing 
an application for the CCAA restructuring. In deciding this matter, the court sets out a 
number of criteria for approving an out-of-court sale under the receivership, which was 
then developed and incorporated to become factors for the court to consider a sale under 
the s.36(3) of CCAA s65.13(4).264 The court approves the sale if it is largely satisfied 
with the guiding factors, including the reasonableness of the sale process, the sale price 
compared to the market price, the effects on the creditors, the monitor/trustee’s 
opinion.265 Canadian courts, with these functions, have an important role in protecting all 
 
261 S. L. Graff and I. E. Aversa, ‘Insolvency Aspects of the Purchase and Sale of a Distressed Business in Canada’, at 23, available at <https://www.airdberlis.com/docs/default-source/articles/insolvency-aspects-of-the-purchase-and-sale-of-a-distressed-business-in-canada.pdf?sfvrsn=2> accessed 24 August 2018. 262 Ibid 23 263 Re Nelson Education Limited , 2015 ONSC 5557 (CanLII). 264 Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 1991 CanLII 2727 (ON CA), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), cited in Re Nelson Education Limited case, para 32, 37. 265 Re Nelson Education Limited , 2015 ONSC 5557 (CanLII), para 38. 
Chapter Five - Corporate Rescue Law in Canada  
190  
parties in rescue as well as preserving the asset estate of the company. However, this also 
presents a challenging task for the court insofar as given the urgency pertaining to the 
sale, the court’s decision must be made in a prompt basis to avoid the devaluation of the 
company asset. 
To summarise this discussion so far, the rescue procedures under Canadian law may 
open the door to invite abuse by both the company and its creditors. However, the debtor 
abuse can be effectively prevented by the combination of the supervision of the monitor 
and the court with the remedy and the punishment under the legislation. The creditor’s 
abuse in the pre-packaged sale can be prevented with the court’s involvement in screening 
and approving the sale. Similarly, the court is capable of tackling the creditor abuse 
associated with the DIP finance by not sanctioning rescue plan if they found it produces 
unfairness to other parties. The above discussion has highlighted a special feature of 
Canadian rescue law, which is the high level of judicial involvement in deciding the 
effectiveness of the law. 
5.4.5 Whether the BIA and the CCAA procedures place the emphasis on rescue? 
 There has been an emerging trend of employing the rescue procedure under the 
CCAA to effect liquidation rather than pursuing the purpose of saving insolvent 
companies.266 The CCAA liquidation is a procedure under which a debtor company takes 
advantage of the moratorium (the stay of proceedings) to effect a sale of company’s assets 
on a piecemeal or on a going concern basis.267 Specifically, when the company initiates 
the CCAA procedure, a stay will prevent creditors from taking any action which is 
detrimental to the company’s assets. However, this protection will be used to market and 
sell the company free of the creditor’s harassment. When the sale has been completed, 
 266 A. Nocilla, ‘Is Corporate Rescue Working in Canada?’, (2012) 53 Can. Bus. L.J. 382 and R. Wood, ‘Rescue and Liquidation in Restructuring Law’ (2012) 53 Can. Bus. L.J. 407.  267 Nocilla, Ibid 385 
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the company will present a post-sale plan to its creditors to distribute the sale proceeds or 
to let the company enter into liquidation. The study conducted by Nocilla on the 
performance of the CCAA between 2002 and 2012 is a confirmation of this new trend.268 
According to the study, among 308 filings for the CCAA during 2001-2012, liquidation 
under the CCAA accounted for the largest proportion, 33%, followed by 31% and 17% 
for rescue and receivership/bankruptcy respectively.269 These figures raise a question 
regarding the actual purpose of rescue law in Canada, whether it is a tool for corporate 
rescue or liquidation to distribute return to creditors.  
It is the fact that the CCAA does not state its objectives in express terms. 
Therefore, the objectives are often clarified by the mean of judicial interpretation. In 
Century Services Inc v Canada, the SCC maintained that ‘the purpose of the CCAA is to 
permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social 
and economic costs of liquidating its assets’.270 However, this ruling did not address the 
issue of whether it is legitimate to use the CCAA to liquidate debtor companies. As a 
result, judicial decisions form conflicting opinions regarding the liquidation under 
CCAA, for example, the courts in Ontario are more likely to approve the sale under the 
CCAA than those in British Colombia and Alberta.271 This controversy raises the question 
of whether the CCAA can be used to effect a sale or liquidation. 
In response to this issue, it is necessary to revisit the examination of the concept 
of corporate rescue. As examined in chapter three, rescue should be fully construed in 
 
268 Ibid 389 269 Ibid 388-389 270 Century Services Inc. v. Canada, 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 SCR 379, para 15 271 Nocilla (n250) 395. For court approving CCAA liquidation, see White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re (2010), 72 C.B.R. (5th) 49, 2010 QCCS 4915 (Que. S.C.) and Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) I at para. II (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), affirmed (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.), additional reasons (2002), 38 C.B.R. (4th) 5 (Ont. C.A.),  leave to appeal refused (2003), 180 O.A.C. 399 (note) (S.C.C.). For court disapproving CCAA liquidation, see Medical Intelligence Technologies inc., Re, 2009 QCCS 2725 (Que. S.C.), in which the court refused to extend the stay of proceedings in order to facilitate the sale of the company’s asset 
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terms of ‘company rescue’ and ‘business rescue’.272 While the former refers to turning a 
distressed company around to the healthy financial state with the same ownership, the 
latter depicts a scenario where the viable business of a company will be transferred or 
sold to a new owner to preserve the going-concern value of the business as well as the 
employment. Principally, Canadian law approaches corporate rescue with the adoption of 
the hybrid model that allows the directors to stay in management. This feature is similar 
to the DIP model under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Because encouraging 
entrepreneurship is the justification of the DIP model, this model can suit well in a culture 
where business failure is considered to be a misfortune rather than misconduct as in the 
US.273 Though the laws in Canada and the US similarly permit the directors to remain in 
the office, they do not work in the same way. In contrast to the easy initiation proceeding 
under the US law, a CCAA application is subject to a rigorous test of viability at the early 
stage through the screening by courts.274 In case the procedure is initiated with the notice 
of intention under the BIA, if the company cannot present a proposal in time, it needs the 
court’s approval to extend the stay of proceeding after the initial stay has expired. 275 The 
basis for courts to grant an extension is the viability test,276 which means that the court 
will refuse to grant the extension if there is no prospect of success, and this will result in 
voluntary liquidation.277 While the legislation facilitates good conditions to effect the 
rescue, the courts have attempted to make it clear that rescue cannot happen in all cases 
if it is not viable. Therefore, it seems to be that Canadian law has placed greater emphasis 
 
272 See Chapter 3 (3.3.2.2 Company Rescue and Business Rescue) 273 G. Moss, ‘Chapter 11: An English Lawyer’s Critique’ (1998)11 Insolvency Intelligence 17,  18 274 LoPucki and Triantis (n142)  284-285 275 BIA s.50.4(9) 276 Ibid 277 Ibid s50.4(8) 
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on ‘business rescue’ rather than ‘company rescue’. As enlightened by the Supreme 
Court,278  
[I]t recognized that companies retain more value as going concerns while underscoring that intangible losses, such as the evaporation of the companies’ goodwill, result from liquidation. Reorganization serves the public interest by facilitating the survival of companies supplying goods or services crucial to the health of the economy or saving large numbers of jobs.  
As such, the purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the going-concern values of the 
company or the viable part of the company business, which is the reflection of the 
philosophy of ‘business rescue’. 
The justification for courts to approve liquidation under the CCAA is that this 
practice can maximise creditors return. For example, in Anvil Range Mining Corp, the 
court interpreted that the procedure under the CCAA can lead to a sale or a liquidation 
because the ultimate goal is to maximise the creditor’s return.279 In Nortel Networks Corp, 
the court reasoned that ‘the CCAA is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad 
and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives, and a sale by the debtor to preserve the 
going concern values of its business appears to be consistent with CCAA objectives’.280 
Therefore, the court has the jurisdiction to authorise a sale under the CCAA regardless of 
the absence of a rescue plan.281  It appears from these cases that the court will approve a 
sale or liquidation of the company if it can maximise the creditor return without 
considering the viability of a rescue plan. The thesis does not agree with this approach 
because of the following reasons. First, the CCAA should not be a procedure employed 
for liquidation because the great flexibility offered by CCAA is exclusively architected 
to support the carrying out of corporate rescue.282 For example, the ease to initiate the 
 
278 Century Services Inc. v. Canada (2010) SCC 60, [2010] 3 SCR 379, para 18 279 Re Anvil Range Mining Corp., (2001) CanLII 28449 (ON SC), para 11 280 Re Nortel Networks Corp, (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 47 281 Ibid 282 R. Wood (n266) 413-414.  
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rescue proceedings and the stay of proceedings with very wide scope and the unlimited 
extension purport to give an insolvent company a breathing period to formulate proposals, 
instead of being utilised to sell the company in an expeditious fashion.283 Second, as 
clearly stated by the SCC, ‘the purpose of the CCAA is to permit the debtor to continue 
to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of 
liquidating its assets’284. Therefore, forcing the company into liquidation or a sale appears 
to run in contrast with the court ruling. Furthermore, the justification of maximising 
creditor return is not convincing because it ignores other parties’ interest, such as 
employees and the community as a whole.285 With these reasons, the thesis opines that 
the court should allow the practice of liquidation or a sale of a company under the CCAA 
only where there is no likelihood for an insolvent company to be rescued. If a sale of the 
company is conducted under the CCAA, it should be associated with a transfer of a going-
concern business to a new owner rather than a piece-meal sale of company’s assets as the 
former option permits the survival of the company’s business. In overcoming the 
uncertainty around this matter, it is the Canadian Parliament who should clearly express 
the purpose of the CCAA.  
5.5 Conclusion 
The examination on the legal development has revealed the influence of UK and 
US law on the shape of Canadian rescue law. Developing in special historical conditions, 
Canadian rescue law has its own distinct features with the existence of the two insolvency 
procedures under the BIA and the CCAA. The BIA was intended to be the main procedure 
for corporate rescue to replace the CCAA, however, the flexibility resulted from the 
 
283 Also, the provision requiring the debtor to periodically see to court to extend the stay is clearly designed for the purpose of rescue supervision. See Wood, Ibid, 413 284 Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) [2010] 3 SCR 379, 2010 SCC 60 (CanLII) 285 R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 4th edn, 2011), at 73 
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judicial interpretation rendered the CCAA a product of long survival. As a result of this, 
there is the bifurcation of rescue procedures in Canada. 
The BIA and the CCAA employ the same model of DIP in rescue administration, 
which permits the company directors to stay in management and carry out business under 
the supervision of the trustee, monitor and the court. While the BIA is a rule-based 
procedure that strictly follows a number of detailed statutory provisions, the CCAA has 
the characteristics of a court-driven procedure under which the court has a wide latitude 
of flexibility to tailor their orders to meet the company’s demands on a case-by-case basis. 
Consequently, the BIA procedure is initiated to rescue small companies, while the CCAA 
procedure is suitable for large companies with a complex structure of debts being over 
C$5 million.  
The examination of the effectiveness of Canadian rescue law based on the four 
benchmarks of time and cost, expertise, creditor participation, and abuse management 
reveals several interesting findings. Regarding time and cost, it appears to be that the time 
for rescue under the BIA is very strict compared to the CCAA under which there is no 
imposition of the time limit. However, this does not indicate that the BIA is more time-
efficient than the CCAA. Rather, it reflects the flexible approach of Canadian law in that 
the BIA procedure must be time-efficient to respond to simpler rescue cases of small 
companies, meanwhile, the CCAA is used to rescue large and complex companies 
because of its flexibility associated with a high level of court involvement. However, the 
high level of professional fee appears to be a very concern in both procedures. While the 
court can decide this matter under the CCAA, the BIA allows this fee to be decided 
between the company and the trustee, which appears to insufficient for this can lead to 
the increase of IPs fee and the reduction of creditor’s return. In terms of expertise, by 
employing the hybrid model, Canadian law can combine the expertise of the director in 
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operating the company with the expertise of court and IPs in monitoring and supervising 
the rescue procedure. Furthermore, borrowing expertise of the CRO to assist the directors 
in operating the company during rescue significantly enhances the rescue effectiveness. 
Compared to the BIA, the CCAA rescue appears to generate a higher degree of expertise 
with judicial involvement, yet, this has a disadvantage of adding more costs to rescue. In 
terms of creditor participation, Canadian law satisfies this benchmark through the 
recognition of the participation of the creditor committee and the super-priority security 
for the DIP finance. Yet, allowing the creditor committee to control the rescue procedure 
also contributes to the increase of rescue cost. Finally, Canadian law meets the benchmark 
of abuse management by relying on IPs and especially the court in monitoring rescue and 
preventing the director’s abuse. The law also tackles the abuse arising from pre-packaged 
sales by subjecting the validity of the sales to court approval. Similarly, judicial 
supervision can be an effective response to the creditor abuse of DIP finance. These 
findings could lead to the conclusion that Canadian law can produce effectiveness for 
corporate rescue. Nevertheless, the issue of cost appears to be a concern as the rescue 
procedure has the participation of many actors such as the company, CRO, IPs, creditor 
committee and the courts. 
 Regarding the fact that Canadian courts approve the practice of using the CCAA 
procedure to effect liquidation or a sale of the company. The thesis took the view that this 
practice runs in contrast with the policy of corporate rescue that places the emphasis on 
preserving the going-concern value of the company as recognised by the SCC. If there is 
a prospect for rescuing a company, the CCAA should not be used to effect a piecemeal 
sale of the company asset or liquidation. 
 In the next chapter, this thesis will examine the corporate rescue law in Vietnam 
following the evaluation framework in this chapter.  
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 CHAPTER SIX  CORPORATE RESCUE LAW IN VIETNAM  
6.0 Introduction 
Following the approach employed in the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada 
chapters, this chapter furthers the examination of rescue law to the legal landscape of 
Vietnam. The case of Vietnam promises interesting findings as the insolvency legal 
system of the country differs from those in the UK and Canada in many aspects, which is 
attributed to the combination of historical, political and economic factors. The chapter 
begins with an examination of the legal development in insolvency in Vietnam to 
highlight the extent to which traditional norms and values, legal transplantation and 
international integration have influenced the insolvency legislative framework of 
Vietnam. This part also addresses the reasons why Vietnam failed to adopt Western 
insolvency laws and the need for undertaking research on Vietnam rescue law given the 
enactment of the new legislation in 2014.  The chapter then examines the informal rescue 
practices and the operation of the formal rescue procedure prescribed under the current 
insolvency legislation - the Bankruptcy Law 2014 (BL2014). Finally, the remaining and 
significant part of the chapter is devoted to critically evaluating the effectiveness of 
Vietnam rescue law under the four benchmarks as established in chapter three, namely 
the time and cost, the expertise, creditors’ participation and abuse management.1  
6.1 The development of insolvency law in Vietnam 
6.1.1 A complicated legal transplantation of insolvency law in Vietnam 
Vietnam is a very special case of legal transplantation insofar as its legal system 
had been shaped by multiple influences of foreign laws during consecutive periods of 
 
1 See Chapter Three (3.6.2.3 Benchmarks for evaluation of rescue law proposed by this thesis) 
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history from the domination of Chinese emperors to French colonisation, from the spread 
of Russian socialism to the emergence of Western commerce.2 It is interesting to note that 
when new imported law dominated in Vietnam, the old traditions did not completely 
disappear, rather, they co-exist in the legal system and influenced the way the 
contemporary law has developed.3   
During the time of Chinese invasion (111BC to 937AD), one important influence 
the Chinese empires brought to Vietnam is Confucianism (Nho Giao), which is a school 
of thought and wisdom established by Confucius and other scholars to provide order to 
the society.4 Confucianism gained its popularity and deeply ingrained into Vietnamese 
society, becoming social norms and beliefs for people to act upon.5 One of the most 
influences of Confucianism on Vietnamese society is the concept of ‘collectivism’.6 The 
philosophy of collectivism expresses that a person is born to be a member of a society 
and has obligation to act for the interest of the society, therefore, he is considered to be 
selfish if he struggles for his own interest.7 In tandem with collectivism, Confucianism 
divided people in society into different classes and people in a class should act upon their 
social status to maintain the social order.8 As the core values of Confucianism are to 
maintain social order, the ruling class in Vietnam employed it as the main political 
doctrine to require people to be loyal to the community and the country.9  
 
2 John Gillespie, Transplanting Commercial Law Reform: Developing a 'Rule of Law' in Vietnam, (Ashgate, 2006) Chapter Two, at 39-68 3 Ibid 4 Pham Duy Nghia, ‘Confucianism and the conception of the law in Vietnam’, in John Gillespie and Pip Nicholson (eds) Asian Socialism and Legal Changes: The Dynamics of Vietnamese and Chinese Reforms (Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 2005), at 78-79 5 Ibid  6 Ibid80 7 Ibid at 80 and D.G. Marr, ‘Concept of “individual” and “self” in twentieth-century Vietnam’ (2000) 34(4) Modern Asian Studies, 769-796 8 Nghia, (n4) at 82. 9 Ibid  
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In the ancient time, private matters related to creditor-debtor relations were largely 
governed by social norms instead of laws,10 they came to the attention of official statutes 
only when they were likely to affect social order.11 For example, in the Penal Code of the 
Le Dynasty (Le Code),12 there imposed a limit on the interest rate to the maximum of 2.5-
3% per month as well as the accrued interest amount not exceeding to the principal debt.13 
Also, under this statute, any attempts to collect debts by forcefully seizing the debtor’s 
property were banned, and failure to adhere to this rule could lead to punishment as well 
as forfeiture of the debt.14 In particular, the Le Code provided for the pro-rata sharing 
principle to distribute debts among creditors, but only in special cases where the debtors 
are state officials.15 Although the Code appeared to govern creditor-debtor relations, it 
was mainly used by the ruling class to maintain social order and the application of the 
Code was very rare in practice.16 The private relations between creditors and debtors were 
largely governed by social norms and customary practices,17 some of which were created 
under the influence of Confucianism values.18 For example, the value of ‘nhan-nghia’19 
demands a son to have the obligation to pay his father’s debts,20 or as commanded by the 
values of ‘face-saving’ and ‘relationship maintaining’, an individual has to respect the 
opinion of the public and society and maintain a good relationship with others in the 
community.21 In applying these values in a credit relationship, a debtor has to find a way 
 
10 Ibid 78 11 Ibid 82. Nghia suggests that despite the existence of some provisions regarding contracts and property in traditional codes, the private law in Vietnam was weak and there is no need to have such provisions. 12 This Code is widely known as “Hong Duc Code”, which is the oldest penal code recorded in Vietnam. See Ta Van Tai, ‘Vietnam's Code of the Le Dynasty (1428-1788)’ (1982) 30 Am. J. Comp. L. 523 13 Le Code, art.529 14 The Lê Dynasty Decree 1634, cited by Ta Van Tai, Ibid 15 Le Code, art.592 16 Nghia (n4) at 78 and John Gillespie, ‘Insolvency Law in Vietnam’ in Roman Tomasic, Insolvency in East Asia (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006) at 241 17 Nghia, Ibid and Gillespie, Ibid 18 Gillespie, Ibid 19 According to this value, ‘nhan’ requires a person to learn benevolence and mercy in his life and ‘nghia’ demands a person to have an obligation towards the family and community, see Nghia, (n.2), p.81 20 N. Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam, (University of California Press, 1993) 12–17. 21 Nghia, (n4) at 80-81 
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to settle his debt secretly or cover up his indebtedness from the public knowledge to 
protect his reputation.22 These traditional values are seen as having vigour that directs 
behaviours of people in Vietnamese society.23 Some of the values, such as ‘face-saving’ 
and ‘relationship maintaining’ are believed to be one of the main hindrances that 
discourage insolvent companies to declare their bankruptcy, which contributes to the 
failure of the bankruptcy legislation in 1993 and 2004.24 
In the time of French colonisation (1858-1954), Western insolvency law started 
to be imported to Vietnam. However, the application of Western law was very limited 
because French law relating to credit and insolvency, in principle, applied exclusively to 
Europeans, while domestic law (such as Gia Long Imperial Code) and customary rules 
governed the credit relationship among Vietnamese.25 The resistance to French imported 
law at this time is attributed to a wide range of factors, such as the small contribution of 
Vietnamese to the colonial economy,26 the unwillingness of Vietnamese intellectuals to 
accept the new foreign ideas when the country was extremely exploited and suppressed 
by the colonist,27 and the strong survival of traditional customary rules and principles in 
Vietnamese villages.28 Following the victory in 1954, the French legal influence 
declined;29 meanwhile, in the South of Vietnam, there was the Commercial Code 1972 
providing for the settlement of bankruptcy in the Republic of Vietnam.30 However, after 
 
22 Ibid 23 Ibid 81 24 Gillespie (n16) at 249 25 Ibid at 241 26  Ibid at 242 27 Nghia (n4) at 83 28 Ibid 29 Gillespie (n16) at 242 30 Pham Duy Nghia, ‘Seeking the philosophy of the Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law’ (2003), 11 Law-Making Research Journal, 35-47,   <http://vibonline.com.vn/bao_cao/gop-y-cua-ts-pham-duy-nghia > accessed  02 November 2018 
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the unification of the country in 1975, this legal legacy of the Republic of Vietnam was 
abolished.31  
Since the 1960s, socialist influence started to permeate Vietnam with the support 
of the Soviet Union in the time of Vietnam-America war. Vietnam considered the Soviet 
Union as an ideal model for the country to follow in terms of political, economic and legal 
structure.32 The concept of ‘socialist legality’ was imported into Vietnam, which 
centralised around three core principles, namely the people as the owners, the party as the 
leader, and the government as the manager.33 Following the adoption of these principles, 
Vietnam pursued the policy of ‘state economic management’ and transforming the 
economy towards the state central management.34 This political-economic movement led 
to the elimination of the private sector due to the belief that private companies might 
support the new capitalist class and this would undermine the state’s interests.35 Due to 
the state’s control of the economy, economic plans and administrative contracts designed 
by line ministries carried the equivalent status to written laws.36 As a result, there was no 
need for introducing insolvency law and the application of insolvency law in this period 
was unlikely to be discussed or documented.37 
In 1986, echoing with the crisis of the Soviet Union, the failure of the state-central 
economy challenged the government leadership, urging innovative measures to be taken 
to direct the economy out of the stage of tardiness.38 The Sixth Party Congress decided to 
 
31 Ibid 32 Gillespie (n16) at 242-3 33 Ibid  34 Ibid 35 Gillespie, ‘Developing a Decentred Analysis of Legal Transfers’ in Pip Nicholson and Sarah Biddulph (eds) Examining Practice, Interrogating Theory: Comparative Legal Studies in Asia (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008) at 49  36 Gillespie, (n16) at 243 37 See Duong Dang Hue and Nguyen Minh Man, ‘Some Issues on the Draft Bankruptcy Law’, (1993) 2 State and Law, 39 38 Duong Thi Nguyet, ‘Transition to a market economy: the case of Vietnam’ (1999), Working paper No.71, Department of Research Cooperation Economic Research Institute Economic planning Agency Tokyo, Japan,   <http://www.esri.go.jp/jp/archive/wor/wor071/wor071.pdf> accessed 01 November 2018 
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initiate the renovation program (Doi Moi) with the objective of transforming the economy 
from the state central control towards the market liberation with multiple sectors subject 
to government regulations.39 This economic transition demanded Vietnam to initiate a 
number of key changes, one of which is to reform the legal system. Accordingly, the legal 
system must be reformed to regulate social and economic transactions as well as 
promoting trading between Vietnam and other countries.40 Apart from this impetus, the 
reform of the Vietnam legal system had been carried out under the pressure to cooperate 
with international donors such as the United Nation Development Program (UNDP), the 
Asian Development Bank41 and the World Bank, and the urgent need to access the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO).42 As global economic integration became a driving force, 
Western laws started to be imported into Vietnam via the support of these foreign 
donors.43 The enactment of the Vietnamese first bankruptcy legislation, the Bankruptcy 
Law 1993 (BL1993), is one of the products of the attempt of incorporating principles of 
Western law to the Vietnamese domestic law under the reform agenda.44 However, the 
first bankruptcy legislation did not produce the result as expected with an extremely low 
number of applications of insolvency companies, resulting in the replacement with the 
Bankruptcy Law 2004 (BL2004).45 After a decade taking effect, the BL2004 failed to 
deliver the effectiveness in dealing with corporate insolvency in the country, which 
 
39 Ibid 6 40 Gillespie (n2) at 64, 145-7 41 Ibid at 63 42 The World Bank, ‘Vietnam Legal Reform for WTO Accession’ (2006)   <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTVIETNAM/1472711169742068115/21087827/vn_wto_legal_reform_march_2006.pdf > accessed  02 November  2018 43 John Gillespie (n2) Ch.5 44 Charles Booth, ‘Drafting Bankruptcy Laws in Socialist Market Economies: Recent Developments in China and Vietnam’ (2004) 18(1) Columbia Journal of Asian Law 93, and John Gillespie (n14), at 239 45 The issue of limited use of the Vietnam Bankruptcy legislation will be discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter.  
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resulted in the replacement with the currently applicable legislation, which is the 
Bankruptcy Law 2014 (BL2014).46  
In summary, the historical examination of insolvency law in Vietnam informs us 
that the Vietnamese insolvency law has been shaped in a complex legal environment, 
which is characterised by the influence of traditional values and foreign laws. Though 
Vietnam approached Western insolvency laws from the time of French colonisation, the 
Western insolvency ideals were truly adopted in Vietnam only when the country enacted 
the first insolvency legislation, the BL1993, to support the shift of the economy from the 
state control to the market liberalism. However, there has been the vestige of traditional 
values operating as resisting forces that limit the application of the legislation. This issue 
will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
6.1.2 The failure of two bankruptcy legislation in 1993 and 2004 
The current applicable insolvency legislation in Vietnam is the Bankruptcy Law 
2014 (BL2014) which exclusively applies to insolvent companies rather than individuals. 
The predecessors of the BL2014 are the BL199347 and the BL2004.48 Each legislation 
had a decade to take effect in Vietnam, yet the results of their implementation were not 
as expected. From 1994 – 2003, the courts received 152 petitions for bankruptcy but only 
46 companies were declared bankrupt under the BL1993.49 Similarly, between 2004 and 
2012, there were 336 petitions for bankruptcy, however, only 83 companies declared 
 
46 The BL 2014 was passed the Vietnam National Assembly on June 19, 2014 and took effect on January 01, 2015. The English version of the Bankruptcy Law 2014 can be seen at the website of the Vietnam Investment and Trade Promotion Centre  <https://www.economica.vn/Portals/0/Documents/51-2014%20Law%20on%20Bankruptcy.pdf> accessed  01 November 2018  47 Bankruptcy Law 1993, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/iir.3940060104>  accessed 07 November 2018 48 Bankruptcy Law 2004, <http://www.moj.gov.vn/vbpq/en/lists/vn%20bn%20php%20lut/view_detail.aspx?itemid=7849> accessed 07 November 2018> 49 Gillespie (n16) 239 
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bankrupt under the BL2004.50 The failure of the two laws in providing a legal mechanism 
for financially difficult companies to exit the market has attracted attention of legal 
scholars in this area. One of prominent scholars in Vietnamese insolvency law is 
Gillespie.51 In researching the failure of transplanting Western insolvency law into 
Vietnam, Gillespie provides the following explanation for the extremely low number of 
companies resorting to the formal bankruptcy statute. As for the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), settling their insolvency affairs appeared to be a sensitive issue in the extent to 
which they represent the state management, and thus their insolvency would lead to loss 
of prestige of the supervising authorities as well as the state.52 This coupled with the fear 
that SOEs would fail their social obligations in providing employment and social welfare 
given their important contribution to the economy.53 Therefore, under these political, 
economic and social pressure, the state established the Central Steering Committee for 
Debt Solvency to coordinate the liquidation of SOEs by merging and privatising 
unprofitable enterprises instead of relying on the formal rules under these laws.54 
Similarly, for the private sector, Gillespie believes that the cultural influence of 
Confucianism that perceived debts and bankruptcy with hostile attitude has inhibited 
private companies to rely on the formal insolvency regulations.55 Furthermore, Gillespie 
points out that the lack of an insolvency institution framework, such as insolvency 
practitioners and the insufficient judicial capacity has been a factor that prevented the 
operation of insolvency legislation in Vietnam.56  
 
50 Report 44/BC-TANDTC of the Vietnamese Supreme Court on the implementation of the Bankruptcy 2004. 51 Gillespie (n2) and (n16)  52 John Gillespie (n16) at 249 53 Ibid at 247. According to the statistic of the Vietnam General Statistical Office 2000, SOEs generated over 30 per cent of the GDP, compared to a mere eight per cent contributed by private enterprises (Gillespie, Ibid at 246). However, it should be reminded that the number of SOEs are significant decreased as the result of the policy of privatisation of the SOEs.  54 Ibid 55 Ibid at 249 and Nghia (n4) at 82 56 Ibid at 268 
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Booth shares the same findings as Gillespie by determining that the preferential 
treatment for the SOEs rendered the bankruptcy legislation subject to the use of 
administrative decisions from the state authorities and the courts only accepted the 
application of an SOE provided the state authority had not issued a decision to settle its 
insolvency affairs.57 The problem of applying the bankruptcy legislation to SOEs is also 
investigated by Nghia.58 Not only does Nghia share the same findings as Gillespie and 
Booth, he also extends his finding to address the reasons behind the low reliance on the 
bankruptcy legislation in respect of private companies.59 Accordingly, Nghia ascribes the 
limited use of the legislation to the tendency of Vietnamese companies of avoiding raising 
commercial disputes at courts as well as the establishment of supporting networks among 
companies in the industry.60 Furthermore, Nghia attributes the limited use of the 
legislation to the practice of settling insolvency affairs secretly, the risk of the company 
directors being subject to criminal offense once the bankruptcy is officially raised to 
courts, and the lack of a legal mechanism to discharge debts for the individual 
bankrupts.61 In enhancing the reliance on the formal insolvency procedure, Nghia 
determines that there is the need for improving judicial capacity as well as establishing 
the profession of insolvency practitioners (IPs) to support the operation of the 
legislation.62 
As such, the failure of the BL1993 and the BL2004 is closely linked to the failure 
of facilitating a suitable environment for the two pieces of legislation to be implemented. 
During the time of economic transition, the remaining traditional values in combination 
 
57 Charles Booth (n44) 58 Pham Duy Nghia (n30) 59 Ibid 60 Ibid 61 Ibid 62 Ibid 
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with business and legal practices in Vietnam has created a barrier for insolvency law to 
fully operate in Vietnam. 
6.1.3 The scarcity of research on the rescue law in Vietnam 
The issue of corporate rescue has been regulated since the enactment of the first 
insolvency legislation, the BL1993.63 From primitive provisions under the first 
legislation,64 corporate rescue has been recognised as one of the main insolvency 
procedures under the BL200465 and the current legislation, the BL2014.66  However, in 
reality, the number of rescue cases officially recorded is extremely low. For example, 
while only one case of successful rescue was recorded in a previous research study,67 
Report 44 of the People Supreme Court on summarising the implementation of the 
BL2004 did not mention any decisions in respect of corporate rescue.68 Similarly, the 
topic of corporate rescue law of Vietnam has rarely received academic attention. In the 
context of Vietnam’s economic transition from central planning towards market 
liberalism, much of the research on Vietnamese insolvency law has focused on the issues 
of how Western law has been imported to Vietnam, and whether Vietnam has facilitated 
a compatible environment in which the imported law can function properly. The work of 
Gillespie on the transplant of bankruptcy law in Vietnam is an example of this.69 
 
63 For example, article 24 of the Bankruptcy Law 1993 governs that the creditor committee has the right to approve the plan to re-organise the business activity of the debtor company; and the Article 36 governs that the judge issues the bankruptcy order only if the creditor committee did not approve the plan to negotiate and reorganise the business activity of the debtor company. Bankruptcy Law 1993,    <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/iir.3940060104>  accessed 07 November 2018 64 Ibid 65 In the Bankruptcy Law 2004, the article 5 regulates that rescue is one of bankruptcy procedures; and the section 1 of chapter VI provides the detailed procedure for corporate rescue,    <http://www.moj.gov.vn/vbpq/en/lists/vn%20bn%20php%20lut/view_detail.aspx?itemid=7849> accessed 07 November 2018 66 The BL2014, chapter VII 67 Duong Dang Hue, ‘Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law in Practice and the Improvement of Business Environment in Vietnam’ (2008), a research sponsored by Ministry of Justice and the GTZ Project of Federal Republic of Germany. Hue mentioned one case of rescuing a textile company (Xí nghiệp Ươm tơ Tháng 8) in Lam Dong province 68 Report 44 of the People Supreme Court (n50) 69 See Gillespie (n2) and (n16) and section 6.1.2 of this chapter 
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Similarly, the issue of how well Vietnamese insolvency law has functioned in solving the 
insolvency affairs of companies has attracted a great deal of attention from domestic 
scholars.70 However, much of contemporary work has focused on the aspect of 
liquidation, while the issue of corporate rescue has been left untouched. Duong Dang 
Hue, the chair of the Drafting Committee of the BL2004 and an influential scholar in this 
area, recognises that it is an objective of the legislation to provide a mechanism for 
ineffective companies to exit the market and create conditions for more effective 
companies to thrive.71 Most of Hue’s work is dedicated to improving the use of insolvency 
law as a way to liquidate insolvent companies and rarely mention the function of 
corporate rescue of the legislation.72 Recently, corporate rescue in Vietnam has been 
initially raised in a research article by Duong Huong Son on the website of the Ministry 
of Justice.73 In recognition of the shift of insolvency law from liquidation to rescue, Son 
noted that rescue plays an important role in dealing with corporate insolvency as well as 
preventing companies from entering into liquidation.74 In order for rescue law to operate 
properly, Son recommends that Vietnam should provide clarity into the definition of an 
insolvent company, simplifying the filing for the procedure as well as conferring the 
debtor company more advantages to initiate the rescue procedure.75 However, an 
important issue that has been ignored so far is which model of rescue administration has 
been employed under Vietnamese rescue law and whether this model can generate 
effectiveness. This thesis provides an answer to these questions through an examination 
 
70 See Duong Dang Hue (n67) and Duong Dang Hue, Bankruptcy Law in Vietnam (Judicial Publishing House, 2005);  Pham Duy Nghia, (n29) 35-47 71 Duong Dang Hue, ‘The Law on Bankruptcy with the Improvement of the Business Environment in Vietnam’ (2005) 3 Democracy and Law, 26–31 72  Ibid 73 Duong Huong Son, ‘Corporate Rescue – An Important Objective in the Making of Modern Bankruptcy law’ (2013) <http://moj.gov.vn/qt/tintuc/Pages/nghien-cuu-trao-doi.aspx?ItemID=1642> accessed 08 November 2018 74 Ibid 75 Ibid 
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of the corporate rescue control model under the BL2014 in addition to a critical evaluation 
of its effectiveness based on the four benchmarks of time and cost, expertise, abuse 
management and creditor participation. Furthermore, in light of the comparison with the 
law of the UK and Canada, the research offers Vietnam recommendations to revise its 
corporate rescue law in consideration of its own distinctive legal culture.  
6.2 The practice of informal rescue in Vietnam 
In 2017, there were over 560,000 companies in Vietnam with approximately 
126,000 new companies incorporated.76 However, the number of companies ceasing in 
operation or waiting to be dissolved was very high, over 33,000.77 These inefficient 
companies can be dissolved under the Enterprise Law 2014 (EL2014)78 or can be 
liquidated or rescued under the BL2014.79 Once the formal legal procedures under these 
legislation might present some challenges for the insolvent companies, informal rescue 
can provide an alternative solution. This section provides an understanding on how the 
informal rescue practice has been developed in Vietnam by examining the establishment 
and operation of two debt-trading companies along with investigating two famous cases 
of corporate rescue.  
6.2.1 The existence of debt-trading companies 
The practice of restructuring financially difficult companies outside the legislation 
has existed in Vietnam and the incorporation of the Debt and Asset Trading Corporation 
(DATC) is an example of governmental attempts to restructure state-owned enterprises 
 
76 According to the General Statistics Office of Vietnam,  <http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=382&ItemID=18738> accessed 10 November 2018 77 Ibid 78 The art 201 of the EL2014 provides that a company is allowed to be dissolved only if it satisfies all financial obligations and is not in the process of dispute resolution at court. See the EL2014 at <https://dangkykinhdoanh.gov.vn/en/Pages/Detaildocument.aspx?vID=26963> accessed 10 November 2018 79 BL2014 
Chapter Six – Corporate Rescue Law in Vietnam  
 209   
(SOEs).80 Given the policy of the government on maintaining the state sector to be the 
leading force of the economy, SOEs have the dominant role in controlling several 
important industries such as petroleum, telecommunications and steel production in 
Vietnam.81 However, as a consequence of the economic transition towards market 
mechanisms, SOEs have been privatised and the number of SOEs significantly reduced 
from 12,000 in the 1990s to over 2,700 in 2017.82 In the process of privatisation, while 
downsizing the state sector, it is important for the government to continue to provide 
subsidies to existing SOEs through offering capital, tax payment postponement and debt 
write-off.83 The establishment of the DATC is a way for the government to implement 
this policy.84 
The DATC is incorporated under the Decision 109 of the Prime Minister to assist 
SOEs in restructuring and transferring the state ownership,85 and it is itself an SOE and 
belongs to the Ministry of Finance.86 The company carries out a number of business 
activities, including debt trading, debt and asset trading in connection with corporate 
restructuring and debt services consultation.87 The DATC’s existence serves the political 
and economic objective of restructuring the SOEs in the context where the government 
has tried to not exercise direct intervention into the business affairs of SOEs. However, 
by subjecting DATC’s operation to exclusively serving the SOEs88 instead of general 
 
80 The DATC company website <http://the DATC.vn/portal/KenhTin/Gioi-thieu.aspx> accessed 10 November 2018 81 Dean-Leung, Suiwah, ‘Vietnam: An Economic Survey’ (2010) 24 (2) Asian Pacific Economic Literature, at 83–103. 82 Kieu Linh, ‘2.700 SOEs has been operating’ Vneconomy, <http://vneconomy.vn/2700-doanh-nghiep-nha-nuoc-dang-hoat-dong-20180119121233502.htm> access on 10 November 2018 83 Vu Quoc Ngu, ‘The State-Owned Enterprise Reform in Vietnam: Process and Achievement’ (2002) Visiting Researchers Series, no. 4. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, June–August.  84 The decision 109/2003/QĐ - TTg dated 05/06/2003 on the incorporation of the DATC 85 Ibid art.1 86 Ibid art. 2 and the Circular 135/2015 of the Ministry of Finance on regulating the incorporation and business activities of the DATC, and see The DATC website, <http://the DATC.vn/portal/KenhTin/Gioi-thieu.aspx> accessed  10 November 2018 87 The Circular 135, Ibid art.11-17. 88 According to art 4.8 of the EA2014, a SOE means any enterprise of which 100% charter capital is held by the State, and the Circular 135, Ibid, art.5 
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companies, the government seems to provide SOEs with preferential treatment over other 
companies in the private sector, which runs in contrast to the principle of market 
liberalism in the transition of the economy. Recently, in estimation that the decrease in 
the number of SOEs will affect the DATC’s performance, there has been the proposal to 
broaden the scope of the company’s activities to companies whose the state capital is less 
than 50%; however, this proposal generates concerns about the DATC’s inability to 
participate in a broader market.89  
The incorporation of Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC)90 is another 
example of the government initiatives which has an impact on the practice of restructuring 
financially troubled companies. Established under the Decree 53/2013 of the government, 
the VAMC is an SOE that operates under the direct supervision of the State Bank. The 
VAMC is a debt-trading company with the functions of handling and trading bad debts 
of credit institutions. In supporting the project of restructuring credit institutions in 2011-
2015,91 the VAMC became an instrument for restructuring banks’ lending portfolio in 
order to maintain a low ratio of non-performing debts.92 Between 2013 and 2016, the 
VAMC purchased bad debts of over forty commercial banks in Vietnam. Although the 
VAMC does not directly participate in the restructuring of financially difficult companies, 
purchasing bad debts from commercial banks is an indirect way to restructure companies 
in the public and private sectors. As specifically stated in its charter, the VAMC has four 
 
89 Hoang Anh, ‘The risks when The DATC broadens business Activities’ The Bidding News (30/08/2018) (Rui ro khi DATC mo rong hoat dong, Bao Dau Thau),   <http://baodauthau.vn/tai-chinh/rui-ro-khi-the DATC-mo-rong-hoat-dong-77885.html>  accessed  10 November 2018 (article in Vietnamese) 90 The company website at <https://sbvamc.vn/> accessed 11 November 2018 91 Since 2011, the problem of bad debts of credit institutions has been increasingly critical for commercial banks as well as the government in Vietnam. On 01/3/2012, the Prime Minister issue the Decision No.254/QD-TTg approving the project ‘The credit institution restructuring project of 2011-2015’. This project aims to develop a versatile modern, safe, efficient, and sustainable banking system for Vietnam by 2020. 92 Sylwester Kozak and Anh Thi Mai Hoang, ‘Vietnam Asset Management Company as a tool for improving asset quality of Vietnamese banks’ (2017) PRZEDSIĘBIORSTWO I REGION NR 9/2017, 143-153,   <www.ur.edu.pl/file/148726/15%20kozak-vietnam.pdf > accessed 11 November 2018 
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important functions, including purchasing bad debts, collecting bad debts, selling bad 
debts and collaterals, and restructuring bad debts and security.93 As such, in performing 
their functions, VAMC can involve in corporate restructuring, for example, by turning 
debts of a company into equity and thus becoming a shareholder in the debtor company. 
Apart from DATC and VAMC, there are around thirty assets management companies 
owned by credit institutions that have operated in the debt-trading market.94 However, the 
operation of these companies is not significant to rescue in that their functions are limited 
to collecting debts and managing collaterals for these credit institutions instead of 
providing insolvent companies a way to turn around their business.95 
In principle, the incorporation of these debt-trading companies is one of the 
instruments employed by the government to control the economy, strengthening the 
performance of SOEs and stabilising the banking systems, which appears to bring direct 
benefits to SOEs and commercial banks. However, for general companies other than 
SOEs, the benefits brought by this policy are subject to a degree of uncertainty. After 
purchasing debts of an insolvent company, there are two options for the VAMC to deal 
with the debts, enforcing debts or restructuring the company. A decision to restructure a 
debtor company requires the VAMC to conduct a thorough investigation into whether it 
is realistically viable to save the company. However, the cost of spending time and 
resources in doing so tends to discourage the VAMC from being actively involved in 
restructuring business. Therefore, it is more likely for the VAMC to enforce the debts 
purchased from the banks. Furthermore, there is a doubt about the ability of these debt-
trading companies in handling bad debts due to their poor performance. For example, the 
 
93 The State Bank issued the Decision 1590 on 22/7/2013 to issue the charter of incorporation of the VAMC 94 Linh Trang, ‘Debt-Trading Market in Vietnam: a Bottleneck at the Legal Framework’ (11/9/2018) The Sai Gon Times,   <https://www.thesaigontimes.vn/278093/Thi-truong-mua-ban-no-nut-that-o-hanh-lang-phap-ly!.html> accessed 11 November 2018 (article in Vietnamese) 95 Ibid 
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ratio of the debt handled by the VAMC in 2015 is extremely low, with only 4.3% of the 
total debts purchased by the company.96 Meanwhile, there is an emerging trend that 
commercial banks have re-purchased the debts sold to the VAMC due to the concern of 
its inability to deal with the huge debts from a large number of commercial banks.97 It 
should be borne in mind that the VAMC is established to serve the government’s policy 
on reducing the ratio of non-performing debts of the banking system.98 The incorporation 
of the VAMC, therefore, has the effect of discouraging commercial banks from 
negotiating with debtor companies to resolve the debt. The banks tend to sell the debts to 
the VAMC in compliance with the government policy in maintaining a low rate of bad 
debts as well as avoiding spending resources to collect the debts from the debtor 
companies.  
6.2.2 Examination on the informal rescue cases in Vietnam 
Since the enactment of the first bankruptcy legislation, the BL1993, there has been 
no decision relating to corporate rescue recorded by the courts.99 Nevertheless, in such a 
dynamic economy of Vietnam, where a large number of companies are incorporated and 
dissolved every year,100 it is likely that a large number of companies facing financial 
 
96 Phan Minh Ngoc, ‘The reality of handing bad debt through the financial statement of VAMC’ (2018) The Sai Gon Times, <https://www.thesaigontimes.vn/271243/Tinh-hinh-xu-ly-no-xau-qua-bao-cao-tai-chinh-cua-VAMC.html> accessed 15 November 2018 (article in Vietnamese) 97 In reality when the VAMC purchases debts from commercial banks, it does not make direct payment to the banks. Rather, VAMC has the right to issue the banks a special kind of bond. With this bond, the banks can ask the State Bank to re-finance capital for them to continue their business. See Nhung Vo, ‘Why Commercial Banks Want to Purchase Back the Debts Sold to VAMC’, (2018) Vietstock News, <https://vietstock.vn/2018/08/vi-sao-cac-ngan-hang-muon-mua-lai-no-xau-da-ban-cho-vamc-757-625993.htm> accessed 21 November 2018 (article in Vietnamese) 98 See the Decision 254 of the Prime Minister on approving the project ‘The credit institution restructuring project of 2011-2015’ (n91) 99 Report 44/BC-TANDTC of the People Supreme Court on summarizing the implementation of the bankruptcy law 2004 did not stated any figure of corporate rescue. 100 According to the General Statistics Office of Vietnam, in 2017, there has been 126,000 new companies incorporated; however, the number of companies ceasing operation or waiting to be dissolved had been over 33,000 <http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=382&ItemID=18738> accessed 18 November 2018 (in Vietnamese) 
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difficulty have settled their insolvency affairs by informal rescue measures. This section 
examines two cases of the informal rescue emerging outside the insolvency legislation  
Case 1. Bianfishco company in Southern Vietnam 
In 2012, Bianfishco, one of the largest companies in the seafood industry with 
over 4,000 employment faced extreme financial hardship. The company was unable to 
pay banks, suppliers, the employees, and other creditors, with the total debt amounting to 
VND 1,525 billion (US$65 million).101 In an attempt to collect debts, some of creditors 
had obtained court judgments, and when the company failed to comply with the 
judgments, the creditors filed an application to court for declaring the company 
bankruptcy or liquidation. However, the court refused the application on the ground that 
there be a likelihood for the company to be restructured.102 In the time of crisis, the CEO 
of the company, Pham Thi Dieu Hien, went abroad for medical treatment and authorised 
her husband, Mr. Tran Van Tri, to be the CEO of the company. During his tenure as the 
CEO, Tri carried out a course of measures to restructure the company, including 
identifying the causes of the crisis, negotiating with creditors, selling the company’s 
assets, cutting labour and seeking assistance from the local authority, the People 
Committee of Cantho city.103  
What makes the case of Bianfishco special is the participation of the DATC into 
the restructuring.104 Estimating that the insolvency of Bianfishco would have adversely 
 
101 VOV, ‘Bianfishco owing VND 1,525 billion’,   <https://baomoi.com/cong-ty-thuy-san-binh-an-no-1-525-ty-dong/c/8213250.epi> accessed 11 November 2018 (article in Vietnamese) 102 FIS, ‘Court refuses petition to conduct bankruptcy proceedings on Bianfishco' (2012),   <https://fis.com/fis/worldnews/worldnews.asp?monthyear=42012&day=16&id=51435&l=e&country=104&special=&ndb=1&df=0> accessed19 November 2018; and VietNamNet Bridge, ‘Bianfishco clinically dead, but cannot declare bankruptcy yet’ (2012),   <https://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/business/20820/bianfishco-clinically-dead--but-cannot-declare-bankruptcy-yet.html> accessed  12 November 2018 (article in Vietnamese) 103 Tran Hung, ‘Bianfishco selling company’s asset to pay debts’ (2012) Saigon Times,   <https://www.thesaigontimes.vn/Home/doanhnghiep/chuyenlaman/72669/Binh-An-se-ban-tai-san-de-tra-no.htmlU> accessed 12 November 2018 (article in Vietnamese) 104 See section 6.2.1 regarding functions of the DATC. According to the charter of incorporation, the DATC’s functions are constrained to trading debts of SOEs, while Bianfishco is a private company.  
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affected the seafood industry, employment and the livelihood of the farmers in the region, 
the People Committee of Cantho city recommended the DATC to take part in the 
restructuring of the company. Because Bianfishco is not an SOE, the DATC’s charter 
does not allow it to be involved in the restructuring. Yet, the DATC had made an 
exception to consult with the Ministry of Finance to have the permission to participate in 
the restructuring of Bianfishco.105 With the DATC’s assistance, the company has 
successfully negotiated with a new bank, Saigon-Hanoi Bank (SHB), who guaranteed to 
pay the company’s debts, and in return, the SHB became a founding shareholder of the 
company when it transferred 50% of founding shares to the bank as agreed in the 
contract.106 The rescue attempt has produced a fruitful result as Bianfishco finally 
overcame the financial difficulty and came back to normal business operations. With a 
good reputation and experience earned in this case, Tri, the CEO of the company, then 
took part in the restructuring of a number of companies in the seafood industry in the 
Mekong Delta such as Phuong Nam, Song Hau, Minh Tri and Ngu Long.107 He was even 
invited to restructure a company in the medical industry in the North of Vietnam.108 
Case 2. Hoang Anh Gia Lai Group (HAGLG) 
HAGLG is a joint-stock company with the headquarter located in the Pleiku city 
in Vietnam. As a diversified company, HAGLG spreads its investment in a number of 
industries, including furniture production, rubber, real-estate and football club.109 The 
 
105 Vietnam Financial Times, Interview with Pham Thanh Quang, the General Director of The DATC, in ‘Rescuing Bianfishco: A “marriage” in crisis, concerns with the farmers’ livelihood’ (2012),   <http://the DATC.com.vn/portal/home/print.aspx?p=1682> accessed  22 November 2018 (article in Vietnamese) 106 Vnexpress, ‘SHB bank rescues Bianfishco’ (2012),   <https://kinhdoanh.vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/ebank/ngan-hang/ngan-hang-cua-bau-hien-giai-cuu-cong-ty-binh-an-2721507.html> accessed 22 November 2018 (in Vietnamese) 107 Security Investment, ‘Interview with Mr. Tran Van Tri’ (2014), <https://tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn/doanh-nhan/thuy-san-binh-an-voi-thang-ngay-bao-lua-tam-su-cua-doanh-nhan-tran-van-tri-92619.html> accessed 25 November 2018 (in Vietnamese) 108 Vnexpress, ‘Thanh Hoa companies asked for help from husband of Dieu Hien businesswoman’ (2013) <https://kinhdoanh.vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/doanh-nghiep/doanh-nghiep-thanh-hoa-cau-cuu-chong-dai-gia-dieu-hien-2851803.html> accessed 25 November 2018 (in Vietnamese) 109 The company website at <http://www.hagl.com.vn/>  
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financial hardship of HAGLC started to come to light in 2015 when its financial statement 
revealed that the company had the indebtedness of VND 30,700 billion (US$1.36 billion), 
accounting for 65% of the company’s total assets and there were VND 12,000 billion 
(US$600million) debts due in the following year (2016).110 The company’s major 
creditors are ten commercial banks and the largest creditor is BIDV who had financed the 
company nearly VND 10,000 billion (US $500 million).111 The pressure to pay debts 
became exacerbated since 2015 when the company suffered serious business losses due 
to the drop in the rubber price in the market. In attempts to ease this pressure, the CEO of 
the company, Doan Nguyen Duc, had negotiated with the bank creditors to restructure 
the company’s debts.  
However, the bank creditors faced a dilemma in dealing with restructuring the 
huge debts of HAGLG. On the one hand, if they enforced the debts by realising secured 
assets, such as selling secured shares and bonds, this decision could lead to the 
devaluation of assets and securities of the company. Furthermore, this action could 
precipitate the company to bankruptcy, resulting in large redundancies of 9,000 
employments. One the other hand, if the bank creditors agreed to restructure the company, 
they would struggle with how to maintain a low level of bad debts as required by the 
government for the credit institutions.112 After a meeting to discuss this situation, the 
banks eventually decided to rescue HAGLG by proposing the case to the State Bank, who 
then made a proposal to the Government for the final approval.113 Though there had been 
 
110 Vietnamnet, ‘Hoang Anh Gia Lai Group: Debt and worries’, (17/02/2016), at  <https://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/special-reports/151286/hoang-anh-gia-lai-group--debt-and-worries.html> accessed  23 November 2018 111 Quang Thang, ‘Who is the largest creditor of Ha Anh Gia Lai’ Zing News (2017) <https://news.zing.vn/ai-dang-la-chu-no-lon-nhat-cua-hoang-anh-gia-lai-post791875.html> accessed 28 November 2018 (article in Vietnamese) 112 See the Decision No.254/QD-TTg approving the project ‘The credit institution restructuring project of 2011-2015’ (n91) 113 This information was disclosed by the audit company of HAGLG, see Kinh Duong, ‘A concern from Hoang Anh Gia Lai case’, Vietnam Finance at <http://vietnamfinance.vn/noi-lo-tu-tien-le-hoang-anh-gia-lai-20170304151740381.htm> accessed 12 November 2018 (Article in Vietnamese) 
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no confirmation on whether the government had agreed to save the company, the 
submission of the rescued proposal by the State Bank to the government had aroused the 
controversy over the issues of fair treatment among companies as well as the 
government’s commitment of maintaining a low rate of bad debts.114 In 2018, HAGLG’s 
extreme burden of debts was released when it entered into a strategic co-operation 
agreement with an auto-maker company, THACO, under which THACO committed to 
investing US$516 million to restructure the HAGLG’s debts and thereby became a major 
shareholder of the company.115 
What emerges from the two cases inform several important features of the 
corporate rescue practice in Vietnam. First, the state still has an important role in assisting 
financially difficult companies, especially large companies to restructure in the time of 
crisis. Though Bianfishco and HAGLG are not SOEs, they had received a great deal of 
support from state actors, such as the local authority, the DATC (an SOE operating in 
debt trading), and the State Bank, without mentioning the possibility that these state actors 
might be those who bridged these financially troubled companies to the rescue 
supporters.116 Furthermore, although the case of Binhanfishco had been official raised to 
court, the company was still allowed to be rescued outside of the insolvency legislation. 
It appears from the two cases that the government tends to intervene with the financial 
affairs of private companies where they would largely affect employment and social 
welfare. Second, IP profession has not been developed to support rescue. What emerges 
from these two cases is that the companies’ directors themselves negotiated with their 
 114 Vietnam Bridge, ‘Rescue of Hoang Anh Gia Lai group stirs strong debate’ (2016) at  <https://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/business/157387/rescue-of-hoang-anh-gia-lai-group-stirs-strong-debate.html> accessed 12 November 2018 115 Minh Do, ‘THACO signs strategic cooperation deal with HAGL’, (2018)  <http://vneconomictimes.com/article/business/thaco-signs-strategic-cooperation-deal-with-hagl> accessed 12 November 2018 116 For example, the agreement signed between HAGLG and THACO is signed under the witness of the Prime Minister, who praised their co-operation see , <https://www.vir.com.vn/thaco-announces-strategic-cooperation-with-hagl-61652.html> accessed 6 December 2018 
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creditors and sought new financers to solve their insolvency affairs. The sketch of 
corporate rescue in the two cases seems to be highlighted by the role of bank creditors, 
large corporate sponsors, and debt-trading companies, such as the DATC and the VAMC 
instead of the expertise and experience of IPs or companies specialising in business 
turnaround. This might be partly explained by the practice of establishing business 
supporting networks among companies in Vietnam.117 However, another reason could be 
that the insolvency profession has been very primitive in Vietnam. The BL2014 recently 
created this profession by regulating the mandatory participation of the Asset 
Management Officer (AMO) in the insolvency procedure to assist courts and debtor 
companies.118 
6.3 The rescue procedure under the Bankruptcy Law 2014 (BL2014) 
The current regulatory framework for corporate insolvency in Vietnam is 
provided for by the BL2014. The legislation consists of 14 chapters with 133 articles, 
exclusively regulating corporate insolvency. As defined by the BL2014, ‘bankruptcy’ is 
a situation where a company becomes insolvent and subject to a court decision to declares 
its bankruptcy.119 When the insolvency procedure is commenced under the BL2014, a 
company can be rescued or liquidated by a resolution of a creditor meeting.120 If the 
rescue option is not approved by the creditors, the company will be declared bankrupt,121 
which means entering into the liquidation procedure. The model of rescue administration 
employed by the BL2014 is the hybrid model of Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) and 
 
117 See Pham Duy Nghia, (n30)  118 BL2014, art.11-16, at and the Decree 22/2015 of the Government on providing detailed regulations on implementation of several articles of the bankruptcy law for the asset management officer, asset management and liquidation practicing 119 Ibid art.4.2 120 Ibid art.83 121 Ibid art.107 
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Professional-in-Possession (PIP), under which the company directors are allowed to carry 
on business under the supervision the AMO and the court.122  
6.3.1 Initiation of the rescue procedure 
The definition of an insolvent company 
Article 4.1 of the BL 2014 defines an insolvent company as failing to perform an 
obligation to repay a debt within three months from the maturity date of the debt.123 This 
definition is unique for two reasons. First, it does not mention a company’s inability to 
pay debts, rather it focuses on whether a company has actually performed the obligation 
of paying debts. This means if the company is still able to pay debts but has the intention 
not to do so, it will face the risk of being subject to the insolvency procedure. Second, 
this provision does not provide for the limit of the amount of debts, therefore, it is possible 
for any creditors to file an application against the company regardless whether a debt is 
small or large.  By defining insolvency based on the actual payment of debts instead of 
the satisfaction of the balance sheet test or the cash-flow test, the BL2014 strictly requires 
a company to be fully aware of any debts owed to any creditors since the ignorance to 
pay a mature debt within three months could lead the company to the risk of being subject 
to the insolvency procedure. Third, by giving a debtor company three months to settle its 
debts, the BL2014 appears to be lenient insofar as it confers the company a specific time 
to devise appropriate measures to deal with paying debts.124 
The commencement of the rescue procedure. 
When a company becomes insolvent, a number of people are granted the right to file 
a bankruptcy application, including creditors, employees, shareholders and legal 
 
122 Ibid art.47 123 Ibid art.4.1 124 Duc Duy, ‘New regulations in the Bankruptcy 2004’ (2014) 20 Financial Information,   <http://tapchitaichinh.vn/tai-chinh-phap-luat/phap-luat-kinh-doanh/nhung-diem-moi-trong-luat-pha-san-2014-55548.html> accessed 06 December 2018 (article in Vietnamese) 
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representatives of a company.125 Five days after the court accepts the application, there 
will be a moratorium taking effect to prevents any actions by creditors against the 
company.126 The court will then make a decision on whether it will commence the 
bankruptcy procedure against the company or not.127 When the court has decided to 
commence the bankruptcy procedure, the decision does not directly result in the initiation 
of the rescue procedure.128 Instead, creditors will decide whether the company will be 
rescued at a creditor meeting.129 As such, rescue is not a separate insolvency procedure 
under the BL2014, rather, it is a procedure resulted from the commencement of 
bankruptcy apart from liquidation procedure.130 
6.3.2 Formulating a rescue plan and approving the plan 
Where the court decides to commence the bankruptcy procedure, it will appoint 
an AMO to take part in the procedure.131 The first creditor meeting will be called to decide 
whether the company will be rescued or liquidated.132 At this meeting, a resolution for 
rescue will be passed when it is approved by a majority of unsecured creditors 
representing 65% total value of unsecured debts.133 Within thirty days after the resolution 
is made, the company must draft a rescue plan and send it to the creditors and the AMO 
for their opinion.134 The plan, after receiving feedback from these parties, will be revised 
by the company and sent again to the AMO, who has the obligation to report the plan to 
the court.135 After receiving the court’s opinion, within fifteen days, the plan will be sent 
 
125 BL2014, art.5 126 Article 41. 127 Ibid art.42 128 Ibid 129 Ibid art.83.1(b) 130 BL2014 art.83.1(b) & (c) 131 Ibid 45. The appointment of the AMO or AMLC can be made by the court based on the request by the applicant 132 Ibid art.75, 83 133 Ibid art.81.2 134 Ibid art.87.1 135 Ibid art.81.2 
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by the judge to the creditors for further consideration and will be approved at the second 
creditor meeting.  The threshold for approval this time is the same as the approval at the 
first meeting, with the approval of a majority of creditors holding 65% of the value of 
unsecured debts.136 As such, creditors play an important role in deciding the rescue fate 
as failing to get their approval at either the meetings will lead to the elimination of rescue 
effort.  However, the provisions for drafting and approving a rescue plan appears to be a 
lengthy procedure as it requires the creditor approval at two creditor meetings along with 
multiple participation of the company, the IPs, and creditors and the court in contributing 
to the rescue plan.  
6.3.3 The effect of approving the rescue plan 
Upon getting sufficient creditor approval at the second creditor meeting, the 
rescue plan will have a binding effect on all creditors,137 and will be implemented 
according to its terms.138 Every six months, the company has the obligation to report on 
the implementation of the plan to the AMO who then reports to the court and notify the 
creditors on the rescue progress.139 If the rescue plan did not state the time for its 
completion, the legislation imposes a duration of three years on the implementation of the 
plan.140 If the rescue plan fails to implement during this time, the court will issue a 
decision to suspend the rescue procedure and initiate the liquidation procedure.141 
6.4 Evaluation of the rescue law in Vietnam  
6.4.1 The extent to which the legislation places emphasis on rescue 
The important role of corporate rescue had not been fully recognised when the 
first insolvency legislation, the BL1993, was enacted. As stated by Duong Dang Hue, the 
 
136 Ibid art.91.5 137 Ibid art.91.6 138 Ibid art.89.1 139 Ibid art.93.2 140 Ibid art.89.2 141 Ibid art.95.1(b) and 96(2) 
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Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the two legislations in 1993 and 2004, the 
objective of the legislation is to liquidate inefficient companies for an orderly exit of the 
market while paving the way for more companies to thrive.142 The corporate rescue has 
been only expressed in strong terms until the enactment of the BL2014.143 The legislation 
contains a number of articles that encourages the initiation of rescue procedure. For 
example, the new definition of an insolvent company confers a company a grace period 
of three months to settle its financial affairs before a creditor can file a bankruptcy 
application against it at court.144 This provision has the effect of encouraging the company 
to initiate informal rescue measures to pay debts, such as seeking financial advice and 
support before entering into formal bankruptcy procedure. Furthermore, the legislation 
facilitates negotiation with the creditors before the commencement of bankruptcy 
procedure145 along with the stay of proceedings to prevent creditors from enforcing debts 
during the rescue time146 According to the People’s Supreme Court,147 the new legislation 
created realistic opportunities for viable companies to remain and re-organise their 
business activities in order to minimise consequences of corporate bankruptcy to the 
lowest level, protect the right of parties in economic relations and contribute to stabilise 
the social life.148 The focus of Vietnamese law on corporate rescue appears to align with 
the government project on re-structuring the economy towards enhancing quality, 
efficiency, and competitiveness in the period of 2013-2020.149 The shift of focus towards 
 
142 Duong Dang Hue (n71)  143 The People Supreme Court, The Statement 03/TTr-TANDTC of People Supreme Court on the Draft of New Bankruptcy Law submitted to the National Assembly. 144 BL2014, art.4.1 145 Ibid art.37 146 Ibid art.41 147 According to article 20 of the Law on Organisations of the People Courts, one of functions of the People Supreme Court in Vietnam is to draft legislations and present them to the National Assembly.  148 The People Supreme Court, Ibid, The Statement 03/TTr-TANDTC of People Supreme Court on the Draft of New Bankruptcy Law submitted to the National Assembly.  149 Decision 339/2013 of The Prime Minister on Approving the Project of Restructuring the Economy in connection with transforming the economic growth model towards enhancing quality, efficiency, and competitiveness from 2013-2020. 
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rescue is also a reflection of the trend of modern insolvency law-making practice around 
the world under which rescue becomes an important part of insolvency legislation due to 
its importance in maintaining business values, employments and stabilising the 
economy.150 These policies can be considered as the basis for justifying the existence of 
the rescue law in Vietnam given the lack of literature and theoretical framework in this 
area. 
Nevertheless, several issues of rescue law cannot be justified relevantly in light of 
these policies, one of which is the issue of ‘company rescue’ and ‘business rescue’.151 
While company rescue refers to the preservation of a company as a whole with the same 
ownership, business rescue allows the viable part of a business to be saved by transferring 
to a new owner.152 The BL2014 enumerates a number of measures available to rescue a 
company, one of which is to transfer the company’s shares to creditors or other parties or 
sell the company’s assets.153 As this measure can lead to the change of the company 
ownership, the legislation seems to endorse the view of ‘business rescue’. The 
examination of the practice of corporate rescue in Vietnam also supports this view. For 
instance, both cases of Bianfishco and HAGLG involved the transfer of the companies’ 
shares to the lender of the rescue finance who then became major shareholders in these 
companies.154  
While the BL2014 adopts the policy of ‘business rescue’, the case of SOEs rescue 
reflects the philosophy of ‘company rescue’. As examined, SOEs in Vietnam have been 
restructured through the functions of the DATC, a company trading SOEs debts.155 As 
 150 See UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (United Nation, 2015) <https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pd > accessed 06 December 2018 151 See Chapter Three (3.3.2.2 Company Rescue and Business Rescue) 152 Ibid and S Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 67(2) Modern Law Review 247, 248. 153 BL2014, art.88.2 (e)&(g) 154 See section 6.3.2 Examination of corporate rescue cases in Vietnam  155 See section 6.2.1 The existence of debt-trading companies  
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stated in its charter, one of the objectives of DATC’s operation is to preserve and develop 
the amount of state capital invested in it and in other SOEs.156 It follows that in the 
restructuring of an SOE, the DATC cannot let the state capital or the state ownership to 
be transferred to another party other than the state. There could be two reasons behind 
this policy. First, retaining the state ownership allows the state to maintain the controlling 
role of SOEs in key industries. Second, by not permitting the capital to be assigned to 
another party, the state can settle the financial affairs of ineffective SOEs behind the veil 
of public knowledge to preserve its reputation. However, it is not always the case that the 
state wants to retain its ownership in all SOEs. For example, in the effort to enhance the 
equitisation of SOEs, the government recently issued the Decree 126/2017 that allows 
SOEs to be privatised and their shares can be purchased by both domestic and foreign 
investors.157  
To summarise this discussion, the BL2014 has placed more emphasis on the 
objective of corporate rescue. Though not expressly stated, ‘business rescue’ appears to 
be the policy endorsed by the legislation. By contrast, the restructuring of the SOEs 
presents the policy of ‘company rescue’ with the purpose of maintaining the control of 
SOEs in key industries as well as resolving the insolvency of SOEs in a discreet manner. 
 
6.4.2 Evaluation of Vietnamese rescue law under the four benchmarks 
Adopting the hybrid model in rescue administration, the BL2014 permits the 
company directors to stay in management. In order to prevent the director’s abuse, this 
model borrows the supervision from the bankruptcy judges and IPs (the AMOs). This 
 
156 See Circular 135/2015 (n86) 157 See Decree 126/2017 of the Government on privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and Mayer Brown Legal Update, ‘New Rules for Equitising State-owned Enterprises in Vietnam’ (2017)  <https://www.mayerbrown.com/new-rules-for-equitising-state-owned-enterprises-in-vietnam-12-11-2017/> accessed 07 December 2018 
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section examines the effectiveness of this model under the current legislation based on 
the four evaluation benchmarks of time and cost, expertise, creditor participation and 
abuse management. 
6.4.2.1 Time and cost  
The rescue procedure is considered effective under this benchmark provided it is 
implemented in a timely and cost-saving manner.158 Therefore, the examination focuses 
not only on the consideration of the amount of time and expenses, and the rate of 
creditor’s return involved in a rescue case but also the extent to which the law facilitates 
conditions to fasten the time and minimise the cost. Though the BL2014 has been taking 
effect for four years in Vietnam, there has been no official report on evaluating the 
implementation of the legislation or empirical research that provides specific figures to 
support this discussion.159 The following examination, therefore, relies on the 
examination on the provisions regulating time and cost under the legislation to see if there 
is sufficient measure to limit time and cost involved in rescue. 
Regarding the time for rescue, it seems to be the policy of the BL2014 to confer 
an insolvent company more time to formulate a rescue plan. Accordingly, art 4.1 of the 
BL 2014 defines an insolvent company as failing to perform its obligation to repay a debt 
within three months from the date of debt maturity.160 This provision confers an insolvent 
company three months to deal with debts before resorting to the formal procedure under 
the legislation. Upon the acceptance of the application, the court has thirty days to decide 
whether to commence the procedure or not.161 If the court decides to commence the 
 
158 See Chapter Three (3.6.2.3 Benchmarks for evaluation of rescue proposed by this thesis: (i) time and cost) 159 For the time of resolving insolvency, World Bank Statistic shows that the time to resolve an insolvency case in Vietnam is 5 years. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.ISV.DURS> accessed  20 November 2018 160 BL2014 art. 4.1 161 Ibid art.42 
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procedure, creditors of the company have thirty days to send written demands for payment 
to the AMO who is given fifteen days to formulate the list of creditors.162 At the same 
time, when the court decides to commence the procedure, the company is given thirty 
days to conduct the asset inventory, with two times for extension of thirty days.163 Finally, 
within twenty days after the list of creditors and the asset inventory is completed, the 
judge will call for the first creditor meeting to pass a resolution whether to liquidate or 
rescue the company. In total, there are about six months between the initiation of the 
procedure and the making of the rescue resolution. In addition to this, if the rescue 
resolution is approved by creditors, the company has thirty days to draft a rescue plan;164 
and there are another twenty-five days for the plan to get feedback and opinions from the 
AMO and the court before being presented to creditors at the second creditor meeting for 
the final approval.165 Therefore, the company is given another fifty-five days to draft the 
rescue plan and get the plan approved by creditors.  
This thesis finds this amount of time beneficial to the company in that it permits 
the company to diagnose causes of its distress, seeking assistance from outside 
professionals and negotiating with creditors. In addition, this allows the company to draft 
a well-prepared rescue plan in advance and this enhances the likelihood for sufficiently 
convincing creditors to approve the plan at the creditor meeting. However, a drawback of 
this is that creditors have to wait too long to decide the company affairs, with nearly six 
months to approve the rescue resolution made by the first creditor meeting and nearly two 
months to approve a rescue plan made by the second creditor meeting. This time is likely 
to bring a negative effect of discouraging creditors to approve the plan as creditors are 
more likely to refuse the rescue plan in the fear of abuse arising in association with 
 
162 Ibid art. 66&67 163 Ibid art.65 164 Ibid art.87 165 Ibid art.87 
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allowing directors to remain in management in this period. For example, the company 
directors may take advantage of this time to have activities that are harmful to creditor’s 
interest, such as transferring the company’s assets at undervalue or dissipate the assets.  
Another point raised by this thesis is that Vietnam should shorten the time for the 
company to present the rescue plan to the creditor. Instead of conducting two creditor 
meetings to pass a rescue resolution and to approve a rescue plan, the BL2014 should 
provide for only one creditor meeting. It is obvious that the basis for creditors to pass a 
rescue resolution is the ability of the company to produce a viable and feasible rescue 
plan and present it before the creditors at the first creditor meeting. If no rescue plan can 
be presented at the first meeting, it is unlikely for the creditors to trust the rescue viability. 
As a result, they will be more likely to vote against the rescue resolution in favour of 
liquidation. By contrast, if the company can produce a plan at the first creditor meeting, 
it is not necessary for it to conduct the second creditor meetings to approve it, which not 
only saves time but also reduces the cost arising from convening the second meeting. 
As far as the cost is concerned, there has been no empirical study on the expenses 
of rescue in Vietnam. However, according to the general statistics on insolvency of the 
World Bank in 2017, the average cost for resolving insolvency cases in Vietnam is 14.5% 
of the company’s estate with the creditor return rate being 21.3%.166 Though the figures 
are of general cases, which may include both liquidation and rescue, it is worth noting 
that the expense for resolving insolvency in Vietnam is quite high, while the rate of 
creditor return is rather low (21.3 cent per dollar). Therefore, Vietnam should have 
regulations that minimise the cost involved in liquidation and rescue. As mentioned 
above, the requirement for two creditor meetings to be conducted to pass a rescue 
 
166 The World Bank Statistic on Insolvency 2017,    <http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency> accessed  10 December 2018 
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resolution and to approve the rescue plan should be replaced with only one creditor 
meetings to reduce the unnecessary cost. 
Under the BL2014, insolvency costs consist of two types of cost, namely the court 
fee167 and the cost for resolving insolvency.168 While the former is just a small amount,169 
the latter accounts for a dominant part of the insolvency cost since it includes 
remuneration for IP (AMO), audit fee, information publishing fee, and other related 
fees.170 The remuneration for AMO is a special cost because the BL2014 has just 
introduced this new actor to participate in the rescue procedure.171 The government has 
issued the Decree 22/2015 to provide clarification to several provisions that regulate the 
profession of the AMO under the BL2014.172 Accordingly, the Decree provides for 
calculating the remuneration of AMO based on one of the following factors: working 
hours, package remuneration, or the value of recovered assets after liquidation.173 In case 
of liquidation, the remuneration can be calculated with reference to the value of the 
recovered assets.174 In case of rescue, the law respects the negotiation between the creditor 
and the AMO.175 If there is no negotiation on the remuneration, it is the judge who will 
conduct the negotiation with the AMO to define an appropriate amount.176 As such, 
Vietnam has established a regulatory framework to define the remuneration of the AMO. 
Allowing the IP fees to be negotiated between the creditors and the IP can prevent 
conflicts and encourage creditors to participate in the rescue procedure. 
 
167 BL2014, art.4.11  168 Ibid art.4.12 169 According to the resolution 326/2016 of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly on regulating fees and court fees, the fee for applying for a court order is VND 1.5 million (approximately $70) 170 BL2014, art.4.12 171 Bankruptcy Law 2014, Art 11-16 172 Decree 22/2015/ND-CP on 16/02/2015, English version at <https://vanbanphapluat.co/decree-no-22-2015-nd-cp-detailed-regulations-of-the-bankruptcy-law-for-the-asset-management-officer> accessed  11 December 2018 173 Ibid art 21.2 174 Ibid art 21.4(b)  175 Ibid art.21.5 176 Ibid 21.4(d) 
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Yet, in practice, the emerging concern is not of how to identify the amount 
properly. Rather, it is the problem of how to facilitate advance payment to cover the 
expenses incurred by the AMOs in performing their functions.177 Although the law allows 
the AMO to sell some of the company asset to cover their expense,178 AMOs have been 
struggling around the sale of company assets to cover these expenses as it appears to be 
difficult to sell the company assets in a timely fashion amid the insolvency.179 As a result, 
the time for rescue will be longer because of the delay when there is not sufficient funds 
to pay AMO in performing their job. This problem is subject to the enhancement of 
professionalism for the AMOs in Vietnam, which is going to be discussed in the next 
section.  
6.4.2.2 Expertise   
The hybrid model adopted by Vietnamese rescue law features the role of the 
incumbent directors in running the company business, the role of the AMO in supervising 
the directors’ activities, and on the top of that is the role of the court in supervising the 
compliance of the parties to the procedure.180 This model will operate effectively under 
the benchmark of expertise provided the parties mentioned possess a sufficient degree of 
expertise to perform their functions. As for directors of the company, the hybrid model 
entrusts them with carrying out business activities, based on the justification that these 
people have already obtained certain information, knowledge and skills regarding the 
company’s operation.181 In the time of crisis, directors’ expertise must be no longer 
 
177 Kim Quy, ‘Asset Management Officer: A less-known profession in resolving bankruptcy’  (2017) Bao Phap Luat Viet Nam’   <http://baophapluat.vn/kinh-doanh-phap-luat/quan-tai-vien-nghe-con-it-biet-trong-giai-quyet-pha-san-327516.html > accessed  10 December 2018 (article in Vietnamese) 178 BL2014, art.16(e) 179 Ibid 180 Ibid art.47.1 181 Phillips and Goldring,‘Rescue and Reconstruction’ (2002) Insolvency Intelligence 76, at 78 
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constrained to carrying out activities in the ordinary course of business but extended to 
negotiating with creditors and seeking for new finance to support the rescue.182  
In Vietnam, concern on the professionalism of the board of directors has been 
raised in the following aspects: no good process of controlling directors’ activities had 
been well developed, their operational process was rather procedural and not clear, and 
there was confusion of functions among directors within the board.183 In dealing with this 
concern, Vietnam enacted the new company legislation, the Enterprise Law 2014 
(EL2014), which is recognised by the World Bank as a positive change to corporate 
governance in terms of enhancing professionalism, independence and risk management 
for company directors.184 In fact, the EL2014 requires a director or general director of a 
company to hold professional qualifications and have experience in business 
management.185 The basis for removing directors is not only the violation of this 
requirement but also that these people are no longer capable of satisfying new business 
plans and strategies of the company.186 The imposition of professional qualifications and 
experience on directors has two benefits: first, corporate governance could be enhanced 
to lead the company to a healthy management stage; second, when the company goes to 
insolvency, and this can provide justification for allowing directors to remain control of 
the company business. However, the requirement of director qualification cannot be itself 
a guarantee for the expertise, there must be a combination between the expertise of the 
 
182 Wood, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Law (Irwin: 2009), at 385 183 Nhue Man, ‘Looking for weaknesses in the governance of Vietnamese companies’, (2014) Securities Investment,   <https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/cd3a8b8043ce74a498b8b8869243d457/Looking+for+Weaknesses+in+Governance+of+Vietnamese+Companies.pdf?MOD=AJPERES> accessed  10 December 2018 184 The World Bank, ‘Corporate Governance in Vietnam: Success Stories’ (2015)  <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/305431468187783026/Corporate-governance-in-Vietnam-success-stories>  accessed 22 December 2018 185 Vietnamese Law on Enterprise, art. 65, 92, 100, 151. 186 Ibid art 101 
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directors in running the company and the expertise of supervising parties such as IPs and 
court. 
The second actor joining the rescue procedure under the BL2014 is IPs who are 
AMOs. It is special that in Vietnam IPs is a very new profession that has been created by 
the introduction of the BL2014. According to the legislation, AMOs are individuals or 
companies specialising in management and liquidation of insolvent companies, who are 
licensed to participate in the rescue procedure.187 AMOs play an important role in 
supervising the director’s conducts in addition to managing and liquidating the company’ 
assets.188  Furthermore, where a company is subject to a rescue resolution, the AMO can 
take part in drafting rescue plans and assisting the company during rescue.189 Though 
AMOs are court officers, they have the obligation to report to the court and have liability 
before the court in the performance of their duties.190  
The underlying policy of bringing the AMOs in control of the rescue procedure 
seems to be that their professionalism will enhance the rescue efficiency and reduce the 
heavy workload of the court. The approach to borrowing outsider expertise of IPs to 
support insolvency settlement in Vietnam is a result of learning the failure of the previous 
legislation, the BL1993 and the BL2004. In the past, the model employed was the Asset 
Management and Liquidation Team which comprised representatives of civil judgement 
enforcement department, courts, trade union, creditors, and the debtor company.191 Since 
this team is dominated by state officials who are not familiar with business management, 
 
187 BL2014, Art.11-13 188 Ibid art. 87.2 189 Ibid art.16.3 190 Ibid 16.6 191 BL2004, art.9,10 
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it could not generate sufficient expertise to support insolvent companies as expected, 
which is considered to one of the factors that contributed to the failure of the BL2004.192  
In order to maintain and enhance professional standards for the AMOs under the 
new legislation, the BL2014 provides for conditions and criteria for licensing their 
profession. Accordingly, individuals eligible for an AMO license must be a lawyer, an 
auditor, or those who hold a bachelor degree in law, economics, accounting, finance or 
banking with five-year working experience in the areas they have trained.193 According 
to the statistic of the Ministry of Justice, an organisation in charge of licensing the 
insolvency practitioners, until 2018, there have been 229 individuals granted the AMO 
license.194 Though the regulations on the AMO profession contribute to the enhancement 
of their professional standards, two problems have emerged from the licensing and 
monitoring AMOs in Vietnam. First, regarding the AMO licensing, the requirement for 
becoming an AMO under the BL2014 is too simple to guarantee that these people can 
gain sufficient expertise to participate in the insolvency procedure. For example, the 
BL2014 simply provides that lawyers, auditors or holders of a degree in law, economics, 
accounting, finance, or banking with five-year working experience are eligible to obtain 
an AMO license.195 Once they satisfy with this requirement, they can file an application 
to the Ministry of Justice for a license.196 What has been missing in these provisions is 
the requirement for AMO applicants to take professional training and professional exams 
in insolvency and rescue like those in the UK and Canada. In the absence of professional 
 
192 The People Supreme Court, the Report 44/2013 on Summarising the Implementation of the Bankruptcy Law 2004.  193 BL2014, art.12 194 The Ministry of Justice Website, The updated list of AMOs and AMLCs   <http://bttp.moj.gov.vn/qt/tintuc/Pages/quan-tai-vien.aspx?ItemID=57> accessed  11 December 2018 195 BL 2014, art.12 196 Under the Decree 22/2015 of the Government on clarifying provisions of the BL2014, the article 4 provides for the application of AMO license, which includes the application form, a copy of lawyer card, an auditor certificate, or the bachelor degree in required areas with the document certifying 5-year working experience, and two ID photos.  
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training and assessment, the BL2014 cannot uphold standards to create qualified AMOs 
to take part in the rescue procedure. The reason behind the policy of introducing the low 
standards for AMOs may be that the government needs to create a sufficient number of 
IPs in the entire state to fulfil the requirement by the BL2014 to make the AMO 
participation mandatory in the rescue procedure.197  However, this cannot justify the fact 
that the lack of rigorous professional training and evaluation will seriously bar them from 
performing their functions properly and effectively once they involve in complicated 
insolvency cases.  
Second, the thesis argues that the current regulations do not offer an effective 
mechanism to monitor the AMO conduct. Presently, the Ministry of Justice licenses the 
AMOs and provides a code of conduct for their profession.198 After obtaining the license, 
AMOs have the obligation to register their profession with the Department of Justice in 
their residency as well as reporting to this department about their professional practice.199 
As such, in Vietnam, an AMO is licensed by a central governmental agency, the Ministry 
of Justice but supervised by a local governmental agency. A benefit of the governmental 
control of AMOs is that it can command public confidence. However, there are drawbacks 
associated with this type of control. The primary concern is the capacity of these 
governmental agencies in developing sufficient expertise to monitor IPs. Currently for 
other professions such as lawyer and auditor, apart from the regulatory control, the 
government monitors them via borrowing functions of recognised professional bodies 
(RPBs) such as the Vietnam Bar Federation200 and the Vietnam Association of 
 
197 BL2014, art.45 198 Article 3, Decree 22/2015 of the Government on providing guidance for implementing articles of the Bankruptcy law 2014 relating to the profession of AMOs and AMLCs. 199 Ibid art. 7.5 and 13.5 200 For the Bar Federation in Vietnam, see <http://liendoanluatsu.org.vn/web/en> accessed 11 December 2018 
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Accountants and Auditors201 or the Vietnam Association of Certified Public 
Accountants.202 However, regarding the case of IPs, in the absence of such RPBs, 
governmental agencies such as the Ministry of Justice and the Department of Justice at 
the local level have to build up their own expertise to monitor these IPs, which seems to 
be an extremely difficult task. For example, under the current regulation, the 
governmental agencies in charge with monitoring AMOs have the responsibility to 
consider the report on the practice of their profession and resolve complaints about their 
practices.203 This presents a huge challenge for them in doing so because the state officials 
in these agencies have to obtain sufficient commercial and professional expertise in this 
area, without mentioning the fact that there is an absence of detailed regulations regarding 
facilitating easy access to the AMO’s complaint system and how to hand the complaints. 
The third actor that contributes expertise in the rescue procedure is insolvency 
judges. Presently, in Vietnam district courts and provincial courts have jurisdiction over 
hearing cases relating to corporate insolvency.204 Within these institutions, there are sub-
economic courts with judges specialising in settling commercial disputes and 
bankruptcy.205 In settling corporate rescue, insolvent judges have to perform important 
functions, such as making a decision on whether to commence the bankruptcy procedure, 
supervising activities of the AMOs, and holding creditor meetings.206 The judges directly 
take part in rescue by facilitating negotiation between a creditor who files bankruptcy 
application against the company207 and contributing to the drafting of the rescue plan by 
 201 For the Vietnam Association of Accountants and Auditors, see < http://vaa.net.vn/> accessed 11 December 2018 202 For the Vietnam Association of Accountants and Auditors, see < http://www.vacpa.org.vn/en/> accessed 11 December 2018 203 Decree 22/2015, art. 22-24 (n198) 204 BL 2014, art.8 205 The Law on the Organization of People's Courts (2014) art. 38, 45 206 BL2014, art.9 207 Ibid art.37 
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giving his opinion the plan before presenting it to creditors.208 In performing these 
functions, insolvency judges not only exercise their judicial oversight but also produce 
commercial judgment that might decide the fate of a company. For example, when the 
judge decides to commence the insolvency procedure, the fate of an insolvent company 
will be handed to creditors who have the right to decide if the company should be 
liquidated or rescued.209 Though the BL2014 allows a creditor to file an application to 
commence the insolvency procedure when the company becomes ‘insolvent’, based on 
the fact that the company has not paid a debt due for three months,210 the judge cannot 
merely base a decision on this ground because the fact that a company has not paid debts 
for three months is very different from the fact that the company is unable to pay debts. 
Therefore, before making the decision, the judge has to consult the company financial 
statements and other documents to evaluate if the company is able to pay the debts. If the 
judge finds that the company is still able to pay debts, he will decide to facilitate 
negotiation among the parties,211 instead of initiating an expensive, complicated 
bankruptcy procedure. Similarly, in giving his opinion about a rescue plan,212 the judge 
has to use his commercial judgment to evaluate the strategies devised by the company 
and the AMOs. To produce sound judgment over these issues, the judge has to possess a 
degree of expertise in finance and business management. 
Though the law appears to demand insolvency judges to have such expertise, the 
lack of judicial capacity has been a concern for Vietnam. Presently, the court system of 
Vietnam has been facing the challenge of lacking of competent judges in dealing with 
increasingly complicated insolvency cases.213 Lacking expertise in areas of finance and 
 
208 BL 2014, art.9 and 87.4 209 Ibid art.83 210 Ibid art 4.1 211 Ibid art.37 212 Ibid art.87.3&4 213 Duong Dang Hue (n67) 
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accounting214 and insufficient experience in dealing with insolvency has rendered judicial 
involvement become ineffective.215 This situation seems to be exacerbated by the fact that 
Vietnamese judges have been under pressure of resolving a great deal of heavy workload, 
which makes it difficult for them to properly develop their expertise.216  Research has 
addressed that the insufficiency of judicial capacity in insolvency would lead to 
increasing time and cost and decreasing the livelihood for rescue and the creditor 
return.217 In dealing with the issue of improving judicial expertise, Vietnam has enhanced 
judicial training in insolvency for judges under the support of international donors such 
as the World Bank and INSOL International.218 However, when the outcome of 
multiplying the training on the large scale for judges in the entire state is subject to the 
matter of time, it is the fact that the efficiency of rescue law has been undermined by the 
lack of judicial capacity.  
To conclude the discussion, although the BL2014 has provided for courts to 
exercise their expertise in the rescue procedure, the lack of judicial capacity in dealing 
with insolvency does not allow them to do so. While Vietnam has fostered a legal 
framework to enhance professionalism for directors, the insufficient regulations on 
licensing and monitoring IP profession coupled with the weak judicial capacity precludes 
these actors from contributing expertise in rescue. Once influential actors such judges and 
 214 Ibid and Nguyen Ngoc Anh, ‘Subjects in Bankruptcy Legal Relations: Problems and Recommendations’ (2018) <http://tcdcpl.moj.gov.vn/qt/tintuc/Pages/phap-luat-kinh-te.aspx?ItemID=224> accessed 12 December 2018 (article in Vietnamese) 215 Although bankruptcy law was first introduced in Vietnam in 1993, the practice of using administrative orders to resolve the insolvency of SOEs in replacement of court role had barred judges from gaining experience in this area for a long time. See Gillespie, (n16) at 252-254 216 The Chairman of the Vietnam Supreme People Court addressed this problem to the conference of National Assembly on October 30, 2018, see <https://baomoi.com/chanh-an-tand-toi-cao-ap-luc-khi-phai-giam-bien-che/c/28419176.epi> accessed 12 December 2018 (article in Vietnamese) 217 B. Iverson and others, ‘Learning by Doing: Judge Experience and Bankruptcy Outcomes’ (March 12, 2018).   SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3084318> accessed 12 December 2018  218 The World Bank, ‘Vietnam Debt Resolution Program Mid-Term Review’ (2018) prepared by Charles Booth,  < https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/7b9a74f7-21da-4d90-8cc4-204e38fd4593/Vietnam+DRE+MTR++Executive+Summary+for+Public+Disclosure.pdf?MOD=AJPERES> accessed 12 December 2018 
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IPs cannot produce expertise to the administration of the rescue procedure, the co-
ordination of expertise between these actors is unlikely to occur, which undermines the 
effectiveness of the hybrid model of rescue administration employed by the BL2014. 
6.4.2.3 Creditor participation 
Under the BL2014, creditors significantly contribute to the effectiveness of 
corporate rescue in two aspects. First, they decide the rescue livelihood by exercising the 
right to approve the rescue resolution219 and the rescue plan.220 Second, they can be the 
provider of the rescue finance for implementing a rescue plan. The BL2014 grants 
creditors a number of important rights that incentivise their participation in the rescue 
procedure. First, by simplifying the definition of ‘insolvent company’, the legislation 
allows any creditors to file a bankruptcy application against the company at court without 
imposing a limit on the value of the debt.221 Especially, in the application, what a creditor 
needs to provide is the evidence of the debt and the law does not place the onus on the 
applicant to prove if the company is unable to pay the debt.222 Second, creditors are 
granted a right to propose an AMO to participate in the rescue procedure,223 which can 
avoid the abuse where the company directors choose the AMO by themselves. Third, after 
the court decides to commence the procedure, creditors have the right to vote on whether 
the company should be liquidated or rescued,224 and if they choose the rescue option, they 
continue to have the right to approve the rescue plan.225 Fourth, though creditors are not 
directly involved in the implementation of a rescue, they can exercise the right to monitor 
rescue through a creditor committee whose functions, including monitoring the rescue 
 
219 BL 2014, art.81.2 & 83.1(b) 220 BL2014, art.91.5 221 BL2014, Art.5.1 222 Ibid art.26 223 Ibid art.19 224 Ibid art.83.1 225 Ibid art.90.1 
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implementation226 and proposing to the AMOs or the judge on how rescue should be 
implemented.227 Especially, the BL2014 confer creditors a right to review the draft of a 
rescue plan and giving their opinion on it.228 
Though the BL2014 provides creditors with significant rights in rescue, there are 
two problems that discourage creditor to participate in the rescue procedure. The first 
problem associated with unfair treatment between secured creditors and unsecured 
creditors.229 Accordingly, the BL2014 divides creditors into three groups: unsecured 
creditor, under-secured creditor, and secured creditor,230 but allows only unsecured and 
under-secured creditors to file an application against the company, excluding secured 
creditors from getting such right.231 In addition, art 81.2 dictates that a rescue resolution 
is approved by a majority of unsecured creditors who represent 65% of the total value of 
unsecured debt. Similarly, art 91.5 provides for the approval of a rescue plan with the 
same threshold of unsecured debts. As such, the right to approve the rescue is only granted 
on unsecured creditors. These provisions, therefore, discourage secured creditors and 
under-secured creditors to participate in the rescue procedure, not to mention that this is 
unfair for an under-secured creditor because he should be treated as an unsecured creditor 
to the extent of the debt not covered by the collateral.232 As a result of this unfair 
treatment, in practice, secured creditors tend to enforce debts by disposing of the collateral 
 
226 The article 16.3 states that the AMO has the obligation to report on the company’s asset status, the obligation and the business, it does not mention to whom the AMO owed this obligation. However, it could be inferred that it is judges and creditors to whom the AMO has to report. While the obligation to report to judges is already stated in the art.16.6, if the AMO does not report to creditors at their request, this could constitute the ground that he is not objective and can be removed by court at the request of the creditor. In addition to this, after creditor meeting approve the rescue plan, the AMO has to report to the in-charged judge and creditor on every six months (art.93.2) 227 Ibid art.87 228 Ibid art.46.1 229 Nguyen Hoang Duy, ‘Three Issues for Secured Creditors in a Bankruptcy Situation in Vietnam’ (2016) <https://vietnam-business-law.info/blog/2016/12/28/three-issues-for-secured-creditors-in-a-bankruptcy-situation-in-vietnam> accessed  12 December 2018 230 Art.4.4-4.6. Under-secured creditors are those whose debts owed by the company are secured by the collateral which has the value lower than the secured debt. 231 The BL 2014, art.5.1 232 Nguyen Hoang Duy (n229) 
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before the company initiates the insolvency procedure in contemplation that this will stay 
their action against the company’s assets. The enforcement of secured creditors against 
the company’s assets can contribute to the exacerbation of the company’s financial 
hardship since lacking essential assets for operating business could precipitate the 
company into the verge of liquidation.233  
Under the BL2014, a secured creditor cannot enforce a secured debt if the 
insolvency procedure is commenced before the debt falls due because the commencement 
of insolvency will result in a moratorium that prevents the creditor from taking any 
actions against the company, including enforcing a judgment.234 A secured creditor can 
only enforce the debt after a resolution is passed by creditors to decide whether to 
liquidate or rescue the company.235 Once the rescue resolution is approved, the BL2014 
allows using the secured asset to implement the rescue plan, however, in doing so there 
must a consent of the secured creditor who has security in the asset.236 However, the 
secured creditor is more likely to refuse the request of using the asset and will take action 
to enforce security in considering the fact that the legislation does not allow him to file 
the application against the company and vote for the approval of the resolution.237 
Therefore, this appears to be a shortcoming of Vietnamese law to discourage secured 
creditors to participate in rescue as well as underestimating the important role they have 
in providing finance to support for the implementation of the rescue plan.  
The second failure of Vietnamese law in promoting creditor participation is that 
there is an absence of a guarantee for the payment of the rescue finance advanced to the 
 233 Kaneko Yuka, ‘Re-evaluating model laws: Transplant and Change of Financial Law in Vietnam’, (2012) 19 Journal of International Cooperation Studies, p. 25,   <http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/repository/81003749.pdf> accessed  12 December 2018 and Tran Duc Phuong, ‘The Paradox of Creditors Afraid of the Debtor’ (2016) <https://tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn/phap-luat/nghich-ly-chu-no-so-con-no-171570.html> accessed  12 December 2018 234 BL2014, art.41.1 235 Ibid art.53 236 Ibid art.91.5 237 Ibid art.53.1(b) and 53.3 
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company to implement the rescue plan. When the rescue plan is agreed upon, it seems to 
be very difficult for the company to seek finance since the insolvency affairs are likely to 
degrade its creditworthiness.238 In deciding to extend the rescue finance, the lender cannot 
just rely on the assessment on rescue viability but demands a sufficient guarantee that the 
finance must be paid in priority over other secured creditors in case rescue attempts fail.239 
Given the importance of the rescue finance in implementing rescue plans as well as the 
legitimate protection for the lender of the rescue finance against insolvency risks, several 
jurisdictions grant the finance a super-priority in payment over the existing secured 
creditors240 and this is also a recommendation of the UNCITRAL for countries to draft 
insolvency legislation.241  
However, there is the absence of a super-priority in the treatment of the rescue 
finance under the BL2014. According to the priority scheme for distributing a company’s 
assets in liquidation,  
Where a judge issues a decision declaring bankruptcy,242 the assets of the enterprise or cooperative shall be distributed in the following order: (a) Bankruptcy costs; (b) Unpaid wages, severance allowances, social insurance and health insurance of the employees and other benefits in accordance with the executed labour contracts and collective labour agreement; (c) Debts arising subsequent to the commencement of the bankruptcy procedure which serve the purpose of business recovery of the enterprise or cooperative; 
 
238 Paul H. Zumbro, ‘DIP and Exit Financing Trends and Strategies in a Changing Marketplace’ in Debtor-in-possession and Exit Financing: Leading Lawyers on Securing Funding and Analyzing Recent Trends in Bankruptcy Financing (Thomson West, 2010), at 4<https://www.cravath.com/files/uploads/Documents/Publications/3616890_1.PDF> accessed 12 December 2018 239 A lender of new finance may be a pre-petition lender who wants to protect his position against an upper-secured creditor. Jordan Myers, ‘Market Trends, Recent Deal Terms in Retail DIP Financing’, (2018) <https://turnaround.org/jcr/2018/06/market-trends-recent-deal-terms-retail-dip-financing> accessed  12 December 2018 240 Examples of this are the United State and Canada 241 UNCITRAL (n150) at 115-117 242 It should be clarified that the bankruptcy term in the BL 2014 has two meanings. First, when a court makes a decision to commence bankruptcy procedure, bankruptcy, in this case, has the same meaning as insolvency which confirms the insolvency of a company has officially initiated, and bankruptcy procedure can lead either consequences: rescue or liquidation. However, when the court makes a decision to declare bankruptcy, bankruptcy, in this case, means liquidation and the company will be liquidated to pay creditors. 
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(d) Financial obligations to the State; unsecured debts payable to the creditors named in the list of creditors; secured debts which remain unpaid due to the value of the assets being insufficient to repay them.243   By the virtue of this priority, when a company goes to liquidation, the payment 
for rescue finance (c) will rank behind the payment for the bankruptcy cost (a) and the 
salaries and benefits of employees (b). Though this provision does not mention secured 
creditors, they are allowed to realise the secured asset out of the bankruptcy procedure 
once a resolution is passed by creditors at the first meeting to decide if a company should 
be rescued or liquidated.244 Secured creditors are eligible to participate in the payment 
scheme only if the value of the secured asset is not sufficient to cover the secured debt, 
and the outstanding debt will fall into category (d) in the scheme above.245 Allowing 
secured creditors to be paid outside the bankruptcy procedure means that secured 
creditors are conferred the highest priority in payment. Therefore, the lender of the rescue 
finance ranks behind the secured creditors, the IPs, and the employees in this scheme of 
priority.  
A question arising from this scheme of payment is that if the company still has 
assets free of security, whether it can grant the lender of the rescue finance a security in 
the asset, and thereby the lender can enjoy the status of a secured creditor. However, it is 
impossible to do so because by the virtue of art 54.1, any debts arising after the 
commencement of bankruptcy procedure for the purpose of rescuing the company will be 
characterised as the debts at art 54.1(c) regardless of whether it is secured or unsecured, 
and thereby ranking behind the bankruptcy costs and payment for employees. By 
providing this priority of payment, the BL2014 discourages either the existing creditors 
or the new creditors to advance the rescue finance to the company. For an existing secured 
 243 BL2014, art.54.1 244 Ibid art 53 245 Ibid  
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creditor, if he consents to use the secured asset to fund the rescue, this will subject him to 
the risk of losing the advantage of being able to enforce security in the asset. This is 
because when the rescue fails, the debt the company owed to him is no longer a secured 
debt, rather, by the virtue of art 54.1(c), it has the status of the debt for rescuing the 
company, which ranks behind other debts. The same holds true in the case the lender of 
the rescue finance is a new creditor. In recognising that the payment for the rescue finance 
will rank behind the payment for not only secured creditors but also the payment for 
bankruptcy cost and employees in liquidation, the lender is unlikely to take risks to fund 
the rescue plan. 
As such, though the BL2014 confers creditors significant rights to check, approve 
and monitor a rescue plan, it has failed to encourage the participation of secured creditors 
due to the unfair treatment with other creditors. Nor can the BL2014 incentivise creditors 
to advance the rescue finance to implement the rescue plan in the absence of a super-
priority to guarantee the repayment of the rescue finance in case of liquidation.  
6.4.2.4 Abuse management  
As examined, the hybrid model of rescue administration features the retention of 
the incumbent directors in managing and operating the company.246 However, permitting 
the incumbent directors to run the business during insolvency time bears a risk that they 
may gamble the company’s assets through making risky decisions at the expense incurred 
by creditors.247 The hybrid model, therefore, invites IPs to supervise the directors. By 
adopting this model in the BL2014, Vietnamese legislators had foreseen the importance 
of monitoring the directors’ abusive behaviours, thereby brings several actors such as the 
court, the AMOs, and creditors to participate in monitoring the company directors during 
the rescue.  
 
246 See Chapter Three (3.5.1.3 The hybrid model of rescue administration) 247 See Lynn M. LoPucki, ‘The Trouble with Chapter 11’ (1993) Wis. L. Rev. 729, 732-34. 
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The director abuse can be tackled with three measures, monitoring directors in 
running the company, changing directors, and punishing directors for misconduct. First, 
when the directors are allowed to run the business during insolvency, they are subject to 
the oversight of the bankruptcy judge, the AMOs,248 and creditors.249 In preserving the 
value of the company estate, the directors are forbidden to take several actions, including 
hiding, dissipating or giving away asset, turning unsecured debts into secured debts, 
paying unsecured creditors, or giving up the right to claim a debt.250 Though directors are 
monitored after the commencement of insolvency, some of their activities can be 
reviewed backward, for example, within six months prior to the insolvency 
commencement,251 or even longer if the transactions were carried out on a non 
arm’slength basis.252 Second, if directors are incapable of running the business or violates 
their obligations during performing their functions, they will face the risk of being 
replaced by the court at the request of creditors or the AMO.253 Third, the last measure to 
monitor directors is to subject them to severe punishment if they conducted activities that 
are prohibited by the law. Directors who carried out prohibited activities will be banned 
from holding any management position in a company for three years,254 or even subject 
to a potential criminal charge.255 As such, with three measures of control, the BL2014 
appears to effectively tackle the problem of directors’ abuse as the law allows the court, 
the AMOs and creditors to participate in supervising their activities. The legislative 
effectiveness of this aspect is even enhanced as the law does not provide for any 
 
248 BL 2014, art.47.1 249 Ibid art.82 250 Ibid art 48.1 251 Ibid art.59.1 252 Ibid art. 59.2, according, if the company conducted transactions with related people, the duration for a court to declare these transactions to be invalid is extended to 18 months prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy. 253 Ibid art. 47.2 254 Ibid art.130 255 Ibid art.129 
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facilitation of transactions such as the pre-packaged sale, thereby avoiding the problem 
that the company might enter into a secret deal to promptly sell the business to an 
influential creditor at the disadvantages to other creditors.256 
Though director abuse is legislatively tackled in the examination of the BL 2014 
regulatory framework, the effectiveness of the legislation is challenged due to two 
reasons. First, the insolvency institutional framework in Vietnam has not been developed 
sufficiently to implement the regulations. For example, reviewing director’s conducts and 
business judgement in running and managing the company requires insolvency judges 
and AMOs to obtain a sufficient degree of expertise in rescue. However, as examined, 
insolvency judges and the AMOs have not been adequately developing their expertise to 
contribute to the monitoring of the rescue procedure.257 Second, by allowing secured 
creditors to enforce security in rescue, the BL2014 not only fails to recognise the 
importance of preserving key assets to fund the rescue plan but also discourages the 
secure creditors to participate in rescue procedure.258 Apart from lacking the key assets 
to fund rescue plan, the policy of excluding secured creditor has the drawback of not 
being able to utilise the expertise of secured creditors, such as commercial banks, who 
possess a considerate degree of expertise as compared to general unsecured creditors such 
as employees or trade creditors.  
In summarising the matter of managing abuse pertaining to the DIP model, the 
BL2014 has addressed the problem with directors’ abuse of the procedure through 
designing a mechanism of control that features the supervision of the court, the AMOs 
 
256 See the discussion of pre-package transaction in the UK and Canada in Chapter Four (4.2.3.3 Abuse management) and Chapter Five (5.4.4 Abuse management) 257 See the discussion of creditor participation under section 6.5.2.3 of this Chapter. 258 Mike Falke, ‘Secured Creditor Protection and the Treatment of different unsecured Creditor Classes under the Chinese draft Bankruptcy Code – A Comparative Analysis’ (1998)    <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/ConferenceMaterial/20206017/Chinese%20Insolvency%20Law%20Reform%20-%20Falke.pdf> accessed  12 December 2018  
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and the creditors in addition to imposing the punishments for the directors’ misconducts. 
However, the promising effectiveness of the legislation in this regard cannot be 
guaranteed due to the lack of expertise of the participating actors in couple with the 
discouragement of creditors to actively engage in the rescue procedure.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The examination of the legal development in insolvency revealed the influence of 
traditional beliefs and foreign laws on the shaping of the insolvency legislative framework 
in Vietnam. Currently, corporate insolvency and rescue are provided for by the BL2014, 
which is the inheritance of the BL1993 and the BL2004. The examination of the failure 
of two legislation in 1993 and 2004 Vietnam shed a light on how Vietnam struggled to 
apply Western insolvency law to the unique legal environment of Vietnam in which the 
traditional beliefs and the influence of state-economic control have still dictated the low 
reliance on official rules to settle corporate insolvency.  
The practice of informal rescue in Vietnam has emerged against the backdrop of 
privatising the SOEs and enhancing the effectiveness of the banking system to deal with 
non-performing debts, which leads to the incorporation of debt-trading companies under 
the state management.  The pioneering role of the state in this area, to a large extent, 
signals the undeveloped rescue practice in Vietnam. Regarding the law-making process, 
though corporate rescue was regulated in the BL1993 and the BL2004, its importance has 
just been emphasised with the enactment of the BL2014 that provides for detailed rules 
to support the pursuit of rescue objective. 
In administering the implementation of the rescue procedure, the BL2014 adopts 
the hybrid model of rescue administration that features directors running the company 
under the supervision of the court and the AMOs.  Though the BL2014 provides for a 
court-driven procedure, it invited a new actor, namely the AMOs to participate in 
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monitoring the company along with the insolvency judges, resulting in the establishment 
of a new IP profession in Vietnam. Based on the four benchmarks of time and cost, 
expertise, creditor participation, and abuse management, the assessment of the 
effectiveness of Vietnamese rescue law produces the following results. First, in terms of 
time and cost, although there is no specific figure to draw a conclusion on the time and 
cost for rescue, the examination addressed that the rescue procedure has been lengthy, 
which can lead to generating more cost in rescue. Therefore, Vietnam should shorten the 
time of conducting the rescue procedure by the requirement for conducting one creditor 
meeting instead of two. Second, in an attempt to borrow the expertise of a professional 
outsider to assist the courts in monitoring the rescue procedure, the BL2014 provides for  
mandatory participation of AMOs. However, the legislation appears to be unable to allow 
expertise to be sufficiently generated in rescue due to the weak regulations in licensing 
and monitoring the AMOs in couple with the fact that insolvency judges in Vietnam have 
not been developing judicial capacity adequately to deal with insolvency cases. Third, the 
legislation has also failed to call for creditor participation through adopting the policy that 
excludes secured creditors and under-secured creditors from approving rescue plans as 
well as discouraging the supply of the finance for implementing the rescue plan in the 
absence of a priority for the payment of the finance in case of liquidation. Fourth, the 
legislation has properly addressed the issue of director’s abuse along with providing 
measures to tackle it. Nevertheless, implementing these measures has presented 
considerable challenges given the insufficient expertise of the monitoring actors such as 
the courts and the IPs and the discouragement of secured creditors to contribute expertise 
in rescue. 
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In the next chapter, the thesis will conduct a comparison of the rescue laws of the 
UK, Canada and Vietnam to identify the best practices emerging in each jurisdiction and 
make recommendations for Vietnam to improve the effectiveness of its rescue law.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
COMPARISON ON RESCUE LAWS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA AND VIETNAM 
 
7.0 Introduction 
Based on the previous examination on the corporate rescue laws of the United 
Kingdom (UK), Canada and Vietnam, this chapter provides a comparative analysis into 
the corporate rescue laws of the three selected jurisdictions.  Purposes served by the 
chapter are twofold: first, it highlights similarities and distinct features of the rescue laws 
in the three states; second, it provides recommendations for Vietnam to enhance the 
effectiveness of its corporate rescue law through an evaluation of the approaches offered 
by the UK and Canada. In pursuit of its purposes, this chapter is structured with three 
parts. The first part maps out influential theories on comparative law and legal 
transplantation, which are the basis for guiding the comparison of rescue law under the 
three legal systems. The second part provides a comparative analysis into rescue models 
and procedures in the laws of three jurisdictions in tandem with providing explanation 
and justification for similarities and differences among them. The comparison will be 
carried out following the four benchmarks previously established, namely time and cost, 
expertise, creditor participation and abuse management. The final part of this chapter is 
devoted to offering Vietnam recommendations to improve the effectiveness of its law, 
based on the best practices found in the results of the comparison and suggests what 
Vietnam should do to facilitate a suitable environment for these practices to prosper.  
7.1 Theories on comparative law and legal transplantation. 
 7.1.1 Comparative law 
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Comparative law, in essence, is perceived as an ‘intellectual activity’1 or a 
‘science’2 that involves a process of comparing rules within a single legal system or 
different legal systems to examine the extent to which they are similar and different.3 The 
history of comparative law can be traced back to the year 1900 when French scholars 
Lambert and Saleilles founded the International Congress for Comparative Law with the 
objective of resolving accidental differences and reduce the level of divergence in laws 
of different nations.4 Since then, comparative law has continuously developed and 
embraced a number of important objectives, including producing new knowledge, 
supporting legislators in the law-making process, providing a tool for constructing law 
and contributing to the unification of law and being a useful discipline in legal education.5  
A dominant approach to comparative law is functionalism established by Zweigert 
and Kötz in An Introduction to Comparative Law.6 The functional approach focuses on 
the function of laws, that is, what laws actually do to achieve their social purposes.7 The 
functional method rests on three premises: (i) legal systems face the same problems; (ii) 
in solving the same problem, different legal systems take different solutions; and (iii) 
despite different measures taken, legal systems reach similar results.8 According to the 
functional approach, laws in different legal systems are created in response to the same 
problems arising in most societies, such as theft, murder, contractual disputes and so on; 
 1K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, OUP 1998), at 2. 2 Vanina Narcisa Botezatu, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Translation’, Journal of Danubian Studies and Research, Vol 6, No 2 (2016), <http://journals.univ-danubius.ro/index.php/research/article/view/3466/3918> accessed 23 January 2019. 3 This common understanding of the comparative concept can be found in numerous literature, for example, K Zweigert and H Kötz, (n1), Botezatu (n2), Geoffrey Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method, (Oxford and Portland, 2014), at11, and E.J. Eberle, ‘The Method and Role Of Comparative Law’ (2009) 8 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 451, 452,  4Zweigert and Kötz, (n1), at 3 5 Ibid p.16 and ücü 2007 E. Örücü, ‘Developing Comparative Law’, in: E. Örücü & D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative Law: A Handbook, (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2007) 6 K Zweigert and H Kötz, (n1) at 3 7 Richard Hyland, ‘Comparative Law’, in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999), 185-7 8 Zweigert and Kötz, (n1), at 34 
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and although the approach offered by laws can be diverse the solutions to the problems 
are eventually similar and identical.9 Therefore, in essence, the functional method aims 
at highlighting similarities among compared legal systems to produce similar, practical 
solutions to a social problem rather than emphasising their differences.10 As claimed by 
Zweigert and Kötz,  
‘incomparables cannot usefully be compared,…if he (a comparative lawyer) finds that there are great differences or indeed diametrically opposite results, he should be warned and go back to check again whether the terms in which he posed his original question were indeed purely functional.’11  
Apparently, the use of the functional approach in comparative law has the benefit 
of directly answering a question of how a problem is dealt with by the law in different 
legal systems and in particular contribute to the unification of law in different legal 
systems through an ‘attempt to delineate a common core of legal institution’12 
Nevertheless, functionalism has been heavily criticised in a number of fronts. Significant 
criticism over the functional approach is directed at the functionalist’s assumption of the 
universal similarity among legal systems that fails to take into consideration the 
differences in historical and socio-economic conditions underpinning compared legal 
systems.13 Critics of the functional approach rely on the negligence of differences among 
the systems to attack the construction of the premises on which the functional method 
grounds. For example, Husa disagrees with the premise that legal systems provide the 
 9 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Methodology of Comparative Legal Research’ (2015) Law and Method, p.10, <https://www.bjutijdschriften.nl/tijdschrift/lawandmethod/2015/12/RENM-D-14-00001> accessed 24 January 2014  10 Oliver Brand, ‘Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal Studies’ (2007) 32(2) Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 410 11 Zweigert and Kötz, (n1) at 34, 40 12 Brand (n10) at 411 13 See Brand, Ibid; Mark Van Hoecke (n9); Jaakko Husa, ‘Farewell to Functionalism or Methodological Tolerance?’, (2003) 67 The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law, 419; David J. Gerber, ‘Sculpturing the Agenda of Comparative Law: Ernst Rabel and the Facade of Language’, in Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law (Annelise Riles, 2001); William Ewald, ‘The Jurisprudential Approach to Comparative Law: A Field Guide to “Rats”’ (1998) 46 The American Journal of Comparative Law, 701; Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law Sets Boundaries, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 737; and Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006) 
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same solutions to the same problems within the same cultural sphere because the 
assumption of universal similarity or ‘sameness’ cannot work well or even be pointless if 
the comparison is taken between culturally remote systems.14 Brand points out that a 
factual situation considered to be problematic in one society may not be a problem in 
others; therefore, it is unsound to rely on the premise that different legal systems face 
similar problems.15 Brand also criticises the functionalism for assuming laws as solutions 
to problems since it is not always the case that laws can effectively provide solutions to 
problems and laws can be dysfunctional in several aspects, for example, a law can be a 
symbolical product or it lacks norms to address social problems.16 With these constructive 
deficits, it is believed that comparative results followed the functionalism could be an 
alien product to be applied to a particular legal system.17 Furthermore, the indifference to 
unique conditions that shape a given legal system subjects the functionalists to the attack 
over being ‘external’ for lacking understanding of about foreign legal systems18 and being 
‘ethnocentric’ for favouring the examination into states that share close, similar 
conditions while neglecting remote states.19  
The limits of functionalism, as mentioned above, has rendered it a doubtful and 
controversial method in comparative law that invites a great deal of academic attention 
in seeking more suitable approaches to replace it. Husa takes a view that it is not correct 
for the functionalists to merely focus on similarities between legal systems as suggested 
by Zweigert and Kötz; rather, the functional method should fully embrace both 
similarities and differences with full consideration and explanation.20 Those who 
 
14 Jaakko Husa (n13) at 425 
15 Brand (n10) at 419 16 Ibid 17 D. J. Gerber (n13) 204 18 W. Ewald (n13) 703–04  19 N. V. Demleitner (n13) 741–44  20 Husa (n13) 424-425 
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advocate examining comparative law in light of other social sciences have developed their 
own method for comparative law. For example, Mattei approaches comparative law under 
the economics perspective that employs the standard of ‘efficiency’ to compare which 
legal systems are better off.21 Accordingly, a legal system is regarded as efficient so long 
as it can generate less waste and lower transaction cost or better resource allocation.22 
Another alternative to the functionalism is the cultural approach by Legrand, which 
attempts to examine a legal rule in a political, economic, social and ideological context 
in order to discover the real meaning attributed to the rule under a legal system.23 In a 
similar, but more exhaustive view, Hoecke emphasises the importance of equally 
considering the doctrinal framework and the underlying legal culture.24 Apart from the 
functional method, he recognises a wide range of methods that can be employed to carry 
out comparative law, including the analytical method (analysing legal concepts and 
rules), the structural method (examining the framework of the law), the historical method 
(examining legal development), and the law-in-context method (focusing on societal 
context, including politics, economy, culture and ideology).25 Hoecke claims that these 
methods are not mutually exclusive, which means that there can be a combination of these 
methods in comparative legal research26 and the selection of which method should be 
used is subject to how legal research designs its aims and questions.27 
To summarise this discussion, the issue of whether comparative law should 
concentrate on similarities or differences between legal systems has distinguished the 
functionalists from the other comparatists and becomes the ground for the debate over 
 
21 Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (University of Michigan Press, 1997) at. 145 22 Ibid 23 Pierre Legrand, ‘How to Compare Now’ (1996) 16(2) Legal Studies, 232, at 235 and ‘The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,”’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 111.  24 Mark Van Hoecke (n9) 25 Ibid 8-21 26 Ibid  9 27 Ibid 2 and 29 
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which method should be used in comparative law to flourish. What is suggested from the 
discussion is that comparatists should not be confined exclusively to a single method, 
rather they must open their perspective to see comparative law in a larger context and be 
familiar with a range of methods so that the comparison is no longer constrained to the 
surface of legislation or doctrinal framework but delves into a deeper understanding of 
the background and the context that shapes the compared legal systems. 
7.1.2 Legal transplantation 
Legal transplantation is a term coined by Watson in his famous book Legal 
Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law.28 Watson describes legal transplantation 
as a phenomenon where a legal rule moves from one country to another or from one 
person to another and argues that there is no connection between law and the social 
context in which it operates, thus laws can transfer easily to new places that are very 
different from the place of its origin.29 Watson’s core argument on the legal transferability 
lies in the assumption that laws have their own life or autonomy that allows them to 
develop in insolation with social, economic or political factors.30 Significantly, he finds 
legal transplants or ‘legal borrowing’ has the most important contribution in changes in 
many legal systems by citing cases of transferring European law to many countries in the 
world.31 
Legrand is the most prominent critic of Watson’ work who challenges the 
argument on the legal transferability with the claim that it is impossible for legal 
transplant to occur.32 Endorsing the assumption of the famous scholar Montesquieu that 
 
28 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Virginia University Press, 1974) 29 Ibid 21-30 30 Alan Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ (1978) 37 Cambridge Law Journal, 313, 314-315 31  Alan Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law’ (2000) 4 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, <https://www.ejcl.org//44/art44-2.html > accessed 27 January 2019 32 Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (1997) 4 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 111, 117 
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laws should be adapted ‘to the people for whom they are framed..., to the nature and 
principle of each government... to the climate of each country’,33  Legrand finds laws 
culturally embedded in a society and argues that because legal culture importantly shapes 
and gives laws a specific meaning, when laws transfer to a new place, the legal culture 
deciding the meaning cannot transfer with them.34 As a result, though the legislative texts 
may be the same in the recipient place, the new legal culture cannot give the borrowed 
laws a similar meaning as they would have in the original legal culture. Kahn-Freund 
shares the same view with Legrand that laws are embedded in legal culture, but his 
understanding of legal transplant differs from Legrand’s in an important aspect that there 
is still a degree of legal transferability.35 Similar to Legrand, Kahn-Freund endorses 
Montesquieu’s view in recognising the connection between laws and social context; 
however, he claims that in modern time, social, economic, and cultural forces have lost 
their importance in deciding legal transferability,36 rather, it is a political factor, namely 
‘political differentiation’ to take this role.37 Specifically, Kahn-Freund claims that laws 
designed to ‘allocate power, rules making, decision making, and all above, policy-making 
power (which are) the ones most resilient to transplantation’.38  
As such, three main contemporary theories on legal transplantation have been 
mapped out. First, Watson establishes the theory that laws can easily transfer from one 
country to another.39 Second, Legrand posits that laws are non-transferable due to the 
obstacle caused by the unbridgeable differences in legal culture in which laws operate.40 
 
33 Baron de Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, ‘The Spirit of Laws’  <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montesquieu/>  accessed 30 January 2019 34 Legrand (n32) at 117 35 Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘On the Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 Modern Law Review, 1-27 36 Ibid 8-11 37 Ibid 38 Ibid 17 39 Watson (n28) 314-5 40 Legrand (n32) 117 
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Third, Kahn-Freund suggested that it is possible for legal transplant to occur, yet this 
possibility depends on the extent of compatibility between the transferred laws and the 
social, political, economic and cultural environment of the recipient country and that 
political differentiation, as opposed to social forces, has operated as the main hindrance 
of legal transplantation.41 
7.1.3 The interplay between comparative law and legal transplantation and 
their application to the comparison conducted by this thesis 
The importance of legal transplants as a central study to comparative law has been 
recognised elsewhere by legal scholars.42 For example, as Michaels observed, there 
remains ‘at least three main current approaches other than the functionalism, namely 
comparative legal history, the study of legal transplants, and the comparative study of 
legal cultures.’43 It is apparent that comparative law and legal transplant maintains a close 
relationship as both the studies allow comparative lawyers to appreciate similarities and 
differences between legal systems and to be in a position to make recommendations.44 
Since there are different, contrasting theories on legal comparison and legal 
transplantation, applying them into this research requires a careful selection as well as 
justification.  
In selecting comparative approaches to conduct the research, the thesis agrees 
with Hoecke in that the research aims and questions will decide which methods should 
be used.45 The research recognises the logic of the functional approach in examining 
whether the rescue laws of the selected jurisdiction have fulfilled their functions, which 
 
41 Kahn-Freund (n35) 42 R. Michaels (n13), and Gilles Cuniberti, ‘Enhancing Judicial Reputation through Legal Transplants: Estoppel Travels to France’ (2012) 60 American Journal of Company Law. 383, 383  43 Ralf Michaels, Ibid 341 44 Shen Zongling, ‘Legal transplant and Comparative Law’ (1999) Revue Internationale De Droit Comparé, 853 45 Mark Van Hoecke (n9) 1 
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is to rescue insolvent companies. However, the functional approach cannot sufficiently 
provide answers to the questions of what the differences are in rescue laws among 
jurisdiction of the UK, Canada and Vietnam and what factors are decide these differences. 
In order to answer these questions, the thesis has to rely on a number of comparative 
methods other than the functional method. For example, analytical method and structural 
method is used to examine concepts, rules and the framework of corporate rescue law in 
each country; the historical method is employed to see how historical development has 
shaped the current laws, and the law-in-context method is used to examine how laws 
actually operate in the selected countries.  
Concerning the application of legal transplant in the attainment of the aims of this 
thesis, it cannot be denied that legal transplant plays an important role in insolvency law 
reform.46 However, evidence on the transplants of insolvency law provided by Martin47 
has invalidated Watson’s claim that laws can exist in insolation with social context and 
thus can be transferred easily.  Examining the failure of insolvency laws in a number of 
countries in Asia and Europe in an attempt to follow the US bankruptcy law, Martin 
determined that the unique historical and cultural elements in these countries have 
rendered the imported law to be inapplicable products.48 The role of social, historical, 
cultural forces of recipient countries in shaping imported insolvency laws has been well 
demonstrated by the law reform of South Asia countries, including Vietnam. Though 
international donors such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, the 
IMF, the OECD, and UNCITRAL have developed very similar ‘Good Practice Standards’ 
 
46 F.V. Bermudez, ‘Legal Transplantation and Commercial Law Reform in the Field of Rule-of-Law Promotion’ (2017) 8 Queen Mary Law Journal, 131-150 47 Nathalie Martin, ‘The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation’ (2005) 28 B.C. Int'l & Comp. Law Review, 1-77 48 Ibid 
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to support Asian countries in insolvency law reform, a report by the ADB found a 
considerable degree of diversity in nature of laws of these countries.49  
The case of Vietnam is a very good example supporting Kahn-Freund claims that 
in the time of global social and economic assimilation there are no other factors other 
than politics that has worked as the main impediment to the process of legal transplant. 
In the previous chapter,50 Gillespie’s investigation into legal transplant of insolvency law 
in Vietnam has attributed the failure of imported laws to a number of factors, among 
which are the policies of the political party towards preserving state-economic sectors 
and the government’s practice of using administrative orders to settle insolvency of the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) instead of relying on the formal legislation.51 However, 
the case of Vietnam also challenges Kahn-Freund’s over-reliance on the political factor 
since other factors such as the hostile traditional precepts towards insolvency and the lack 
of insolvency institutions have equally contributed to the impediment of the legal 
transplant in Vietnam.52  
In light of the above understanding, the following comparison on rescue laws of 
the selected jurisdictions will not be confined to legislative texts but extended to a 
consideration of the social, economic and cultural factors. Where there are 
recommendations to be made for Vietnam, as enlightened by the legal transplant theories, 
the possibility to apply these recommendations to Vietnamese law will be fully 
considered through an examination of whether they are compatible with the legal culture 
in Vietnam. 
 
49 R.W. Harmer, ‘Insolvency Law Reforms in the Asian and Pacific Region’ (2000) Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank, 8–86, and Roman Tomasic, ‘Diversity and Convergence in Insolvency Laws in East Asia’ in Insolvency Law in East Asia (Ashgate, 2006), at 1-8 50 See Chapter Six (6.1.2 The failure of two bankruptcy legislation 1993 and 2004) 51 J. Gillespie, Transplanting Commercial Law Reform: Developing a 'Rule of Law' in Vietnam (Ashgate, 2006), and ‘Insolvency Law in Vietnam’ in R.Tomasic,  Insolvency Law in East Asia (Ashgate, 2006) 52 See Chapter Six (6.1.2 The failure of two bankruptcy legislation 1993 and 2004) 
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7.2 Comparison on rescue law of the UK, Canada and Vietnam 
7.2.1 Comparing the societal context where rescue law operates in the three 
countries 
In light of the above discussion on comparative law, apart from comparing 
regulations in legislations, a comparison on corporate rescue law must contemplate the 
need for taking into consideration the societal context, especially the legal culture. Bell 
defined legal culture as ‘a specific way in which values, practices, and concepts are 
integrated into the operation of legal institutions and the interpretation of legal texts’.53 
The definition suggests that laws are not just legislative texts but also social practices that 
importantly define their meaning, implementation and roles in society.54 Therefore, 
understanding laws in a legal system must be associated with gaining insight into the legal 
culture where the law has operated. 
The UK and Canada are very typical examples of countries following Western 
legal culture, which is premised on the principles of individualism and rationalism.55 
While individualism refers to the value of individual autonomy and liberty in and against 
society, rationalism is the belief that humans know, structure and master the reality in an 
objective manner,56 which bases their actions or opinions on reasoning rather than 
emotion or religion.57  Influenced by the ideology of individualism, the UK and Canada 
advanced to capitalist societies where the function of the economy relies on two principles 
of preserving the private ownership and protecting the market liberalism. Insolvency law 
 53 John Bell, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Theory’, in Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems, Krawietz, W., Maccormick, N., & Von Wright, H. (eds. Duncker & Humblot, 1995) at 19-31.  54 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law’ (1998) 47(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 495, 498 55 Ibid 503-505 56 Ibid 57 Cambridge Dictionary, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/rationalism> accessed 14 February 2019 
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in these countries is created to support these principles. The law protects individual rights 
by offering creditors a tool to maximise the collection of debts,58 while allowing owners 
of companies to preserve their business through rescue procedure.59 The protection of the 
market economy is perceived in the sense that liquidating ineffective companies will give 
way for companies with higher competitiveness to thrive in the market.60 Apart from 
individualism, rationalism is other value underpinning the function of the insolvency law 
in these countries.61 Essentially, the value of rationalism allows individual bankruptcy 
and corporate insolvency to be perceived as a normal phenomenon in economic 
development.62 For example, bankruptcy laws in these countries had changed their focus 
from criminalising individual bankrupts to recognising bankruptcy as a normal 
phenomenon, therefore, granting honest, unfortunate bankrupt a discharge of debts.63 
Similarly, corporate insolvency has been no longer attributed only to mismanagement; 
rather economic crisis have perceived as a driving force resulting in corporate failure, 
which demanded these countries shift their legislative focus from liquidation towards 
rescue.64 As a result, bankruptcy and insolvency laws become a source of solution for 
individuals and corporate to deal with their financial problems. 
 
58 T. H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University Press,1986) 59 Karen Gross, ‘Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System’ (1997) 248-49; Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’, (1991) 91Colom. L. Rev. 717; Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy policy, (1987); 54 U. Chicago Law Review. 775; Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘Searching for Reorganization Realities’, (1994) 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257 60  D. G. Bair ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale Law Journal, 581 61 M.V.Hoecke (n54) 498 62 The laws in these countries had changed their focus from punishing individuals to recognising the possibility of their bankruptcy caused by misfortune, therefore, granting honest, unfortunate creditor with a discharge of debts. See Charles Jordan, ‘The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge’ (1991) (65) American Bankruptcy Law Journal, 325-71, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2312573> accessed 17 February 2019 63 Charles Jordan, Ibid 64 See the development of corporate rescue law in UK and Canada in Chapters Four and Five 
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Vietnamese legal culture offers a contrasting image to those of the UK and 
Canada.65 Vietnam can be characterised as Asian legal culture where collectivism and 
irrationalism have operated as dominating principles to direct the perception of law.66 As 
previously examined,67 the study from the past revealed that collectivism brought by 
Confucianism is deeply ingrained in Vietnam society, which subjects individual interest 
to the interest of community and state.68 Therefore, laws were enacted, to a large extent, 
to maintain social order instead of protecting individual rights.69 Furthermore, 
irrationalism dictates that law was subject to moral values and beliefs. This is well 
illustrated in the creditor-debtor relation where debtor’s performance of an obligation 
owed to creditors was largely directed by the value of face-saving which does not permit 
a person to have misconducts that damage the image of his family or community.70 In a 
culture where collectivism and irrationalism maintain driving forces, bankruptcy and 
insolvency was not recognised as a normal phenomenon; rather, it was perceived as a 
taboo up which a debtor tried to cover to save his honour and reputation.71  
It should be noted that Vietnamese legal culture had interacted with Western 
countries in the period of French colonisation and American intervention.72 However, 
upon the defeat of the French and American, Vietnamese legal culture changed towards 
socialist orientation which largely abolished Western legal influence.73 The shift towards 
 
65 According to countries comparison by Hofstede Insights, scores for individualism for the UK, Canada and Vietnam are 89, 80 and 20 respectively <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/canada,the-uk,vietnam/> accessed 17 February 2019 66 M. V. Hoecke (n54) 506-7 67 See Chapter Six (6.1.1 A complicated legal transplantation of insolvency in Vietnam) 68 Pham Duy Nghia, ‘Confucianism and the conception of the law in Vietnam’, in John Gillespie and Pip Nicholson (eds) Asian Socialism and Legal Change: The Dynamics of Vietnamese and Chinese Reform (Asia Pacific Press, 2005) 69 See Chapter Six (6.1.1 A complicated legal transplantation of insolvency in Vietnam). Pham Duy Nghia, Ibid and Gillespie (n51) at 241 70 Pham Duy Nghia, Ibid and Gillespie, Ibid 71 Ibid 72 Gillespie, Ibid 241-42 73 Ibid 242-43 
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socialism with the state-management of economy suppressed the development of private 
ownership and laws were employed as administrative tools for the state to control the 
economy.74 However, still insolvency could not have legal recognition as the government 
only used administrative orders to restructure ineffective SOEs with the purpose of 
preserving their reputation.75 In the context of the economic transformation towards 
market liberalism, the first two insolvency legislation enacted in 1993 and 2004 
incorporated a number of Western insolvency principles.76 However, the failure of both 
legislation indicates that the Vietnamese legal culture did not suitable for supporting the 
application of the law. As examined in the Vietnam chapter, traditional and socialist 
values have been influential factors that prevent insolvency law to operate effectively in 
Vietnam.77 
7.2.2 The convergence and divergence of approach to  rescue law in the UK, 
Canada and Vietnam 
7.2.2.1 The existence of different rescue procedures 
There is an easily recognisable similarity among rescue laws in the three countries 
that they are products of the legal reforms in which the legislative focus was shifted from 
liquidation towards restructuring objective. While the UK and Canada supported the 
rescue culture in the 1980s, Vietnam has emphasised this objective later with the 
enactment of the latest insolvency legislation 2014.78 There is a striking similarity 
between rescue laws of all selected jurisdictions that they endorse the principle of 
 74 Ibid 246 75 Ibid 246-250, and Pham Duy Nghia, ‘Seeking the philosophy of the Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law” (2003), 11 Law-Making Research Journal, 35-47 <http://vibonline.com.vn/bao_cao/gop-y-cua-ts-pham-duy-nghia > accessed 17 February 2019 76 See Chapter Six (6.1.2 The failure of two bankruptcy legislation 1993 and 2004) 77 Ibid 78 See Chapter Four (4.1.2 The rise of rescue culture in the UK), Chapter Five (5.2 The distinguishing characteristics of Canadian rescue law) and Chapter Six (6.4.1 The rescue concept and the extent to which Vietnam places emphasis on rescue) 
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‘business rescue’ instead of ‘company rescue’.79 This means that the laws aim at saving 
only viable parts of a company business instead of saving the company as a whole, which 
can result in changes in the company management and ownership once the going-concern 
business is transferred to new owners. As previously examined, in the UK, the pre-
packaged sale has emerged as a new trend to sell a company instead of saving it under 
the administration, and there is a similar trend in the use of the rescue procedure to sell 
or liquidate a company in Canada.80 Though this trend has not emerged in Vietnam, the 
Bankruptcy Law 2014 (BL2014) also endorse the policy of ‘business recue’ by 
recognising the transfer of ownership as one of rescue measures.81 This confirms the 
argument raised by this thesis that rescue laws of the selected countries reflect the 
ideology of the traditionalists in supporting corporate rescue and the proceduralists in 
endorsing liquidation.82 
Though these countries follow the same path in shifting their legislative focus, 
their approach to corporate rescue is different. The UK has the most diverse approach 
with the existence of three rescue procedures, namely the administration, the creditor 
voluntary arrangement (CVA) under the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA1986) and the Scheme 
of Arrangement (SA) in the Company Act 2006 (CA2006). The diverse approach is 
reflected not only in the number of procedures but also in the models of rescue 
administration adopted by these procedures. For example, the administration procedure 
follows the Professional-in-Possession (PIP) model that features insolvency practitioners 
(IPs) replacing the current directors in management; the SA follows the Debtor-in-
 
79 See Chapter Four (4.3.1 The emphasis of UK law on corporate rescue) Chapter Five (5.4.5 Whether the BIA and the CCAA proceeding place emphasis on rescue?) and Chapter Six (6.4.1 The rescue concept and the extent to which Vietnam places emphasis on rescue) 80 Ibid 81 Ibid and BL 2014, art.88.2 (e)&(g) 82 See Chapter Two (2.1.1 Two different schools of thought justifying the introduction of insolvency and rescue law) 
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Possession (DIP) model which permits the company directors to retain in their office; 
while the CVA has a nature of a hybrid model under which the directors are allowed to 
manage the company but under the oversight of IPs. Similar to the UK, Canada offers 
insolvent companies with a degree of flexibility with the introduction of two rescue 
procedures under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and the Companies' Creditors 
Arrangement Act (CCAA). Both the procedures follow the hybrid model that permits 
incumbent directors to stay at post; yet, they are designed differently to suit different types 
of companies. While the rule-based procedure under the BIA purports to restructure small 
companies, the court-based procedure the CCAA is designed to restructure companies 
with a complicated structure of debts.83  
In comparison, with a more diverse approach, the UK rescue law can be thought 
to provide insolvent companies with the most flexibility. However, the UK’s diverse 
approach to rescue procedures cannot be as flexible as Canada; instead, it has proven 
more troublesome due to the lack of a moratorium to stay creditors’ enforcement against 
the company under the CVA and the SA.84 Therefore, in order to take advantage of the 
moratorium, the CVA or the SA has to be initiated in combination with the administration, 
which appears to be an inefficient and costly option.85 The lack of moratorium under CVA 
and the SA can be explained by the fact that the UK has been a pro-creditor jurisdiction 
under which insolvency law has been long perceived as a tool for maximising creditor 
return and providing them with an orderly scheme of distribution.86 Furthermore, there 
has been a hostile attitude towards insolvency in the UK, which considers corporate 
 
83 According to s.3(1) of the CCAA, the Act applies to a company with the total amount of debt being more than C$5,000,000 84 See the examination in Chapter Four (4.2.2.4 The interplay between the administration, the CVA and the SA) 85 Ibid 86 R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 2005), at 5 
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failure as wrongdoing rather than misfortune.87 Therefore, although the CVA and the SA 
allow the directors to stay in the company, the absence of a moratorium proves the UK 
has been lingering with adopting a debtor-friendly model to its rescue law. Concerning 
Vietnam, the BL2014 provides for a single rescue procedure featuring the hybrid model 
that applies to all companies. It is a special feature of the Vietnamese law that rescue 
procedure cannot be initiated directly, rather it is an outcome of the initiation of the 
insolvency procedure. Accordingly, when an application is made to initiate the insolvency 
procedure, it can lead to two possible outcomes, rescue or liquidation, and this will be 
decided by creditors.88 An apparent benefit of a single procedure is its simplicity as 
insolvent companies do not have to spend time and effort in deciding which procedure is 
suitable for them. 
7.2.2.2 Factors deciding the diversity of rescue procedures under rescue laws 
of the three countries 
The diversity of the approach to rescue law in the countries is attributed to factors 
relating to the historical development of insolvency law. For the UK, the existence of 
diverse rescue procedures has proved the UK legislature’s efforts in providing insolvent 
companies with flexibility with a wide range of solutions. The introduction of the 
administration and the CVA under the IA1986 is an example of this. While the CVA was 
expected to be a less costly procedure to deal with financial difficulty without engaging 
in formal insolvency, the administration was contemplated as a more formal rescue 
procedure with the protection of a moratorium to stay creditor’s actions.89 Apart from the 
 
87 Westbrook ‘A Comparison of Bankruptcy Reorganisation in the US with Administration Procedure in the UK’ (1990) Insolvency Law and Practice 86, at 88 and G Moss ‘Chapter 11: An English Lawyer’s Critique’ (1998) 11 Insolvency Intelligence 17 88 BL2014, art. 83.1 89 Paul J. Omar and Jennifer Gant, ‘Corporate Rescue in the United Kingdom: Past, Present and Future Reforms’ < http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/27854/1/Pubsub5402_Omar.pdf > at 9-10, accessed 20 February 2019 
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administration and the CVA, which are products of the insolvency legislation reform, the 
SA is a rescue practice that has been existing long in the UK company legislations and 
their initiation is not based on insolvency proof.90 Though the SA is considered to be time 
and cost-consuming,91 maintaining it in the CA2006 reflects the intention of the 
legislature in providing multiples choices for companies to settle their insolvency affairs. 
Canada also has a flexible approach to rescue by offering insolvent companies 
with two procedures under the BIA and the CCAA. The vision for corporate rescue had 
been developed in Canada with the enactment of the CCAA in 1933 and with the Supreme 
Court of Canada upholding the application of the statute.92 However, the 1953 
amendment to tackle the debtor’s abuse of the statute to escape debt rendered the Act ‘a 
dead letter’ for a long time. The Act revived in application since the 1980s when Canadian 
courts increasingly interpreted the statute as a restructuring tool to respond to a large scale 
of corporate failure caused by the economic recession.93 The rescue procedure under the 
BIA was introduced later in an attempt to replace the CCAA and enhance the unification 
of Canadian insolvency law.94 However, as a strict rule-based procedure under the BIA 
could not replace the one under the CCAA to solve complicated rescue cases of larger 
companies; therefore, the latter cannot be abolished. As a result of this, there is a co-
existence of the two procedures in Canada, with the BIA available for small companies 
and the CCAA available for large companies.95 The bifurcation of rescue procedures 
 
90 Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act 1870; 33& 34, Vict c.104, and see John Tribe, ‘Companies Act Schemes of Arrangement and Rescue: the lost cousin of restructuring practice?’, at 5 <file://nstu-nas01.uwe.ac.uk/users2$/h2-duong/Windows/Downloads/SSRN-id1328487.pdf> accessed 20 February 2019 91 Omar and Gant (n89) 7 92 See Chapter Five (5.1 Legal development in corporate insolvency and rescue law in Canada) 93 Ibid 94 Ibid See Chapter Five (5.2.3 The bifurcation of rescue law and the significant role of the courts in Canada) 95 Ibid 
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under Canadian law appears to be a coincidental result of the insolvency reform instead 
of the legislature’s intention to diversify rescue procedures like the case of the UK.  
Unlike the UK and Canada, the Vietnam approach to corporate rescue with a 
single procedure under the BL2014 featuring the hybrid model that allows directors to 
manage a company under IP’s supervision. This model of administration has been 
adopted since the first bankruptcy legislation was enacted in 1993. The single rescue 
procedure under the BL2014 has the benefit of simplicity as compared to the multiple 
procedures in the UK that require an insolvent company to spend time and effort in 
evaluating and selecting which is the best option to solve its financial affairs. The 
adoption of the hybrid model in the rescue procedure under the BL2014 proves the 
legislature’s attempt to correct the failure of the rescue model in the previous legislation. 
Under the BL2004, company directors allowed to operate the company under the 
supervision of an asset management and liquidation team dominated by the state officials. 
As examined, this model contributed to the failure of the BL2004 due to the lack of 
expertise of people in the team.96 To overcome this shortcoming, Vietnam adopted the 
policy of inviting IPs (asset management officers) to participate in the rescue procedure, 
which creates a new profession in the country.97 
7.2.3 Comparing the best practices of the rescue laws in the UK, Canada and 
Vietnam under the evaluation four benchmarks  
7.2.3.1 Time and cost 
 
96 See Chapter Six (6.4.2.2 Expertise)   97 Vietnamese legislators adopted the UNCITRAL’s recommendation to invite IPs to participate in the insolvency procedure. See The People Supreme Court of Vietnam, ‘The Statement 33/2013 to the Naitonal Assembly on the Bill of a New Bankruptcy Law’  
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According to the World Bank, Canada and the UK are among jurisdictions with 
highly effective insolvency regimes, with the rankings being 13 and 14 respectively.98 
The average time to complete insolvency in the UK is one year, while this figure for 
Canada is slightly shorter, only 0.8 year.99 In terms of cost, the recovery rate for creditors 
is 85.3% in the UK and the figure for Canada is slightly higher at 87.5%.100 Vietnam is 
very far behind these jurisdictions with the 133rd ranking, and it takes five years to 
complete insolvency and the recovery rate for creditors is just 21.3%.101 However, these 
figures are of general insolvency cases, including both liquidation and rescue.  Therefore, 
it cannot reveal exactly the amount of time and cost involved in corporate restructuring 
in the selected countries. Furthermore, not all cases of rescue are officially recorded, such 
as the Scheme in the UK or the CCAA in Canada. Therefore, it seems to be relevant for 
the comparison to direct its focus towards the extent to which rescue laws in the selected 
countries fasten the time and minimise the cost instead of comparing specific figures. 
As for the time to complete rescue, the common practice for fastening the rescue 
procedure under the UK and Canada law is to grant the company a limited time to 
formulate and submit a rescue proposal. In the UK, the administration procedure is a 
prominent representation of this. The IA1986 imposes a time limit of eight weeks on the 
administrator to make a proposal and present creditors for approval102 and a duration of 
twelve months to complete the administration.103 This requirement places a degree of 
pressure on not only the administrator to fulfil his duty but also company directors, who 
have to cooperate with the administrator. A similar practice can be found in the BIA 
 
98 See World Bank, ‘Resolving Insolvency’ (2018)   <http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency > accessed 26 February 2019 99 Ibid 100 Ibid 101 Ibid 102 IA 1986, Schedule B1, para 49(5), 103 Schedule B1, para 76 
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procedure under Canadian law. The initiation access is available to both the debtor and 
creditor, and there is no requirement for the court to be involved in the commencement 
of the procedure.104 Specifically, a company debtor who already developed a proposal 
can file it to a licensed trustee, who then files the proposal and associated documents to 
the official receiver;105 or if the company has not developed a plan yet, then he can file 
the notice of intention to make a proposal with the official receiver.106 For the latter 
option, the company is given a thirty-day period to file the plan,107 and it can apply to the 
court for extension up to five months with each extension not exceeding forty-five 
days.108 Apparently, in insolvency time, it is unlikely for a company to develop a viable 
proposal within a thirty-day period unless it has had proper preparation prior to the 
initiation of the procedure. Therefore, apart from imposing pressure on a company to 
fasten the making of a proposal, this provision encourages the company to consider the 
rescue option as early as possible to have proper preparation for it.  
However, the practice of granting companies a limited time to draft proposals has 
the drawback of weakening the rescue viability or ruining effort because it is insufficient 
for a viable proposal to be produced under such time pressure. For example, within eight 
weeks, the UK administrator is more likely to come up with a proposal to sell the company 
instead of rescuing it, given his unfamiliarity with the company’s business and operation. 
Therefore, the short and strict timescale of the administration and the BIA procedure is 
only suitable for rescuing companies with simple structures of debts. For more 
complicated cases, there are other procedures available under the UK and Canadian law 
that provides for a longer time. For example, in the UK a company can be rescued under 
 
104 BIA, s.50(1) 105 Ibid, s.50(2) 106 Ibid s.50.4(1)  107 Ibid s.50.4(8) 108 Ibid s.50.4(9) 
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the CVA or with the SA under which the time to complete the rescue is subject to 
negotiation among parties. In some cases, there can be a combination of the 
administration with the CVA or with the SA to take the advantage of the moratorium 
under the administration and use it to develop proposals under the CVA or the SA.109 
Canada also has another procedure exclusively available for companies with large 
structures of debt (C$5millon), which is the CCAA. The procedure is very flexible for a 
company insofar as it does not impose any limit on the duration for developing proposals 
or completing the rescue. However, the flexibility provided by these procedures under the 
two jurisdictions is a trade-off for efficiency as the time and cost involved under these 
procedures are longer and larger.  
In comparison with the UK and Canada, Vietnam provides for a unique way to 
initiate rescue procedures. Accordingly the BL2014, the procedure can be only initiated 
when a company becomes insolvent, which means it is unable to pay a debt that has been 
due for three months.110 This opens a ‘financial restructuring window’ of three months111 
for a company to initiate informal rescue or to develop a proposal if it has to enter into 
formal rescue. A three-month period may not practically sufficient for the company to 
complete the restructuring,112 yet, it has a rescue significance in that it makes insolvent 
companies more cognizant of their financial affairs and thereby initiating informal rescue, 
such as negotiating with creditors or consulting financial adviser, before resorting to the 
formal procedure in the legislation. 
 
109 This is due to the lack of a moratorium under the SA and the moratorium is not available for all companies under CVA, only small companies are eligible to take advantage of the moratorium. 110 The BL 2014, art.4.1 111 Phil Smith, ‘Creditors to gain from bankruptcy law’ (2014), <https://www.vir.com.vn/creditors-to-gain-from-bankruptcy-law-29722.html> accessed 01 March 2019 112 Ibid 
Chapter Seven – Comparison on the Corporate Rescue Laws of the UK, Canada, and Vietnam  
269  
  However, under the BL2014, the time for submission of the rescue proposal to 
creditors is relatively long, around four months since the procedure is initiated.113 In 
addition to a grace period of three months, this duration is apparently more generous for 
a company to develop a rescue proposal than the UK administration with eight weeks and  
the Canadian BIA procedure with one month.114 By this way, Vietnamese law not only 
encourages a company to be aware of initiating informal rescue efforts before entering 
the formal procedure but also provides the company with a relatively comfortable 
timeframe to develop a proposal. However, this generosity is associated with a danger 
that creditors are more likely to lose their patience and tend to vote for a liquidation 
option. However, this comparison is constrained to the UK administration, the Canadian 
BIA procedure as the timeframe for initiation and completion of other rescue procedures, 
such as the CVA and the SA in UK law and the CCAA in Canadian law, largely depends 
on the negotiation and the terms of the proposals.  
As for the rescue cost, creditor return is an important indicator of whether a rescue 
regime is cost-effective. Improving the creditor return is associated with reducing the 
insolvency cost, one of which is the IP fees. It is often the case that the IP fee accounts 
for a dominant part of the insolvency cost, which, as examined, adversely affects the 
 
113 Specifically, according to the BL2014, after the application is filed at court, there are 30 days for court to decide whether the proceeding will be commenced or not (art.42) If the court decides to commence the proceeding, the company has 30 days to conduct asset inventory and send notice the creditors and make the creditor list (the inventory can be extended by court for two times, each time will be longer than 30 days) (art. 65 & 67). If these works are finished, there are 20 days to call for the first creditor meeting to decide if the company is liquidated or rescued (art.75). If the creditor resolution is to rescue, the company then has 30 days to develop a proposal to send to the asset management officer and the in-charged judge for consideration (art.87.1), who then submit it to the second creditors meeting for final voting within 15days. (art.87.3) 114 Under s.50.4(9) of the BIA, a company is granted 30 days to develop proposals once it files a notice of intention to make the proposal to the official receiver. It is possible for the company to petition the court for extensions up to five months and every extension is no more than 45 days. However, the court will do it if it is satisfied that the company has acted in good faith with due diligence, there is a viable prospect for the proposal to be made, and the extension does not materially prejudice creditors. 
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creditor return115 or even undermines the rescue attempt.116 In monitoring the IP’s fee, 
the UK and Vietnam share a similar practice of allowing this fee to be agreed between 
creditors and the IPs.117 In case of absence of the creditor approval, both jurisdictions 
have the detailed guideline for the involved parties to determine this fee based on the time 
given by IPs, the fixed amount or the percentage of creditor return, and court is the final 
recourse when there is no common ground for an agreement.118 Canada has a different 
approach with the UK and Vietnam for allowing the IP fee to be decided by the company 
and the IPs under the BIA and the court intervention is exercised only in the absence of 
such agreement.119 Canadian courts have developed jurisprudence in establishing number 
of principles that base the fee calculation on a number of factors including asset value, 
time expended by IPs, expertise, result of work, and cost of comparable services 
performed in a prudential and economical manner.120  
By allowing creditors to be the party who determines the IP fee, the approach of 
the UK and Vietnam appears to be more satisfactory than that of Canada. It should be 
borne in mind that creditors are those who decide whether a rescue plan should be carried 
out, therefore, conferring them the right to negotiate this fee will avoid the possibility of 
a rescue plan to be rejected at the creditor meeting. Besides, this practice encourages the 
participation of some sophisticated creditors such as banks who are well-equipped with 
skills and knowledge to be able to make informed decisions regarding which amount of 
 
115 See the examination on time and cost associated with the rescue laws of the UK (Chapter Four: 4.3.2.1 Time and cost for rescue implementation) and Canada (Chapter Five: 5.4.1 Time and cost), and see John Armour, Audrey Hsu and Adrian Walters, Enterprise Act 2002 – Corporate Insolvency Provision: Evaluation Report, (2008) at 111  116 Community Pork Ventures Inc. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (2005), 11 C.B.R. (5th) 65, 2005 SKQB 245 (Sask. Q.B.), additional reasons 2005 SKQB 252 (Sask. Q.B.), 117 UK Insolvency Rules 2016, r.18.18 and art. 21.5 of the Decree No. 22/2015/ND-CP on providing detailed regulations on the implementation of several articles of the Bankruptcy Law 2014 for asset management officers and the practice of asset management and liquidation in Vietnam. 118 Ibid r.18.16 and the Decree No. 22, art.21.2 119 BIA, s.39(3) 120 TNG Acquisition Inc. (Re), 2014 ONSC 2754 [Commercial List] (“TNG Acquisition”) and Bank of Nova Scotia v. Diemer, 2014 ONSC 365  
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fees should be appropriated.121 Furthermore, this can avoid the possibility of litigation 
where the creditors find the fee inappropriate and challenge it at court. By allowing this 
fee to be agreed between the company and the IPs, the Canadian approach is more likely 
to invite litigation at court in case of creditors disagreeing with the fee. Though the 
Canadian court appears to be capable of settling this dispute in determining this fee, the 
court involvement in settling not only prolongs the time but also adds up cost into the 
procedure. In addition, lacking provisions allowing creditors to participate in the 
negotiation of this fee does not create incentives for directors to consider the importance 
of projecting the IP fees in drafting a rescue plan. By contrast, the approach of the UK 
and Vietnam in allowing creditors to negotiate this fee makes a company more aware of 
projecting the fee in a proposal and this can become an important basis for the creditors 
to evaluate the rescue viability and approve for it.  
 7.2.3.2 Expertise 
Expertise contributed to rescue procedures comes from the company directors, IPs 
and courts who participate in running the company during crisis time, forming and 
implementing a rescue plan and monitoring the implementation of the plan. The extent to 
which these characters contribute their expertise in rescue may vary depending on models 
of rescue administration adopted by the legislation of the selected jurisdictions as well as 
the development of corporate rescue practice in each country. For example, in a PIP 
model such as the UK administration, IPs perform both operating the business and 
conducting rescue effort, while in the DIP model, this role is normally performed by the 
incumbent directors. The following examination compares how the laws in the selected 
 121 Elaine Kempson, ‘Review of Insolvency Practitioner Fees Report to the Insolvency Service’ (July 2013)  <http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/geography/migrated/documents/pfrc1316.pdf> accessed 08 March 2019 
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countries ensure main characters sufficiently contribute their expertise in rescue and how 
the expertise is coordinated under the selected jurisdiction.  
The company directors 
Directors in the UK has limited power to run the company business during rescue 
compared to those in Canada and Vietnam. To be specific, under the UK administration, 
directors are replaced by the administrator who takes the managerial power in operating 
the business as well as carrying out rescue activities.122 In the CVA and the SA, although 
directors can remain in office, it is difficult for them to carry out business activities 
efficiently due to lacking a moratorium to prevent creditors from enforcing their claim 
against the company. Therefore, it is likely for rescue strategies devised by the directors 
to be challenged when creditors are aware that there is nothing to prevent them to take 
enforcement actions against the company.123 The policy of limiting the managerial power 
of directors in the UK is originated from the hostile attitude that sees insolvency as 
managerial wrongdoing rather than misfortune.124 A benefit associated with this policy is 
that replacing directors with IPs under the administration can avoid the likelihood of the 
directors engaging in risky business activities at the cost incurred by creditors.125 
However, this policy has a drawback that IPs have to struggle to operate the company as 
well as producing a rescue plan under time pressure given their unfamiliarity with the 
company business as an outsider.126 As IPs have to perform their function in a speedy and 
 
122 IA 1986, Schedule B1, s.59 and 61  123 Actually, the moratorium is available under the CVA, but it is eligible for a ‘small company’ as defined by the CA2006 and the IA1986, Schedule A1, para 2(1) 124 G. Moss (n87)18 125 David Hann, ‘Concentrated Ownership and Control of Corporate Reorganizations’ (2004) 4(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 117-154 126 Finch, Corporate Insolvency Laws: Perspectives and Principles (Cambridge University Press, 2edn, 2002), at 434-435 
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least contentious fashion, they cannot exercise their expertise as effectively as 
expected.127  
By contrast to the UK, the hybrid model under Canadian and Vietnamese rescue 
laws allows directors to hold office during the time of rescue. An advantage of this 
deployment is that the directors can contribute skills, knowledge and experiences they 
have possessed in rescue. As not encountering the risk of being replaced by IPs, directors 
will not incline to hold out important information and the company’s financial affairs to 
prolong their tenure,128 rather, they are incentivised to initiate rescue in a timely fashion 
that can lead to a higher prospect of rescue success.129 However, allowing the incumbent 
directors to remain in power is effective provided there is a mechanism to monitor their 
conduct during the exercising of their power to prevent potential abuses.130 The 
appointment of a chief restructuring officer (CRO) in Canada is considered to be an 
advanced approach to enhance director expertise. The CRO is a turnaround specialist 
appointed by the court to perform the service of co-ordinating rescue efforts for the 
distressed company.131 A special feature of CRO is that though being appointed by the 
court, he is an officer of the company and assists it in negotiation with creditors, 
formulating and implementing a rescue plan. An undeniable benefit of this practice is that 
the CRO can combine his turnaround expertise with the directors’ expertise in operating 
the company to produce a well-drafted plan as well as placating creditors who have doubts 
at the company management.132 As the CRO has the status of being the company 
advocate, instead of being the company’s monitor, the directors will find a comfort zone 
 
127 Ibid  128 Ibid at 400 129  Hann (n125) 34 130 This will be discussed more in the comparison on managing potential abuse (see 7.2.3.4 Abuse Management) 131 ICR Commercial Real Estate (Regina) Ltd. v. Bricore Land Group Ltd., (Re) (2007), 33 C.B.R. (5th) 39 (Sask. Q.B.). 132 R. Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law (Irwin, 2009) at 386 
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to work along with the CRO and co-ordinate their expertise together. This approach is 
more satisfactory than the UK administration insofar as it encourages the incumbent 
directors to contribute their expertise in operating the company and avoids the 
administrator’s unfamiliarity in running the company when he replaces the directors in 
the administration. Also, the appointment of CRO also proves itself more desirable than 
the CVA and the SA in the UK and the procedure under BL2014 in Vietnam. This is 
because though directors are allowed to stay in management under these procedures, they 
cannot alone manage the company sufficiently for operating a company in normal time 
of business is not the same as in the time of crisis.133 Besides, despite the participation of 
IPs, they have a neutral role of monitoring the company and thus cannot involve deeply 
in the company affairs.134 However, these problems can be dealt with if there is the 
participation of the CRO. 
Insolvency practitioners (IPs) 
There are different names for IPs taking part in rescue procedures in the selected 
jurisdictions. In the UK, they are identified as the administrator in the administration, or 
the nominee and then supervisor in the CVA; in Canada, IPs are the trustee in the BIA 
procedure or the monitor in the CCAA procedure; in Vietnam, IPs are the asset 
management officer (AMO). IPs perform a number of roles depending on the rescue 
procedure they take part in, which range from taking control of the company business,135 
 
133 Ibid 134 Canadian court is of opinion that the CRO should be conferred protection from liability similarly to the monitor who is a court’s officer in monitoring the company in rescue procedure. For example, he/she is not deemed to be a director or an officer of the company and any actions against him should be stayed except with leave of court. See Re Northstar Aerospace, Inc. et al. Initial Order of Justice Morawetz, June 14, 2012, issued and entered on June 14, 2012 at paras. 32 to 38 cited by Grant B Moffat, ‘CRO: Chief Restructuring Officer or Cost-effective Restructuring Option’,  <http://www.tgf.ca/resources/publications/publication/cro-chief-restructuring-officer-or-cost-effective-restructuring-option> accessed 12 March 2019 135 For example, the administrator to replace company directors under the administration procedure 
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assisting company directors to draft and implement rescue plans,136 to monitoring and 
reporting to court the implementation of recue.137 The UK, Canada and Vietnam have 
different systems for licensing and monitoring IPs’ professions. In the UK, IPs are 
licensed by five different recognised professional bodies (RPBs) who are self-regulated 
organisations and monitored by the Insolvency Service (IS) to ensure that these bodies 
meet common standards.138 The requirements for a candidate to obtain an IP license are 
to pass the Joint Insolvency Examination Board (JIEB) exam and to have sufficient 
amount of experience in insolvency, which is calculated by a certain number of working 
hours.139 Once an applicant is successfully granted a license, he is required to adhere to 
statements of insolvency practice (SIP) issued by the RPBs to maintain professional 
standards. Furthermore, the RPBs is are charge with monitoring licensed IPs through 
facilitating a system for handling complaints regarding IPs’ conducts and providing 
disciplinary actions.  
The Canadian approach to licensing IPs is different from the UK’s in two 
important respects. First, the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB),140 which 
is a governmental body, directly regulates licenses the IPs (trustee) instead of self-
regulated RBPs in the UK. Second, Canadian requirements for licensing IPs are more 
rigorous than those in the UK. Accordingly, while the UK just requires an applicant to 
 
136 These roles are performed by the nominee/the supervisor under the CVA, the trustee under the BIA restructuring and the monitor under the CCAA restructuring in Canada and the AMO under the procedure in Vietnamese BL2014. Since the UK administrator replaces the director company, he will be the person who drafts the rescue proposal and the directors have to provide information at his request.  137 Most of IPs in the examined procedure have to perform this role. 138 See Insolvency practitioners: recognised professional bodies,   <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/insolvency-practitioners-recognised-professional-bodies/recognised-professional-bodies > accessed 12 March 2019 139 According to ICAEW, the applicant is often required to have at least 600 working hours of experience over three years. See ICAEW, see ‘Become an ICAEW insolvency licence holder’, at  <https://www.icaew.com/technical/insolvency/become-an-insolvency-practitioner-with-icaew/becoming-an-icaew-insolvency-licensed-practitioner> accessed 12 March 2019 140 See Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, at < http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/home> accessed 12 March 2019 
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pass the JIEB exam having certain working experience in insolvency to be eligible for an 
IP license,141 an trustee candidate in Canada is required to successfully complete a number 
of professional courses and exams such as the Chartered Insolvency and Restructuring 
Professional (CIRP) Qualification Program (CQP), the CIRP National Insolvency Exam, 
the Insolvency Counsellor’s Qualification Course and the Oral Board of Examination.142 
While it seems to be the UK’s policy to let IPs themselves earn experience in corporate 
practice, Canadian policy places the emphasis on providing trustee candidates with 
extensive professional training at the beginning, then requires them to earn experience 
with a probation period in which a newly licensed trustee has to actively practise with an 
active established trustee.143  
Regarding IP monitoring, with five self-regulated RPBs regulating IPs, the UK 
system has prompted concerns over maintaining common professional standards and 
consistency in handling complaints about IPs’ conduct among these bodies.144 A 
professional survey of insolvency profession finds that while 39% of IPs think there 
should be one regulator for the profession, 38% feel there should be more than one but 
less than four, and a vast majority of IPs (72%) think that the UK should introduce a 
unified monitoring system and a single complaints system.145 In an attempt to reform IPs 
regulation, the IS has been considering the proposal for introducing a single regulator for 
 
141 See ICEAW (n139) 142 The Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, ‘How to become a Licensed Insolvency Trustee’    <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br01128.html> accessed 13 March 2019 143 Directive No. 13R6, s.20(1) 144 Adrian Walters and Mary Seneviratne, ‘Complaints Handling in the Insolvency Practitioner Profession A Report Prepared for the Insolvency Practices Council’ at p. 79  <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1094757> accessed 13 March 2019 145 R3, ‘The Future of Insolvency Practitioner Regulation’, (2010)  <https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/policy_papers/insolvency_industry/The_future_of_insolvency_practitioner_regulation.pdf> accessed 13 March  2019 
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licensing and monitoring IPs.146 If the UK can successfully implement this proposal, it 
will bring its system of licensing and monitoring IPs closer to that of Canada with only a 
single regulator.  
While IP is a long-established profession in the UK and Canada, it has been a 
primitive profession in Vietnam which was created by the enactment of the BL2014. In 
Vietnam, IPs participating in insolvency procedures are asset management officers 
(AMOs) who are licensed by the Ministry of Justice. The regulations on licensing IPs in 
Vietnam are not as rigorous and effective as those in the UK and Canada. Accordingly, 
the requirement for an applicant to be qualified as an AMO is very simple in that any 
lawyers or auditors can become AMOs without having to take a professional training 
course, professional exam, and experiences.147 Furthermore, a person holding a degree in 
law, economics, accounting and banking with five-year working experience in their field 
can be qualified to apply for an AMO license.148 In the absence of sufficient requirements 
for professional training and assessment in insolvency like those in the UK and Canada, 
the IP’s licensing system in Vietnam apparently cannot create a cadre of IPs who are 
qualified to assist distressed companies in rescue, for example, in drafting and 
implementing rescue proposals as required under the BL2014.149  
Nor could this system provide a sufficient degree of oversight over the IP’s 
profession. There are currently three governmental bodies that monitor IPs in Vietnam, 
namely the Ministry of Justice, the Provincial People Committee, and the Department of 
 
146 The insolvency Service, 2017 Review of Insolvency Practitioner Regulation (2018),  <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/706354/Annual_Review_of_IP_Regulation_2017.pdf > accessed 13 March 2019 147 BL2014: art.12 and Decree 22/2015/NĐ-CP detailing the implementation of articles of the bankruptcy law relating to AMO and asset management and liquidation profession.  148 Ibid 149 BL2014, art.87&93 
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Justice.150 Vietnam appears to pursue the policy towards borrowing expertise of 
governmental departments to monitor AMOs, which is similar to that of Canada with the 
functions of the OSB. However, while the OSB in Canada is a professional department, 
which has long specialised in bankruptcy and insolvency, the mentioned Vietnamese 
government departments have to perform numerous functions apart from licensing and 
monitoring AMOs.151 Therefore, it is unlikely for them to establish sufficient expertise to 
deal with monitoring AMOs. Furthermore, though the law provides these organisations 
are in charge with handling complaints over AMO’s conduct, there has been the lack of 
detailed regulations on how to facilitate assess for lodging complaints and how to handle 
the complaints as well.152 With these apparent shortcomings, the system for regulating 
IPs in Vietnam cannot generate a sufficient degree of expertise and effectiveness like 
those in the UK and Canada. 
Judicial expertise 
The insolvency courts are entrusted and empowered to monitor the compliance of 
the parties with insolvency legislation as well as performing adjudicating functions once 
there is litigation arising from rescue. The extent of court participation in rescue 
procedures is very different among the selected jurisdictions. In the UK, the effectiveness 
of rescue law relies on the role of IPs, while the court involvement in rescue procedure is 
not significant.153 For example, under the UK administration, the administrator can be 
appointed on an out-of-court basis;154 and courts perform their monitoring role over the 
 
150 See the Decree 22/2015/NĐ-CP, art.22-24. Ministry of Justice is a ministry of the central government in Vietnam; the Provincial People Committee is the local government in every province. The Department of Justice is a department within the local government, however, it is still subject to the control of the Ministry of Justice. 151 IPs profession in Vietnam has been officially created by the enactment of the BL 2014 that requires IP to participate in the insolvency procedure. 152 See Chapter Six (6.4.2.2 Expertise) 153 However, UK court still have significant involvement in the Scheme of Arrangement under part 26, the Company Act 2006 154 IA 1986: Sch.B1, para.14,18, 22, 27 
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administration and the CVA through the functions of the administrator and 
nominee/supervisor who has a duty to report to the courts at certain stages of the 
procedures.155 Furthermore, the UK courts tend to endorse the administrator’s discretion 
in conducting a pre-packaged administration to sell a company in rescue.156 By contrast 
to UK courts, Canadian courts have a higher degree of involvement in rescue. For 
example, under the BIA and the CCAA, a rescue plan approved by creditors must be 
approved by courts to ensure it is fair and reasonable.157 Particularly, in the CCAA 
procedure, courts play the role of screening application to assess its viability and decide 
whether to grant an initial order that stays creditor’s actions against the company.158 With 
the approach of liberal interpretation to the CCAA, Canadian courts can flexibly make a 
number of orders to meet the specific corporate rescue cases.159 The great degree of 
flexibility provided by Canadian courts has rendered the CCAA procedure a favourable 
option over the procedure under the BIA for rescuing companies with complex structures 
of debts.  
The different degree of court involvement in rescue in the UK and Canada stems 
from the unique development of insolvency law and practice in each country. As 
previously examined, courts play a significant role in supporting the use of the CCAA in 
Canada.160 Since 1970s Canadian courts have adopted the policy of judicial liberation 
towards interpreting legislation in light of the Parliament policies,161 which allows the 
judicial expertise to be accumulated constantly in providing interpretation into a wide 
range of important matters under the CCAA. Canadian courts have developed an 
 
155  Ibid s.2, s.4(6), and SchB1 para 53&55, and IR 1.29 156 See the comparison on abuse management in section 7.2.3.4 of this chapter 157 BIA: s.59(2) BIA and Re Keddy Motor Inns Ltd. (1992), 12 C.B.R (3d) 245 (N.S.C.A) and Re Mayer (1994), 25 C.B.R. (3d) 113 (Ont. Ct. Gen.Div) 158 CCAA s.11.02(1) & (2) 159 See Chapter Five (5.2.3 The bifurcation of rescue law and the significant role of the courts in Canada) 160 Ibid 161 Elmer A. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974) 
Chapter Seven – Comparison on the Corporate Rescue Laws of the UK, Canada, and Vietnam  
280  
institutional structure and judicial specialisation to deal with corporate insolvency.162 By 
contrast, the practice of employing professionals such as accountants to solve company 
insolvency has been used for a long time in the UK. Especially, in the 19th century when 
the IA1986 was created and shifted its legislative focus towards corporate rehabilitation, 
IP’s roles have become increasingly important in administering the rescue, resulting in 
the strong growth of IPs profession in the UK.163 Borrowing IPs’ expertise in dealing with 
corporate insolvency could be the explanation for why the UK legislatures limit the court 
involvement in rescue.164 
As provided for by the BL2014, the extent of court involvement in rescue 
procedure in Vietnam is quite similar to that in Canada. Accordingly, Vietnamese 
bankruptcy courts perform a number of important functions, including screening 
insolvency application to decide if the procedure should be initiated,165 calling for and 
administering creditor meetings,166 and giving opinions on the rescue plan drafted by the 
company before submitting it to creditors for approval.167 To perform these functions, 
Vietnamese judges must possess a sufficient degree of expertise like those in Canada. 
However, while insolvency judges in the advanced countries such as Canada have a long 
period of time to develop their expertise and been assisted by a well-established IP 
profession, the judges in Vietnam has just familiarised themselves with the insolvency 
law since 1993 when the first insolvency law was enacted. Particularly, the shift of 
legislative focus to corporate rescue has just gained importance with the enactment of the 
 162 Wood (n127) 395 163 J.A.Flood and Eleni Skordaki, ‘Insolvency practitioners and big corporate insolvencies’ ACCA Research Report 43 (ACCA, London, 1995) 9-22 164 However, this does not mean that the UK courts are not capable to deal with complicated insolvency cases. It should be reminded that UK courts still have a high degree of involvement in the Scheme of Arrangement procedure under the Company Act 2006 165 BL2014, art.42 166 Ibid art. 75, 91. 167 Ibid art. 87.1 
Chapter Seven – Comparison on the Corporate Rescue Laws of the UK, Canada, and Vietnam  
281  
legislation in 2014. Therefore, it seems to be unlikely for Vietnamese courts to draw on 
enough expertise to efficiently perform their function as prescribed by the legislation. As 
previously mentioned, Vietnam has been lacking judges who have sufficiently judicial 
capacity to deal with corporate insolvency in the entire state.168 
7.2.3.3 Creditor participation 
Creditors have a very important role in deciding the likelihood of rescue through 
approving, monitoring and providing finance to implement rescue.169 There is a great 
degree of similarity in respect of creditor participation under the rescue law of three 
selected jurisdictions. Specifically, the UK, Canada and Vietnam all have a common 
approach of conferring creditors a right to vote for the approval of a rescue plan.170 Even 
though creditors do not have a direct governance role in rescue, they can exercise this role 
indirectly through the functions of the creditor committee established by the legislation, 
the terms of the agreement between the company and the creditors, or court, and this 
practice is similarly developed in all three countries.171 Conferring creditors such rights 
has the effect of encouraging them to actively participate in rescuing the company. 
However, in order for creditors to actively participate in rescuing the company, the first 
priority is to have a moratorium to prevent their individual enforcement of debts against 
 
168 See Chapter 6 (section 6.4.2.2 Expertise) 169 See Chapter 3 (3.5.2.3 (iv) Creditor participation)  170 According, Under the UK laws, a proposal in the administration must be approved by majority of creditors (rule 2.28, Insolvency Rule 1986), while in the CVA, it is approved when there is approval of 75% by value of all creditor attending creditor meeting (rule 1.19 , IR 1986), in the Scheme of Arrangement procedure, creditors are divided into different classes for voting; and each class, at least 75% by value and more than 50% in number must approve the Scheme (s.899, Company Act 2006). Under Canadian law, both the CCAA and the BIA provides that a proposal must be approved by a majority of creditors representing two-thirds of the value of debt (s.6 (1) CCAA, and s.54(2) and 62(2)(b) BIA). Under the BL2014 in Vietnam, creditor’s resolution for rescue and a proposal must be approved by half of unsecured creditors representing 65% value of debt (The BL 2014: art 81(2) art.91(5)) 171 The creditor committee can be established in the UK administration proceeding by the virtue of Part 17, IR2016 or by the terms of the arrangement under a CVA. In Canada, although there is an absence of statutory provisions regulating this practice, courts can exercise their general authority to appoint the creditor committee under the CCAA proceeding. And under the jurisdiction of Vietnam, a committee can be elected at the creditor meeting (art.82 BL 2014) 
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the company assets. There is the availability of a moratorium under rescue procedures in 
Canada and Vietnam, however, it is not always a case for the UK as a moratorium is 
provided for only under the administration.172 Without a moratorium, it is very difficult 
to call for creditors to participate in rescue under the CVA or the SA in the UK, which 
can lead to the combination between the administration and the CVA or the SA.173 
However, as already mentioned, this combination appears to be costly and lengthy for 
insolvent companies.174 
Concerning the rescue finance or the ‘DIP finance’, it plays an important role in 
funding the implementation of a rescue. However, in order for creditors to provide this 
finance, there must be a guarantee or security that grants the lender of this finance priority 
over existing creditors in the queue of payment. In this regard, the approach of the selected 
countries is very different. Canada endorses the use of the DIP finance as well as granting 
this finance a super-priority over existing creditors in rescue.175 The practice of using this 
finance has been popular in Canada for a long time and courts have been developing 
judicial expertise sufficiently to deal with defining the priority of this finance over other 
existing creditors.176 The current approach under Canadian legislation is to empower 
courts to make an order that grants the DIP financing a super-security against all or part 
of the company property and that this security will have priority over those of any secured 
creditor.177 The effectiveness of this approach relies largely on judicial expertise because 
in deciding this matter, the courts have to take into consideration important issues for 
 
172 As examined, a moratorium is only available under the CVA for small companies (IA 1986, Schedule A1, s.1&2) 173 See Chapter Four (4.2.2.4 The interplay between the administration, the CVA and the SA) 174 Ibid 175 See Chapter Five (5.4.3 Creditors’ participation) 176 Michael B. Rotsztain, ‘Debtor-in-Possession Financing in Canada: Current Law and a Preferred Approach’, (2000) 33 Can. Bus. L.J.283,  < http://www.gsnh.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/AR2000-4T1.pdf> accessed 14 March 2019 177 CCAA, s.11.2(1) & (2) and BIA s.50.6(1) & (3) 
Chapter Seven – Comparison on the Corporate Rescue Laws of the UK, Canada, and Vietnam  
283  
example, whether the finance will improve the rescue viability and whether there are 
creditors who will be materially prejudiced as the result of the order.178 While the 
Canadian approach to the DIP finance is very straightforward, the issue of whether the 
rescue finance should be given a super-priority has become controversial in the UK. There 
is the absence of regulation that directly addresses this finance under the IA1986 although 
the UK seems to allow a similar practice of granting super-priority under the 
administration. For example, s.19(4) and para 99 of Schedule B1 allow the 
administrator’s expenses to enjoy security over other security, which may be interpreted 
to include the DIP finance.179 However, there is a degree of uncertainty over this 
interpretation as the issue of deciding which expenses are the administrator expenses has 
to be dealt with by court on a case-by-case basis.180 The UK Insolvency Service has 
already recognised the importance of the DIP finance to the success of rescue 
implementation and put their proposals for granting this finance a super-priority through 
their Consultation Paper 2009 and 2016.181 However, these proposals have not been 
pursued by the UK Parliament as there has been controversy over how to protect the rights 
of existing creditors and the effect of the proposals on the UK lending practice.182 
Compared to Canada, the difficulty with incorporating the DIP finance in the UK law can 
be explained with the difference in the UK prevailing business culture and practice where 
there is a belief that an existing holder of a floating charge can be in a position to provide 
 
178 CCAA, s.11.2(4) and BIA s.50.6(5) 179 IA 1986 180 Freakley v Centre Reinsurance International Co, [2006] BCC 971, and Bibby Trade Finance Ltd v. McKay [2006] All ER 226 181 Insolvency Service, Consultation Paper 2016,   <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/525523/A_Review_of_the_Corporate_Insolvency_Framework.pdf > accessed 18 March 2019 182 Jennifer Payne, ‘The future of UK debt restructuring’ (October 5, 2016), p.11.  SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2848160 >or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2848160> accessed 18 March 2019 
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the DIP finance.183 Nevertheless, in the absence of a moratorium and regulations on the 
DIP finance, the UK rescue law appears not to encourage creditor participation. 
The case of Vietnam law is a nuanced distinction in comparison with the UK and 
Canada. Though the BL2014 provides for this finance, the regulation on the priority of 
this finance does not provide the lender with incentives to fund the company in rescue. 
According to art 54, the rescue finance will rank behind the payment for secured creditors, 
liquidation expense, and the payment for salary, employment leave, social insurance, and 
health insurance for employees.184 In addition, the BL2014 does not encourage the 
participation of secured creditors by allowing these creditors to enforce security against 
the company’s assets out of the insolvency procedure.185 Due to the lack of priority for 
the rescue finance, a secured creditor will tend to opt for enforcing debts in the collateral 
instead of using the secured assets to fund the company.186 The failure of Vietnam law to 
consider the important role of the DIP finance in rescue can be explained with the fact 
that rescue law and practice have still been a new area that demands the legislatures to 
have more time and experience to be familiar with.  As such, of the three selected 
jurisdictions, Canada has emerged from the comparison as the jurisdiction with the most 
sufficient response to the issue of creditor participation.   
7.2.3.4 Abuse Management  
Managing director’s abuse  
As previously examined, the selected jurisdictions have different approaches to 
employing models of rescue administration. For example, the UK employs three different 
models under its rescue law, the PIP in the administration, the DIP in the SA, and the 
 
183 Ibid 11 184 BL2014, art.54 185 Ibid art.91(5) 186 See Chapter Six (6.4.2.3 Creditor participation) 
Chapter Seven – Comparison on the Corporate Rescue Laws of the UK, Canada, and Vietnam  
285  
hybrid model in the CVA. Meanwhile, Canada and Vietnam share a similarity in adopting 
the hybrid model. Of all the procedures examined, the UK administration most likely 
open to abuse. Though the PIP model replaces directors in management, the abuse arising 
tends to be associated with the director’s conduct.187 Accordingly, in a fear of being 
replaced by the administrator, the directors are likely to conceal as much as the fact that 
the company has been in insolvency and engage in risky activities with the hope to rescue 
the company by themselves.188 This attempt reduces the livelihood of rescue because such 
risky activities could lead to the loss of the company assets which are necessary for the 
implementation of a rescue plan.189 Besides, the directors tend to not co-operate with the 
administrator once the administration is initiated.190 The UK law tackles this abuse by 
imposing a monetary penalty on directors under the IA1986191 or disqualifying errant 
directors from serving as director at any company by courts for between two to fifteen 
years.192 Nevertheless, the imposition of a heavy penalty is insufficient to tackle the 
director abuse as once the directors learn they will be replaced in the administration, 
severe penalties seem not to provide them with incentives to initiate the procedure in a 
timely manner as well as co-operating with the administrator after the administration is 
initiated.193 
In contrast to the PIP model, the procedures following the DIP model allow the 
directors to remain in office. The SA under the UK Company Act 2006 is a representative 
of the DIP model under which creditors exercise their vote for approval of rescue proposal 
 
187 Hann (n125) 139 188 Ibid at 139 189 Ibid 139 190D. Baird and E. Morrison, ‘Bankruptcy Decision Making’ (2001) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 356, 369 191 The IA 1986, s.214 Wrongful trading 192 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA), s. 6 and 10. There is a change in the disqualification of directors that was introduced into the CCDA by the IA 2000, which allows the Secretary of the State to accept a disqualification taking where it is satisfied a person had conducts that make him unfit to be a director of a company 193 Hann (n125) 134 
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while the court significantly involves in administering and monitoring rescue. There is 
potential director’s bias in favour of a rescue option rather than other options that produce 
better results to the creditors, such as liquidation because the rescue option can prolong 
their tenure and use their control power to get some benefits for themselves.194 However, 
this abuse can be effectively tackled with the heavily judicial involvement in hearing 
important matters, such as the scheme’s viability, classification of creditors into voting 
classes, and sanction of the scheme approved by creditors. Significant involvement of the 
court can be an assurance to prevent director’s abuse of the procedure. 
It is a striking similarity that the hybrid model is employed under rescue laws of 
the selected jurisdictions, with the CVA under the UK1986 in the UK, the two rescue 
procedures under the BIA and the CCAA in Canada and the rescue procedure under the 
BL2014 in Vietnam. As the hybrid model employs IP’s functions to monitor the directors 
in rescue, it can produce more satisfactory results in abuse management than in the PIP 
and DIP model. On the one hand, by allowing company directors to remain in office, the 
hybrid model encourages rescue decisions to be made by directors in a timely manner as 
well as incentivising them to contribute their expertise in the implementation of rescue 
proposals, which is an efficient response to the shortcomings associated with the 
director’s delay in commencement of rescue procedure and director’s non-cooperation 
with IPs under the PIP model, as discussed with the UK administration. On the other 
hand, the hybrid model enhances the level of monitoring over the directors under the DIP 
model. The hybrid model brings IPs into the rescue procedure to enhance the monitoring 
of the court in that IPs are required to report to the court true nature of the company affairs 
so that the court can make sound judgments. Nevertheless, it should be noted that not all 
hybrid procedures produce the same degree of monitoring over director’s activities. For 
 
194 Hann (n125) 137 
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example, the BIA procedure in Canada and the CVA procedure in the UK can be seen to 
have a low level of monitoring as these procedures are carried out on an out-of-court 
basis195 and the courts do not have the role to decide if they should be initiated.196 As the 
court’s involvement is very limited, these procedures have to rely on the monitoring of 
creditors and IPs.197 By contrast, the rescue procedure under the CCAA in Canada and 
the one under the BL2014 in Vietnam can be considered to produce a high degree of 
monitoring from not only the creditors and the IPs but also from courts.198 
 Managing abuse arising from pre-pack administration under the IA 1986 and pre-
pack sales under the CCAA 
The pre-pack administration under the IA 1986 of the UK and the pre-pack sales 
under the CCAA of Canada share a very similar feature in that they involve an 
arrangement for sale of assets or business of an insolvent company before the 
commencement of the formal insolvency procedure, and when the company enters into 
formal insolvency procedure, the sale will be effected immediately without the need for 
creditor approval. As previously examined, this kind of sale brings about several benefits, 
such as retaining the company value, preserving more job and providing better returns for 
secured creditors.199 However, this sale poses a danger that it can be purported to provide 
the purchaser more benefits over other creditors who are not informed about the sale until 
its completion, or it may be the case where the business is sold back to the company 
 195 BIA, s.50.4(1) & (2) and s.62(1) and IA 1986 s.2. Courts only involve in the procedure once there is a creditor challenging the initiation of these procedures 196 Under the CVA, the nominee has the duty to report the court on the company affair, however, a negative report to court does not have the effect of prevent the CVA to be presented to creditors for approval (IA 1986, s.2) 197 The trustee in the BIA has a number of statutory duties to perform, while the supervisor in the CVA will perform their duties according to the terms of the arrangement. 198 See Chapter Five (5.4.2 Expertise) and Six (6.4.2.2 Expertise) 199 See Chapter Four (4.2.2.1.6 The pre-packaged administration)  
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directors (phoenix trading)200 or the parties connected to the directors at an unfair price.201 
Because this practice is not provided for by the BL2014 in Vietnam, the comparison is 
conducted with the rescue laws of Canada and the UK. 
Canada and the UK have adopted a different approach in dealing with such abuse. 
Under Canadian law, it is the courts who have the power to authorise this sale.  Though 
the sale has been carried out before the initiation of the CCAA procedure, it is subject to 
the same level of scrutiny as those carried out after the CCAA takes place.202 In making 
their decision, the courts have to consider a range of factors such as the monitor’s opinion, 
the effects of the sale on other creditors and the sale consideration in comparison with the 
market value.203 For the sale to parties related to the company, the courts only grant their 
authorisation so long as the sale has been made with good faith effort and the 
consideration is more than that offered by other parties.204 While the Canadian approach 
relies on the judicial scrutiny and approval over the pre-packaged sale, the UK approach 
is to empower the administrator with discretion to conduct the sale, and there is no need 
for the administration to call for the initial creditor meeting to approve a proposal for the 
pre-pack sale.205 Because the language of the IA1986 does not expressly deal with the 
 
200 The UK Parliament, ‘Phoenix trading’ (2017)  <https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN04083> accessed 20 March 2019 201 R3, ‘Pre-packaged Sales’, <https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/publications/press/Pre-packs_briefing.pdf> accessed 20 March 2019 202 Nelson Education Ltd, Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List), Court File CV-15-10961-00CL, and Primus Telecommunications, Inc., et al., Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List), Court File CV16-11257-00CL. 203 CCAA s.36(3) 204 Ibid s.36(4) 205 The para 3, Schedule B1 of the IA 1986 provides that the administrator has to perform his function to pursue hierarchy of three objectives, namely (a) rescuing the company, (b) achieving better result for creditors than in the case of winding up, and (c) realising asset to distribute to secured or preferential creditors. According to this hierarchy, the administrator has to perform the objective (a) and (b) first, yet he can decide to pursue the objective (c) if he thinks it can provide better results for the creditors than the former options.205 Undertaking the pre-pack can be seen as the pursuit of the objective (c) as it involves a sale of the company asset. Pursuing this objective does not require the administrator to have the creditor approval as by the virtue of para 52 of the Schedule B1, once the administrator thinks it is impossible to achieve the objective (a) and (b), the administrator does not have to call for a creditor meeting. 
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pre-pack, nor is it the intention of the Parliament,206 the administrator’s discretion to apply 
this procedure is likely to give rise to litigation at court. However, the UK court appears 
to consistently endorse the practice of using the pre-pack and are reluctant to intervene in 
the business judgment made by the administrator.207 The concern over potential 
misconduct of the administrator in exercising this discretion has prompted the IP 
regulators, the RPBs, to introduce solution to deal with creditor complaints over the 
administrator. The RPBs now requires an administrator to provide creditors with the 
SIP16 statement under which he must provide the creditors with explanation and 
justification for electing the pre-pack, disclosing information about the sale and 
identification of purchaser and valuation.208 The compliance with the SIP16 is monitored 
by the Insolvency Service with the breach of this requirement subject the administrator 
to disciplinary actions.209 
The UK approach to pre-pack sale is more likely to invite abuse as compared to 
that of Canada. It can be seen that the decision to sell the company business is not a small 
matter but an important one for it directly affects the interest of many creditors. While the 
pre-pack sale can be only decided by courts in Canada, which can command a degree of 
public confidence, it is discretionarily decided by the administrator, which can result in 
numerous complaints from creditors who were not consulted in the sale. As the judicial 
intervention is rarely exercised in the UK to deal with this issue,210 it appears to be 
 
206 A. Keay and P. Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal (Jordans, 3nd, 2012), p.129 207 DKLL Solicitors v. HMRC [2008] 1 BCLC 112, Re Kayley Vending Limited [2009] BBC 578, Re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch), [2010] BCC 295, cited by Keay and Walton, Ibid at 131 208 See an example of SIP16 by the R3 at <https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/technical_library/SIPS/SIP%2016%20Version%203%20Nov%202015.pdf> accessed 21 March 2019 209 See Insolvency Service, Report on the Operation of Statement of Insolvency Practice 16, 1 January to 31 December 2011 210  The courts exercise the intervention only where there is a conflict of interest. For example, in VE Vegas Investors IV LLC and others v Shinners and others [2018] EWHC 186 (Ch), the court removed the administrators who had conducted a pre-pack sale to sell the company to its former management. 
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shortcomings of the UK legislators for not limiting the administrator’s discretion 
regarding this matter. Without a requirement for a court order or creditor approval, there 
is a possibility that the UK administrator can make a decision driven by an influential 
creditor, such as the purchaser. This may happen where an administrator, under the time 
pressure of eight weeks to present a proposal to creditors,211 attempts to complete his duty 
as early as possible, or where the administrator tactically acts as a receiver of a creditor 
who wants to buy the company business at a good price by the pre-pack though the 
administrator is required to act in the interest of creditors as a whole.212 The requirement 
of submitting the SIP report appears not to be sufficient enough to prevent the occurrence 
of this abuse because it serves the purpose of disclosing to creditors information regarding 
a transaction already entered into by the administrator and it does not confer creditors a 
right to vote against it. Furthermore, failing to comply with this requirement is not serious 
enough for the administrator to be revoked his license by IP regulators.213 This thesis 
takes a view that the imposition of severe penalties on the administrator after granting 
him with discretion does not seem to be a sound policy because managing abuses 
associated with the pre-pack sale should be a preventative measure, where the abuses are 
about to arise, rather than a punitive approach after it has already arisen.  
 7.3 Recommendations for Vietnam to improve the effectiveness of its rescue 
law 
 7.3.1 Should Vietnam have diverse approaches to rescue procedures? 
Presently, Vietnam provides for a single procedure for corporate rescue under the 
BL 2014, following the hybrid model that allows incumbent directors to run the business 
 
211 IA1986: Sch.B1, para 52 212 Ibid para 3(3) 213 The Insolvency Service, Report on the Operation of Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (July-December/2009) at 3 
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under the oversight AMOs and courts. The UK and Canadian diverse approach could be 
an option for Vietnam to consider. However, the thesis argues that the diverse approach 
of the UK appears not to be a good recommendation for Vietnam for several reasons. 
First, in following this approach, a company has to face a number of options and 
difficulties in evaluating which option is the best for it. Secondly, the diverse approach 
of the UK suffers the drawback of lacking a moratorium to prevent creditors from taking 
actions against the company under the CVA and the SA, which makes it difficult for the 
use of these procedures, while the combination with the administration could be to a more 
expensive and lengthy procedure. Thirdly, regarding the UK administration, it does not 
appear to be a suitable recommendation for Vietnam as the foundation of the 
administration, which is the practice of the appointment of a receiver by a secured creditor 
to run the company business and realise its assets to pay the creditors, has not been 
developed in Vietnam. Furthermore, the administration model runs in contrast to the 
policy of allowing directors to stay in office that has been unchanged since the enactment 
of the first insolvency legislation in 1993.  
 The Canadian approach is another model for Vietnam to consider. While simpler 
rescue cases are settled by a less expensive, rule-based procedure under the BIA, 
complicated rescue cases will be dealt with by a costly but more flexible procedure under 
the CCAA.214 The bifurcation of procedures finds its merit in that simpler rescue cases 
can be settled in an economical fashion that saves unnecessary costs arising in dealing 
with the more complex ones. However, the thesis takes the view that Vietnam should not 
follow this approach as the current single rescue procedure under the BL2014 has offered 
the benefit a simplicity for an insolvent company. The cost arising from the IPs and court 
 
214 The CCAA procedure is eligible to the companies with the amount of debt obligation exceeding C$5 million (CCAA, s.3(1)) 
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involvement is not a very problem because simpler rescue cases will be dealt with sooner 
and cheaper than complicated rescue cases with a procedure.  
 7.3.2 Recommendation for time and cost involved in rescue  
 The BL2014 provides a single procedure to deal with corporate rescue and 
liquidation. Accordingly, when an application is filed at court, it neither serves the 
purpose of rescuing nor liquidating a company, rather, it petitions the court for 
commencing the insolvency procedure.215 When the court decides to commence the 
procedure,216 the first creditor meeting is called to pass a resolution on whether the 
company will be liquidated or rescued.217 If the decision is to rescue the company, there 
will be the second creditor meeting initiated to decide the approval of the proposal.218 In 
the Vietnam chapter, the thesis has pointed out that the requirement for calling two 
creditor meetings is not a satisfactory regulation because it unnecessarily adds time and 
cost to the rescue procedure and does not motivate creditors to vote for the plan.219 
Creditors are likely to opt for rescuing a company at the first meeting so long as the 
company has provided them with sufficient evidence on rescue viability, such as a well-
drafted rescue plan. A rescue plan presented at the first creditor meeting not only provides 
creditors with a basis to assess the rescue viability but also makes them realise that the 
company has seriously been aware of their financial situation and has already had a plan 
to fix it. If the company can do it at the first creditor meeting, there is no need for calling 
the second creditor meeting. Therefore, in order to save time and cost, this thesis 
 
215 BL2014, art.26-29 216 Ibid art.42 217 Ibid art.83 218 Ibid art.91 219 See Chapter Six (6.4.2.1 Time and cost) 
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recommends Vietnam to amend this regulation to require the company to provide for the 
approval of the rescue resolution and the rescue plan with only one creditor meeting.  
 Furthermore, this thesis suggests that Vietnam should shorten the time for 
presenting a rescue proposal to the creditors. Presently, the BL2014 allows the company 
a three-month period to sort out its financial difficulty by informal measures before 
entering into the formal insolvency procedure,220 which incentivises a company to be 
aware of its financial affairs and have a course of solutions to it. In addition, when the 
insolvency procedure is initiated, the legislation still confers a debtor company a generous 
amount of time, with five months before presenting a proposal to creditors.221 This 
duration is very unnecessarily long for the company and can bring danger to the viability 
of rescue once the creditors have to wait for a long time and tend to select a shorter route 
for recovering their debts, such as liquidation. 
 In this regard, the UK administration and the Canadian BIA could be considered 
a good recommendation for Vietnam. Under the UK administration, the timeframe for the 
administrator is very strict, within eight weeks of his appointment to formulate a 
proposal222 and within ten weeks of his appointment to call for a creditor meeting.223 
Similarly, under the Canadian BIA procedure, where an insolvent company has not 
formulated a proposal, after filing a notice of intention to make a proposal, it is given a 
 
220 According to art. 4(1), BL2014, Vietnam does not reply on the cash-flow test or the balance-sheet test to define whether a company is insolvent. Instead, when a company cannot be paid a due debt to a creditor, after three months since the debt becomes due, the creditor can file an application to initiate the insolvency procedure against the company. 221 Under the BL2014, between the filing of the application and the commencement of the procedure, the company has thirty days to wait for court’s decisions (art.42) between the commencement of the procedure to the first creditor meeting, it has the maximum of ninety days to do the asset inventory and prepare for the creditor meeting (thirty days for doing asset inventory with two possible extensions, one of each is thirty days) (art.65) and another thirty-day period between the first and the second creditor meeting to draft the rescue proposal. (article 87) 222 IA 1986: Schedule B1, para 49 223 Ibid para 51. There may be an extension, however, subject to creditor consent and court approval (para 107 and 108) 
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thirty-day period to submit the proposal to the trustee.224 Vietnam law should have a 
similar approach to shortening the time for the company to present a proposal to creditors 
like those in the UK and Canada. Though a time limit can put a certain degree of pressure 
on the company, this has the advantage of making the company more aware of its 
financial difficulty to seek professional assistance at the early stage of its crisis. 
Furthermore, the time limit above seems not to be a difficulty for an insolvent company 
as before entering into the formal insolvency procedure, the BL2014 gives a debtor 
company a grace period of three months to resolve its financial crisis. Therefore, in 
addition to this period, the time limit presented by the UK administration and the BIA in 
Canada appears not to place much pressure on the company.  
 7.3.3. Recommendations for Vietnam to enhance expertise contributed to 
rescue 
 Following the hybrid model of rescue administration, the BL2014 provides for a 
procedure that allows the incumbent directors to hold the office under the supervision of 
the court and AMOs. In the above comparison, this thesis has identified shortcomings of 
Vietnamese law in regulating the contribution of expertise to the rescue procedure. In 
overcoming the shortcomings, there are recommendations for Vietnam as follows. First, 
Vietnam should consider the Canadian practice of appointing the chief of restructuring 
officer (CRO) to work along with the company directors in running the company during 
rescue time. The appointment of CRO not only enhances the directors’ expertise but also 
increases confidence in creditors who have doubts at the incumbent directors’ ability in 
running the business, thereby partly gaining their approval for the rescue plan. Second, 
Vietnam needs to work more on the issue of licensing and governing the IP profession.  
 
224 BIA, s.50.4  
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Under the BL 2014, a lawyer, an auditor or a person who holds a relevant degree with 
five-year working experience in the degree-related areas can file an application to obtain 
an AMO license. In the absence of professional training and assessment, the regulation 
on the AMO eligibility is too simple to guarantee that AMO can contribute a sufficient 
degree of expertise in the rescue procedure. Therefore, Vietnam should consider the 
approach of the UK and Canada to introduce the IP professional exam as a part of 
eligibility conditions for issuing an AMO license. Besides, professional education is a 
key factor in the development of this profession. Vietnam should consider the possibility 
of offering AMO applicants intensive professional training like those in Canada. It is 
feasible for Vietnam in doing so because the country has recently received support from 
international donors, such as the World Bank and INSOL International in providing 
training for IPs.225  
 Apart from licensing AMOs, what Vietnam should consider is to monitor their 
profession. Presently, the Ministry of Justice who issues AMO license is also responsible 
for monitoring their profession.226 Apart from this department, the local authorities, which 
are the Provincial People Committee, and its sub-body, which is the Department of Justice 
are in charge of handling complaints relating to IPs.227 However, as previously examined, 
there is a great deal of challenges for these bodies to perform their functions properly 
because they are responsible for numerous administrative tasks and do not specialise in 
insolvency, which makes it hard for them to develop expertise in monitoring AMO.228 
Therefore, a recommendation by this thesis is that Vietnam should create a governmental 
 
225 Chu Van Anh, ‘IFC Provides Training to Help Promote Insolvency Resolution in Vietnam’, <https://ifcextapps.ifc.org/ifcext%5Cpressroom%5Cifcpressroom.nsf%5C0%5C02AA627112D0F48C85257EE40010FFF8> accessed 27 March 2019 226 See the Decree 22/2015 of the Government on clarifying provisions of the BL2014 relating to AMOs and AMLC, art.23 227 Ibid art.24 228 See Chapter Six (6.4.2.1 Time and cost) 
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organisation that specialises in insolvency like the Office of Superintendent in 
Bankruptcy in Canada or the Insolvency Service in the UK.  This organisation could be 
exclusively responsible for licensing and supervising AMOs and it can even consult the 
insolvency law-making in Vietnam. As a governmental body, this organisation can ensure 
the same degree of public confidence as the Ministry of Justice and by exclusively 
focusing its functions in insolvency areas, it can deal with licensing and monitoring 
AMOs in a more effective way than this ministry. Another possibility for Vietnam to 
consider is to follow the UK approach in devolving the monitoring of this profession on 
hands of a self-regulated professional body such as RBPs in the UK. However, the thesis 
is of the opinion that this approach not suitable for Vietnam because of two reasons. First, 
the IP profession has just introduced in Vietnam with the enactment of the BL2014, thus 
it takes time for the establishment of such professional organisation. Second, as the IP 
profession has been very primitive in Vietnam, a self-regulatory professional body cannot 
command confidence for the public about its ability and integrity.  
 Finally, as courts have a considerate involvement in rescue procedure under the 
BL 2014, insolvency judges should possess a sufficient degree of commercial expertise 
to perform their functions. As previously observed, insolvency judges in Vietnam need 
to have more training to enhance their judicial capacity in dealing with insolvency 
cases.229 Therefore, the training for insolvency judges should be vehemently enhanced to 
guarantee that they can effectively participate in the settlement of corporate insolvency 
and restructuring. 
 
229 See Neil Cooper, ‘Vietnam Insolvency Administrator Training’ in the Quarterly Journal of INSOL International (4th Quarter 2015) at 13. Recently, there was a series of a judicial training for Vietnamese judges organised by the Supreme Court with the support of the International Financial Corporation and the INSOL International in the three regions of Vietnam in May 2018,  <https://congly.vn/hoat-dong-toa-an/nghiep-vu/hoi-nghi-tap-huan-ve-luat-pha-san-viet-nam-danh-cho-cac-tham-phan-254796.html> accessed 27 March 2019  
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7.3.4 Recommendation for Vietnam to enhance creditor participation 
 There are two issues Vietnam should consider to improve creditor participation. 
First, the timeframe for initiating rescue and submitting the proposal to creditors should 
be shortened to encourage creditors to approve the proposal. With a three-month period 
to file an application, followed by a period of more than five months for a rescue proposal 
presented before the creditor meeting,230 the creditors would lose their patience and 
confidence for rescue and tend to favour expeditious procedures such as liquidation. 
Second, it is very important that Vietnam law should encourage creditors to provide the 
rescue finance to implement a rescue proposal by amending the priority of this finance 
under the art 54 of the BL2014. The approach of Canada law in granting the lender of the 
rescue finance a super-priority could be a recommendation for Vietnam. However, 
Vietnam should consider this cautiously as a granting super-priority status may result in 
a conflict with the existing creditors and create potential abuse when the lender of the 
rescue finance uses his position to influence the company directors to act for the benefit 
of his interest. Therefore, this thesis suggests that the law should grant insolvency courts 
a right to decide this matter on a case-by-case basis.  
 7.3.5 Recommendation on abuse management 
 The rescue procedure under the BL2014 is based on the hybrid model that allows 
the company directors to retain their management power. Preventing potential abuse from 
this model lies in the facilitation of the oversight over director’s conduct through 
monitoring functions legislatively assigned to IPs and court. In doing so, Vietnam should 
have regulations and provide training to ensure these actors acquire a sufficient degree of 
expertise to participate in the rescue. Another issue should be mention is that Canada and 
 
230 See section 7.3.2 of this chapter  
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the UK have offered Vietnam experiences on how to deal with the pre-pack sale and 
administration. It is predicted that once the rescue practice is sufficiently developed in 
Vietnam, it is the matter of time for the pre-pack sale or pre-pack administration to exit. 
A lesson Vietnam can learn from the two jurisdictions is that while allowing this 
procedure can bring certain benefits such as saving time sale and preserving the 
company’s value and employment, the abuse arising in this procedure, such as director’s 
phoenix trading must be effectively dealt with. 
 7.3.6 Facilitating a compatible environment for implementing the new 
legislation 
 With the enactment of the BL2014, the rescue law in Vietnam has come very 
closer to those of the Western countries. In light of the legal transplant theories discussed 
at the beginning of this chapter and based on the evidence of the failure of Vietnam in 
adopting foreign insolvency in the past, the thesis suggests that Vietnam must facilitate a 
supportive environment under which the BL2014 can be fully implemented. To facilitate 
this environment, Vietnam has to works on the following issues. First, there has to be an 
attitude change towards corporate insolvency and rescue. Due to the influence of 
traditional values, corporate insolvency has been perceived as a taboo in Vietnam, which 
is identified as one of factors that preclude insolvent companies from relying on the 
formal insolvency procedure to resolve their insolvency although Vietnam shifted its 
economy from a centrally planned to a market liberalism model.231 However, once the 
market economy has become entrenched and developed,232 the author believes that 
corporate insolvency will be perceived as a normal phenomenon of the economy instead 
of a taboo.  In this context, the shift of legislative focus towards corporate rescue will lead 
 231 Gillespie (n51) 232 See the World Bank on overview of Vietnam market economy at  <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/vietnam/overview> accessed 28 March 2019 
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to an attitude change and encourage insolvent companies to rely on the procedure under 
the legislation. However, it is not sufficient for Vietnam to facilitate a supportive 
environment for corporate rescue by merely enacting new legislation. There is the need 
for the government, bankers and other related parties to endorse and support corporate 
rescue through making and implementing their policies. 
 Second, the rescue legal framework of Vietnam only functions well like those in 
Western jurisdictions such as Canada and the UK provided it is supported by insolvency 
institutions such as courts and the market agencies such as IPs. Therefore, Vietnam should 
enhance regulations on licensing and monitoring IPs in combination with facilitating 
professional education and training for IPs and insolvency judges so that these actors can 
effectively support the implementation of the BL2014 
 Third, the rule of law should be enhanced in Vietnam. In the past, Vietnam 
maintained a centrally planned economy under which the state used its managerial power 
to resolve insolvency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through administrative orders 
instead of recourse to the formal legislation. This practice still occurred when the first and 
the second insolvency bankruptcy were passed in 1993 and 2004 although Vietnam 
decided to transform its economy towards market liberalism in 1986.233 However, when 
the economic transition has gained its momentum as now, Vietnam is demanded to 
enhance the principle of ‘rule of law’ in its legal framework in order to serve economic 
development.234 As a result, Vietnam has significantly narrowed the public economic 
sectors through privatising state-owned enterprises (SOEs),235 supporting the 
 
233 Gillespie, (n50) 234 Ngo Ba Thanh, ‘The 1992 Constitution and the Rule of Law The Constitution 1992’ in Carlyle A. Thayer and David G. Marr, Vietnam and the Rule of Law (Australian National University, 1993) 81-115. The ‘rule of law’ principle was first adopted under article 12 of the Constitution 1992 and now article 8, the Constitution 2013 235 Before 1986 when Vietnam did not initiate the innovation policy, there had been 12000 SOEs in the entire state, however, this number is expected to be only 103 in 2020 according to the Decision No. 
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development of the private economic sector, and encourage the use of insolvency 
legislation to resolve the financial difficulty of insolvent companies, including SOEs.236 
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that there has been still the state’s involvement and 
intervention in restructuring SOEs through the establishment of debt-trading companies. 
In 2020 when Vietnam is expected to meet the target of privatisation that allows only 103 
SOEs to exist,237 the state’s intervention in corporate restructuring should be limited, 
leaving the insolvency affairs of all companies to be decided by the legislation and the 
market. If the government consistently implement this policy, the law on insolvency and 
corporate rescue law will be fully operating in Vietnam.  
7.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter has provided a comparison on the rescue procedures and the rescue 
administration models of the UK, Canada and Vietnam with the objectives of highlighting 
the best practice emerging in each jurisdiction, and thereby providing recommendations 
for Vietnam to enhance the effectiveness of its rescue law. Based on the discussion on the 
theories on comparative law, this comparison has not been constrained to the 
functionalism approach that seeks similarities among the rescue laws in performing their 
function. Instead, the chapter furthered the comparison under an exhaustive comparative 
approach that emphasises not only the similarities but also the differences among the 
selected legal systems in respect of their legal culture and legislative framework of 
corporate rescue. Furthermore, endorsing the theory of legal transplantation that requires 
the imported laws to be compatible with the legal culture in the host country, the thesis 
 58/2016/QD-TTg which specified certain categories of enterprises to be restructured from 2016 to 2020 and state ownership ratios in various SOEs and sectors. 236 As stated by the Minister of Finance, Dinh Tien Dung, in responding to the question by a representative at the Vietnam National Assembly Meeting in October 2018, SOEs who are unable to pay debts will be liquidated under the BL 2014, <https://vov.vn/kinh-te/doanh-nghiep/doanh-nghiep-nha-nuoc-neu-khong-tra-duoc-no-se-cho-pha-san-832359.vov> accessed 29 March 2019. 237 See the Decision No. 58/2016/QD-TTg (n235) 
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took into consideration the difference in Vietnamese legal culture when making 
recommendations for Vietnam to improve its rescue law based on the experiences of the 
UK and Canada.  
The significant similarity among rescue laws of the countries is that all of them 
follow the policy of ‘business rescue’ that aims to preserve the going-concern values of a 
company instead of ‘company rescue’ that purports to preserve the company as a whole. 
Despite this similarity, there are striking differences emerging from the comparison. The 
UK is the jurisdiction that has the most diverse approach to rescue, with three procedures 
following different models of DIP, PIP and the hybrid model. Meanwhile, though Canada 
and Vietnam similarly employ the hybrid model in their rescue law, Canada provides for 
two rescue procedures as compared to the single procedure in Vietnam. The difference in 
this employment is attributed to the legal development, insolvency legislative policy and 
the legal culture where the laws have operated.  
The comparison of rescue laws of the three countries under the four benchmarks 
of time and cost, expertise, creditor participation and abuse management produces the 
following findings. First, for the benchmark of time and cost, rescue laws of the countries 
perform very differently due to the existence of different procedures. A lesson drawn 
from the examination is that in reducing time and cost, a company should be provided 
with a suitable period of time to formulate a proposal to win the creditor approval and 
that the procedures for dealing with more complicated cases require more time and cost 
involved in than those designed to settle simpler cases. In reducing the professional fee 
in rescue, the laws of the UK and Vietnam have a more satisfactory approach than 
Canadian law in allowing creditors to participate in the negotiation of this fee. Second, as 
for the benchmark of expertise, among other actors, IPs have proved themselves to be an 
increasingly important participant in monitoring the company and assisting courts in 
Chapter Seven – Comparison on the Corporate Rescue Laws of the UK, Canada, and Vietnam  
302  
making decisions and Canada appeared to be more effective than the UK and Vietnam 
counterparts in providing rigorous regulations on licensing and regulating IPs. Third, 
regarding creditor participation, it is important for a rescue law to have a moratorium to 
stay creditor action as well as encouraging them to contribute the rescue finance to 
support the implementation of a rescue plan. In this regard, Canadian law has a more 
satisfactory approach than the UK and Vietnam with the facilitation of a super-priority 
for the rescue finance to encourage creditors to contribute this finance for implementing 
rescue. Fourth, the best practice to manage abuse is to rely on the oversight role of IPs 
and court. For some special cases of pre-pack administration or pre-pack sale, there 
should be judicial involvement in scrutinising and approving it like the Canadian 
approach, instead of entrusting IPs with discretion to deal with this matter as under the 
UK administration. 
     Based on the results of the comparison, several recommendations have been 
made for Vietnam to improve the effectiveness of its rescue law. Vietnam should shorten 
the time for presenting a rescue proposal to creditors, enhance regulations on licensing 
and monitoring AMOs and have regulations that incentives creditors to provide rescue 
finance to implement rescue. In tandem with revising the current legislation, Vietnam 
should facilitate a supportive environment in which insolvency institutions such as courts 
and market support agencies such as IPs sufficiently participate in the rescue procedure. 
The facilitation of this environment requires the state’s adherence to the ‘rule of law’ and 
limit its intervention in the insolvency of SOEs, leaving the insolvency of all companies 
to be decided by the current legislation. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Research objectives and contribution 
This thesis is a comparative study on the corporate rescue laws in the three 
jurisdictions of the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, and Vietnam. The main objective of 
the thesis is to offer Vietnam recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of its rescue 
laws. In pursuing this objective, the thesis conducted the assessment of the effectiveness 
of the models of rescue administration employed under the rescue laws of the three 
selected countries, based on the four evaluation benchmarks of time and cost, expertise, 
creditor participation and abuse management to identify best practices emerging from the 
laws of the selected countries. The recommendations for Vietnam have been drawn from 
these practices in consideration of the compatibility between these practices and the 
distinct legal environment of Vietnam.  
In terms of originality, this thesis has proved itself to make a contribution of 
knowledge insofar as it has launched an examination on the extent to which the models 
of administration are reflected in the rescue legislation of the UK, Canada and Vietnam 
and the extent to which they can achieve effectiveness through an evaluation guided by 
the set of four benchmarks. While much of the literature has already focused on 
examining rescue procedures in individual countries such as those in the UK and Canada, 
the thesis departs from this direction by narrowing the research topic to the issue of the 
effectiveness of the rescue law and the models of administration in the rescue procedures 
under a comparative approach. By juxtaposing the laws of the selected countries into a 
critical comparison and establishing a set of benchmarks for conducting the comparison, 
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the thesis has highlighted the best practices emerging from the laws of the selected 
countries. In addition to this, the thesis has been conducted against the backdrop of the 
rarity of studies on Vietnamese corporate rescue law, particularly there is an emerging 
need for examining the effectiveness of the new insolvency legislation, the Bankruptcy 
Law 2014, which has been taking effect in the country since 2015. As a critical assessment 
for the newly applicable legislation, recommendations made by this thesis will offer 
Vietnam an international perspective to reconsider the issue of how to improve the 
effectiveness of its rescue law. 
 8.2 The thesis findings 
The models of rescue administration under the laws of the three countries 
Three models of rescue administration have been examined by the thesis, namely 
the Debtor-in-Possession (DIP), the Professional-in-Possession (PIP) and the hybrid 
model, which combines the features of the DIP and the PIP models. While the DIP model 
permits incumbent directors to remain in office and operate the companies during the time 
of rescue, the PIP model offers a contrasting approach, which replaces the incumbent 
directors with outsider insolvency practitioners (IPs) who take the role of running the 
company business and conducting rescue procedures. There is the existence of defects 
inherent in both models. If the DIP model invites the directors’ bias of favouring rescue 
over other better options, the PIP encounters the shortcomings of efficiency as IPs need 
time to be familiar with running the company business and there is a likelihood of non-
cooperation of the directors upon being removed from office. Bearing features of the both 
DIP and PIP models, the hybrid model can be a solution to overcome the defects of the 
two models insofar as it allows the company directors to stay in the management and 
contribute their expertise to rescuing the company, yet the abuse of their power will be 
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controlled through the IP’s supervision. As examined, there is a great degree of 
divergence in applying these models in the rescue procedures under rescue laws of 
different countries. For example, the Chapter 11 of the United States law famously 
features a procedure using the DIP model, Canada and Vietnam have incorporated the 
hybrid model under their rescue law, while the UK law has the most diverse approach by 
adopting all three models in three different rescue procedures. 
 Establishing the benchmarks for evaluating the effectiveness of the rescue 
law 
In evaluating the effectiveness of these models, based on the existing literature, 
the thesis establishes a set of four benchmarks, namely time and cost, expertise, creditor’s 
participation and abuse management. These benchmarks are expressed as follows: time 
and cost requires rescue to be carried out in a timely and economical fashion; expertise 
demands a sufficient degree of expertise of those who take the role of rescue 
administration to be contributed in administering the rescue procedure; creditor 
participation examines the extent to which creditors are incentivised to participate in 
rescue to provide finance for implementing a rescue plan; and abuse management 
evaluates whether a rescue law could provide a sufficient mechanism to tackle potential 
abuse arising in a rescue procedure. These benchmarks are not only used to examine the 
effectiveness of the rescue law in each selected jurisdiction but also become criteria 
guiding the comparison of the rescue laws of the selected countries to induce the best 
practices among them.  
Case study of the rescue laws in UK, Canada, and Vietnam 
Differences in adopting rescue models under rescue laws in the three countries 
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 As theoretically examined, there are three models of administrative control of 
rescue procedure and the main actors participating in administrative control of the 
procedure are the company’s director, the IPs, the court and the creditors. There is a 
degree of divergence of approaches to selecting and applying these models in insolvency 
legislation as well as the participation of main actors in these models under laws in 
different countries. The examination into the rescue laws of the UK, Canada and Vietnam 
has provided a very good example of this. These countries have incorporated different 
rescue models in their legislation and the legislative policies have been shaped by unique 
historical background and distinct societal conditions in which the laws have operated. 
Of the selected jurisdictions, the UK has the most diverse approach to corporate 
rescue which features the availability of the three rescue procedures, namely the 
administration and the creditor voluntary arrangement (CVA) under the Insolvency Act 
1986 and the Scheme of Arrangement (SA) under the Companies Act 2006. These 
procedures are a full reflection of all the examined models. The administration follows 
the PIP model under which an administrator will replace the company directors to run the 
business and supervise the procedure. The SA follows the DIP model that allows directors 
to retain their managerial power and operate the company business, whereas the CVA is 
an exemplification of the hybrid model that permits the directors to run the company 
under the oversight of the IPs. This legislative policy associated with the UK’s attempt to 
offer an insolvent company a degree of flexibility in choosing suitable rescue procedures 
to settle its financial difficulty. Among these procedures, the administration appears to be 
the most popular procedure in the UK. The popularity of this procedure can be explained 
by the most expeditious route it provides for settling the financial affairs of an insolvent 
company. Apart from this, there has been a hostile attitude towards insolvency that 
attributes the business failure to the mismanagement of directors, which results in the 
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favourability of the administration under which the directors are replaced by the 
administrator. In addition, IP has been a well-established profession and contributed 
greatly to the effectiveness of the UK insolvency procedure and this provides an incentive 
for pursuing the policy of replacing the incumbent management team with professional 
outsiders to manage the company business and control the rescue procedure.  
Insolvency law in Canada provides for two rescue procedures under the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and the Companies Creditor Arrangement Act 
(CCAA) and both of them follow the hybrid model that allows the company directors to 
run the company business under the supervision of a trustee or a monitor. While the BIA 
has the feature of a rule-based procedure, which is used for rescuing small companies, the 
CCAA is a court-based procedure which provides a great degree of flexibility for rescuing 
companies with a complex structure of debts. The selection of this model by Canadian 
law has been historically examined with the influence of the UK and US on the 
development of insolvency law in the country. Under the influence of UK law, Canada 
initially allowed the practice of using trust deeds to allow the creditors to participate in 
restructuring debts of the debtor; however, this practice was abolished due to the 
requirement for their shares to be listed in the US stock market. When the trust deed was 
no longer in use, Canada enacted the first rescue legislation, the CCAA which permitted 
debtor companies to restructure their debts by themselves. A special feature of Canadian 
rescue law is that courts play an important role in shaping the legislative policies. In the 
absence of legislative responses to the corporate failure in the 1980s, Canadian courts 
revived the application of the CCAA by adopting the liberal interpretation to provide 
clarification to the basic structure of the statute to deal with the insolvency of companies 
on a case-by-case basis. The effectiveness of the CCAA, which is largely attributed to the 
flexibility conferred by the court’s involvement is the explanation for the survival of the 
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CCAA after the Canadian legislatures attempted to replace it with the current BIA 
multiple times. As a result of this, there has been an existence of two rescue procedures 
in Canada. 
As for the case of Vietnam, the transplantation of Western insolvency laws into 
its domestic legislation without considering the compatibility between the transplanted 
law and the local conditions rendered two pieces of legislation in 1993 and 2004 
inapplicable products. The resistance of Vietnamese local conditions dictated by 
traditional values and beliefs coupled with the influence of socialism has been the factors 
that contribute to the failure of the two legislations. Although the first insolvency 
legislation was enacted in the 1990s, corporate rescue has only gained legislative 
recognition by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Law 2014 (BL2014). Under this 
legislation, Vietnam adopts a single rescue procedure following the hybrid model under 
which the company directors a play role of running the company business under the 
oversight of IPs and court. The BL2014 makes the participation of IPs mandatory in 
insolvency, resulting in the creation of the IP profession in Vietnam. Within the hybrid 
model, IPs will participate in the rescue along with the courts to supervise the company 
director’s activities. The enactment of the BL2014 has demanded Vietnam to sufficiently 
facilitate and develop market institutions such as IPs as well as improving judicial 
capacities of insolvency judges to support the implementation of the legislation. 
Similarities between rescue laws of the selected jurisdictions 
Firstly, the rescue laws of the three countries share a striking similarity in terms 
of defining the rescue objective. Notwithstanding the philosophical change from 
liquidation towards corporate rehabilitation which leads to the legislative focus on rescue 
objective, rescue cannot be a priority if it cannot produce a better result for the creditors 
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than other options. Following this, all selected jurisdictions pursue the policy of ‘business 
rescue’ instead of ‘company rescue’, which means that only the going concern value of 
the company business will be preserved instead of keeping a company alive as a whole 
with the same ownership. Therefore, rescue attempts are more likely to involve a sale of 
companies to other owners, as indicated in the examination of the laws of the UK and 
Canada. The second similarity is the participation of IPs in the rescue procedures. IPs 
undeniably play an important role in delivering the effectiveness of a rescue law 
regardless of rescue models followed by legislation. Acting as an intermediary party, they 
contribute to the effectiveness of a rescue procedure by not only supporting the company 
in the time of crisis but also assisting the courts in making informed decisions. Even 
where they do not officially take part in the rescue procedure, such as under the UK 
Scheme of Arrangement, they still have their unofficial involvement through giving the 
company professional advices on negotiating with creditors and drafting rescue 
proposals. 
The best practices emerging from the rescue laws in the three countries 
The comparison on rescue law of the three countries not only highlights the best 
practice emerging from their laws but also demonstrates how the four benchmarks for 
evaluating the effectiveness are performed under the rescue laws of the selected 
jurisdictions. Regarding time and cost, the UK administration and the Canadian BIA 
appears to be two expeditious routes for dealing with corporate rescue by requiring rescue 
proposals to be drafted and submitted within a short period of time. However, the 
examination of other procedures such as the CCAA and the SA affirms the fact that 
complicated cases of rescue demand more time and cost to be invested as compared to 
the simple ones. Though Vietnam provides for a more lengthy procedure compared to 
those in the UK and Canadian, offering insolvent companies with a duration of three 
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months to initiate informal rescue actions before entering into formal procedure should 
be appreciated as a good practice of Vietnamese rescue law. Constraining the time for 
initiating rescue procedures to an appropriate period of time also contributes to the 
reduction of cost. Along with this, the issue of determining proper remuneration for IPs 
appears to be equally important as this payment accounts for a part of creditor recovery. 
In this regard, the best practice is to allow creditors to decide this fee as under the laws of 
the UK and Vietnam because creditors are the party who decides the approval of the plan. 
For the three remaining benchmarks, Canada appears to be the best performer 
among the selected jurisdictions. In particular, the benchmark of expertise demands 
expertise to be contributed not only to running the company business but also controlling 
the rescue procedure. Canadian law satisfies this criterion with the practice of appointing 
the Chief of Restructuring Officer to assist the company directors in operating the 
company, and at the same time, bringing other IPs such as trustee and monitor to assist 
the court in supervising the rescue procedure. Furthermore, the requirement for IPs to 
practice their profession in Canada is more rigorous than those in the UK and Vietnam, 
including important aspects of mandatory education, training and assessment. As for 
creditor participation, Canadian law also appears to be a more advanced practice than 
those of UK and Vietnam, with the availability of a moratorium (a stay of proceedings) 
to prevent creditors from enforcing debts against the company and the recognition of the 
super-priority of the rescue finance. For the final benchmark of abuse management, 
Canadian law also has a more satisfactory response to the issue of pre-packaged sales 
with courts having the role to decide the matter on a case-by-case basis, which runs in 
contrast to the UK approach of granting the administrator a wide latitude of discretion to 
approve a pre-packaged administration without consulting creditors, which can give rise 
to potential abuse. 
Chapter Eight – Conclusions and Recommendations  
311  
However, this conclusion does not mean a hybrid model for rescue like the one of 
Canada, will always produce a higher degree of effectiveness than the others. For 
example, although Vietnam law selects the hybrid model, it cannot deliver the same level 
of effectiveness as the Canadian law does for failing to satisfy the evaluation benchmarks. 
The findings, therefore, indicate that regardless of the model followed, in pursuing 
effectiveness, a rescue law should place a balance in performing the mentioned 
benchmarks.  
8.3 Recommendations 
There are several recommendations the thesis would like to make as follows.  
First, the examination of corporate rescue law of a country should be linked to the 
contextual background of legal history development and societal conditions to identify 
influential factors that shape the legislative policies. This is particularly true for a 
comparative study of corporate rescue laws under which the compared countries originate 
from different legal cultures such as the UK, Canada and Vietnam. Even for the countries 
coming from the same legal culture such as the UK and Canada, a historical approach to 
their legal development has revealed how their legislative policies on insolvency and 
corporate rescue have been designed differently due to the distinct cultural features of 
each country. The approach to societal context allows comparative legal research to fully 
identify and justify the differences in the laws of different jurisdictions. 
Second, following the first recommendation, Vietnam should take into 
consideration the difference between the legal culture, where its rescue law has operated 
and those in the UK and Canada before deciding to apply the advanced practices drawn 
from the laws of these jurisdictions. The first thing Vietnam should do is to develop 
marketing supporting institutions such as IPs and enhancing the judicial capacity to 
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support the implementation of the current legislation. When these institutions are fully 
developed, the country should further effort to enhance ‘the rule of law’ by encouraging 
the use of the legislation and minimising the state intervention in settling the insolvency 
affair of SOEs. Although traditional values act as a strong resistant factor that prevents 
the legislation from effectively operating in Vietnam, the thesis takes the view that so 
long as there is sufficient facilitation of insolvency supporting actors such as IPs and 
courts, the legislation will become an effective legal device and gain popular use. 
Third, different countries may have different approaches in choosing and adopting 
rescue models in their legislation. The availability of multiple rescue procedures, as 
exemplified by the case of the UK and Canada, can offer an insolvent company greater 
flexibility in choosing the one that suits it the best. However, this approach is not always 
a sound policy as an insolvent company has to spend time and effort in evaluating these 
procedures. In addition, time and cost can be duplicated in case the company elects to 
combine these procedures or switch among procedures. Rescue law of the UK is a very 
good example for this where a company has to combine the CVA or the SA with the 
administration in order to take advantage of the moratorium available only under the latter 
to stay creditor actions in drafting rescue plans. Therefore, if there is the availability of 
multiple procedures, a moratorium should be fully provided in each procedure to avoid 
unnecessary cost arising from switching or combing. 
Fourth, for the issue of evaluating the effectiveness of rescue law, time and cost 
appear to be the first consideration in evaluating a rescue law. However, this benchmark 
alone does not form a sufficient basis for evaluation of a rescue law because the amount 
of time and cost involved depends on the degree of complexity of a company. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that data for time and cost is not always available for an 
examination due to the confidential nature of rescue. With these reasons, the evaluation 
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of the effectiveness of a rescue law should rely on other benchmarks such as expertise, 
creditor participation and abuse management. Importantly, there must be a balance in the 
pursuit of the rescue law’s objectives following these benchmarks. 
Finally, the set of benchmarks developed in the thesis provides a critical basis to 
evaluate the effectiveness of rescue law. The results from assessing rescue laws of the 
UK, Canada and Vietnam in this thesis suggest that these benchmarks can be used for 
examining the effectiveness of rescue law in other jurisdictions.  
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